"Anatomy of a Division" is not a unit history so much as a collection of tactical/operational case studies that add up to one. The book takes a hard and comprehensive look at the evolution of air cavalry, development of machinery and doctrine, and its implementation and practice in the field.
Stanton's writing style is strictly "mil-speak," barely embellishing after-action reports with a brush of basic prose. Not surprising, as the author was a former captain in the 82nd Airborne and served in Vietnam with Special Forces. You read this book for the details it has to offer, otherwise it will be a boring slog.
Using the helicopter in battle allowed the army to ignore terrain, shifting battalions of the First Cav anywhere they was needed, jungle and mountains be damned. This made the Cav a powerful weapon in the Vietnam War, but to what end? Stanton recites the division's success in terms of enemy killed and weapons seized. Its units win every fight, even when they almost lose.
He analyzes with First Cav's performance within the framework of conventional war. Yes, there were times when the Cav had to fight larger North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong formations. But much of the fight was also normal counter-insurgency, which demands more static placement of units that can protect the local civilians from the guerillas. Stanton argues that the Cav was successful in this mission, but military critics may beg to differ. (That is all "food for thought" in other works.)
Stanton takes the reader through all of First Cav's capabilities--air assault, sustained pursuit, clearing operations, flexible response, cavalry raid, and exploitation, grounding each mission with an operational example. Stanton even tosses in a chapter on division structure, explaining how all the parts are supposed to work together, as well as a chapter looking at division performance (lack of fraggings and war crimes notable).
He ends his story with the sad final transition of the Cav from an airmobile to an armor division, following a botched transition to a mixed force of armor and airmobile. The concept of air cavalry was later embodied in the 101st Air Assault division. But the air cavalry combat brigade, a corps-based asset, falls by the wayside untried and badly tested.
I give this book a two-star rating. I would have given it three if Stanton had a better writing style. Casual readers of military history will be disappointed by the matter-of-fact presentation of battle as ground taken, enemy killed, with names and dates to frame the actions. But I must stress that it's the seemingly boring details that matter. First Cav was built to implement the Army's vision of air mobility in combat. The nuts and bolts of making an idea work is the meat of the book, no matter how dry the explanation. That is the reason for reading it. The pros will take it seriously. The amateurs will read something else.