Truman and the Bomb: The Untold Story

by D.M. Giangreco, John Kuehn (Foreword)

Many myths have grown up around President Harry S. Truman’s decision to use nuclear weapons against Imperial Japan. In destroying these myths, Truman and the Bomb will discomfort both Truman’s critics and his supporters, and force historians to reexamine what they think they know about the end of the Pacific War.

Myth: Truman didn’t know of the atomic bomb’s development before he became president. Fact: Truman’s knowledge of the bomb is revealed in his own carefully worded letters to a Senate colleague and correspondence between the army officers assigned to his Senate investigating committee.

Myth: The huge casualty estimates cited by Truman and Secretary of War Henry Stimson were a postwar creation devised to hide their guilt for killing thousands of defenseless civilians. Fact: The flagrantly misrepresented “low” numbers are based on narrow slices of highly qualified—and limited—U.S. Army projections printed in a variety of briefing documents and are not from the actual invasion planning against Japan.

Myth: Truman wanted to defeat Japan without any assistance from the Soviet Union and to freeze the USSR out of the postwar settlements. Fact: President Franklin D. Roosevelt and President Truman desperately wanted Stalin’s involvement in the bloody endgame of World War II.

Using previously unpublished material, D. M. Giangreco busts these myths and more. An award-winning historian and expert on Truman, Giangreco is perfectly situated to debunk the many deep-rooted falsehoods about the roles played by American, Soviet, and Japanese leaders during the end of the World War II in the Pacific. Truman and the Bomb, a concise yet comprehensive study of Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb, will prove to be a classic for studying presidential politics and influence on atomic warfare and its military and diplomatic components.

Making this book particularly valuable for professors and students as well as for military, diplomatic, and presidential historians and history buffs are extensive primary source materials, including the planned U.S. naval and air operations in support of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. These documents support Giangreco’s arguments while enabling the reader to enter the mindsets of Truman and his administration as well as the war’s key Allied participants.
 

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Politics, Audiobook, War, Us Presidents

280 pages, Hardcover

First published August 1, 2023

About the author

D. M. Giangreco served at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for more than 20 years as an editor at Military Review, followed by work in the Foreign Military Studies Office. An award-winning author of thirteen books on military and sociopolitical subjects, he has also written extensively for numerous national and international publications and news agencies.

Reviews

[Phillip Welshans · Rating 3 out of 5]

On the whole, I liked this book and think that it will prove to be a useful addition to the debate over whether Truman really did need to use nuclear weapons on Japan at the end of WW2. Giangreco uses recently developed primary resources as powerful evidence against the revisionist argument that Truman largely invented the massive casualty estimates for the coming invasion of the Japanese Home Islands after the fact to justify his decision. Moreover, these resources show that the idea of "atomic diplomacy", the use of nuclear weapons to keep the Soviet Union from invading Manchuria and to send a diplomatic message to Moscow regarding American military might, is wrong.

The actual text of the book is only about 120 pages in total, but it's very dense and Giangreco gives a deep treatment of the primary documents he's relying on. The back half of the book are a series of appendices of some of these documents, as well as other reports or memos from government and non-governmental officials pointing to the widespread belief in the military and civilian government that any invasion of Japan would be very costly in American lives and treasure, and that it was actually to America's benefit if Stalin could commit to the Soviets invading Manchuria after German's defeat.

However, I do have some quibbles with the book. First, it reads more like a series of pre-existing shorter papers that were compiled into a book. Giangreco uses the same quotations over and over again in different chapters, which is a bit odd. And there's not as cogent a flow among all the chapters as you'd expect from a singularly told narrative. One feels like each chapter was at some point a much longer paper that's been pruned down to fit into the book. The book could have been longer and more integrated in its connections between chapters without making it unwieldy (does the world need another 800 page book about WW2? No, is my definitive answer).

Additionally, the book could have better edited. There are numerous typos and obviously omitted words from sentences, which is disappointing to see coming from an imprint of an academic publisher (in this case an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press).

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a full 5-star book. It is in the same vein as Richard Frank’s “Downfall” and Marc Gallicchio’s “Unconditional” and moves the ball forward in some specific new ways.

One of them is on the casualty estimates issue for an invasion of Japan, which is the primary focus of this book. Giangreco details how the revisionists are wrong in misinterpretation and non-contextualization of military staff planning reports. He also provides information about efforts I never knew about (there will be lots of stuff hidden behind the spoiler alerts) about how, by late summer 1944, we have specific programs within Lend-Lease to build up Soviet supplies in eastern Siberia for an invasion of Manchuria, training of Soviet sailors to use former U.S. ships, and how serious the work was at Yalta and Potsdam to make sure the USSR entered the war in 1945, and had more than just a lower-level diversionary attack when it did.

A secondary thesis is that Truman knew more about the bombs, and the whole Manhattan Engineering Project, before becoming president, or even before becoming vice-president, than the “textus receptus” version of this part of the story has held in the past. One moderately indiscreet letter in the summer of 1943 shows this. But, how much more Truman knew remains lost to the sands of time.

OK, much of the details will be hidden behind spoiler alerts, with a synopsis before them.

Prologue: Truman talked extensively with Herbert Hoover. Got a report from him, with casualty estimates twice as high as the military's, and they had a back-and-forth after that. ... Joins Frank and Gallicchio in calling out Kai Bird and Richard Sherwin of "American Prometheus," esp. Bird individually, as well as Alperovitz.

Chapter 1: Truman knew more before he became Veep than he let on.

Chapter 2: I had never before even heard of Project Milepost and Project Hula, a special parallel to Lend-Lease and other aid designed to help the USSR in Manchuria after it invaded, on the first, and training Soviet sailors in Alaska, on the second. (Indeed, there is no Wikipedia page for Milepost, tho some information is subsumed on its Hula page, which is fairly extensive, so I’m not alone!)

Chapter 3: Less directly connected, but important backgrounding. It’s about both FDR and Truman dealing with Stalin over Poland.

Chapter 4: Truman takes over. Churchill, before falling, tries to get Truman to keep more US forces in the ETO. But Truman, knowing the inexorable timetable, turns him down forcefully.

Chapter 5: Giangreco notes that intraservice and interservice June 1945 casualty estimates NOT shown to Truman but often cited by revisionists had several flaws.

Chapter 6: A brief look at the Potsdam Conference and what was wrapped up there.

Then? 40 percent of the body text is appendices, followed by EXTENSIVE footnotes. Giangreco has left NO stone unturned and crushes Alperowitz, Bird, Sherwin, Barton Bernstein and other revisionists. And? Crushed they are.

And, it's spoiler alert from here on out, with expanded information on all of the above.

Prologue: Truman talked extensively with Herbert Hoover. Got a report from him, with casualty estimates twice as high as the military's, and they had a back-and-forth after that. He was no naif after becoming president. And Giangreco argues he wasn't before.

From this and military reports, Truman talked with SoW Stimson, undersecretary to the SoS Joe Grew, former SoS Hull and Fred Vinson, then head of the Office of War Mobilization. Note Gallichio's talking about Stimson and Grew and other old hand Republicans wanting him to drop unconditional surrender. Even Hoover was a naif about Hirohito.

The revisionists use a 1946 "Summary Report" on US strategic bombing, which said the war would have ended by the end of the year due to conventional bombing, ignoring that that summary was in part military politics related to the eventual creation of the USAF. Casualties? Those were 3-month estimates, not totals.

Prince Fumimaro was sent as "special envoy" to Stalin, early summer 1945, to stall out the USSR. Japan knew what the breaking of the Neutrality Pact meant and likely had the 91st day marked.

Rightly notes that "bombs" plural were needed to hit Japan over the head hard enough. (Will see later if he specifically mentions if Japan realized the plutonium base of 2nd bomb and what that meant.)

Joins Frank and Gallicchio in calling out Kai Bird and Richard Sherwin of "American Prometheus," esp. Bird individually, as well as Alperovitz.

==

Chapter 1: Truman knew more before he became Veep than he let on. In a letter to a former Washington senator asking about Hanford in 1943, Truman speaks about a “secret weapon that will be a wonder” … and “I hope that it works.” Presumably Stimson was the one who read him in. Later, when sitting senators both on his committee and not asked about apparent waste at Hanford and Pasco, Truman wrote letters at various times designed to stop on Marshall’s desk or else go straight to Stimson, but in either case, written in a way to be politely rejected. Giangreco says this was deliberate. Why did Truman not say differently in his memoir? Giangreco speculates it might have felt too hard to set the record straight or else might have felt deceptive when he said so. Maybe national security reared up, too? Note: Truman wrote in the late 1950s, and contra Kennedy-Johnson myth, he was not broke at the time of presidential pensions being approved in 1958. He got a publisher’s advance equal to about $3M today, and had other assets. (Life Magazine paid $500K shortly after he left office.) Was he as rich as Hoover? Or as Ike after Ike’s presidency ended? No. But he wasn’t dirt poor or close to it.

Chapter 2: I had never before even heard of Project Milepost and Project Hula, a special parallel to Lend-Lease and other aid designed to help the USSR in Manchuria after it invaded, on the first, and training Soviet sailors in Alaska, on the second. (Indeed, there is no Wikipedia page for Milepost, tho some information is subsumed on its Hula page, which is fairly extensive, so I’m not alone!) This puts the lie to Truman using the bomb as shot across Stalin’s bow. Giangreco says this wasn’t more publicized at the time because of Soviet vulnerability at Vladivostok and fear of Japanese attacks on USSR-flagged US ships, or attacks on the Trans-Siberian Railroad's eastern end. The USSR had no desire to publicize it later; after attacks on Yalta, neither did the US. Milepost started in 1944, after Stalin confirmed, per earlier statement at Tehran, that he would enter the Pacific War. Hula was training of Soviet sailors, in Alaska, to run things like landing craft.

Chapter 3: Less directly connected, but important backgrounding. It’s about both FDR and Truman dealing with Stalin over Poland, and not only for FDR’s 1944 election but working to insure in 1945 that the US approved the UN.

Chapter 4: Truman takes over. Churchill, before falling, tries to get Truman to keep more US forces in the ETO. But Truman, knowing the inexorable timetable for Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, and even the build-up for Coronet, turns him down forcefully. It’s at this time that the US military realizes Japan has moved troops back from the Asian mainland, Truman gets Hoover’s higher-than-the-military casualty estimates and more. Hoover’s estimates, as Truman and those he shared them with knew, would eat up the entire next 12 months’ expanded draft call-ups.

Chapter 5: Giangreco notes that intraservice and interservice June 1945 casualty estimates NOT shown to Truman but often cited by revisionists had several flaws. The first of these is not yet knowing that Japan was already reinforcing Kyushu. The second is that, in the field, the Army side chose Leyte, not Okinawa, as a basis for Olympic casualty estimates.
Giangreco also cites Marshall noting that air power alone didn’t knock Germany out. (And, for the last year of the war, Germany was semi-blockaded, too.)

Chapter 6: A brief look at the Potsdam Conference and what was wrapped up there, even if we don’t know details, with a final eye to refuting the revisionists on casualty estimates by Truman, Marshall, et al.

Then? 40 percent of the body text is appendices, followed by EXTENSIVE footnotes. Giangreco has left NO stone unturned and crushes Alperowitz, Bird, Sherwin, Barton Bernstein and other revisionists. And? Crushed they are.

Appendix B? First two pages of Hoover’s letter to Truman.

Appendix C? Guest essay by Michael Kort. He notes that revisionism, specifically with the claim that not only were the bombs unnecessary, but that Truman was firing a shot across the bow of Stalin, started in 1946. Kort does leave out Frank’s estimates from “Downfall” that even if Japan HAD surrendered by the end of 1945 without the bombs, the civilian casualties in Japan alone would have exceeded those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Civilian casualties in Japanese occupied territories plus military casualties of all warring nations would probably have been 2-3x Japanese civilian casualties. Distinguishes between Alperovitz and “moderate revisionists” who accept that Truman used the bomb at least primarily for his stated reasons but that he was still wrong on casualties and on the idea that Japan wouldn’t surrender before 1946 without the bombs. Next, he notes that modern Japanese historians have rejected Western revisionists on the idea of unconditional surrender extending the war. (This also ignores the fact that the eventual surrender was NOT unconditional, that the Australian government was pissed that Hirohito wouldn’t hang, and that a fair amount of the Imperial house wanted him to abdicate to Akihito under a regency. [Dugout Doug liked being an American shogun too much for that to ever happen.])

Appendix D: Manhattan Project timeline

E: Letter from Truman Comm military aide Gen. Frank Lowe to Gen. Harry Vaughn, secondary aide, and to Truman, in 1950, mentions the three of them talking about “fissuring of the atom” already in 1942.

F. April 26, 1945 letter from Stimson to Truman asking for meeting.

G. U.S. Navy ships transferred to USSR under Project Hula, itemized.

H. Stalin-Churchill-Roosevelt agreement for USSR to enter war, detailing land to be given to USSR

I. July 2 letter by Stimson “Proposal for Japan”

J. Dept of War proposal for increasing study of likely US casualties

K. Notes on casualties discussion from June 18 meeting of Truman with Joint Chiefs. Notes weather-related effect of delaying Olympic until after Nov. 1. Unspoken but in background was surely fear that Russia wouldn’t be ready before then either. As part of discussion, USAAF Gen. Ira Eaker cites Hap Arnold saying that airbases on Kyushu would be key to any blockade, undercutting revisionists that a blockade would work just fine without even Olympic. Other thoughts are that a blockade would need 18 months to really work. See my notes about Appendix C.

L. Gen. Thomas Hardy, for Truman, writing letter authorizing use of bombs.

M. Cover letter for Truman’s bombs press release, written at Potsdam.

N. Potsdam Declaration.

O. Chip Bohlen’s notes from Truman-Stalin meeting at Potsdam July 17. Interesting side note: Stalin was apparently already making noise about Italian colonies then. (For non-skeptical leftists, he eventually tried to gain a protectorate over Libya and was refused. Outside the scope of Potsdam, he also, around the time of the Marshall Program, tried to pressure Turkey, neutral throughout WWII, into surrendering Turkish Armenia.) Franco also raised by Stalin. Both S and T discuss British election.

P. Tripartite US-UK-USSR chiefs of staff meeting July 26. Zones of operation for various land, sea and air sectors discussed.

Q. Discussion of US air and sea support for Russian invasion of Manchuria. Originally this was defensive and discussions started in 1943.

R. Log of Truman’s trip to Potsdam with July 18 meeting with Stimson et al discussing Trinity Site.

[D. M. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Reviewer Phillip Welshans wrote a fine, perceptive review for Goodreads, but I, the author, have a few brief clarifications for some of his points:

1 - "Giangreco uses the same quotations over and over again in different chapters, which is a bit odd."

Potomac Books is an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press and this work was produced with an eye towards classroom use. From long experience I've found that educators very frequently assign specific chapters of my books rather than the complete works. With this in mind, Truman and The Bomb was written with relatively short "stand alone" chapters so that students would be provided a higher degree of context when select chapters are assigned. Educators are also provided with an unusually large number of appendices to draw to their students' attention.

2 - "The book could have [been] better edited. There are numerous typos and obviously omitted words from sentences."

A small irony here is that the reviewer's criticism itself displays a dropped word that I've kindly inserted within brackets. As for typos, I've seen some but the number flagged for correction in the second printing is not particularly different from what I regularly come across in first printings. That said, I hate to see ANY.

As far as dropped words are concerned, yes there are a very considerable number of them. Only a very, very few, however, are going to be modified in the next printing with the rest being left alone because they occur in quotes and especially document excerpts from cryptic military communications and operational orders. It was decided early on to reproduce this material clean with neither bracketed nor silent insertions. Probably the worst offender in this regard is Appendix Q - "Planned US Naval and Air Operations in Support of the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria" but, again, I've learned to be very cautious. Things like silent insertions and particularly the use of ellipse to alter the meaning of what Truman and his advisors said have occurred regularly during the highly contentious atomic bomb debate by critics of the decision to use atomic weapons. One will find only a very sparse use of bracketed insertions and ellipsis in this book.

3 - “The book could have been longer and more integrated in its connections between chapters without making it unwieldy.”

I’ve noted earlier why the chapters are structured the way they are, but my 552-page Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947, published by the Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, may be more to reviewer Welshans' and others' liking though it does have its negatives.

I have been playfully teased by colleagues from my years at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, over how I approached American and Japanese planning for the invasion of Japan. They have remarked that the US and Japanese war plans, respectively Olympic and Ketsu-Go, are given the somewhat dense "Staff College treatment" in Hell to Pay. I can only plead guilty. This level of examination had to be done, however, because there are so many deep-rooted misconceptions attached to this subject, particularly regarding the true state of the Imperial Army and Navy, as well as their air elements, and the basic realities "on the ground" in the invasion areas.

The end result is that, unlike my fairly engaging The Soldier From Independence: A Military Biography of Harry Truman (which came out at the essentially the same time as Hell to Pay, then yet again in paperback at the same time as Hell to Pay’s current Expanded Edition was published), Hell to Pay is indeed impossibly dense but has nevertheless gone through five printings. So while I’ve also been accused -- with clear justification -- of writing the book like a US Army staff study, the subject matter necessitated this type of treatment.

The result is that reading Hell to Pay is a little like walking on one’s knees through mud, yet the book's upside is that it has proven to be an effective tool for fighting insomnia. And, thankfully, the feared lawsuits from drivers who fell asleep at the wheel while listening to the audio book never materialized. So perhaps you might like reading Hell to Pay if you desire a more robust look at the subject. Just don’t do so if you plan to be operating heavy machinery.

[Thomas Green]

A historical legal brief supporting the 'orthodox' understanding of the use of the atomic bomb, the motivation was to shorten the war and save lives. I don't know why the 'revisionists' and 'orthodox' camp are so rigid in their positions - I think the orthodox was the primary reason, but also in August 1945 we knew that Russian occupation in Europe was going to be a problem, and using the bomb to shorten the war to keep them out of it, and deprive them of the spoils of war in Asia is a good motivation as well. I like the research, use of source documents, and details on our support of a Russian front in Manchuria,etc. We were training the Soviets on US equipment in Alaska, wow, who knew. Author does a good job in intimating that Truman knew more about the bomb when he was VP and maybe even as a Senator than commonly understood.

[Erwin · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the almost neverending debate on why America chose to drop the atomic bomb on Japan... the author writes the case that Truman did so specifically to save American lives and uses supporting documents to prove his case from many many sources.
This is really a large essay and the second part of the book includes Appendix after Appendix to explain or document the various arguments that are being addressed in the overall book.

[Keith Kelley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall good, hard to tell the degree to which evidence and arguments are omitted as always, but seems to address many of the most common claims that I've heard in passing, then again, I already tended to agree with the premise, so it can be hard to tell.

[Hope · Rating 4 out of 5]

this was definitely written by a military historian lol

[Regan Hess · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is more of a cirtique of previously published historical accounts of what Truman knew, when he knew it, and what his motivation was. The author makes solid arguments. See also: Killing the Rising Sun: How America Vanquished World War II Japan.