Imperien: Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten

by Herfried Münkler

Imperien seien Relikte der Vergangenheit, glaubte man bis vor kurzem. Umso bestürzter waren die Europäer, als die USA ihre Vormachtstellung offen demonstrierten. Plötzlich stellen sich drängende Fragen: Wodurch zeichnen sich Imperien aus? Welche Risiken birgt eine imperiale Ordnung? Und welche Chancen bietet sie? Herfried Münkler zeigt, wie Imperien für Stabilität sorgen und welche Gefahren ihnen drohen, wenn sie ihre Kräfte überdehnen.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, German Literature, War, Military Fiction, Political Science

336 pages, Paperback

Published January 1, 2007

About the author

Herfried Münkler is a German political scientist. He is a Professor of Political Theory at Humboldt University in Berlin. Münkler is a regular commentator on global affairs in the German-language media and author of numerous books on the history of political ideas (German: Ideengeschichte), on state-building and on the theory of war, such as "Machiavelli" (1982), "Gewalt und Ordnung" (1992), "The New Wars" (orig. 2002) and "Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States" (orig. 2005). In 2009 Münkler was awarded the Leipzig Book Fair Prize in the category "Non-fiction" for Die Deutschen und ihre Mythen (engl. "the Germans and their myths").

Reviews

[Helen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This 2005 book seems to be addressed to fellow-Europeans, calling on them (or rather, their leadership) to unite and take on more of the qualities of empire, in order to counter the influence of the United States, which the author regards as a global empire. The idea being that otherwise, European countries will have little to no say about external security concerns, acting together to resolve issues in the continents potentially unstable periphery etc. The author was correct in locating the source of Europe's future problems within an arc stretching from Belarus through Ukraine into the Mid-East and across North Africa. The problems have in fact since arisen in these areas but usually there was no concerted response from the EU although NATO or at least the US (still) fights ISIS in Syria, a coalition led by the US bombed Libya which led to the fall of Qaddafi although Libya has had governance problems ever since. Europe has tried to act collectively with respect to the migrant issue but the issue has seemingly burned the unity of the continent, with many states strictly closing their borders, while others such as Italy, Greece and Spain have no choice but to accept thousands of migrants arriving by sea. Meanwhile, the UK exited the EU largely because it wished to pursue an independent policy with respect to migrants. Unfortunately, the migrant issue stems mostly from the Mid-East wars, as well as the effects of environmental problems that have made it impossible for millions of people from Afghanistan to Syria, to North Africa and many areas in sub-Saharan Africa, to remain in their home countries. Conflict, crime, and environmental catastrophe are also pushing thousands of migrants into the United States. The rich developed countries of Europe and North America have thus become magnets for hundreds of thousands of desperate migrants, most of whom don't share the language or culture of the country they are migrating to. The effort to acculturate, or deal with, the flood of migrants has absorbed the money and efforts of European countries (as well as many of the United States) and demographically transformed to lesser or greater extent the industrialized, rich North.

The book actually hardly touches on the issue of migration - perhaps the migration to Europe was not underway in 2005 as much as it would be years later, after the Syrian Civil War created a tragic humanitarian crisis, and migrants generally began moving out of the Mid-East toward Europe. The book instead compares the rise and fall of empires by typology (sea vs. land vs steppe empires) and across time, from the earliest empires such as that of ancient Athens and the Han Empire in China. It is interesting that patterns of development and decay can be discerned across all empires, although some empires such as the Han morphed into long-lasting civilizations that underwent numerous political changes yet remain fundamentally culturally and linguistically intact. The author discusses the role of soft power (cultural influence) vs hard power (the extent of military influence via bases, air and space power, naval power) in the context of the hegemonic United States (as he and many other observes have seen it since the fall of the USSR). The book is quite interesting, easy to read, written by an obviously erudite author who has clearly thought a great deal about patterns and outcomes of empire and empire-building worldwide. I would recommend it to anyone interested in reading a comparative study of empires, from antiquity to the present era.

Here are the quotes, which I shall try to paraphrase for brevity's sake.

From the "Preface:" "The anti-imperial trend...is directed against US supremacy and claims to dominance..." "...it is a long time since the functions and demands of an empire have been ...thought through." "Empires...see themselves as creators and guarantors of an order that ultimately depends on them and that they must defend against the outbreak of chaos..." "...the imperial mission...represents a fundamental justification for world empire...[be it] to spread civilization, establish a worldwide socialist order, defend human rights or promote democracy."

From Chapter 1, "What is an Empire?" "...NATO ... in the 1990s transformed...from an alliance based on consultation into an instrument of US control over Europe." "Empires have no neighbors which they recognize as equal, that is, as possessing equal rights..." "...the central power is under an evident compulsion to intervene politically and militarily within the imperial 'world' it dominates..." "...the Athenians spoke of political credibility, but their words and deeds suggested a loss of any sense of obligation to their allies...With its disappearance, Athenian hegemony turned into empire..."

From Chapter 2, "Empire, Imperialism and Hegemony: A Necessary Distinction" "...capital manipulated public opinion in its efforts to persuade the state to open up ... lucrative investment opportunities abroad...it aroused nationalist instincts and stirred up a pro-imperialist mood..." "For imperialism theory, these ....spaces [into which empires were expanding] were...peripheral to the issue of the reformability of capitalism and the nature of its strengths and weaknesses." "...in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century... ....the Tsarist empire had to rely on imports of capital, and its changing alliances...the switch from Germany to France at the end of the 1880s...were closely bound up with the loan agreements that Russia had to make in order to modernize its infrastructure and army and to build up its industry." "...since the time of Peter the Great, the tsars largely fell back on non-Russians to administer their huge empire. Germans played a prominent role ...not only the Baltic German nobility, which came under tsarist rule with the expansion of the early eighteenth century and enjoyed...special privileges, but also officers and administrators recruited in Germany itself. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some 18 per cent of senior officials in Russia were of German origin, and by the turn of the twentieth century the proportion [was] ...probably...even higher." "...at the heart of the empire, In Madrid, ...the Bourbon reforms sought to contain Creole influence and ...increase the weight of European Spaniards in the New World." "The economic agreements [the British empire] forced on dependent countries did not lead to a strengthening and liberalization of the political order, but rather to its ...weakening and ...breakdown." "[because of delays in debt repayments and threats to the security of investments] ..a stark choice confronted the [US and European] ... powers which ...had refrained ...from direct political interference in the regions they had economically penetrated: either to withdraw from them altogether or to take over administrative and political control ." "...the decision ... to place their state apparatus, armed forces and fiscal revenue in the service of economic interests...marked the transition from capitalist to imperialist states." "...Karl Marx's "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louise Bonaparte (1852) [at the source of theories of imperialism]. [Marx] ... attributed the ...rise of Napoleon III to a 'class equipoise' in mid-nineteenth century France: the forces of progress and ...inertia held each other in a paralyzing balance, [so that]...the state rose autonomously above them...not subject to the directive force of a ruling class." "For Marx, Louis Bonaparte was...the leader of two sections of the lumpenproletariat: the parvenus and the thugs..." "...Louis Bonaparte built his regime on 'despotism at home and war abroad.' Imperialism and despotism were two sides of the same coin." "The emperor, the court and the generals made...efforts to achieve recognition of their preeminent role...in France...in Europe and the rest of the world...through new imperial adventures, from the consolidation of French rule in the Maghreb to the policy of support for the Hapsburg Maximilian in Mexico." "...the constant trading of economic capital for political prestige. This might ...have an economic payoff in the medium to longer term, but ...in the short term every [French citizen] ... would gain by participating in the glitter of empire." "In September 1870, following its defeat in [the Franco-Prussian War] ...France ...returned to the republican form of state, whereas the various princes and rulers of the German states, now unified under Prussia...placed themselves in early 1871 under the supreme power of the Kaiser." "The major continental powers...sought to increase their prestige by associating themselves with the ancient Roman empire." "...gain prestige through military victories over politically or economically inferior opponents. ...when the rivalry for power and standing breaks down...these normally asymmetrical imperial wars on the periphery turn into imperialist wars, in which the rivals are directly locked together in a struggle for hegemony." "In [the struggle of states for power and influence] ...the weighing of costs and benefits in the economic sense has less importance." "...it took nearly ...ten years [after 1991 - at the end of which the USSR ceased to exist even formally] ... for the players to understand the consequences of the end of bipolarity." "In the course of the eighteenth century, Britain came to hold the balance o power in... Europe." "...between 1815 (when the British ...checked its push into Canada) and 1917 (when it entered the First Wrold War) [US] ...forces never had to measure up to an equally powerful rival. The conflicts with Mexico and Spain in the middle and late nineteenth century were wars of imperial expansion against ...inferior enemies." "...marginal positions ...bright forth empires, because ... the absence of strong rivals and the high degree of time sovereignty that they they afford the powers located there." "...the Pacific coast represented ...a temporary halt for American expansion; the United States began its rise as a Pacific power at the end of the nineteenth century...entered a collision course with Japan." "The ... European powers...had to ...take possession of extra-European territories, so as to demonstrate their status as a world power ....Those ...which acquired no colonies or failed to expand territoriality in other ways came away empty-handed from the distribution of markets and sources of raw materials, and also lost weight and influence within the European system of powers." "...since the late eighteenth century, [hegemonic] ... orders have ...[existed] only temporarily ....and have had ...to transform themselves into imperial structures or ... go under in self-destructive wars." "...the United Sates has been an empire since President Carter launched his human rights offensive, but was a hegemon in the preceding period when it tolerated military dictatorships even within NATO."

From Chapter 3 "Steppe Empires, Sea Empires and Global Economies: A short typology of imperial rule" "Empires that rest only upon military or commercial surplus extraction and forgo ...investment in infrastructure are scarcely in a position ...to integrate their fringes into their 'world order,' although this is essential for their stability and long-term survival." "...Roman expansion...rested upon an association of aristocratic values with a universal ideology of world rule; travel by ship...a symbol for the victory of human intelligence over the stifling confinement to land that...characterized previous centuries." "In 1864, ...foreign minister, Count Gorchakov, wrote a circular justifying he Russian push to Tashkent, [stating that] ...Russia's situation was similar to that of all civilized countries facing wild, semi-nomadic peoples on their fringes which were forced against their will to take the path of expansion." "...the end of the Austro-Hungarian empire..." "...the Slav population...did not feel adequately represented and redoubled its efforts to gain independence. ...the division of the empire [in 1867 released] ...powerful centrifugal forces. The ...nations grew apart, the nobility...fell into great difficulties [because] of social-economic changes, the economic weakness of the Balkans led to an enduring budget deficit, and a sense that there was no way out...began to spread among the population. It was hoped that a great war might dispel the mood of ... despair, but then the dual monarchy collapsed as a result." "Spanish power [disintegrated] ... because it had no long-term solution to its financial problems." "...the takeover of Portugal in 1580 [prolonged Spain's imperial cycle]...the crown acquired an additional colonial empire. It now had the world's largest navy, and this allowed it ...to make up the losses it incurred through the secession of the Netherlands. In the eighty years of war to win back the renegade provinces...Spain [however, consumed] ... precious resources without achieving permanent victory." "...key to the success of the Augustan reforms was the creation of an administrative elite resistant to corruption." "The Augustan threshold...a set of far-reaching reforms through which en empire ends its phase of expansion and passes into the phase of ...long-term existence." "...the empire passed from an exploitative to a civilizing relationship between center and periphery." "...an independent bureaucracy...removed the administration of the empire from the arbitrariness of the Roman ...oligarchy, was followed by the gradual spread of civil rights from the enter to sections of the provincial population." "...[Spain's] demise as an empire ...due to the fact that the struggle for European supremacy stripped it of the resources that might otherwise have stood the imperial periphery in good stead ... its ...preoccupation with military power may...be explained by the constant outbreak of [hegemonic] ... wars." "The Petrine project...led to colonization of the center by the center, with the aim of expanding the ... periphery." "...military power ... the real foundation of the Ottoman empire: the ...janissaries, always ready for combat in their barracks...the basis for its superiority vis-a-vis the West. When ...innovations in weapons technology and military organization asserted themselves more strongly, the ...Ottoman empire became 'the sick man ...[of Europe]." "...the real weakness of the Ottoman empire was its lack of economic power, and the shift from nomadism to ...farming changed nothing in this respect." "...there was no active economic policy, nor any of the usual incentives for the development of an entrepreneurial class."

[Doa'a Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

ماذا نفكر حول عجلة القوّة والسيطرة بين الجماعات الانسانية في المناطق الجغرافية المختلفة؟
"منطق" السيادة الكونية يحتاج للدراسة والبحث لوضع أركانه وفقًا لكل المراحل التاريخية، والتي تغيرت معالمها بشكل اسرع في آخر قرنين من الزمان. كما نحتاج للبحث عن نقاط مشتركة بين اسباب صعود وهبوط القوى المختلفة، وخصوصيات الموقع الجغرافي وطرق التجارة وشكل العلاقات مع المناطق المجاورة..

يتحدث الكتاب بشكل مستفيض عن تفاصيل الامبراطوريات قديما وحتى حديثًا (ان صح إطلاق نفس المسمى)...
كتاب مهم جدا ويحاول الإجابة عن أسئلة صعبة ويضع إطار مناسب يحوي على تفاصيل في السياسة والاقتصاد والحرب والسلم...

[Leopold Benedict · Rating 2 out of 5]

This is an example of German academic style that I dislike: dull, pretentious and lacking substance. There were interesting bits and pieces here and there, but Münkler claims that this is a systematic, scientific analysis. Where is the method? He basically jumps from place to place and time to time and rambles about his own thoughts about the subject at hand, and calls that scientific method. I would be more sympathetic with this book, if it was not sold as science. Another problem that I have after reading this, is that it is still not clear what Münkler's argument is. The definition of empire remains vague, as does the application of the concept to the contemporary United States. In the end, I do believe that the subject is fascinating and worthy to be written about, but Münkler does not add much to the debate.

[Zare · Rating 4 out of 5]

I came across this book by accident. I was looking into a book about history of Hapsburg monarchy and I saw this book with pretty interesting title so I decided to buy them both.

First and foremost this is not an easy read - and I think it was not meant to be a popular read for everybody. It is densely written with a lot of foot-notes and references. It is a serious read and it may take you some time to go through it - but trust me when I tell you it is worth it.

I just read one of the comments on the book saying that author is off-target when it comes to United States. I think that (with all due respect) reader is completely off-target because this is not a book that is written to portray this or that state of modern times as an empire (last chapter shows as much) - author tries to explain that from beginning of time countries have tried to exert their power and might over the other countries - thus they became first hegemon's or what you might call primus-inter-pares in state alliances. But very rarely do they stay at that position of power. Why? Simple, because of two things - (a) when someone is enjoying privilege and higher status (how ever it is achieved - through valor and hard work or through not so noble ways) that breeds resentment in others especially if there is no common enemy or cause (this is something that is true for any sphere of human activity) and (b) that same privilege and higher status is something that nobody is willing to give up no matter the cost. This breeds hostility and this culminates in conflict.

Faced with possibility that others may unite against them hegemons feel need to grow and expand to avoid being completely dissolved. Their fighting and gaining more and more ground sets them on the path to the empire. Some succeed, some fail, some last for millennia but the point is that states will fight to expand their zone of influence until there is no longer point to grow - when borders of known world are conquered. When that point is reached empire needs to find the way to manage itself internally (don't you find it very easy to complaint on others and feel rather silly when there is no-one to complain about than you - same is with states, small or great - internal issues are always greater cause of concern than external issues).

This step is what author calls "The Augustan threshold". It marks the period of decline but if it is properly managed this decline can last very long and may not be decline at all but controlled fall that may provide other alleys and venues for the empire to prosper and survive.

But very rare are those that manage this.

So to wrap up my review - this book is not about naming names but about showing patterns in behavior of great states and how they embark on the path to empire not solely because they want but because natural order of things forces them to do that in order to survive. And if someone recognizes behavior of some countries while reading this book that just proves the authors point. Nature knows of no vacuum and there is no vacuum in the world of politics. Only thing required to have peace is to have balance and (near) equality present (full equality is rarely achievable and even then it is situation more akin to rivalry than camaraderie) - otherwise things may turn sour for everybody.

Recommended for anyone interested in politics and/or history.

[Victor Hernandez · Rating 1 out of 5]

Un libro de texto. Tiene conceptos interesantes, como el umbral augusteo, diferencia entre imperio y potencia hegemónica, etc, pero no tiene mucho método. Salta de un imperio a otro, dando pinceladas pero sin entrar en profundidad en cada cuestión. Se me hizo bastante tedioso por momentos y me faltó mucha sustancia en un tema tan importante como este para entender la geopolítica del mundo desde la Antigüedad hasta ahora.

[Samir Salifou · Rating 2 out of 5]

In Empires Herfried Münkler writes a comparative analysis about empires and their role in world politics. His analysis looks at the difference between modern empires and empires as far back as Rome and Mongolia. The author attempts to delineate between an empire and a hegemonic state. His analysis hints at the notion that the United States may fit the definition of a modern Empire but never explicitly comes to such a conclusion. Though his definition of “empire” was somewhat vague, I recognize the importance of the scholarship in this book.
Herfried Münkler conducts a qualitative analysis by taking a historical perspective on empires and their role in international relations. He starts by differentiating an empire from a hegemon, saying the latter is typically a state that has won supremacy over other states in an ongoing competition among equals, whereas empires are no longer competing, but are settled in their role of world dominance. This is an important distinction in his analysis, which leads him to ostensibly frame the United States as an empire.The author essentially lays out the question as to whether the United States’ position as the sole global superpower in a post Cold War world has caused it to be an empire with dominion over world affairs, or if it is still just a hegemon competing for global supremacy.
Ultimately it may be too soon to tell whether a post Cold War United States is an empire. Before this question is answered, the United States must first define how it wants to project its power across the globe. If the example of the 2003 Iraq War era of preemptive warfare is going to be the model then empire may well be the goal of American foreign policy. Yet if the post Obama doctrine of engaged collective action (such as in Libya, Iran, or Ukraine) sets a new precedence, than America will define itself as a hegemon among equals. President Obama said during a speech at West Point, “We cannot exempt ourselves from the rules that apply to everyone else … that’s why we form alliances – not only with governments, but with ordinary people.” If this doctrine prevails, then the claims of an American empire would fall short of Münkler’s definition.

[YvesL · Rating 3 out of 5]

How do empires get to exist, expand, collapse…. What an interesting topic, and even more so today with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The author is a German academician with an incredible erudition. The comparative analyses between empires (Greece, Rome, Spain, Austria-Hungary, USSR, USA, …) are compelling and one does learn a lot. Yet, overall, the book is quite a hard read and a bit frustrating. Too often the information is scattered over lengthy chapters and interminable sentences (Germanic style?). What a pity! A shorter version would have deserved 4 stars or more.

The subtitle "The logic of World Domination" gives a good idea of what the book is about. After discussing general notions (empires, imperialism, hegemony), Münkler goes on to identify the key elements used by empires as justification such as the "barbarian discourse" (inside the empire boundaries are the good guys living in order and peace, outside are the bad guys living in chaos), the sacred imperial mission, the preservation of prosperity, ethnographic justifications (races, religion, …). The last two chapters are about the overexpansion of empires, their defeat by weaker but motivated populations and the renaissance of empires in today's post-imperial age.

[Jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

An academic book that looks at the Imperial model and how it structures historic and future political and social behaviors. Its thesis is that historically most humans were organized within the structure of empire and that, whilst in the last decades this subject has been seen as negatively connotated and as not as relevant with the fall of 19th century empires and the end of the cold war, it will be making its comeback in future discourse.

Personally this book really effected my worldview and allowed me to explain and interpret differently many political trends and behaviors that have been happening currently. We live in very chaotic times and overview can be far-sought. Munkler provided me with many insights and ideas that pointed out my own ignorance on current political processes and I am very happy it did.

I would definitely recommend it to anyone who want gain some insight into the goings on of international behaviors. It reads away decently so i'd say its fit for use outside academia

[Henning Klank · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent

[Louis König · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ein Fest

[Jiro]

金融军事帝国

[Alan · Rating 2 out of 5]

A Eurocentric take on the old idea that America is an Empire, in both good and bad ways. Not many new ideas, not very interesting. Nice maps though.