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Doing without Concepts
Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework.
In Doing without Concepts , Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of
concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest.
In Doing without Concepts , Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of
concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest.
- GenresPhilosophyPsychology
296 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
4 people are currently reading
94 people want to read
About the author
Edouard Machery
12 books10 followersHe is a Distinguished Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (University of Pittsburgh-Carnegie Mellon University), and an Adjunct Research Professor in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by psychology and cognitive neuroscience with a special interest in concepts, moral psychology, the relevance of evolutionary biology for understanding cognition, modularity, the nature, origins, and ethical significance of prejudiced cognition, the foundation of statistics, and the methods of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He is also involved in the development of experimental philosophy, having published several noted articles in this field.
He published more than 100 articles and chapters on these topics in venues such as Analysis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Cognition, Mind & Language, Nous, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophy of Science. I am the author of Doing without Concepts (OUP, 2009) as well as the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (OUP, 2012), La Philosophie Expérimentale (Vuibert, 2012), Arguing about Human Nature (Routledge, 2013), and Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (Routledge, 2014). He have given more than 200 talks on my research throughout the world. I have been an associate editor of The European Journal for Philosophy of Science from 2009 to 2013 as well as the editor of the Naturalistic Philosophy section of Philosophy Compass since 2012.
He has been awarded the Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Award by the University of Pittsburgh in 2011 and the Stanton Prize by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2013; He was a Senior Fellow of the Korea Institute for Advanced Study in 2013 and the Clark Way Harrison Visiting Professor at Washington University in St. Louis in 2015. He was the Scots Philosophical Association Centenary Fellow at the University of Edinburgh in 2017 and I am a Regular Visiting Distinguished Professorship at Eidyn (Edinburgh). He also sit on the governing board of the Philosophy of Science Association and on the Lectures, Publications, and Research Committee of the American Philosophical Association. My work has been chronicled in The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education.
His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by psychology and cognitive neuroscience with a special interest in concepts, moral psychology, the relevance of evolutionary biology for understanding cognition, modularity, the nature, origins, and ethical significance of prejudiced cognition, the foundation of statistics, and the methods of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He is also involved in the development of experimental philosophy, having published several noted articles in this field.
He published more than 100 articles and chapters on these topics in venues such as Analysis, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Cognition, Mind & Language, Nous, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, and Philosophy of Science. I am the author of Doing without Concepts (OUP, 2009) as well as the editor of The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality (OUP, 2012), La Philosophie Expérimentale (Vuibert, 2012), Arguing about Human Nature (Routledge, 2013), and Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy (Routledge, 2014). He have given more than 200 talks on my research throughout the world. I have been an associate editor of The European Journal for Philosophy of Science from 2009 to 2013 as well as the editor of the Naturalistic Philosophy section of Philosophy Compass since 2012.
He has been awarded the Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Award by the University of Pittsburgh in 2011 and the Stanton Prize by the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in 2013; He was a Senior Fellow of the Korea Institute for Advanced Study in 2013 and the Clark Way Harrison Visiting Professor at Washington University in St. Louis in 2015. He was the Scots Philosophical Association Centenary Fellow at the University of Edinburgh in 2017 and I am a Regular Visiting Distinguished Professorship at Eidyn (Edinburgh). He also sit on the governing board of the Philosophy of Science Association and on the Lectures, Publications, and Research Committee of the American Philosophical Association. My work has been chronicled in The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education.
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November 3, 2022
O livro é uma referência para qualquer um interessado em entender o que são conceitos. Julgo que é especialmente importante para a filosofia, pois muito se fala sobre conceitos, mas pouco entendimento se estabelece sobre uma definição mais específica sobre eles.
Macherry defende a seguinte definição de CONCEITOS:
Conceitos, portanto, são psicologicamente compreendidos como aglomerados de conhecimento armazenados na memória de longo prazo. Toda vez que alguma atividade cognitiva superior é desempenhada, essa memória é acessada e o conteúdo (o aglomerado de conhecimento) é utilizado para alguma tarefa, como reconhecimento (isto é um cachorro ou um gato?), planejamento (devo comprar comida para o meu cachorro hoje ou amanhã?), inferência (Se faltar comida para o meu cachorro hoje, ele pode ficar muito incomodado e atrapalhar a minha noite de sono).
Com base nessa definição, apresenta-se as principais teorias sobre conceitos, na literatura científica: concepts as prototypes, concepts as exemplars and concepts as theories.
A conclusão de Machery é que conceitos não são um tipo natural unificado (a natural kind). Quando diferentes psicólogos estão utilizando diferentes definições sobre conceitos, eles estão, na verdade, estudando diferentes capacidades de processamento mental. Diferentes categorias de conceitos servem para diferentes tipos de categorias de objetos. Não sendo um fenômeno unificado, a noção de conceito deve ser abandonada do vocabulário científico (e filosófico) e deve-se destacar cada tipo de conhecimento armazenado na memória de longo prazo como um "tipo" de conceito. Essa tese é denominada de eliminativismo conceitual. Algo semelhante com o estudo científico sobre "memória", na qual não há um único tipo de memória, mas vários tipos específico de capacidades mentais que associamos a ela, como memória de curto prazo, memória de longo prazo, memória motora, memória semântica, memória biográfica etc.
(1) The best available evidence suggests that for each category of objects, and individual typically has several concepts, that is, again, several bodies of knowledge that are by default retrieved from long-term memory and used when he or she categorizes, reasons inductively or deductively, or makes analogies;
(2) Evidence strongly suggests that prototypes, exemplars, and theories are among the fundamental kinds of concept;
(3) Prototypes, exemplars, and theories are often used in distinct cognitive processes;
(4) The notion of concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it might prevent psychologists from correctly characterizing the nature of our knowledge in long-term memory and its use in cognitive processes (p. 54).
Macherry defende a seguinte definição de CONCEITOS:
Conceitos, portanto, são psicologicamente compreendidos como aglomerados de conhecimento armazenados na memória de longo prazo. Toda vez que alguma atividade cognitiva superior é desempenhada, essa memória é acessada e o conteúdo (o aglomerado de conhecimento) é utilizado para alguma tarefa, como reconhecimento (isto é um cachorro ou um gato?), planejamento (devo comprar comida para o meu cachorro hoje ou amanhã?), inferência (Se faltar comida para o meu cachorro hoje, ele pode ficar muito incomodado e atrapalhar a minha noite de sono).
Com base nessa definição, apresenta-se as principais teorias sobre conceitos, na literatura científica: concepts as prototypes, concepts as exemplars and concepts as theories.
A conclusão de Machery é que conceitos não são um tipo natural unificado (a natural kind). Quando diferentes psicólogos estão utilizando diferentes definições sobre conceitos, eles estão, na verdade, estudando diferentes capacidades de processamento mental. Diferentes categorias de conceitos servem para diferentes tipos de categorias de objetos. Não sendo um fenômeno unificado, a noção de conceito deve ser abandonada do vocabulário científico (e filosófico) e deve-se destacar cada tipo de conhecimento armazenado na memória de longo prazo como um "tipo" de conceito. Essa tese é denominada de eliminativismo conceitual. Algo semelhante com o estudo científico sobre "memória", na qual não há um único tipo de memória, mas vários tipos específico de capacidades mentais que associamos a ela, como memória de curto prazo, memória de longo prazo, memória motora, memória semântica, memória biográfica etc.
(1) The best available evidence suggests that for each category of objects, and individual typically has several concepts, that is, again, several bodies of knowledge that are by default retrieved from long-term memory and used when he or she categorizes, reasons inductively or deductively, or makes analogies;
(2) Evidence strongly suggests that prototypes, exemplars, and theories are among the fundamental kinds of concept;
(3) Prototypes, exemplars, and theories are often used in distinct cognitive processes;
(4) The notion of concept ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it might prevent psychologists from correctly characterizing the nature of our knowledge in long-term memory and its use in cognitive processes (p. 54).
August 19, 2018
A meticulously constructed argument for a surprising thesis: the notion of "concept" refers (in the context of psychology - philosophers mean something different by it) to a multifarious collection of distinct things (exemplars, prototypes, theories, and plausibly others) which are different enough that concepts, as usually construed, do not constitute a natural kind. Psychologists working on the theory of concepts are busy arguing over whether concepts are really exemplars, prototypes, or theories, and these efforts are wasted if all three exist and play distinct roles in cognition. Machery advocates the eliminativist position (i.e. that the term "concept" should be eliminated from the vocabulary of psychologists) in a way that I found compelling and convincing.
July 29, 2019
Psychological research on concepts assumes that concepts are a monolithic type of psychological entity, dealt with by a single type of psychological process. Against this, Machery argues that there are at least 3 distinct types of concepts (paradigms, exemplars, theories), and heterogenous psychological processes deal with each type of concept. He concludes that if psychology is to make progress, the notion of 'concept' should be eliminated altogether.
In the first two chapters, Machery distinguishes the psychological and philosophical notions of 'concept'; psychological and philosophical research on concepts are incommensurable. Psychologists take concepts to refer to bodies of knowledge that are accessed by higher cognitive activities (e.g., categorization, induction, analogy making). In contrast, philosophers regard concepts as necessary conditions for forming propositional attitudes towards objects of those attitudes. The difference amounts to whether the primary concern is about our capacities to carry out cognitive tasks vs. our intentional relations to objects in the world. Concepts as operative in the former are very different from those as operative in the latter. Thus philosophers who appeal to psychological research on concepts in formulating philosophical accounts of concepts are ill-guided and likely misinterpret the research.
Machery then shows that this psychological notion of 'concept' is too rough, and should rather be split into three distinct kinds: paradigms, exemplars, and theories. He reviews psychological research on each kind, showing that psychologists at large are mistaken in assuming that (1) one kind must be fundamental or exclusive, and (2) one kind of psychological process makes concept use possible. Machery then shows that major experiments in psychology are best explained by either paradigms, exemplars, or theories, and this provides evidence that the three are distinct natural kinds and are irreducible to one another. He also shows that positing multiple, potentially independent psychological processes per kind of concept explains experimental findings better than positing a single process per kind of concept. These two claims, about the heterogeneity between kinds of concepts and processes that produce concepts, amount to Machery's "heterogeneity thesis".
Machery concludes by arguing for a special sort of concept eliminitivism. Traditional forms of eliminitivism often take the argumentative strategy of showing that there are no psychological entities in the world to which a psychological term refers, and so that term should be rejected. Machery's eliminitivism is different. There are various psychological entities that are capturable by the term 'concept', but these entities are of different natural kinds. Assuming there is one primary kind hinders psychological research.
Machery's arguments are rigorous, and this thesis is convincing. But I was very disappointed by the lack of discussion on philosophical approaches to concepts. Although Machery states that he will focus on psychological approaches, he nonetheless claims that his thesis will help show how philosophical research on concepts should relate to psychological research on this matter. He does not touch on that subject at any point in the book.
If I were interested in concepts solely as researched empirically, I would probably like this book a lot more. But as driven by philosophical interests, I found most of the book irrelevant to my concerns about the nature of concepts, and about the historical assumptions/paradigms that have framed how we tend to think about concepts.
Machery takes a critical approach to concepts, but yet he stops far too short, in my opinion. He does not question a more fundamental assumption in empirical psychology (and philosophy) at large, which permeates all research on concepts: namely, that the mind is a isolable, self-standing system, which contains concepts as inner entities and applies them in order to make transactions with the world beyond. This assumption leads to a constellation of further assumptions: rational thought, perception, and action are distinct processes, and concept-use is applicable to only the first. (I understand that it is not within Machery's scope to fully address these issues, but at least he could've mentioned that his thesis takes these assumptions for granted, and there are psychologists and philosophers (e.g., J.J. Gibson; Wittgenstein; Merleau-Ponty) who reject these assumptions.)
So I'd recommend this book to people interested in empirical and experimental debates about concepts. The philosophically interested could skip this book, or just read a précis of it.
In the first two chapters, Machery distinguishes the psychological and philosophical notions of 'concept'; psychological and philosophical research on concepts are incommensurable. Psychologists take concepts to refer to bodies of knowledge that are accessed by higher cognitive activities (e.g., categorization, induction, analogy making). In contrast, philosophers regard concepts as necessary conditions for forming propositional attitudes towards objects of those attitudes. The difference amounts to whether the primary concern is about our capacities to carry out cognitive tasks vs. our intentional relations to objects in the world. Concepts as operative in the former are very different from those as operative in the latter. Thus philosophers who appeal to psychological research on concepts in formulating philosophical accounts of concepts are ill-guided and likely misinterpret the research.
Machery then shows that this psychological notion of 'concept' is too rough, and should rather be split into three distinct kinds: paradigms, exemplars, and theories. He reviews psychological research on each kind, showing that psychologists at large are mistaken in assuming that (1) one kind must be fundamental or exclusive, and (2) one kind of psychological process makes concept use possible. Machery then shows that major experiments in psychology are best explained by either paradigms, exemplars, or theories, and this provides evidence that the three are distinct natural kinds and are irreducible to one another. He also shows that positing multiple, potentially independent psychological processes per kind of concept explains experimental findings better than positing a single process per kind of concept. These two claims, about the heterogeneity between kinds of concepts and processes that produce concepts, amount to Machery's "heterogeneity thesis".
Machery concludes by arguing for a special sort of concept eliminitivism. Traditional forms of eliminitivism often take the argumentative strategy of showing that there are no psychological entities in the world to which a psychological term refers, and so that term should be rejected. Machery's eliminitivism is different. There are various psychological entities that are capturable by the term 'concept', but these entities are of different natural kinds. Assuming there is one primary kind hinders psychological research.
Machery's arguments are rigorous, and this thesis is convincing. But I was very disappointed by the lack of discussion on philosophical approaches to concepts. Although Machery states that he will focus on psychological approaches, he nonetheless claims that his thesis will help show how philosophical research on concepts should relate to psychological research on this matter. He does not touch on that subject at any point in the book.
If I were interested in concepts solely as researched empirically, I would probably like this book a lot more. But as driven by philosophical interests, I found most of the book irrelevant to my concerns about the nature of concepts, and about the historical assumptions/paradigms that have framed how we tend to think about concepts.
Machery takes a critical approach to concepts, but yet he stops far too short, in my opinion. He does not question a more fundamental assumption in empirical psychology (and philosophy) at large, which permeates all research on concepts: namely, that the mind is a isolable, self-standing system, which contains concepts as inner entities and applies them in order to make transactions with the world beyond. This assumption leads to a constellation of further assumptions: rational thought, perception, and action are distinct processes, and concept-use is applicable to only the first. (I understand that it is not within Machery's scope to fully address these issues, but at least he could've mentioned that his thesis takes these assumptions for granted, and there are psychologists and philosophers (e.g., J.J. Gibson; Wittgenstein; Merleau-Ponty) who reject these assumptions.)
So I'd recommend this book to people interested in empirical and experimental debates about concepts. The philosophically interested could skip this book, or just read a précis of it.
December 15, 2020
Good survey of state of the psychology of concepts, but the concept-eliminativism conclusion is a bit ridiculous. Just look at how much utility he gets from making use of the concept!
April 2, 2014
In this important work, Machery advances the Heterogeneity Hypothesis, which states that processes that produce concepts are distinct, that they share little in common.
At least three different kinds of concepts exist in your cognitive architecture:
Prototypes are bodies of statistical knowledge about a category, a substance, a type of event, and so on. For example, a prototype of dogs could store some statistical knowledge about the properties that are typical of dogs and/or the properties that are diagnostic of the class of dogs… Prototype are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that compute similarity linearly.
Exemplars are bodies of knowledge about individual members of a category (e.g., Fido, Rover), particular samples of a substance, and particular instances of a kind of event (e.g., my last visit to the dentist). Exemplars are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that compute the similarity nonlinearly.
Theories are bodies of causal, functional, generic, and nomological knowledge about categories, substances, types of events, etc. A theory of dogs would consist of some such knowledge about dogs. Theories are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that engage in causal reasoning.
The rest of my review can be found here:
http://kevinbinz.com/2014/04/02/mache...
At least three different kinds of concepts exist in your cognitive architecture:
Prototypes are bodies of statistical knowledge about a category, a substance, a type of event, and so on. For example, a prototype of dogs could store some statistical knowledge about the properties that are typical of dogs and/or the properties that are diagnostic of the class of dogs… Prototype are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that compute similarity linearly.
Exemplars are bodies of knowledge about individual members of a category (e.g., Fido, Rover), particular samples of a substance, and particular instances of a kind of event (e.g., my last visit to the dentist). Exemplars are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that compute the similarity nonlinearly.
Theories are bodies of causal, functional, generic, and nomological knowledge about categories, substances, types of events, etc. A theory of dogs would consist of some such knowledge about dogs. Theories are typically assumed to be used in cognitive processes that engage in causal reasoning.
The rest of my review can be found here:
http://kevinbinz.com/2014/04/02/mache...
June 18, 2013
"... we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language....[But] ... We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways." (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§132-33.)
Machery, on the other hand, thinks it's perfectly fine to be "reforming" ordinary language, even if it makes it difficult or impossible for "professionals" and "ordinary persons" to communicate with one another about ... concepts?!
A travesty, if you ask me. A waste of erudition.
Machery, on the other hand, thinks it's perfectly fine to be "reforming" ordinary language, even if it makes it difficult or impossible for "professionals" and "ordinary persons" to communicate with one another about ... concepts?!
A travesty, if you ask me. A waste of erudition.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews