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Seeing Red: A Study in Consciousness
"Consciousness matters. Arguably it matters more than anything. The purpose of this book is to build towards an explanation of just what the matter is." Nicholas Humphrey begins this compelling exploration of the biggest of big questions with a challenge to the reader, and himself. What's involved in "seeing red"? What is it like for us to see someone else seeing something red? Seeing a red screen tells us a fact about something in the world. But it also creates a new fact--a sensation in each of our minds, the feeling of redness. And that's the mystery. Conventional science so far hasn't told us what conscious sensations are made of, or how we get access to them, or why we have them at all. From an evolutionary perspective, what's the point of consciousness? Humphrey offers a daring and novel solution, arguing that sensations are not things that happen to us , they are things we do --originating in our primordial ancestors' expressions of liking or disgust. Tracing the evolutionary trajectory through to human beings, he shows how this has led to sensations playing the key role in the human sense of Self. The Self, as we now know it from within, seems to have fascinating other-worldly properties. It leads us to believe in mind-body duality and the existence of a soul. And such beliefs--even if mistaken--can be highly adaptive, because they increase the value we place on our own and others' lives. "Consciousness matters," Humphrey concludes with striking paradox, "because it is its function to matter. It has been designed to create in human beings a Self whose life is worth pursuing."
160 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 2006
9 people are currently reading
229 people want to read
About the author
Nicholas Humphrey
43 books67 followersNicholas Keynes Humphrey is an English neuropsychologist based in Cambridge, known for his work on evolution of primate intelligence and consciousness. He studied mountain gorillas with Dian Fossey in Rwanda; he was the first to demonstrate the existence of "blindsight" after brain damage in monkeys; he proposed the theory of the "social function of intellect". He is the only scientist to have edited the literary journal Granta.
Humphrey played a significant role in the anti-nuclear movement in the late 1970s and delivered the BBC Bronowski memorial lecture titled "Four Minutes to Midnight" in 1981.
His 10 books include Consciousness Regained, The Inner Eye, A History of the Mind, Leaps of Faith, The Mind Made Flesh, Seeing Red, and Soul Dust. He has received several honours, including the Martin Luther King Memorial Prize, the Pufendorf Medal and the British Psychological Society's book award.
He has been lecturer in psychology at Oxford, assistant director of the Subdepartment of Animal Behaviour at Cambridge, senior research fellow at Cambridge, professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research, New York, and school professor at the London School of Economics.
Humphrey played a significant role in the anti-nuclear movement in the late 1970s and delivered the BBC Bronowski memorial lecture titled "Four Minutes to Midnight" in 1981.
His 10 books include Consciousness Regained, The Inner Eye, A History of the Mind, Leaps of Faith, The Mind Made Flesh, Seeing Red, and Soul Dust. He has received several honours, including the Martin Luther King Memorial Prize, the Pufendorf Medal and the British Psychological Society's book award.
He has been lecturer in psychology at Oxford, assistant director of the Subdepartment of Animal Behaviour at Cambridge, senior research fellow at Cambridge, professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research, New York, and school professor at the London School of Economics.
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Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews
September 9, 2019
Actually, 4.5 stars.
Super interesting take on the question of "what is consciousness". The author does a terrific job of separating out various elements of the actions in our nervous system (though he doesn't use that term), giving us language to use to create useful distinctions. By creating those distinctions, he re-assembles them in a way to (mostly) make a case of what consciousness - the X factor - is, how it is operating, and how it arose.
He is careful not to say his hypothesis is "the answer"; there are a few leaps of imagination required to accept it, and he's not immune to the need for these ideas to be battered - to see if they stand up under scrutiny.
But all in all, he's made an interesting case. I'll likely go read it again - just not immediately.
Super interesting take on the question of "what is consciousness". The author does a terrific job of separating out various elements of the actions in our nervous system (though he doesn't use that term), giving us language to use to create useful distinctions. By creating those distinctions, he re-assembles them in a way to (mostly) make a case of what consciousness - the X factor - is, how it is operating, and how it arose.
He is careful not to say his hypothesis is "the answer"; there are a few leaps of imagination required to accept it, and he's not immune to the need for these ideas to be battered - to see if they stand up under scrutiny.
But all in all, he's made an interesting case. I'll likely go read it again - just not immediately.
February 16, 2020
Near the beginning of this short work - essentially a lightly edited transcript of a series of lectures - Humphrey refers to Husserl's idea of epoché or bracketing, the attempt to suspend all processing and instead focus on what one is perceiving. Start with a simple idea: staring at a red screen. What is going on in your mind? How do you become aware of yourself, translating electric current in your visual cortex into the idea of redness? The problem of consciousness is famously hard: Humphrey quotes Stuart Sutherland's wryly defeatist definition
Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon; it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it.Humphrey is a maverick cognitive scientist/psychologist who has spent many years working with primates, and discovered a phenomenon he calls "blindsight" - a sort of visual perception present even in completely blind apes. His conclusion seems to be that consciousness' very resistance to definition is an innate part of its value: something which underwent evolutionary pressure to seem mysterious and inexplicable, which reinforced our self-perception as complex, rich beings. Unfortunately, I seem to have deleted some of my notes from this book, leaving only the line "Has to do with mirroring?" (No idea what I meant.) In any case, I don't really feel qualified to judge Humphrey's theory. I'm not sure if anyone can.
November 13, 2012
Nicholas Humprhrey's book is a study in consciousness from an amalgam of cognitive science, philosophy, and art. That last may take one by surprise, but the whole basis of Humphrey's study and thesis is based upon visual processing, perception, cognition and conceptualization and the relationship of these to the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness: that is, how does one explain the relationship between mind and brain; are they two, or is one 'reducible' to the other?
Humphrey posits an interesting thesis by beginning with the 'simple' question, "What's involved in seeing red?" From the somewhat unexpected idea that sensation is not something that happens to us, but rather something we do, he ends up with a theory that though evolutionary processes, these sensations end up creating the human sense of '"Self." His theory can even be seen as explaining why that sense of "Self" would end up seeming like something "ineffably" transcendent from the body!
Humphrey argues that this mistaken idea of a mind-body duality and the belief in an "other-wordly" soul, though mistaken (he is and remains a naturalist) has served a highly adaptive purpose by increasing the value we place on our own and other's lives.
My thinking is that though the sense of a self may have been adaptive, and certainly serves great purpose in our daily lives, the seeing more clearly it's creation and illusory basis is what is now needed if we are to have any hope that humanity can continue to survive and thrive.
Humphrey posits an interesting thesis by beginning with the 'simple' question, "What's involved in seeing red?" From the somewhat unexpected idea that sensation is not something that happens to us, but rather something we do, he ends up with a theory that though evolutionary processes, these sensations end up creating the human sense of '"Self." His theory can even be seen as explaining why that sense of "Self" would end up seeming like something "ineffably" transcendent from the body!
Humphrey argues that this mistaken idea of a mind-body duality and the belief in an "other-wordly" soul, though mistaken (he is and remains a naturalist) has served a highly adaptive purpose by increasing the value we place on our own and other's lives.
My thinking is that though the sense of a self may have been adaptive, and certainly serves great purpose in our daily lives, the seeing more clearly it's creation and illusory basis is what is now needed if we are to have any hope that humanity can continue to survive and thrive.
November 26, 2012
For such a small thing, this is one of the finest examples consciousness explorations I've seen in a book, and it is the perfect size for its subject matter. Forget Kant's doorstops, or Sartre's voluminous streams of wanderings. This book should be assigned reading for any student of philosophy or psychology.
What is consciousness? We certainly take it's understanding for granted, since few people could answer such a question if asked. We all have our own working definition of consciousness which we use with ourselves and with others, yet when we try to actually pin down what that definition is, we start having trouble.
Where does a brain stop, or a mind begin? What really happens when we perceive things, or think about things? what does it mean to even exist?
These questions would challenge anyone who tried to deal with them. Yet Nicolas Humphrey not only deals with them thoroughly, he also manages to keep it short, and to keep out most of the philosophical jargon that would keep the layperson away from the book in the first place.
The book is quick, concise, profoundly thoughtful, and accessible. All the attributes anyone can hope for from a book covering such a topic, is within this pocket-sized binding.
What is consciousness? We certainly take it's understanding for granted, since few people could answer such a question if asked. We all have our own working definition of consciousness which we use with ourselves and with others, yet when we try to actually pin down what that definition is, we start having trouble.
Where does a brain stop, or a mind begin? What really happens when we perceive things, or think about things? what does it mean to even exist?
These questions would challenge anyone who tried to deal with them. Yet Nicolas Humphrey not only deals with them thoroughly, he also manages to keep it short, and to keep out most of the philosophical jargon that would keep the layperson away from the book in the first place.
The book is quick, concise, profoundly thoughtful, and accessible. All the attributes anyone can hope for from a book covering such a topic, is within this pocket-sized binding.
February 8, 2019
A slim book, but a brilliant and important one. In 'Seeing Red,' Nicholas Humphrey expands on the ‘private sensory experience’ idea first discussed in his groundbreaking 'A History Of The Mind.' The theme here is the knotty problem of deciding what exactly is the ‘stuff of consciousness’ – what is usually referred to as the hard problem, i.e. of what philosophers of the mind call qualia.
The book is taken from a series of lectures given in 2005, and, as observed in a wry introduction, its text echoes the chatty style of the spoken word. But it’s a terrific read for all that informality. Essentially, it sets out in greater depth Humphrey’s notion of the separation into two ‘channels’ of sensation and perception, with the former being something actually generated by the mind, not simply responded to. Using this theory, Humphrey finds himself able to explain much that otherwise is mysterious about consciousness.
The final two chapters seem a tiny bit rushed compared with the brilliant first few, but that’s a quibble. This is a marvellous, insightful, lucid and superbly argued book.
The book is taken from a series of lectures given in 2005, and, as observed in a wry introduction, its text echoes the chatty style of the spoken word. But it’s a terrific read for all that informality. Essentially, it sets out in greater depth Humphrey’s notion of the separation into two ‘channels’ of sensation and perception, with the former being something actually generated by the mind, not simply responded to. Using this theory, Humphrey finds himself able to explain much that otherwise is mysterious about consciousness.
The final two chapters seem a tiny bit rushed compared with the brilliant first few, but that’s a quibble. This is a marvellous, insightful, lucid and superbly argued book.
October 29, 2015
This is a slender, astonishing work of science-grounded philosophy that sneaks up upon a remarkable hypothesis. I won't spoil it for the reader, as this book is meant to be absorbed like a long lecture, but it is worthwhile. Like Daniel C. Dennett, whom Humphrey namechecks as an ally near the beginning, the author has a lucidity to his expression and a focus on empiricism and science that sharpens his philosophical reasoning and makes it easy to understand the importance of his points. I was very surprised with how much I enjoyed this book, as I was not familiar with the author and didn't really know what it would be like when I began, but I can easily say it was a fully worthwhile use of my time. I'll be pondering this for a while.
March 17, 2011
Consciousness is an unbelieveably tough subject to address. Humphrey does so in a way where those unfamiliar with the subject are drawn in. The truth is that it is still a part of the mystery of existance. I think he does a great job explaining what is known in a pedestrian enough way, that this should be known as a top primer. More importantly, his conclusions lead to why it matters that we have consciousness and a sense of self opposed to anything else outside of self. This was an unlikely pleasant read, both rigorous in an academic sense, but engaging as an armchair read.
July 7, 2013
Basics of phenomenality and the problems it poses for the study of consciousnesses.
December 5, 2023
The author made a point that there is a difference between perception and sensation. Something to do with the fact that long ago when we were still googoo gaa gaa we felt sensation and started to react to it and eventually it got centralized in our brains in order to stay alive. But in the end I did not learn what is consciousness. The writing is difficult to understand and lengthy. Like another reviewer mentioned, it would have been much better if the author could summarize each chapter in the end rather than droning on and on about some random E=mc2 or random paintings and painters.
Blog: http://literaturesandmovies.com/
Blog: http://literaturesandmovies.com/
March 12, 2021
Although most definitely a work in what I understand to be evolutionary psychology (and therefore is more of a matter of interpretation and educated conjecture than an empirical scientific theory) Humphrey's book is fascinating and even quite poetic! I love how he talks about consciousness and the evolution of it from the first single-celled organisms to humans. This book is a must-read for those who love neuroscience, psychology, or generally pondering how we ended up the way we are!
April 7, 2024
Humphrey starts promisingly, with close observation of a quale: a patch of vivid red projected onto a screen. However, he dances around the central issue and never explains what the red quale is, how it arises from nerve activity, and why it has the ineffable physiognomy it has ("looking red"). Which is what we want from a theory of qualia/consciousness concerned with "seeing red." Disappointing. Doesn't move the ball forward.
October 12, 2023
Leggendolo a quasi vent'anni dalla prima pubblicazione, si nota che mancano alcuni recenti sviluppi nelle neuroscienze.. ma sicuramente il libro è stagionato bene e almeno a mio avviso le idee dell' autore sono più vicini all'essere confermate che sconfessate.
April 23, 2018
Much of this is quite interesting. The ultimate conclusion seems too Cartesian to take seriously.
June 24, 2023
His perspective on the difference between perception and experience is interesting however his conclusions about consciousness don't add much to our understanding.
November 27, 2023
Quick read. I mean this text is quite old with respect to how much research has been done since publication. I'll read his more recent book next and see what I think.
February 20, 2014
An experiment to understand consciousness: Seeing red does not go grand
The author starts his book with a pessimistic quotation from psychologist Stuart Sutherland, "Nothing worth reading has been written about it" (consciousness). At the end of chapter 3, the author makes a rather optimistic conclusion that "So, I do believe we are closing in on what consciousness is and what it's for, I admit...... But we are on our way" (to understand consciousness.) After reading this book in its entirety, the reader is unable to share this author's optimism.
The author attempts to relate sensation to subjective qualia, and consciousness. What is creating the sensation and what makes this to be the subject of it? Could it be consciousness or selfhood? Francis Crick and Christof Koch believe the most difficult problem is the qualia; the redness of red, painfulness of pain, etc. The author believes that neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) may be the causal factor because the experience of sensation is a result of neuronal activity. The other factor could be the functional correlates of sensation (FCC).
Wherever there is a subjective experience, there has to be a subject. Because pain, mood, wish can not exist without a bearer, and the person has to be there first before the subjective experience. Sensation consists of; ownership that belongs to the subject, body location (particular part of the body), present-ness (being at present), qualitative modality (visual, facial, hearing, etc.) and phenomenal immediacy (happening to me instead of somebody else, happening at the moment than another moment). The author surmises that the evolution of sensation, feeling, and perception starting with primitive amoeba and ending up with human beings is as follows: It appears that during evolution the sensory activity gets privatized. The command signals for every sensory response get short circuited before they reach the body surface. So that instead of reaching all the way out to peripheral site of stimulation (as in amoeba), they now reach only to points more and more central on the incoming sensory pathways, until eventually the whole processes becomes closed off from the outside world in an internal loop within the brain (as in humans.)
The book is very brief and it is based on guest lectures delivered at Harvard in spring 2004. Some paragraphs have been repeated verbatim; for example, third paragraphs of pages 94 and 121 are almost the same. It would have been easier for the reader, if the last paragraph of each chapter or the last chapter of the book had summarized the author's point.
The author starts his book with a pessimistic quotation from psychologist Stuart Sutherland, "Nothing worth reading has been written about it" (consciousness). At the end of chapter 3, the author makes a rather optimistic conclusion that "So, I do believe we are closing in on what consciousness is and what it's for, I admit...... But we are on our way" (to understand consciousness.) After reading this book in its entirety, the reader is unable to share this author's optimism.
The author attempts to relate sensation to subjective qualia, and consciousness. What is creating the sensation and what makes this to be the subject of it? Could it be consciousness or selfhood? Francis Crick and Christof Koch believe the most difficult problem is the qualia; the redness of red, painfulness of pain, etc. The author believes that neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) may be the causal factor because the experience of sensation is a result of neuronal activity. The other factor could be the functional correlates of sensation (FCC).
Wherever there is a subjective experience, there has to be a subject. Because pain, mood, wish can not exist without a bearer, and the person has to be there first before the subjective experience. Sensation consists of; ownership that belongs to the subject, body location (particular part of the body), present-ness (being at present), qualitative modality (visual, facial, hearing, etc.) and phenomenal immediacy (happening to me instead of somebody else, happening at the moment than another moment). The author surmises that the evolution of sensation, feeling, and perception starting with primitive amoeba and ending up with human beings is as follows: It appears that during evolution the sensory activity gets privatized. The command signals for every sensory response get short circuited before they reach the body surface. So that instead of reaching all the way out to peripheral site of stimulation (as in amoeba), they now reach only to points more and more central on the incoming sensory pathways, until eventually the whole processes becomes closed off from the outside world in an internal loop within the brain (as in humans.)
The book is very brief and it is based on guest lectures delivered at Harvard in spring 2004. Some paragraphs have been repeated verbatim; for example, third paragraphs of pages 94 and 121 are almost the same. It would have been easier for the reader, if the last paragraph of each chapter or the last chapter of the book had summarized the author's point.
December 4, 2012
amazon review:
"Consciousness matters. Arguably it matters more than anything. The purpose of this book is to build towards an explanation of just what the matter is."
Nicholas Humphrey begins this compelling exploration of the biggest of big questions with a challenge to the reader, and himself. What's involved in "seeing red"? What is it like for us to see someone else seeing something red?
Seeing a red screen tells us a fact about something in the world. But it also creates a new fact--a sensation in each of our minds, the feeling of redness. And that's the mystery. Conventional science so far hasn't told us what conscious sensations are made of, or how we get access to them, or why we have them at all. From an evolutionary perspective, what's the point of consciousness?
Humphrey offers a daring and novel solution, arguing that sensations are not things that happen to us, they are things we do--originating in our primordial ancestors' expressions of liking or disgust. Tracing the evolutionary trajectory through to human beings, he shows how this has led to sensations playing the key role in the human sense of Self.
The Self, as we now know it from within, seems to have fascinating other-worldly properties. It leads us to believe in mind-body duality and the existence of a soul. And such beliefs--even if mistaken--can be highly adaptive, because they increase the value we place on our own and others' lives.
"Consciousness matters," Humphrey concludes with striking paradox, "because it is its function to matter. It has been designed to create in human beings a Self whose life is worth pursuing."
"Consciousness matters. Arguably it matters more than anything. The purpose of this book is to build towards an explanation of just what the matter is."
Nicholas Humphrey begins this compelling exploration of the biggest of big questions with a challenge to the reader, and himself. What's involved in "seeing red"? What is it like for us to see someone else seeing something red?
Seeing a red screen tells us a fact about something in the world. But it also creates a new fact--a sensation in each of our minds, the feeling of redness. And that's the mystery. Conventional science so far hasn't told us what conscious sensations are made of, or how we get access to them, or why we have them at all. From an evolutionary perspective, what's the point of consciousness?
Humphrey offers a daring and novel solution, arguing that sensations are not things that happen to us, they are things we do--originating in our primordial ancestors' expressions of liking or disgust. Tracing the evolutionary trajectory through to human beings, he shows how this has led to sensations playing the key role in the human sense of Self.
The Self, as we now know it from within, seems to have fascinating other-worldly properties. It leads us to believe in mind-body duality and the existence of a soul. And such beliefs--even if mistaken--can be highly adaptive, because they increase the value we place on our own and others' lives.
"Consciousness matters," Humphrey concludes with striking paradox, "because it is its function to matter. It has been designed to create in human beings a Self whose life is worth pursuing."
March 20, 2015
Seeing red is indeed an abstract yet phenomenal book. I came to understand the 'trinity' of perceiving an object - I, Self, Myself. There are different levels to understanding our consciousness and consciousness in us. It is interesting to note how perception and sensation are related; how our belief system can influence our perception and phenomenal experience. I like the phenomenological analysis and its distinctions: 1. phenomenal experience/propositional attitudes; 2. sensation/perception; 3. values/facts; 4. first-person/third-person; 5. theory-theory of mind/simulation-theory of mind; 6. being there/emptiness. Consciousness is indeed mystical, magical and evolutionary. "Seeing red" has many layers of meanings, depending on how you view. It can be based on perception of subjective/objective matter, sensation leading to emotion/affect (e.g. anger) and mind-brain duality that may lead to cognitive illusion.
Read
March 29, 2013As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame;
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves --goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.
-Gerard Manley Hopkins
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name;
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells;
Selves --goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came.
-Gerard Manley Hopkins
September 8, 2009
Brevity in a subject like this is a real advantage. I have read a number of books on consciousness that just seem to ramble on and on. This book by Humphrey cuts to the chase, and is jam packed with ideas.
July 19, 2011
A philosophical take on the most crucial discriminatory of humans from other animals...consciousness. Seemed to lack a science base but more of an logic based argumentative style in exploring the idea of consciousness.
September 23, 2007
I really liked this book. It is small and loaded with philosophical insight in the area of philosophy of the mind.
December 22, 2008
Beautifully illustrated account of advances in understanding the relationship between the brain and behavior...I found it facinating
August 10, 2009
An Absolutely superb book regarding consciousness. It is a difficult read by well worth the effort. Bought Kris a copy. ras
June 8, 2016
I think he did not do what he set out to do with this book. Read Daniel Dennett's review. He says it better than I can.
Want to read
January 22, 2008NOT AT LIB 1/08 - Ginnie gave 4 stars
Displaying 1 - 26 of 26 reviews