Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad

by James Hughes

The sheer scale and brutality of the hostilities between Russia and Chechnya stand out as an exception in the mostly peaceful breakup of the Soviet Union. From Nationalism to Jihad provides a fascinating analysis of the transformation of secular nationalist resistance in a nominally Islamic society into a struggle that is its antithesis, jihad. Hughes locates Chechen nationalism within the wider movement for national self-determination that followed the collapse of the Soviet empire. When negotiations failed in the early 1990s, political violence was instrumentalized to consolidate opposing nationalist visions of state-building in Russia and Chechnya. The resistance in Chechnya also occurred in a regional context where Russian hegemony over the Caucasus, especially the resources of the Caspian basin, was in retreat, and in an international context of rising Islamic radicalism. Alongside Bosnia, Kashmir, and other conflicts, Chechnya became embedded in Osama Bin Laden's repertoire of jihadist rhetoric against the "West." It was not simply Russia's destruction of a nationalist option for Chechnya, or "Wahabbist" infiltration from without, that created the political space for Islamism. Rather, we must look also at how the conflict was fought. The lack of proportionality and discrimination in the use of violence, particularly by Russia, accelerated and intensified the Islamic radicalization and thereby transformed the nature of the conflict.

This nuanced and balanced study provides a much-needed antidote to the mythologizing of Chechen resistance before, and its demonization after, 9/11. The conflict in Chechnya involves one of the most contentious issues in contemporary international politics—how do we differentiate between the legitimate use of violence to resist imperialism, occupation, and misgovernment, and the use of terrorism against legitimate rule? This book sets out indispensable lessons for understanding conflicts involving the volatile combination of nationalist insurgency, jihad, and terrorism, most notably for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Genres: Russia, History, Islam

296 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2007

About the author

Librarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name.

Reviews

[Praj · Rating 4 out of 5]

**This review is particularly for Randy for he sweetly anticipates my perspective.**

I will not evaluate this book per se. When politically acute manuscripts are grasped I refrain from viewing through its technicalities and focus on its erudite impetus. I do not give a rat’s ass to the author’s literary style or synchronization. All that matters is the articulacy of problematic inceptions that materialize from the printed prose.

Chechnya, ‘Kurdistan’(varies with regional ethnicity),East Timor, Myanmar, Palestine terrains, Congo, Sudan and Kashmir; these are just few of the numerous explosive landscapes where life is celebrated every night as it may not be able to see the subsequent sunrise. As a woman who has matured among the recurrent news of the bestowed atrocities on Kashmiri residents and rebellious bloodshed propelled with a religious garb, I desire to yelp each disturbing question that churns in my agitated mind.

1):- Is human life only valued on the basis of their birthplace, caste or religion?
2):- What makes an individual resort to the utmost inhumane tactics engulfing every guiltless soul that come in the way of their "existential sovereignty"?
3):- Why is 'free will' the merely valued gem of human existence abused with a deathly gusto?
4):-Why is hatred spewed beneath the roofs of sycophancy and falsified harmonious assertions?
5):- What is the root cause of the leeching terror that never seems to stop sucking blood from cores of unscathed living?
6):-Why do we restore fear in the fearless (children), flinging them in an abyss of boundless nightmares?

Chechnya found a prominent listing in my politically contested world through the dishonorable Beslan School Massacre(September 1,2004),when a group of Ingush and Chechen militants took more than 1000 people(including 777 children) hostage in a three-day fatal anguish ensuing 300 horrific deaths. While scrutinizing the repercussions of terror hostilities, the mass devastation blurs our senses to an abnormality of muddled judgments. I am not and never will defend any terror mechanisms; however through the pandemonium we tend to overlook the obvious-"thinking outside the box". Through all the denied allegations the truth of the flourishing power-mongers and tainted governmental operations cannot be washed away as it subconsciously sows the seeds of uncouth rebellion with a thirst for self-identity.
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In the late1980s during Gorbachev’s regime, Chechnya was one of the most politically stable secular parts of the Soviet Union.After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; numerous regions sought independence establishing separate political systems. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR was split into two: the Republic of Ingushetia and Republic of Chechnya. The latter proclaimed the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, which sought independence. However, and then President Boris Yeltsin snubbed Chechen’s declaration of independence declining to accept Chechnya as separate republic. Speculatively it was inferred as ‘oil’ being the main element for Yeltsin’s denial; since a major pipe line carried the oil from Baku onto the Caspian Sea and from Chechnya through Ukraine. Frail egos, misgovernmental policies and refusal of peaceful agreements resulted in two brutal wars in the 1990s terminating into tormenting genocide. Since then there has been a systematic restoration and upgrading process, though sporadic fighting continues in the mountains and southern regions of the republic. Steady rise in religious radicalism, political violence and conflicting nationalist hegemony, led to terror insurgence embedded in the antithesis, jihad. Furthermore, Chechen resistance has been linked to Bin Laden’s demonizing repertoire of vengeance against the "West" making it one of the most litigious issues in international political inconsistency.

Terror is an influential weapon used to attain egotistical motives in the cloak of religion; a devious cloak indoctrinating radical extremities in the feeble. When faith submerges in the unfathomable squalid of raging supremacy and audacious fervor, humanity dissolves in the reins of brutality. Consequently, how must a demarcation be set between legitimize use of violence confronting unethical governmental systems, imperialism and the exploit of terrorism against a justifiable decree? Or are they no resolutions to indispensable lessons learned from horrific conflicts hindering every nonviolent prospect.

I vividly recount the BBC documentary on the Beslan outcome. From the profusely aired interviews of victims (dominantly children) and the Beslan populace, rancorous tones erupted from every uttered expression of revenge and atheist connotations seeking answers from deafened authorities for the bequeathed mayhem.

It irks me immensely to be a voiceless spectator to the continuing Hammurabi-‘eye for an eye’ coded sadistic global cycle termed "justice".

[Abdullah Mushtaq · Rating 3.5 out of 5]

This book is not a military history of the two Chechen wars but rather a thoroughly political analysis of the conflict. James Hughes, being a political scientist, has rigorously unraveled the context of the conflict right from Gorbachev’s perestroika to Putin’s centralization, albeit the discourse is filled with dense academic jargon which might occasionally throw you off the chair if you were looking for a relaxing evening read.

Chapter 1 is about the “Causes of the Conflict”, in which the author starts off by stating various mainstream approaches that have been adopted to explain the Chechen conflict, pointing out the weaknesses of such generalizing approaches. The causes of conflict are almost always complex, and it is often presumptive to identify any single factor or actor as predominant. The protracted nature and the radicalizing experience of the military conflict from 1994 and on, transformed the conflict from a secular nationalist movement to an islamist pan-Caucasian one. The question of secession remains but is posed and legitimized by a different ideological frame. Here the reader might be compelled to juxtapose the two approaches in stark contrast, but it is necessary to remember that the nationalist movement of 1990s is an exception in the 300-year-long pan-Caucasian struggle that has always been steeped in religious rhetoric. For Chechens, the religious, national and ethnic identities overlaps and mutually enforce each other. Islam presents for them everything anti-Soviet. A war against an external (Russian) aggressor is almost automatically associated with a war for territory, freedom, national honor, identity, and religion.

Russia underestimated the capabilities of the Chechens. This underestimation of Dudayev by Yeltsin was demonstrated on November 8-9, 1991 when there was the first of several botched attempts at military intervention in Chechnya by Russian forces. Not for the first time, Yeltsin’s hubris may have led him to overestimate his power. After the initial failed coup attempts, Yeltsin escalated a campaign to undermine Dudayev’s authority in Chechnya, which was characterized by a twin-track strategy alternating between coercion and isolation by blockade.

One particular error that I want to rectify is that the author states that Ingush and Chechens are Hanafis which is not the case. Everyone east of Ossetia are majorly Shafis (i.e., Ingush, Chechens, Dagestanis) with the exception of Nogais. Meanwhile, those inhabiting in the west of Ossetia are Hanafis (i.e., Circassians, Karachays, and Balkars).

Chapter 2 is a thorough research into Russia’s Re-federalization after Soviet collapse. The “ethnic” revival account of a trend to disintegration in Russia during the 1990s was overstated and flawed. All the socialist federations had disintegrated (USSR and Yugoslavia) or dissolved (Czechoslovakia). Russia was a territorialized ethnofederal state as well, but why did it not meet the same fate as the rest of them? Hughes stated 5 constraints that had softened the secession potential in Russia (the first four are internal while the last one is external):

(1) demographic composition
(2) resource interdependencies
(3) spatial location
(4) historical assimilation and identity.
(5) the nonrecognition of secession by the international system.

All of the ethnic autonomous units inside RSFSR (Russia) lacked some of them except for Chechnya which occupied a peculiar position in the wake of Soviet collapse. (1) a homogenous unit, thanks to the remigration of Chechens from all over the Soviet Union and the exodus of non-Chechen Russian in the early 90s. (2) working oil refining industrial infrastructure in Grozny that accounted for 90% of Russia’s specialized aviation oils. (3) a peripheral spatial location in the map of Russia and (4) a historically poor assimilation in the dominant Russian culture, all gave Chechnya an exceptional status in this discourse.

Chapter 3 discusses in depth the nature of the initial Chechen conflict under Dudayev’s regime. The causes of the failure to negotiate a solution for Chechnya as it was done for other autonomous ethnic republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are often attributed to the personal enmity that had existed between Yeltsin and Dudayev, coupled with the ethnic and racial stereotyping that precluded any sensible compromise between the two. But this, as the author contends, is oversimplification. Chechnya was instrumentalized by Yeltsin as a political tool in the president versus parliament conflict in Russia. The lack of president-to-president negotiations was a major flaw that ultimately brought the whole peace process to a standstill in 1994. A major problem with the negotiations was the lack of consistency of positions on both sides. This was a clear challenge to Dudayev’s insistence that any treaty should be between equal states and recognize the independence of Chechnya. Dudayev was a charismatic nationalist leader who believed in the morality, legality, and necessity of independence for Chechnya. He refused to consider any compromise on full independence. Although, at the late stages (Nov 1994), Dudayev appears to have made desperate attempts to avoid war. During 1994 he became more conciliatory to Russia. In early December 1994, as the Russian invasion was about to commence, Dudayev told Russian journalists that Chechnya could remain part of Russia. [This could have been due to a genuine wish for a compromise or he might be trying to shift the blame for the conflict after seeing its inevitability]. Consequently, the decision to invade Chechnya was partly impelled by the illusion that a “short victorious war” would boost Yeltsin’s ratings and political authority in Russia.

Chapter 4 is about the “Dual Radicalization” that commenced in both Russia and Chechnya as the conflict prolonged. The radicalization in Chechnya was a direct product of the experience and practice of the violence in the first war. Russia’s blockade and international isolation left Maskhadov with an impossible task of state-building against the backdrop of a severe economic crisis, vast-spread infrastructural devastation and rise of lawlessness. By 1998-9, Maskhadov’s Chechnya was left in a frozen limbo whose remedy was to be found sooner or later. The military view in Russia was that Chechnya was an unfinished business. With the declining popularity of Yeltsin and in the wake of elections, an event of some kind was required to bolster Putin’s authority and maximize his electoral prospects. Yeltsin had did the same in 1994 and peace negotiations in 1996 were also done for the same reason. The Russian strategy on second war had two dimensions: military force plus a major political effort from Putin to win over elements of the resistance who could be used as local collaborators: Chechenization. The policy of Chechenization is an enduring feature of Russia’s strategy since 1991. Putin regards Kadyrov as central to Russia’s policy.

Chapter 5 is a thoroughly analytical study of how various political theorist, sociologist, legists have ventured to accurately define what terrorism really is. (tldr: they were unable to do that). The author utilized Chechnya as a case study to point out the inherent contradictions in defining terrorism and how terrorism is constructed. After a long discussion from various point of views, the author contends that the use of terrorism by some elements of the Chechen resistance is broadly justified within the national movement as a whole, for being reactive to Russia’s strategy of excesses, whether to deter it, or to exact revenge. (please read the chapter fully before lynching me)

Lastly, Chapter 6 is about the “study of conflict”. Probably the most dense part of the book that requires sufficient prior comparative knowledge of political science and its theories to fully grasp what has been said. I must admit I was too tired and lazy at the moment, so I glided through it in the hope that I might latch onto some beneficial low-hanging fruit of wisdom. (I am afraid I didn't)

[Austin Barselau · Rating 3 out of 5]

In “Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad,” James Hughes explores the theoretical underpinnings and ethnogeographical motivations for how conflict such as the Chechen wars can arise. Hughes, a longtime professor of comparative politics at the LSE, shows how Chechen self-determination and secessionist ambitions mutated from a form of secular nationalism to a transnational theocratic struggle radicalized by religious and racial exclusivism, which ultimately challenged notions of a cohesive post-Soviet Russian state. Hughes delves into how Chechen secessionism became a casus belli, frustrating Yeltin’s appeasement policies and eventually provoking Putin’s violent crackdown, which he justified by the need to “impose order” on a rapidly deteriorating regional terrorism threat.

While “Chechnya” is somewhat dated, it excels in its own lane; it is not a blow-by-blow military chronicle, but rather a philosophical examination of how conflict emerges at the crucible of competing national/sub-national interests.

[Alex · Rating 4 out of 5]

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jmh/summ...

From a JHU review:

"A typical sentence from page 118 reads: "Proxy rule by a reliance on a collaborationist indigenous stratum to manage rebellious territories is an essential instrument in the imperialist's toolkit." This is not a book for the beach."