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Russia's War
In the early hours of 24 February 2022, Russian forces attacked Ukraine. The brutality of the Russian assault has horrified the world. But Russians themselves appear to be watching an entirely different war – one in which they are the courageous underdogs and kind-hearted heroes successfully battling a malign Ukrainian foe.
Russia analyst Jade McGlynn takes us on a journey into this parallel military and political universe to reveal the sometimes monstrous, sometimes misconstrued attitudes behind Russian majority backing for the invasion. Drawing on media analysis and interviews with ordinary citizens, officials and foreign-policy elites in Russia and Ukraine, McGlynn explores the grievances, lies and half-truths that pervade the Russian worldview. She also exposes the complicity of many Russians, who have invested too deeply in the Kremlin’s alternative narratives to regard the war as Putin’s foolhardy mission. In their eyes, this is Russia’s war – against Ukraine, against the West, against evil – and there can be no turning back.
Russia analyst Jade McGlynn takes us on a journey into this parallel military and political universe to reveal the sometimes monstrous, sometimes misconstrued attitudes behind Russian majority backing for the invasion. Drawing on media analysis and interviews with ordinary citizens, officials and foreign-policy elites in Russia and Ukraine, McGlynn explores the grievances, lies and half-truths that pervade the Russian worldview. She also exposes the complicity of many Russians, who have invested too deeply in the Kremlin’s alternative narratives to regard the war as Putin’s foolhardy mission. In their eyes, this is Russia’s war – against Ukraine, against the West, against evil – and there can be no turning back.
238 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 27, 2023
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July 22, 2023""The source of conflict has become identity imbued with genealogical essentialism and historicism- a fight over the past for civilisations unable to imagine, let alone provide, a better future.""-- the author, from the book
This is an interesting book about the Russo-Ukrainian war. Its main thesis posits boldly that, contrary to popular declarations, the invasion receives the tacit approval of a lot of Russians, who see the 'special military operation' as the conclusive articulation of hopes and dreams of resuscitation of Russian national identity. This stands in contrast to depictions of the war as the fervid madness of Putin alone, who embarked on a personal vendetta of conquest against the wishes of his populace. As the author says, 'our quarrel is with the Russian people', not Putin alone.
This is a huge claim so I was interested to see what evidence the author would advance to bolster her proposition. Unfortunately, this book isn't convincingly provisioned with proof. The author cites the results of phone surveys in Russia, which by her own admission and widespread knowledge are notoriously, farcically unreliable in results, because they are introduced as emissaries of a state that punishes criticism, protests and political disagreements with years-long tenancy in labor colonies that rob opponents of health and life. These phone surveys furthermore lead by 'confirming' the respondent's name and address, voiding any possibility of anonymity and a sincere response. The other source of the author's conclusion are the opinions and assertions of professors in and out of Russia, which are quite anecdotal and inconclusive in validity. Therefore I am not sure whether it is true Russians in majority support Putin's war.
This is nevertheless a book worth reading because it attempts to delve into the Russian citizen's psyche, and discover how people could lead decent lives while atrocities and butchery are being done on their behalf and implicit support. The author asserts that Russians exist in a spectrum of support for the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine, ranging from reflexive and ritualized vehement trust and endorsement of everything Putin does, to dislike of Putin but strong nativist and nationalist sympathies, to a defensive posture with regards to NATO encirclement, to neutrality and apathy tempered by a vague feeling of patriotism for Russia. What unites these positions is that they don't present a credible opposition to Putin and his war.
In a stroke of malicious genius that's derived and perfected from years of practice in creating a landscape of disinformation, Russian media coverage of the war positions the war not just as an objective event, but instead couches them in narratives of civilizational defense or moral crusade, that appeal powerfully to Russians with emotional touchstones and sensitive buttons of humiliation or nostalgia from the fracture of the Soviet Union and the consequent loss of jobs and stability and identity that came with this collapse. This pivot to emotional narrative is so powerful because it seems so convincing and 'realistic', that it overrides isolated facts such as violation of Ukrainian civilians, and allows the feeling of overwhelming certainty in one's righteousness even as it is divorced from reality. If they see mass graves or murdered civilians, it is explained away as the act of the actual 'Nazis' of the Ukrainian government. How is the Ukrainian government 'Nazified'? They are founded on the ideology of Banderites, which was allied with Hitler, and manifests now as Russophobia as proven by the removal of Russian as an official language of Ukraine. And so forth and so on.
This is such an interesting phenomenon with implications that go beyond what Russians believe. People everywhere can be susceptible to it. When a political narrative has an emotional core, believers will twist and warp the interpretation of facts to fit it, rather than ax the bedrock core of the belief. We can see it even in online discussions on hot-button issues, in our own, Western societies: people will react with conviction on topics even without statistics to back us. In fact, the author points out that Telegram, Russia's version of social media, floats in a rather free Internet, yet strident Russians there willingly choose to seek out news and narratives that confirms their pro-Putin position while sidestepping reports that scrutinize actual facts.
This happens even when the political message is not self-consistent. In the media landscape of Russia, storylines jostle with each other for emotional impact yet coexist: the invasion is a liberation of Ukraine, yet it is retribution for ethnic Russians. It is a limited 'special operation' that can start and stop anytime, yet it is also a clash of civilisations embracing all parts of life, including the survival of the Orthodox religion. The invasion restores Ukraine's sovereignty from the Nazis, yet it incorporates it within Russia's sovereignty. The war is an anti-colonial project, the war is an absorption project. These points contradict each other, yet to the Russian audience, the author says, they simultaneously make sense.
These narratives are particularly powerful in Russia where autocracy is in operation, people's political willpower is sapped by the lack of avenues for expression, and disengagement becomes a feedback loop wherein people become more lethargic and less likely to engage with minutiae of political news and facts. Propaganda becomes all-encompassing, with planned topics and vantage points coordinated throughout print, broadcast, and the distorting prism of social media.
Because of all these insights, this comprises an interesting book.
This is an interesting book about the Russo-Ukrainian war. Its main thesis posits boldly that, contrary to popular declarations, the invasion receives the tacit approval of a lot of Russians, who see the 'special military operation' as the conclusive articulation of hopes and dreams of resuscitation of Russian national identity. This stands in contrast to depictions of the war as the fervid madness of Putin alone, who embarked on a personal vendetta of conquest against the wishes of his populace. As the author says, 'our quarrel is with the Russian people', not Putin alone.
This is a huge claim so I was interested to see what evidence the author would advance to bolster her proposition. Unfortunately, this book isn't convincingly provisioned with proof. The author cites the results of phone surveys in Russia, which by her own admission and widespread knowledge are notoriously, farcically unreliable in results, because they are introduced as emissaries of a state that punishes criticism, protests and political disagreements with years-long tenancy in labor colonies that rob opponents of health and life. These phone surveys furthermore lead by 'confirming' the respondent's name and address, voiding any possibility of anonymity and a sincere response. The other source of the author's conclusion are the opinions and assertions of professors in and out of Russia, which are quite anecdotal and inconclusive in validity. Therefore I am not sure whether it is true Russians in majority support Putin's war.
This is nevertheless a book worth reading because it attempts to delve into the Russian citizen's psyche, and discover how people could lead decent lives while atrocities and butchery are being done on their behalf and implicit support. The author asserts that Russians exist in a spectrum of support for the Kremlin's invasion of Ukraine, ranging from reflexive and ritualized vehement trust and endorsement of everything Putin does, to dislike of Putin but strong nativist and nationalist sympathies, to a defensive posture with regards to NATO encirclement, to neutrality and apathy tempered by a vague feeling of patriotism for Russia. What unites these positions is that they don't present a credible opposition to Putin and his war.
In a stroke of malicious genius that's derived and perfected from years of practice in creating a landscape of disinformation, Russian media coverage of the war positions the war not just as an objective event, but instead couches them in narratives of civilizational defense or moral crusade, that appeal powerfully to Russians with emotional touchstones and sensitive buttons of humiliation or nostalgia from the fracture of the Soviet Union and the consequent loss of jobs and stability and identity that came with this collapse. This pivot to emotional narrative is so powerful because it seems so convincing and 'realistic', that it overrides isolated facts such as violation of Ukrainian civilians, and allows the feeling of overwhelming certainty in one's righteousness even as it is divorced from reality. If they see mass graves or murdered civilians, it is explained away as the act of the actual 'Nazis' of the Ukrainian government. How is the Ukrainian government 'Nazified'? They are founded on the ideology of Banderites, which was allied with Hitler, and manifests now as Russophobia as proven by the removal of Russian as an official language of Ukraine. And so forth and so on.
This is such an interesting phenomenon with implications that go beyond what Russians believe. People everywhere can be susceptible to it. When a political narrative has an emotional core, believers will twist and warp the interpretation of facts to fit it, rather than ax the bedrock core of the belief. We can see it even in online discussions on hot-button issues, in our own, Western societies: people will react with conviction on topics even without statistics to back us. In fact, the author points out that Telegram, Russia's version of social media, floats in a rather free Internet, yet strident Russians there willingly choose to seek out news and narratives that confirms their pro-Putin position while sidestepping reports that scrutinize actual facts.
This happens even when the political message is not self-consistent. In the media landscape of Russia, storylines jostle with each other for emotional impact yet coexist: the invasion is a liberation of Ukraine, yet it is retribution for ethnic Russians. It is a limited 'special operation' that can start and stop anytime, yet it is also a clash of civilisations embracing all parts of life, including the survival of the Orthodox religion. The invasion restores Ukraine's sovereignty from the Nazis, yet it incorporates it within Russia's sovereignty. The war is an anti-colonial project, the war is an absorption project. These points contradict each other, yet to the Russian audience, the author says, they simultaneously make sense.
These narratives are particularly powerful in Russia where autocracy is in operation, people's political willpower is sapped by the lack of avenues for expression, and disengagement becomes a feedback loop wherein people become more lethargic and less likely to engage with minutiae of political news and facts. Propaganda becomes all-encompassing, with planned topics and vantage points coordinated throughout print, broadcast, and the distorting prism of social media.
Because of all these insights, this comprises an interesting book.
August 13, 2023
Extremely good.
I recommend this for anyone following the events that Russia triggered in Ukraine. This is not a military history book but one that explains the widespread domestic support. It is well structured , well written (accessible , clear and lively ) and well sourced . Occasionally the odd throw away line and a passage about someone in the 1930s jar but these do nothing to detract. Makes you think , not just about Russia’s manipulation of history but that the misunderstanding in your own (uk in my case ) country .
Thoroughly recommend
I recommend this for anyone following the events that Russia triggered in Ukraine. This is not a military history book but one that explains the widespread domestic support. It is well structured , well written (accessible , clear and lively ) and well sourced . Occasionally the odd throw away line and a passage about someone in the 1930s jar but these do nothing to detract. Makes you think , not just about Russia’s manipulation of history but that the misunderstanding in your own (uk in my case ) country .
Thoroughly recommend
May 23, 2023
Jade McGlynn is my favorite up and coming Russia analyst, that is starting to gain more recognition and steam. Her views are accurate, to the point, and offer a "no bs" approach with answers. This is rarely seen today other than with Fiona Hill.
This book could help anybody from expert to novice, understand the shadow mechanisms behind this conflict. It also offers solutions, however that is where I have some criticism. McGlynn states that she wishes to fully support Ukraine and turn it into a "west berlin of democracy and opportunity". This is while offering to Russia simply to "stop the war, if Russia chooses, then Ukraine's victory will become Russia's victory too". This conclusion leads credence to the Western mindset of abandoning Russia (one of Russia's centuries long grievances stemming back to over 500 years), due to its historical backwardness and illnesses, instead of working towards HEALING the root cause of Russia's tantrums... which is Russia seeking acceptance and respect for what are from the West, legitimate slights from many generations.
You cannot simply tell a country built on being told it's "an unsolvable enigma that is existential in nature and unique in not being part of anything else" that it can just.... stop its behavior. I'm surprised honestly that McGlynn gave such a prognosis given her tendency to give historical parallels, the one she should have given is that of the collapse of the USSR and the West's OWN apathy towards helping Russia financially with the IMF and rebuilding. Russia has NOT been given ample opportunity that other post-soviet nations have, in healing, becoming integrated, and being forgiven for the ingrained revolutionary fever dreams stemming from Vladimir Lenin's inspiration and lust of Karl Marx's ideas. Granted, Russia is the heir to the USSR, it deserves a chance to change and grow... this is one of the main ways to truly allow Russia to overcome its internal anger at the West.
However, despite this major blind spot in this work, McGlynn offers the following interesting info:
p23 "comparison of post soviet trauma to a grotesque carnival"
p141 "its not NATO enlargement that matters, its Moscows perception that its ownership of Eastern Europe is violated"
p142 "with expansion, NATO went from defensive to aggressive alliance through kosovo"
p174 "russia worries that there is nothing, why does it exist, should it exist? need to justify - turn to history to ignite patriotism"
p210 "russia's great power status is dependent on its legacy as a victor over nazism"
p220 "humiliated people struggle to imagine a future as they play out old trauma's over and over. lacking a design for the future, Russia looks back at where it went wrong, where they lost the golden age, how they can improve the past, relive the bygone era"
I especially appreciated her humor at times, particularly on p157 in her roasting of Russia's obsession with moral stalwartism despite knowing so much about "gay sex parties" or "cocaine fueled sex workers" she said "the salicious mind boggles"
This book could help anybody from expert to novice, understand the shadow mechanisms behind this conflict. It also offers solutions, however that is where I have some criticism. McGlynn states that she wishes to fully support Ukraine and turn it into a "west berlin of democracy and opportunity". This is while offering to Russia simply to "stop the war, if Russia chooses, then Ukraine's victory will become Russia's victory too". This conclusion leads credence to the Western mindset of abandoning Russia (one of Russia's centuries long grievances stemming back to over 500 years), due to its historical backwardness and illnesses, instead of working towards HEALING the root cause of Russia's tantrums... which is Russia seeking acceptance and respect for what are from the West, legitimate slights from many generations.
You cannot simply tell a country built on being told it's "an unsolvable enigma that is existential in nature and unique in not being part of anything else" that it can just.... stop its behavior. I'm surprised honestly that McGlynn gave such a prognosis given her tendency to give historical parallels, the one she should have given is that of the collapse of the USSR and the West's OWN apathy towards helping Russia financially with the IMF and rebuilding. Russia has NOT been given ample opportunity that other post-soviet nations have, in healing, becoming integrated, and being forgiven for the ingrained revolutionary fever dreams stemming from Vladimir Lenin's inspiration and lust of Karl Marx's ideas. Granted, Russia is the heir to the USSR, it deserves a chance to change and grow... this is one of the main ways to truly allow Russia to overcome its internal anger at the West.
However, despite this major blind spot in this work, McGlynn offers the following interesting info:
p23 "comparison of post soviet trauma to a grotesque carnival"
p141 "its not NATO enlargement that matters, its Moscows perception that its ownership of Eastern Europe is violated"
p142 "with expansion, NATO went from defensive to aggressive alliance through kosovo"
p174 "russia worries that there is nothing, why does it exist, should it exist? need to justify - turn to history to ignite patriotism"
p210 "russia's great power status is dependent on its legacy as a victor over nazism"
p220 "humiliated people struggle to imagine a future as they play out old trauma's over and over. lacking a design for the future, Russia looks back at where it went wrong, where they lost the golden age, how they can improve the past, relive the bygone era"
I especially appreciated her humor at times, particularly on p157 in her roasting of Russia's obsession with moral stalwartism despite knowing so much about "gay sex parties" or "cocaine fueled sex workers" she said "the salicious mind boggles"
June 11, 2023
This is an unusual and exceptionally powerful book. McGlynn combines scholarly rigour with crusading passion to explore and understand the emergence of aggressive nationalism in Putin's Russia and its cultivation by Russia's leaders to justify the illegal full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
McGlynn explicitly challenges the view that this is 'Putin's war', emphasising the deeper and broader roots of Russian aggression as an emergent feature of post Soviet society, drawing on various tropes of Russia's constructed historical memory as a civilizing imperial force.
McGlynn is particularly effective in pointing out the disgraceful self justifications and self pity of much of the Russian intellectual elite who find Ukrainians' removal of Pushkin statues somehow more upsetting than Russian troops murdering Ukrainian children, stealing home appliances and shipping them back to their families in Russia, and raping Ukrainian women with the apparent blessing of wives back home.
McGlynn concludes that unfortunately, just as was the case for Nazi Germany, only the comprehensive defeat of Russia on the battlefield is likely to motivate a genuine soul searching and rebuilding of Russian identity on a humanist foundation.
Wonderful book.
McGlynn explicitly challenges the view that this is 'Putin's war', emphasising the deeper and broader roots of Russian aggression as an emergent feature of post Soviet society, drawing on various tropes of Russia's constructed historical memory as a civilizing imperial force.
McGlynn is particularly effective in pointing out the disgraceful self justifications and self pity of much of the Russian intellectual elite who find Ukrainians' removal of Pushkin statues somehow more upsetting than Russian troops murdering Ukrainian children, stealing home appliances and shipping them back to their families in Russia, and raping Ukrainian women with the apparent blessing of wives back home.
McGlynn concludes that unfortunately, just as was the case for Nazi Germany, only the comprehensive defeat of Russia on the battlefield is likely to motivate a genuine soul searching and rebuilding of Russian identity on a humanist foundation.
Wonderful book.
March 31, 2023
Fascinating and disturbing
This is a fascinating and very disturbing assessment of the war. It is a story of hatred unleashing a conflagration of evil. One certainly realises that there is no prospect of anything but grinding attrition and increasing hatred for a long time to come. I like the reminders that these are real people just like ourselves caught up in a nightmare of horror, rather than a retelling of events in the ground, such as 'the enemy launched as missiles today.' Read it!
This is a fascinating and very disturbing assessment of the war. It is a story of hatred unleashing a conflagration of evil. One certainly realises that there is no prospect of anything but grinding attrition and increasing hatred for a long time to come. I like the reminders that these are real people just like ourselves caught up in a nightmare of horror, rather than a retelling of events in the ground, such as 'the enemy launched as missiles today.' Read it!
May 27, 2024
A well written and researched look at the empirical facts surrounding an inconvenient truth. It outlines how large segments of the Russian population perceive the war in Ukraine with apathy, indifference, quiet support and in some cases with active support. It delves into how this is possible and how Putin’s regime operates to forward an agenda and to neutralize and silence opposition.
The insights are sharp and the picture it provides is bleak and uncomfortable. It bears naked a kleptocracy that picks and chooses narratives cynically, mixing a venomous brew of nationalism, authoritarian militarism, xenophobia, homophobia through a twisted lens of history. It proves case by case and empirically the wide spread apathy and fear as well as the lack of empathy and outright callus indifference of a rotten society.
There are no easy answers, no great solutions. The reader is left with a cold and bleak look into what indifference and evil.
The language is at times, decorative and the sentences ramble on. The wit and analysis is there but on occasion the audience would surely prefer a delivery to the point sooner.
The insights are sharp and the picture it provides is bleak and uncomfortable. It bears naked a kleptocracy that picks and chooses narratives cynically, mixing a venomous brew of nationalism, authoritarian militarism, xenophobia, homophobia through a twisted lens of history. It proves case by case and empirically the wide spread apathy and fear as well as the lack of empathy and outright callus indifference of a rotten society.
There are no easy answers, no great solutions. The reader is left with a cold and bleak look into what indifference and evil.
The language is at times, decorative and the sentences ramble on. The wit and analysis is there but on occasion the audience would surely prefer a delivery to the point sooner.
December 5, 2024
Fantastic book. It's a 5 star read without any doubt.
It is a bit outdated on the impact of sanctions, as the book was published in 2023, and the impact started to be felt more acutely recently. That was to be expected from a book published so shortly after the full-scale invasion.
Also, another thing happened which is not mentioned, again, because it is a more recent phenomenon. She doesn't speak of russians killing Ukrainian POWs, as in executions because Olenivka prison massacre and its ideological connection to the soviet killing of Polish POWs in Katyn is very rightly presented in a clear manner.
It is a bit outdated on the impact of sanctions, as the book was published in 2023, and the impact started to be felt more acutely recently. That was to be expected from a book published so shortly after the full-scale invasion.
Also, another thing happened which is not mentioned, again, because it is a more recent phenomenon. She doesn't speak of russians killing Ukrainian POWs, as in executions because Olenivka prison massacre and its ideological connection to the soviet killing of Polish POWs in Katyn is very rightly presented in a clear manner.
November 24, 2023
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Они все врут –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Они все врут –
Рыба гниет, гниет, гниет…
Народ не врет –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Но народ не тот –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Очень поверхностная книга, в которой весь анализ сводится к цитированию пророссийской пропаганды и нескольким интервью. Тогда зачем эта книга была написана? С моей точки зрения, причины две. Первая причина заключается в банальном желании заработать денег на такой горячей теме как Российско-Украинский конфликт. Вторую причину можно найти в самом начале книги, в том месте, где обычно пишется, кому посвящается книга. В этой книге мы находит такие слова: «To my Ukrainian friends, colleagues and heroes». Думаю, можно догадаться, в каком стиле выдержана вся книга. Что касается цели автора, то она очень проста: показать читателям, что это не Путин начал войну, а россияне в целом. На самом деле это очень удобно, ибо на запрос украинцев, кто теперь будет восстанавливать их города, американец и европеец, держа вот эту книгу, скажет, что раз начал войну не Путин и его окружение, коим европейцы и американцы пожимали руки, а русский народ, то вот у русского народа и требуйте. Но это ведь правильно, разве нет? Проблема в том, что кто девушку ужинает, тот её и танцует. А зная русских можно легко предположить, что русские просто так ничего не дадут, а дадут за некоторые уступки. Какие же это могут быть уступки? Русский язык, Пушкин, братскость и далее по списку. Вы меня спросите: а как же Бахмут, Буча и всё остальное? Я не знаю. Думаю, найдут слова (realpolitik, необходимость быть прагматичными, сложная ситуация, «ну вы же понимаете…»). Если ЕС и США сократят финансовую помощь Украине (см. историю пост-югославского конфликта) и заявят, что раз весь русский народ отвечает за действия своего правительства, а не российские чиновники и олигархи, у российского народа и требуйте денег. Но вы скажете: так то же самое было с Германией в 1945, разве нет? Нет, в Германии ответственность легла на плечи высшего истеблишмента (народ был жертвой) и именно поэтому в западную Германию очень быстро полились деньги, т.е. вчерашнего врага стали накачивать деньгами, восстанавливать города, экономику и пр. Ничего подобного автор этой книги не предлагает. В самом конце книги автор коротко резюмирует, что русские должны понять какую ошибку они допустили и…, ту я не понял, что нужно сделать: то ли покаяться, то ли ещё что-то. Может, построить демократию? Да нет, автор вообще ничего не пишет о проблеме демократии ни в РФ, ни в Украине. Проблема в том, что в итоге, Россия будет выглядеть не как ФРГ после экономического чуда 1948-1964, а как Веймарская республика 1918 года (на которую были наложены санкции из разряда «вот народ пусть и выплачивает»). Тут не то, что денег на восстановление востока Украины не будет, тут центральную Россию прокормить бы (каяться могут только сытые люди, а не голодные, как показал опыт той же Германии). Украина – новая Хорватия! Угу, а теперь почитайте про поствоенный период Хорватии, про диктатора Франьо Туджмана и добавьте к этому украинскую коррупцию, олигархат, размер страны и непонятные экономические отношения с соседями. Впрочем, я могу и ошибаться. Это всё гипотетически.
«The response rates to Russian polls are actually in line with, and generally higher than, the response rates in the USA, suggesting that it may not be fear or the autocratic political situation undermining Russians’ confidence to answer questions. Moreover, preference falsification, which looks at how respondents’ answers change when the questions are disguised, does not indicate that large numbers of Russians are lying about their approval».
Автор начинает с тезиса, что социологическим опросам можно верить, а они, как известно, показывают, что число россиян, которые поддерживают Путина, приближалось в разные годы к 90% (в среднем около 80%). Прям как в СССР или Румынии за несколько дней до расстрела Чаушеску. Но оставим этот социологический кульбит на совести автора.
«Until 5 March 2022, Russian laws on media and protest restrictions were very similar to those of 2021, when people took to the streets to rally against the unjust imprisonment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny.<…> The number of protestors and the number of cities that staged protests were considerably higher for Navalny than for Ukraine».
Для иностранца тут нет ничего странного, но для россиянина видна некомпетентность автора, ибо с начала Ковида в России начались очень сильные политические изменения. Именно с началом Ковида Россия изменилась, т.е. стала больше тоталитарной, нежели авторитарной. Иностранец этого увидеть не мог, конечно, но россияне это отчётливо почувствовали. Так что уже к 2022 году выходили на улицы только самые смелые или, лучше сказать, самые безумные. Российские власти вскоре после начала СВО поняли, что на самом деле большинству населения война очень не нравится, именно поэтому ввели сталинские уголовные сроки за любую публичную критику действий властей. Почему, если верить автору, это было сделано, если народ молчаливо поддержал Путина? В том то и дело что автор заблуждается. Автор не поняла, как на самом деле устроена Россия, а вот Путин это понял. Если бы не в ведение уголовной ответственности за любую критику режима, то уже очень скоро людей выходило бы намного больше, чем за всю историю современной России.
«Perhaps more pertinently, there have been no mass protests of Russians against the war in any of the places of emigration».
Выходили протестовать только самые политизированные и русские и украинцы. Нужно не забывать, что родина всё видит, всё слышит и всё записывает, что означает, что ответственность придёт даже спустя многие годы, если такой русский, по каким-то причинам, решит вернуться на родину. Это означает, что должна быть 100% гарантия, что он ни при каких обстоятельствах не будет выдворен из страны обратно в РФ.
«Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad».
Во-первых, как пишет автор книги The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution, украинцы смогли победить Януковича только благодаря тому, что много людей (включая многих националистов, коих в РФ задавили полностью) приехало из Львова. Другим словами, если бы не помощь из Львова, сейчас бы правил Янукович и никакой революции не было бы. Во-вторых, эта молодая девушка делает вид, что не понимает, почему русские, которые лишь пару лет жили при относительной политической свободе (т.е. 30 лет жили под диктатурой), не вышли под пули снайперов. А почему белорусы не вышли в 2022 году или они согласны с тем, что происходит? В Украине было намного больше свободы (даже при Януковиче), чем в России и Белоруссии. Так же интересно, почему сами украинцы, которых в РФ проживает около 2 миллионов не вышли? Почему не вышли жители Донбасса, предпочтя воевать и умирать? Почему автор не понимает таких простых вещей?
«They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’».
Другими слова, с кем там, в России говорить, если даже русские либералы являются дерьмом, что укладывается в украинскую парадигму «хороших русских не бывает». У русских, конечно, особое отношение, как к украинцам, так и к белорусам (старшая сестра и две младших, за которыми нужен глаз да глаз). Вот только россияне никогда не отрицали наличия украинского и белорусского государства, языка, культуры и пр. Права украинского народа на революцию? В Киргизии было три революции, но за это Россия не напала на Киргизию. Причина - в появившемся украинском политическом дуализме, особо ярко проявившемся в речёвке «Хто не скаче, той москаль». Думаю поэтому и был выбран Бандера (коррупция, бедность, неспособность попасть в ЕС – всё по причине русских корней), а не представитель олицетворявший демократию в Украине. Для Бандеры было главное не демократия, а независимая Украина, которая могла быть вовсе не демократической. Так что дело не в том, что россияне не могу увидеть в Украине другое государство и другой народ. Дело в элитах и их политических играх.
«So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to – and continue to choose to – even in the free space of the internet».
Какие же у автора аргументы? Только не смейтесь, но вот как она это обосновывает: «the most popular political and news channels on Telegram are pro-war and pro-Kremlin». И это всё. Вам смешно? А мне вот нет, ибо такие вот на Западе «эксперты по России».
P.S. Русским, конечно, необходимо пересмотреть своё отношение к Украине и Беларуси, но такие книги только вредят и отдаляют такое действие. Также, без построении демократии европейского образца этого произойти не может.
It is a very superficial book in which the entire analysis is reduced to quoting pro-Russian propaganda and a few interviews. Then why was this book written? From my point of view, there are two reasons. The first reason is the desire to make money on such a hot topic as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The second reason can be found at the very beginning of the book, in the place, where it is usually written to whom the book is dedicated. In this book, we find these words: "To my Ukrainian friends, colleagues and heroes". I think we can guess in what style the whole book is written. As for the author's goal, it is very plain: to show readers that it was not Putin who started the war, but Russians as a whole. In fact, it is very convenient because when Ukrainians ask who will now rebuild their cities, an American and a European, holding this book, will say that since the war was started not by Putin and his entourage, to whom Europeans and Americans shook hands, but by the Russian people, demand it from the Russian people. But it's the right thing to do, isn't it? The problem is that there is a good Russian proverb for this situation: "Who pays for a girl's dinner, dances with her". And knowing Russians, one can easily assume that Russians will not give anything for nothing but will give it for some concessions. What concessions could they be? Russian language, Pushkin, brotherhood, and the list goes on. But you will ask me: what about Bakhmut, Bucha, and everything else? I do not know. I think they will find words (realpolitik, the need to be pragmatic, a difficult situation, "you must understand..."). If the EU and the US cut financial aid to Ukraine (see the history of the post-Yugoslav conflict) and declare that since the Russian people are responsible for the actions of their government, and not Russian officials and oligarchs, demand money from the Russian people. But you will say: the same thing happened to Germany in 1945, wasn't it? No, in Germany, the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the upper establishment (the people were the victims), and that is why money poured into West Germany very quickly, i.e., they began to pump money into yesterday's enemy, rebuild the cities, the economy, etc. The author of this book offers nothing of the sort. At the very end of the book, the author briefly summarizes that Russians should understand what mistake they made and..., I didn't understand what they should do: either repent or something else. Maybe to build democracy? No, the author writes nothing about the problem of democracy neither in the Russian Federation nor in Ukraine. The problem is that in the end, Russia will look not like the FRG after the economic miracle of 1948-1964 but like the Weimar Republic of 1918 (which was heavily sanctioned on the basis of "let the people pay for it"). Not only will there be no money to rebuild eastern Ukraine, but there won't be enough money even for central Russia (only well-fed people can repent, not hungry people, as the experience of the same Germany has shown). Ukraine is the new Croatia! Uh-huh, and now read about Croatia's post-war period, about dictator Franjo Tudjman, and add to that Ukrainian corruption, oligarchy, size of the country, and unclear economic relations with neighbors. However, I could be wrong. This is all hypothetical.
«The response rates to Russian polls are actually in line with, and generally higher than, the response rates in the USA, suggesting that it may not be fear or the autocratic political situation undermining Russians’ confidence to answer questions. Moreover, preference falsification, which looks at how respondents’ answers change when the questions are disguised, does not indicate that large numbers of Russians are lying about their approval».
The author starts with the thesis that sociological polls can be trusted, and they, as we know, show that the number of Russians who support Putin approached 90% in different years (on average about 80%). Just like in the USSR or Romania a few days before Ceausescu was shot. But let's leave this sociological somersault to the author's conscience.
«Until 5 March 2022, Russian laws on media and protest restrictions were very similar to those of 2021, when people took to the streets to rally against the unjust imprisonment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny.<…> The number of protestors and the number of cities that staged protests were considerably higher for Navalny than for Ukraine».
For a foreigner, there is nothing strange here, but for a Russian, the author's incompetence is obvious, because since the beginning of Covid, very strong political changes began in Russia. It was with the beginning of COVID-19 that Russia changed, i.e., became more totalitarian than authoritarian. A foreigner could not see it, of course, but Russians felt it. So by 2022, only the most courageous or, better to say, the most insane took to the streets. The Russian authorities realized soon after the SVO began that the majority of the population disliked the war very much, which is why they introduced Stalinist criminal sentences for any public criticism of the authorities' actions. Why, according to the author, was it done if the people tacitly supported Putin? That's the point - the author is deluded. The author did not understand how Russia really works, but Putin did. Without the criminalization of any criticism of the regime, very soon, there would be many more people taking to the streets than in the entire history of modern Russia.
«Perhaps more pertinently, there have been no mass protests of Russians against the war in any of the places of emigration».
Only the most politicized Russians and Ukrainians came out to protest. One should not forget that the homeland sees everything, hears everything, and records everything, which means that responsibility will come even after many years if such a Russian, for whatever reason, decides to return to his homeland. This means that there should be a 100% guarantee that under no circumstances he will not be expelled from the country back to the Russian Federation.
«Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad».
First, as the author of The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution writes, the Ukrainians were able to defeat Yanukovych only because many people (including many nationalists, who were completely crushed in Russia) came from Lviv. In other words, if there had been no help from Lviv, Yanukovych would have ruled now, and there would have been no revolution. Secondly, this young girl pretends she doesn't understand why Russians, who only lived under relative political freedom for a couple of years (i.e., 30 years living under a dictatorship), didn't come out under snipers' bullets. And why didn't the Belarusians come out in 2022, or are they okay with what's going on? Ukraine had much more freedom (even under Yanukovych) than Russia and Belarus. I also wonder why the Ukrainians themselves, of which there are about 2 million in the Russian Federation, didn't come out. Why didn't the residents of Donbas come out, preferring to fight and die? Why doesn't the author understand such simple things?
«They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’».
In other words, there is nobody to talk to in Russia if even Russian liberals are shit, which fits into the Ukrainian paradigm of "there are no good Russians". Russians, of course, have a special attitude to both Ukrainians and Belarusians (an older sister and two younger ones who need an eye and an eye). Russians have never denied the existence of Ukrainian and Belarusian states, language, culture, etc. The rights of the Ukrainian people to revolution? There were three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, but Russia did not attack Kyrgyzstan for that. The reason for this is the Ukrainian political dualism that has emerged, especially manifested in the slogan "Хто не скаче, той москаль". I think that's why Bandera was chosen (corruption, poverty, inability to join the EU - all because of Russian roots in Ukraine) over the representative who represented democracy in Ukraine. The main thing for Bandera was not democracy but independent Ukraine, which might not be democratic at all. So the point is not that Russians cannot see in Ukraine another state and other people. It's about the elites and their political games (I'm talking about the elites of both Ukraine and Russia).
«So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to – and continue to choose to – even in the free space of the internet».
So, what is the author's reasoning? Don't laugh, but here's how she justifies it: "The most popular political and news channels on Telegram are pro-war and pro-Kremlin." And that's it. Is that funny to you? I'm not because these are the kind of "Russian experts" in the West.
P.S. Russians, of course, need to reconsider their attitude to Ukraine and Belarus, but such books only harm and alienate such action. Also, it cannot happen without building a European-style democracy.
Они все врут –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Они все врут –
Рыба гниет, гниет, гниет…
Народ не врет –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Но народ не тот –
Рыба гниет с головы.
Очень поверхностная книга, в которой весь анализ сводится к цитированию пророссийской пропаганды и нескольким интервью. Тогда зачем эта книга была написана? С моей точки зрения, причины две. Первая причина заключается в банальном желании заработать денег на такой горячей теме как Российско-Украинский конфликт. Вторую причину можно найти в самом начале книги, в том месте, где обычно пишется, кому посвящается книга. В этой книге мы находит такие слова: «To my Ukrainian friends, colleagues and heroes». Думаю, можно догадаться, в каком стиле выдержана вся книга. Что касается цели автора, то она очень проста: показать читателям, что это не Путин начал войну, а россияне в целом. На самом деле это очень удобно, ибо на запрос украинцев, кто теперь будет восстанавливать их города, американец и европеец, держа вот эту книгу, скажет, что раз начал войну не Путин и его окружение, коим европейцы и американцы пожимали руки, а русский народ, то вот у русского народа и требуйте. Но это ведь правильно, разве нет? Проблема в том, что кто девушку ужинает, тот её и танцует. А зная русских можно легко предположить, что русские просто так ничего не дадут, а дадут за некоторые уступки. Какие же это могут быть уступки? Русский язык, Пушкин, братскость и далее по списку. Вы меня спросите: а как же Бахмут, Буча и всё остальное? Я не знаю. Думаю, найдут слова (realpolitik, необходимость быть прагматичными, сложная ситуация, «ну вы же понимаете…»). Если ЕС и США сократят финансовую помощь Украине (см. историю пост-югославского конфликта) и заявят, что раз весь русский народ отвечает за действия своего правительства, а не российские чиновники и олигархи, у российского народа и требуйте денег. Но вы скажете: так то же самое было с Германией в 1945, разве нет? Нет, в Германии ответственность легла на плечи высшего истеблишмента (народ был жертвой) и именно поэтому в западную Германию очень быстро полились деньги, т.е. вчерашнего врага стали накачивать деньгами, восстанавливать города, экономику и пр. Ничего подобного автор этой книги не предлагает. В самом конце книги автор коротко резюмирует, что русские должны понять какую ошибку они допустили и…, ту я не понял, что нужно сделать: то ли покаяться, то ли ещё что-то. Может, построить демократию? Да нет, автор вообще ничего не пишет о проблеме демократии ни в РФ, ни в Украине. Проблема в том, что в итоге, Россия будет выглядеть не как ФРГ после экономического чуда 1948-1964, а как Веймарская республика 1918 года (на которую были наложены санкции из разряда «вот народ пусть и выплачивает»). Тут не то, что денег на восстановление востока Украины не будет, тут центральную Россию прокормить бы (каяться могут только сытые люди, а не голодные, как показал опыт той же Германии). Украина – новая Хорватия! Угу, а теперь почитайте про поствоенный период Хорватии, про диктатора Франьо Туджмана и добавьте к этому украинскую коррупцию, олигархат, размер страны и непонятные экономические отношения с соседями. Впрочем, я могу и ошибаться. Это всё гипотетически.
«The response rates to Russian polls are actually in line with, and generally higher than, the response rates in the USA, suggesting that it may not be fear or the autocratic political situation undermining Russians’ confidence to answer questions. Moreover, preference falsification, which looks at how respondents’ answers change when the questions are disguised, does not indicate that large numbers of Russians are lying about their approval».
Автор начинает с тезиса, что социологическим опросам можно верить, а они, как известно, показывают, что число россиян, которые поддерживают Путина, приближалось в разные годы к 90% (в среднем около 80%). Прям как в СССР или Румынии за несколько дней до расстрела Чаушеску. Но оставим этот социологический кульбит на совести автора.
«Until 5 March 2022, Russian laws on media and protest restrictions were very similar to those of 2021, when people took to the streets to rally against the unjust imprisonment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny.<…> The number of protestors and the number of cities that staged protests were considerably higher for Navalny than for Ukraine».
Для иностранца тут нет ничего странного, но для россиянина видна некомпетентность автора, ибо с начала Ковида в России начались очень сильные политические изменения. Именно с началом Ковида Россия изменилась, т.е. стала больше тоталитарной, нежели авторитарной. Иностранец этого увидеть не мог, конечно, но россияне это отчётливо почувствовали. Так что уже к 2022 году выходили на улицы только самые смелые или, лучше сказать, самые безумные. Российские власти вскоре после начала СВО поняли, что на самом деле большинству населения война очень не нравится, именно поэтому ввели сталинские уголовные сроки за любую публичную критику действий властей. Почему, если верить автору, это было сделано, если народ молчаливо поддержал Путина? В том то и дело что автор заблуждается. Автор не поняла, как на самом деле устроена Россия, а вот Путин это понял. Если бы не в ведение уголовной ответственности за любую критику режима, то уже очень скоро людей выходило бы намного больше, чем за всю историю современной России.
«Perhaps more pertinently, there have been no mass protests of Russians against the war in any of the places of emigration».
Выходили протестовать только самые политизированные и русские и украинцы. Нужно не забывать, что родина всё видит, всё слышит и всё записывает, что означает, что ответственность придёт даже спустя многие годы, если такой русский, по каким-то причинам, решит вернуться на родину. Это означает, что должна быть 100% гарантия, что он ни при каких обстоятельствах не будет выдворен из страны обратно в РФ.
«Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad».
Во-первых, как пишет автор книги The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution, украинцы смогли победить Януковича только благодаря тому, что много людей (включая многих националистов, коих в РФ задавили полностью) приехало из Львова. Другим словами, если бы не помощь из Львова, сейчас бы правил Янукович и никакой революции не было бы. Во-вторых, эта молодая девушка делает вид, что не понимает, почему русские, которые лишь пару лет жили при относительной политической свободе (т.е. 30 лет жили под диктатурой), не вышли под пули снайперов. А почему белорусы не вышли в 2022 году или они согласны с тем, что происходит? В Украине было намного больше свободы (даже при Януковиче), чем в России и Белоруссии. Так же интересно, почему сами украинцы, которых в РФ проживает около 2 миллионов не вышли? Почему не вышли жители Донбасса, предпочтя воевать и умирать? Почему автор не понимает таких простых вещей?
«They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’».
Другими слова, с кем там, в России говорить, если даже русские либералы являются дерьмом, что укладывается в украинскую парадигму «хороших русских не бывает». У русских, конечно, особое отношение, как к украинцам, так и к белорусам (старшая сестра и две младших, за которыми нужен глаз да глаз). Вот только россияне никогда не отрицали наличия украинского и белорусского государства, языка, культуры и пр. Права украинского народа на революцию? В Киргизии было три революции, но за это Россия не напала на Киргизию. Причина - в появившемся украинском политическом дуализме, особо ярко проявившемся в речёвке «Хто не скаче, той москаль». Думаю поэтому и был выбран Бандера (коррупция, бедность, неспособность попасть в ЕС – всё по причине русских корней), а не представитель олицетворявший демократию в Украине. Для Бандеры было главное не демократия, а независимая Украина, которая могла быть вовсе не демократической. Так что дело не в том, что россияне не могу увидеть в Украине другое государство и другой народ. Дело в элитах и их политических играх.
«So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to – and continue to choose to – even in the free space of the internet».
Какие же у автора аргументы? Только не смейтесь, но вот как она это обосновывает: «the most popular political and news channels on Telegram are pro-war and pro-Kremlin». И это всё. Вам смешно? А мне вот нет, ибо такие вот на Западе «эксперты по России».
P.S. Русским, конечно, необходимо пересмотреть своё отношение к Украине и Беларуси, но такие книги только вредят и отдаляют такое действие. Также, без построении демократии европейского образца этого произойти не может.
It is a very superficial book in which the entire analysis is reduced to quoting pro-Russian propaganda and a few interviews. Then why was this book written? From my point of view, there are two reasons. The first reason is the desire to make money on such a hot topic as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The second reason can be found at the very beginning of the book, in the place, where it is usually written to whom the book is dedicated. In this book, we find these words: "To my Ukrainian friends, colleagues and heroes". I think we can guess in what style the whole book is written. As for the author's goal, it is very plain: to show readers that it was not Putin who started the war, but Russians as a whole. In fact, it is very convenient because when Ukrainians ask who will now rebuild their cities, an American and a European, holding this book, will say that since the war was started not by Putin and his entourage, to whom Europeans and Americans shook hands, but by the Russian people, demand it from the Russian people. But it's the right thing to do, isn't it? The problem is that there is a good Russian proverb for this situation: "Who pays for a girl's dinner, dances with her". And knowing Russians, one can easily assume that Russians will not give anything for nothing but will give it for some concessions. What concessions could they be? Russian language, Pushkin, brotherhood, and the list goes on. But you will ask me: what about Bakhmut, Bucha, and everything else? I do not know. I think they will find words (realpolitik, the need to be pragmatic, a difficult situation, "you must understand..."). If the EU and the US cut financial aid to Ukraine (see the history of the post-Yugoslav conflict) and declare that since the Russian people are responsible for the actions of their government, and not Russian officials and oligarchs, demand money from the Russian people. But you will say: the same thing happened to Germany in 1945, wasn't it? No, in Germany, the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the upper establishment (the people were the victims), and that is why money poured into West Germany very quickly, i.e., they began to pump money into yesterday's enemy, rebuild the cities, the economy, etc. The author of this book offers nothing of the sort. At the very end of the book, the author briefly summarizes that Russians should understand what mistake they made and..., I didn't understand what they should do: either repent or something else. Maybe to build democracy? No, the author writes nothing about the problem of democracy neither in the Russian Federation nor in Ukraine. The problem is that in the end, Russia will look not like the FRG after the economic miracle of 1948-1964 but like the Weimar Republic of 1918 (which was heavily sanctioned on the basis of "let the people pay for it"). Not only will there be no money to rebuild eastern Ukraine, but there won't be enough money even for central Russia (only well-fed people can repent, not hungry people, as the experience of the same Germany has shown). Ukraine is the new Croatia! Uh-huh, and now read about Croatia's post-war period, about dictator Franjo Tudjman, and add to that Ukrainian corruption, oligarchy, size of the country, and unclear economic relations with neighbors. However, I could be wrong. This is all hypothetical.
«The response rates to Russian polls are actually in line with, and generally higher than, the response rates in the USA, suggesting that it may not be fear or the autocratic political situation undermining Russians’ confidence to answer questions. Moreover, preference falsification, which looks at how respondents’ answers change when the questions are disguised, does not indicate that large numbers of Russians are lying about their approval».
The author starts with the thesis that sociological polls can be trusted, and they, as we know, show that the number of Russians who support Putin approached 90% in different years (on average about 80%). Just like in the USSR or Romania a few days before Ceausescu was shot. But let's leave this sociological somersault to the author's conscience.
«Until 5 March 2022, Russian laws on media and protest restrictions were very similar to those of 2021, when people took to the streets to rally against the unjust imprisonment of opposition figure Aleksei Navalny.<…> The number of protestors and the number of cities that staged protests were considerably higher for Navalny than for Ukraine».
For a foreigner, there is nothing strange here, but for a Russian, the author's incompetence is obvious, because since the beginning of Covid, very strong political changes began in Russia. It was with the beginning of COVID-19 that Russia changed, i.e., became more totalitarian than authoritarian. A foreigner could not see it, of course, but Russians felt it. So by 2022, only the most courageous or, better to say, the most insane took to the streets. The Russian authorities realized soon after the SVO began that the majority of the population disliked the war very much, which is why they introduced Stalinist criminal sentences for any public criticism of the authorities' actions. Why, according to the author, was it done if the people tacitly supported Putin? That's the point - the author is deluded. The author did not understand how Russia really works, but Putin did. Without the criminalization of any criticism of the regime, very soon, there would be many more people taking to the streets than in the entire history of modern Russia.
«Perhaps more pertinently, there have been no mass protests of Russians against the war in any of the places of emigration».
Only the most politicized Russians and Ukrainians came out to protest. One should not forget that the homeland sees everything, hears everything, and records everything, which means that responsibility will come even after many years if such a Russian, for whatever reason, decides to return to his homeland. This means that there should be a 100% guarantee that under no circumstances he will not be expelled from the country back to the Russian Federation.
«Explanations that will convince a Western audience – that Russians cannot be expected to protest in such a frightening environment, all they can do is leave – are given short shrift by Ukrainians who have staged two revolutions over the last twenty years, in the face of brutality and snipers, and who returned to fight in their tens of thousands from working abroad».
First, as the author of The Ukrainian Night: An Intimate History of Revolution writes, the Ukrainians were able to defeat Yanukovych only because many people (including many nationalists, who were completely crushed in Russia) came from Lviv. In other words, if there had been no help from Lviv, Yanukovych would have ruled now, and there would have been no revolution. Secondly, this young girl pretends she doesn't understand why Russians, who only lived under relative political freedom for a couple of years (i.e., 30 years living under a dictatorship), didn't come out under snipers' bullets. And why didn't the Belarusians come out in 2022, or are they okay with what's going on? Ukraine had much more freedom (even under Yanukovych) than Russia and Belarus. I also wonder why the Ukrainians themselves, of which there are about 2 million in the Russian Federation, didn't come out. Why didn't the residents of Donbas come out, preferring to fight and die? Why doesn't the author understand such simple things?
«They are so arrogant and condescending, even among liberals, this is just their attitude, the Russian attitude, they do not see Ukraine as really abroad, as a real country, we are just a joke to them.’».
In other words, there is nobody to talk to in Russia if even Russian liberals are shit, which fits into the Ukrainian paradigm of "there are no good Russians". Russians, of course, have a special attitude to both Ukrainians and Belarusians (an older sister and two younger ones who need an eye and an eye). Russians have never denied the existence of Ukrainian and Belarusian states, language, culture, etc. The rights of the Ukrainian people to revolution? There were three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, but Russia did not attack Kyrgyzstan for that. The reason for this is the Ukrainian political dualism that has emerged, especially manifested in the slogan "Хто не скаче, той москаль". I think that's why Bandera was chosen (corruption, poverty, inability to join the EU - all because of Russian roots in Ukraine) over the representative who represented democracy in Ukraine. The main thing for Bandera was not democracy but independent Ukraine, which might not be democratic at all. So the point is not that Russians cannot see in Ukraine another state and other people. It's about the elites and their political games (I'm talking about the elites of both Ukraine and Russia).
«So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to – and continue to choose to – even in the free space of the internet».
So, what is the author's reasoning? Don't laugh, but here's how she justifies it: "The most popular political and news channels on Telegram are pro-war and pro-Kremlin." And that's it. Is that funny to you? I'm not because these are the kind of "Russian experts" in the West.
P.S. Russians, of course, need to reconsider their attitude to Ukraine and Belarus, but such books only harm and alienate such action. Also, it cannot happen without building a European-style democracy.
March 18, 2024
Everyone, especially in the West, should read this.
January 4, 2025
This is a very readable book that follows a line that I thought I'd disagree with prior to reading and was only in a very limited sense persuaded by during the reading, but still found very much worth the investment of time.
Her argument I summarise as follows (with quotes from the book):
The "purpose in writing this book is to explain why Russians support the war and what that support actually means in a context (almost) devoid of political agency." It is a mistake to focus on Putin in isolation as the instigator of the assault and invasion of Ukraine. “Putin doesn’t shape Russians’ views on foreign policy or Ukraine so much as he articulates them", using state propaganda to co-create narratives with the Russian population to justify their policies. Kremlin narratives draws on existing societal sentiment, with the main aims being to create a “coherent Russian identity out of the past in order to derive political legitimacy from it in the present. The narrative compromises three broad arguments: that Russia needs a strong state; that Russia has a special path of development; and that Russia is a messianic great power with something unique to offer the world.” For example, "Russians have scored higher than any other country polled on the measure of ‘blind and militant’ patriotism since the 1990s", something Putin has leaned on in generating support for one of the most pointless, deadly and destructive wars in modern history.
She argues however that it isn’t simply a case of Putin and Russia thinking ‘might is right’ – they also think they are a morally superior nation, ‘the goodies’ in the story; “Russia analyst Aleksandr Baunov described this perspective succinctly: ‘Russians believe that the West is richer than us not because they are better but because they are worse. They might be richer or stronger but we have truth.’ This harks back to a longstanding self-perception that Russians are more spiritual and sincere than the materialistic and rationalist West. Ostensibly, they prize moral justice over legal justice.”
This ‘goodness’ of Russians is also used by state propaganda to explain to the population why their army hasn’t taken Ukraine in two days, as the odious propaganda chief Margarita Simonyan predicted a year prior to the invasion. As the successful author, Vladimir Orlov, stated - "‘Russia is not the United States, Russia will not behave like the Americans behaved in Iraq, where they arrived and used divide and rule. We will not pit the Catholics against the Orthodox, like the Americans did with the Sunni and Shia. We will not do aerial bombardments like the Americans did in Iraq… if Russia had wanted to win just by military force we could have done that easily. With lots of loss of human life in Ukraine but easily.’ Like real Communism, it would appear that winning the war simply has never been tried.”
Other themes she explores include the idea of Russian exceptionalism; “Vladimir Putin is clearly quite personally troubled by American claims to exceptionalism. The historian Sergey Radchenko has written about how this preoccupation and effort to occupy the same space reminds him of the protagonist in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Rodion Raskolnikov, who struggles to rationalise the abominable to prove his own exceptionalism. ‘Behind all this rhetoric lies Putin’s preoccupation – an obsession even – with proving to others and, above all, to himself that he has the right to Ukraine, the right not in a moral-ethical sense, nor in any legal sense, but in Raskolnikov’s sense: to bend down and pick up what was his because he dared to do what no one else did – openly challenge the US-led rules-based world order.’”
In the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of the USSR and the disastrous pseudo-capitalism of the 1990's, the Kremlin's collective narrative is also founded on the politics of bitterness. "It leaves no space for hope, only revenge; no space for improvement, only redemption; and no space for the future, only a reproducible past in which people can take shelter from the present... In the absence of ideology, the source of conflict has become identity imbued with genealogical essentialism and historicism."
These aspects of Russian society stem in part from how Russia has dealt with its history. “There has been no historical reckoning with Soviet perpetrators in Russia, indeed the fact that those responsible for the extrajudicial murder of millions have never faced justice and that many of them even remain heroes, with their heirs in charge of the country, at a conscious and subconscious level encourages the same cult of violence to continue.” For example, Putin’s Russia and the ‘Russias’ that existed prior to Putin have used the victory over Nazi Germany not only to remember and mourn the dead, but to “justify internal politics and also imperial expansion”. There is indeed a strange and unnerving slogan that ‘we can do it again’ associated with Victory Day – strange considering the staggering loss of life the country experienced during WWII, unnerving because the consequence - after liberation from the Nazis - was the oppressive occupation of Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the author states that “ultimately, (she sees) Russia’s genocidal war of conquest against Ukraine as a deranged quest to prove an imagined essentialist vision of Russianness spurred by the fear and trauma of having to overcome and address Russians’ lack of national ‘bondings’, to borrow Putin’s neologism”, and that “rather than pretending the cure is as simple as fact-checking – information versus disinformation – anyone wishing to engage or change Russians’ views will need to address the sources of why people want to watch disinformation, what are they looking for? The watching of propaganda is as much symptom of an underlying problem, as it is cause of further problems.”
As to my view, I agree that it is important to understand how the Kremlin’s lines find sympathetic ears amongst much of the population. There has indeed been much bitterness in Russian political sentiment that Putin represents and has tried, I believe with limited success, to ignite, as well as widely believed myths (hardly unique to Russia) as to the moral goodness of the nation and the consequent responsibility to save the world from itself. Certainly, it can come as quite a shock to see YouTube street interviews with especially pensioner-aged Russians where they absolutely see the ‘collective West’ as the bad guys and Russia as the good guys, protecting the poor people of Eastern Ukraine (which their army has spent three years shelling to destruction).
Where we differ, however, is why so many Russians accept and 'agree' with the war. What I see is passive acquiescence, not positive support. I find this unsurprising in a system run by a dictator who has removed almost all forms of opposition over his (up until the invasion) 22 years in power, one that is characterised by a deeply repressive political system where the police are used to beat up disobedient subjects and where even a small protest can lead to a decade behind bars – where even a small, semi-hidden graffiti saying ‘no to war’ is an act of political bravery.
Too little weight is given in the book to the Kremlin's manipulation of the population. Putin’s state at the federal level is bad at doing almost everything, but one thing it is extremely capable at is understanding how to wield propaganda. It is striking how the source of Russian people’s information effectively defines their view of the narrative around the war – television (all state controlled) viewers buy the line that Russia is protecting itself and Russian speaking populations from an aggressive and expansionist ‘collective west’ (led by bloodthirsty anglo-saxons according to some of the most looney presenters!), whilst those that gain their information from the internet (and can access alternative views with the use of VPNs) are aware of the lies but feel hopeless in effecting change. It’s true that we haven’t seen mass protests amongst Russians who have emigrated due to the war, but I’d argue that this is mostly due to fear of repercussions against their remaining family members in country.
So I would suggest that far less important to understanding Russian society’s reactions to war are the narratives that Putin and society co-create, and far more important are the ways people (not just Russians) living under such a system have to find ways to adapt so as not to go to jail or go mentally insane. That includes avoiding non-state sources of information and willing themselves to believe their side are the good guys, or escaping from reality by trying to ignore it completely. Yes, there is a turbo charged nationalist section of Russian society, and they are the ones being promoted and having their voices amplified in Putin’s system, but to look to them as a source of this conflict would I think be a mistake.
I would argue that this war, fundamentally, is about Putin’s obsession, after so many years holding unopposed power, with showing the world (and future historians) what he is capable of as an individual ‘great’ leader, whilst trying – quite weakly in fact – to shroud his motivation in pseudo narratives that most of the population is pretending to go along with.
For me, there is no evidence this is a popular war. On the contrary, the Russian state has needed to pay small fortunes to get people from the country's poorer regions to sign up, and when mobilisation was announced, up to a million young men voted with their feet and got the hell out. Sales of anti-depressants have sky rocketed. Outside of state television, politics as a public subject is avoided like the plague. Ultimately, as quoted at the end of the book, tragically for Ukraine first and Russia second, “Russia lives in a closet stuffed with skeletons and this war will only add more” (Maxim Trudolyubov, former Editor-at-Large of Meduza).
Her argument I summarise as follows (with quotes from the book):
The "purpose in writing this book is to explain why Russians support the war and what that support actually means in a context (almost) devoid of political agency." It is a mistake to focus on Putin in isolation as the instigator of the assault and invasion of Ukraine. “Putin doesn’t shape Russians’ views on foreign policy or Ukraine so much as he articulates them", using state propaganda to co-create narratives with the Russian population to justify their policies. Kremlin narratives draws on existing societal sentiment, with the main aims being to create a “coherent Russian identity out of the past in order to derive political legitimacy from it in the present. The narrative compromises three broad arguments: that Russia needs a strong state; that Russia has a special path of development; and that Russia is a messianic great power with something unique to offer the world.” For example, "Russians have scored higher than any other country polled on the measure of ‘blind and militant’ patriotism since the 1990s", something Putin has leaned on in generating support for one of the most pointless, deadly and destructive wars in modern history.
She argues however that it isn’t simply a case of Putin and Russia thinking ‘might is right’ – they also think they are a morally superior nation, ‘the goodies’ in the story; “Russia analyst Aleksandr Baunov described this perspective succinctly: ‘Russians believe that the West is richer than us not because they are better but because they are worse. They might be richer or stronger but we have truth.’ This harks back to a longstanding self-perception that Russians are more spiritual and sincere than the materialistic and rationalist West. Ostensibly, they prize moral justice over legal justice.”
This ‘goodness’ of Russians is also used by state propaganda to explain to the population why their army hasn’t taken Ukraine in two days, as the odious propaganda chief Margarita Simonyan predicted a year prior to the invasion. As the successful author, Vladimir Orlov, stated - "‘Russia is not the United States, Russia will not behave like the Americans behaved in Iraq, where they arrived and used divide and rule. We will not pit the Catholics against the Orthodox, like the Americans did with the Sunni and Shia. We will not do aerial bombardments like the Americans did in Iraq… if Russia had wanted to win just by military force we could have done that easily. With lots of loss of human life in Ukraine but easily.’ Like real Communism, it would appear that winning the war simply has never been tried.”
Other themes she explores include the idea of Russian exceptionalism; “Vladimir Putin is clearly quite personally troubled by American claims to exceptionalism. The historian Sergey Radchenko has written about how this preoccupation and effort to occupy the same space reminds him of the protagonist in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, Rodion Raskolnikov, who struggles to rationalise the abominable to prove his own exceptionalism. ‘Behind all this rhetoric lies Putin’s preoccupation – an obsession even – with proving to others and, above all, to himself that he has the right to Ukraine, the right not in a moral-ethical sense, nor in any legal sense, but in Raskolnikov’s sense: to bend down and pick up what was his because he dared to do what no one else did – openly challenge the US-led rules-based world order.’”
In the ideological vacuum left by the collapse of the USSR and the disastrous pseudo-capitalism of the 1990's, the Kremlin's collective narrative is also founded on the politics of bitterness. "It leaves no space for hope, only revenge; no space for improvement, only redemption; and no space for the future, only a reproducible past in which people can take shelter from the present... In the absence of ideology, the source of conflict has become identity imbued with genealogical essentialism and historicism."
These aspects of Russian society stem in part from how Russia has dealt with its history. “There has been no historical reckoning with Soviet perpetrators in Russia, indeed the fact that those responsible for the extrajudicial murder of millions have never faced justice and that many of them even remain heroes, with their heirs in charge of the country, at a conscious and subconscious level encourages the same cult of violence to continue.” For example, Putin’s Russia and the ‘Russias’ that existed prior to Putin have used the victory over Nazi Germany not only to remember and mourn the dead, but to “justify internal politics and also imperial expansion”. There is indeed a strange and unnerving slogan that ‘we can do it again’ associated with Victory Day – strange considering the staggering loss of life the country experienced during WWII, unnerving because the consequence - after liberation from the Nazis - was the oppressive occupation of Eastern Europe.
In conclusion, the author states that “ultimately, (she sees) Russia’s genocidal war of conquest against Ukraine as a deranged quest to prove an imagined essentialist vision of Russianness spurred by the fear and trauma of having to overcome and address Russians’ lack of national ‘bondings’, to borrow Putin’s neologism”, and that “rather than pretending the cure is as simple as fact-checking – information versus disinformation – anyone wishing to engage or change Russians’ views will need to address the sources of why people want to watch disinformation, what are they looking for? The watching of propaganda is as much symptom of an underlying problem, as it is cause of further problems.”
As to my view, I agree that it is important to understand how the Kremlin’s lines find sympathetic ears amongst much of the population. There has indeed been much bitterness in Russian political sentiment that Putin represents and has tried, I believe with limited success, to ignite, as well as widely believed myths (hardly unique to Russia) as to the moral goodness of the nation and the consequent responsibility to save the world from itself. Certainly, it can come as quite a shock to see YouTube street interviews with especially pensioner-aged Russians where they absolutely see the ‘collective West’ as the bad guys and Russia as the good guys, protecting the poor people of Eastern Ukraine (which their army has spent three years shelling to destruction).
Where we differ, however, is why so many Russians accept and 'agree' with the war. What I see is passive acquiescence, not positive support. I find this unsurprising in a system run by a dictator who has removed almost all forms of opposition over his (up until the invasion) 22 years in power, one that is characterised by a deeply repressive political system where the police are used to beat up disobedient subjects and where even a small protest can lead to a decade behind bars – where even a small, semi-hidden graffiti saying ‘no to war’ is an act of political bravery.
Too little weight is given in the book to the Kremlin's manipulation of the population. Putin’s state at the federal level is bad at doing almost everything, but one thing it is extremely capable at is understanding how to wield propaganda. It is striking how the source of Russian people’s information effectively defines their view of the narrative around the war – television (all state controlled) viewers buy the line that Russia is protecting itself and Russian speaking populations from an aggressive and expansionist ‘collective west’ (led by bloodthirsty anglo-saxons according to some of the most looney presenters!), whilst those that gain their information from the internet (and can access alternative views with the use of VPNs) are aware of the lies but feel hopeless in effecting change. It’s true that we haven’t seen mass protests amongst Russians who have emigrated due to the war, but I’d argue that this is mostly due to fear of repercussions against their remaining family members in country.
So I would suggest that far less important to understanding Russian society’s reactions to war are the narratives that Putin and society co-create, and far more important are the ways people (not just Russians) living under such a system have to find ways to adapt so as not to go to jail or go mentally insane. That includes avoiding non-state sources of information and willing themselves to believe their side are the good guys, or escaping from reality by trying to ignore it completely. Yes, there is a turbo charged nationalist section of Russian society, and they are the ones being promoted and having their voices amplified in Putin’s system, but to look to them as a source of this conflict would I think be a mistake.
I would argue that this war, fundamentally, is about Putin’s obsession, after so many years holding unopposed power, with showing the world (and future historians) what he is capable of as an individual ‘great’ leader, whilst trying – quite weakly in fact – to shroud his motivation in pseudo narratives that most of the population is pretending to go along with.
For me, there is no evidence this is a popular war. On the contrary, the Russian state has needed to pay small fortunes to get people from the country's poorer regions to sign up, and when mobilisation was announced, up to a million young men voted with their feet and got the hell out. Sales of anti-depressants have sky rocketed. Outside of state television, politics as a public subject is avoided like the plague. Ultimately, as quoted at the end of the book, tragically for Ukraine first and Russia second, “Russia lives in a closet stuffed with skeletons and this war will only add more” (Maxim Trudolyubov, former Editor-at-Large of Meduza).
April 23, 2024
"In the absence of ideology, the source of conflict has become identity imbued with genealogical essentialism and historicism - a fight over the past for civilisations unable to imagine, let alone provide, a better future."
One of the big questions many in the West have is why don't Russians oppose Putin, closely followed by why do so many people support Putin and his savage war against Ukraine. In "Russia's War" Jade McGlynn aims to throw light on these questions. Her study is extensive and based on years of work in Russia and extensive interviews with Russians and analysis of Russian media and the way the Russian people interact with it. The results of her work are likely to be shocking and disturbing in equal measure. Reading these pages it is hard not to keep looking back to historic parallels where history has subsequently asked "How did ordinary people let such horror rise and happen in their name?" and "How could people go along so happily and supportively with what was so clearly wrong?".
It is worth remembering that while this book focuses on a particularly cruel and brutal regime which is dependent on terror to control its own population, similar narratives are constructed and used to justify the policies and actions of most states including the morally superior western liberal democracies. We can look at decades of western involvement in some seriously brutal repressions which together have slaughtered millions (Indonesia, Vietnam, Chile, Central America, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Palestine etc.) yet have been sold with reasonable success to their populations as necessary wars that it is the moral and patriotic duty of citizens/subjects to support. To raise your head above the parapet and go against any state, even one where such actions are supposedly one of its key positive attributes, is not easy and comes at a personal and social cost.
For an individual to oppose any action of their state already puts them into a "suspect" class in any system. McGlynn illustrates how Putin weaponised this threat of the "enemy within" in his March 2022 speech about "scum" who oppose the war as "traitors to the nation ''. These words she notes were "carefully chosen comments about the need to cleanse society of national traitors" and a "deliberate invocation of Stalinist language to conjure the memory of repressions of that age" - leaving dissenters in little doubt what they could expect to face (as many thousands once again have). On the one hand then there is the threat, on the other there is the draw where a public "... reluctance to admit a core pillar of their identity, the military, is rotten. Faced with a choice between a comforting lie and an inconvenient truth, many people will opt for the former". She continues that many "... people believe the Kremlin propaganda because it is easier and preferable to admitting or accepting that you are the bad guys. Now imagine your son died in a pointless war and he was part of a genocidal campaign. It is natural that anyone would try to resist believing that ...".
The scale of indoctrination and cultural control that Russians have experienced over the last two decades is impressive. Putin has systematically co-opted or exterminated any media which did not reproduce a Kremlin friendly line. The book describes the system as "informational autocracy" (active at least to 2022) with "... the way in which those in power generally used their dominance over information channels to manipulate rather than coerce audiences", and where "... Russian authorities curated a media environment that had a proven ability to devise persuasive and engaging content. So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to - and continue to choose to - even in the free space of the internet". Pro-Kremlin media "... seeks to create an emotional state in people that diminishes their critical thinking, and to develop cognitive filters and heuristics that reject any alternative version of reality". It is as if the regime learned something from the tabloid media in the West, much of the Soviet era media failed as it created a barrier between the regime and readership, the Wests tabloids have for decades effectively embraced and successfully appealed to base emotions, fears and bias of their readerships, moulding and nurturing positions which go against their interests, Putin's people have turned this into an art form and now feed it back West in an even more virulent form with a bewildered herd begging for the fodder that satisfies their hunger for scapegoats.
Interestingly McGlynn argues that it is not enthusiastic regime supporters that Putin seeks, rather a docile, disinterested, apathetic mass that accepts its lot while engaging in individual patriotic rituals. While Putin has nurtured the extreme-right globally, and is reasonably happy to have a huge domestic openly fascist support base, he is mindful that the ideologically motivated can become overly engaged in politics and form the basis of a threat and get upset when the centre fails to pursue a genuinely purging and ideological pure line. This problem can be seen in Putin's on - off relationship with the Eurasionists such as Alexander Dugan.
The message of this book is that the future for Russia is bleak (perhaps not as bleak as for Ukraine and Central Europe). Anti-Putin Russians have been murdered, imprisoned or have gone into exile, internally or externally. McGlynn believes that "...there can be no grand reset in European - Russian, or US - Russian, relations that does not begin with a fundamentally different Russia...". I remain unconvinced about this conclusion. There are two other possibilities. One that Russia destroys and consumes Ukraine while the West prevaricates. This is followed by hand wringing and expressions of regret, meanwhile the money men with crocodile tears rolling gradually find innovative ways to break through the ineffective sanctions regime (the West is still filling Putin's war chest with gold as it quibbles giving aid to Ukraine) and slowly business returns to normal (state criminality has never hindered business, who remembers Tiananmen Square or Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi?). The other possibility is that a fundamentally different West suddenly finds it is singing from the same fascist songbook as Putin and can be welcomed into fold of terror quite happily (with Trump back in the Whitehouse, Le Pen in France, AfD in Germany, Putin's people have the world in their palm, with maybe a little string pulling from Beijing).
In Russia Putin remains a popular Fuhrer. The war against Ukraine is understood as an existential civilizational war for the future of Russia against the Nazi hordes of Ukraine and the West. As long as Putin lives and receives the patronage of China and powerful Republicans in the USA there is no reason to expect much to change. If Putin finally expires he will probably be replaced by someone equally taciturn and unhinged, maybe Medvedev who has been doing his best to appear loyally bonkers in the wings. As long as the money men keep raking it in and the puppeteers are able to keep the masses entranced, as McGlynn thinks likely, then the future looks Orwellian: "If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face— forever."
This book is essential reading to understand why things have turned out the way they have and how they could easily get much worse.
One of the big questions many in the West have is why don't Russians oppose Putin, closely followed by why do so many people support Putin and his savage war against Ukraine. In "Russia's War" Jade McGlynn aims to throw light on these questions. Her study is extensive and based on years of work in Russia and extensive interviews with Russians and analysis of Russian media and the way the Russian people interact with it. The results of her work are likely to be shocking and disturbing in equal measure. Reading these pages it is hard not to keep looking back to historic parallels where history has subsequently asked "How did ordinary people let such horror rise and happen in their name?" and "How could people go along so happily and supportively with what was so clearly wrong?".
It is worth remembering that while this book focuses on a particularly cruel and brutal regime which is dependent on terror to control its own population, similar narratives are constructed and used to justify the policies and actions of most states including the morally superior western liberal democracies. We can look at decades of western involvement in some seriously brutal repressions which together have slaughtered millions (Indonesia, Vietnam, Chile, Central America, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Palestine etc.) yet have been sold with reasonable success to their populations as necessary wars that it is the moral and patriotic duty of citizens/subjects to support. To raise your head above the parapet and go against any state, even one where such actions are supposedly one of its key positive attributes, is not easy and comes at a personal and social cost.
For an individual to oppose any action of their state already puts them into a "suspect" class in any system. McGlynn illustrates how Putin weaponised this threat of the "enemy within" in his March 2022 speech about "scum" who oppose the war as "traitors to the nation ''. These words she notes were "carefully chosen comments about the need to cleanse society of national traitors" and a "deliberate invocation of Stalinist language to conjure the memory of repressions of that age" - leaving dissenters in little doubt what they could expect to face (as many thousands once again have). On the one hand then there is the threat, on the other there is the draw where a public "... reluctance to admit a core pillar of their identity, the military, is rotten. Faced with a choice between a comforting lie and an inconvenient truth, many people will opt for the former". She continues that many "... people believe the Kremlin propaganda because it is easier and preferable to admitting or accepting that you are the bad guys. Now imagine your son died in a pointless war and he was part of a genocidal campaign. It is natural that anyone would try to resist believing that ...".
The scale of indoctrination and cultural control that Russians have experienced over the last two decades is impressive. Putin has systematically co-opted or exterminated any media which did not reproduce a Kremlin friendly line. The book describes the system as "informational autocracy" (active at least to 2022) with "... the way in which those in power generally used their dominance over information channels to manipulate rather than coerce audiences", and where "... Russian authorities curated a media environment that had a proven ability to devise persuasive and engaging content. So appealing were the emotive narratives on offer, that viewers were not forced to watch the propaganda, they chose to - and continue to choose to - even in the free space of the internet". Pro-Kremlin media "... seeks to create an emotional state in people that diminishes their critical thinking, and to develop cognitive filters and heuristics that reject any alternative version of reality". It is as if the regime learned something from the tabloid media in the West, much of the Soviet era media failed as it created a barrier between the regime and readership, the Wests tabloids have for decades effectively embraced and successfully appealed to base emotions, fears and bias of their readerships, moulding and nurturing positions which go against their interests, Putin's people have turned this into an art form and now feed it back West in an even more virulent form with a bewildered herd begging for the fodder that satisfies their hunger for scapegoats.
Interestingly McGlynn argues that it is not enthusiastic regime supporters that Putin seeks, rather a docile, disinterested, apathetic mass that accepts its lot while engaging in individual patriotic rituals. While Putin has nurtured the extreme-right globally, and is reasonably happy to have a huge domestic openly fascist support base, he is mindful that the ideologically motivated can become overly engaged in politics and form the basis of a threat and get upset when the centre fails to pursue a genuinely purging and ideological pure line. This problem can be seen in Putin's on - off relationship with the Eurasionists such as Alexander Dugan.
The message of this book is that the future for Russia is bleak (perhaps not as bleak as for Ukraine and Central Europe). Anti-Putin Russians have been murdered, imprisoned or have gone into exile, internally or externally. McGlynn believes that "...there can be no grand reset in European - Russian, or US - Russian, relations that does not begin with a fundamentally different Russia...". I remain unconvinced about this conclusion. There are two other possibilities. One that Russia destroys and consumes Ukraine while the West prevaricates. This is followed by hand wringing and expressions of regret, meanwhile the money men with crocodile tears rolling gradually find innovative ways to break through the ineffective sanctions regime (the West is still filling Putin's war chest with gold as it quibbles giving aid to Ukraine) and slowly business returns to normal (state criminality has never hindered business, who remembers Tiananmen Square or Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi?). The other possibility is that a fundamentally different West suddenly finds it is singing from the same fascist songbook as Putin and can be welcomed into fold of terror quite happily (with Trump back in the Whitehouse, Le Pen in France, AfD in Germany, Putin's people have the world in their palm, with maybe a little string pulling from Beijing).
In Russia Putin remains a popular Fuhrer. The war against Ukraine is understood as an existential civilizational war for the future of Russia against the Nazi hordes of Ukraine and the West. As long as Putin lives and receives the patronage of China and powerful Republicans in the USA there is no reason to expect much to change. If Putin finally expires he will probably be replaced by someone equally taciturn and unhinged, maybe Medvedev who has been doing his best to appear loyally bonkers in the wings. As long as the money men keep raking it in and the puppeteers are able to keep the masses entranced, as McGlynn thinks likely, then the future looks Orwellian: "If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face— forever."
This book is essential reading to understand why things have turned out the way they have and how they could easily get much worse.
September 24, 2023
Kirja
Tartuin kirjaan, kun luin siitä ja ymmärsin sen käsittelevän sotaa ennen kaikkea tavallisten venäläisten näkökulmasta. Kyllä kirja silti pyörii pitkälti valtionjohdon ja muun eliitin parissa. Mutta kyllä siinä käydään myös läpi laajemmin kansan mielialoja, mitkä asiat vaikuttavat ja millaisia mielialoja on.
Kirjassa on paljon tuttua. Mutta ehkä hieman sekavasti makuuni. Yhteenvetoluku kannattaa ehdottomasti lukea ensimmäisenä. Se mitä halutaan sanoa ja millä argumenteillatuntuu välillä hukkuvan. Sanoisin, että tästä kaikesta huomaa kirjan tehdyn kiireellä, muutamassa kuukaudessa. Vyörytys on jatkuvaa, kokonaiskuva ei aina hahmotu tai punainen lanka näy. Kirjassa on paljon hyvää asiaa ja sanottavaa, mutta tiiviys ja selkeys puuttuvat (kuten tästä arviostakin). Jäin kaipaamaan vielä selkeämmin kansan näkemyksen erittelyä, mitä mieltä se on ja miksi ja millä perusteilla ja aineistoilla kirjoittaja on tätä mieltä. Eli siis enemmän maaseutua ja provinssia, vähemmän poliitikkoja, ajattelijoita ja muita yläluokkia.
Ennen kaikkea kirjassa korostetaan, että sota on venäläisten, kaikkien venäläisten sota. Ei siis Putinin ja hänen lähipiirinsä. Venäjällä järjestettiin isompia mielenosoituksia Navalnyin puolesta kuin sotaa vastaan. Ja samaan aikaan ukrainalaiset ovat uskaltaneet itse nousta kahteen kertaan omaa johtoaan vastaan, joten venäläisiä ei pidä tutkailla eri kulmasta ja voivotella heidän johdon kovia otteita mielenosoittajia kohtaan. Miksi Venäjällä venäläiset ovat antaneet ajautua tilanteeseen, jossa heidät voidaan pelotella näin hiljaiseksi? Tämä ei ole tapahtunut yht’äkkiä sodan alettua vaan pitkän ajan kuluessa.
Kirjoittaja käy läpi sekä millaista propagandaa venäjällä tuotetaan ja miten se vaikuttaa. Samalla kun mietitään mikä on venäläisten itseymmärrys ja miten he näkevät oikeutuksen valtionsa toimille.
Sotaa ei ehkä tueta aktiivisesti, mutta se hyväksytään hiljaisesti. Samalla kun sille tarjotaan erilaisia oikeutuksia ja tarinoita, joista venäläiset saavat valita itsellensä sopivan. Tai ainakin olla uskomatta mihinkään muuhunkaan kilpailevaan, länsimaiseen versioon. Aivan kuten venäläisessä propagandassa yleensä. Propaganda ei myöskään luo tyhjästä väitteitään vaan se vahvistaa jo olemassa olevia. Joten täysi epäusko sodan syihin olisi erittäin vaikeaa, suorastaan mahdotonta kognitiivisen dissonanssin takia.
Sodan syynä nähdään ennen kaikkea se, miten Venäjä näkee itsensä, identiteettinsä ja historiansa. Ja koska Ukraina oleellinen osa tätä ymmärrystä, sen miettiminen miksi ukrainalaiset eivät pidä venäläisistä johtaisi tämän venäläisten tarinan kyseenalaistamiseen. Ei siis kysytä.
Sinällään tarina on tuttu. Venäjä nähdään erityisenä valtiona. Nimenomaan valtiona. Sen on oltava vahva valtio, jolla vahva johtaja. Se on suurvalta. Se on imperiumi, mutta ei kolonialistinen sellainen. Venäjällä on suuri tehtävä, joka pitää toteuttaa. Venäläiset ovat huomattavasti henkisempiä ja vähemmän korruptoituneita kuin länsi. Ja Ukraina on osa tätä Venäjän ymmärrystä. Jos Ukraina ei ole osa tätä, Venäjän ymmärrys itsestään jonain tavallista hienompana kyseenalaistetaan.
Sodassa nousseet puheet nazismista liittyvät toiseen maailmansotaan. Se on venäläisiä yhdistävä asia. Se on asia, josta he ovat ylpeitä. Sitä ei voi eikä saa kyseenalaistaa, koska silloin kyseenalaistaa koko Venäjän olemuksen ja oikeutuksen. Venäjällä on vahva ja hieno visio menneisyydestä, jota tarjotaan ihmisille, koska visiota tulevaisuudesta ei ole.
Miksi sitten tällainen pöhkö näkemys Venäjästä, sen historiasta ja olemuksesta määrittelee toimintaa nykypäivänä? Suurin syy on käsittelemätön menneisyys. Venäjän historia on kaappi, joka on täynnä luurankoja. Ukrainan sota on näistä uusin. Ja venäläiset elävät täällä kaapissa eivätkä halua kolistella, etteivät luurangot herää. He eivät ole valmiita avaamaan kaappia ja käsittelemään menneisyyttään ja traumojaan. Eikä toisaalta maalla ole tarjota mitään muutakaan. Eteenpäin ei päästä ennen kuin menneestä päästää irti.
Lopussa kirjoittaja vetää asioita yhteen seuraavasti:
Sota ei voi loppua ennen kuin venäläiset luopuvat taistelustaan todellisuutta vastaan ja aloittavat menneisyyden käsittelyn. Venäjän koko 1900-luvun historia on toinen toistaan seuraavia sortotoimia, joissa kohteena ovat muut maat ja venäläiset itse. Venäläisten näkemys venäläisistä uhreina on kyseenalaistettava ja heidän on myönnettävä tekonsa, jotta samalla voidaan kyseenalaistaa venäläisten näkemys venäläisyydestä ja valtionsa oikeuksista sekä etupiireistä. Tätä uudenlaista luomista ei ole helpottanut sota. Se on vain vahvistanut vanhaa ja lukinnut ajatuksia.
Kirjoittajan mukaan sotaa ei voida voittaa vaikuttamalla venäläisiin. Lännen käsitys maasta liberaalina, vapautusta odottavana valtiona on väärä. Se ei ole sellainen. Kuvaa vääristävät länsimaisten kontaktit vähälukuiseen liberaaliin eliittiin. Ja sitä paitsi suurin osa toisinajattelevista on jo lähtenyt maanpakoon. Lenin ajoi vastustajat maanpakoon, nyt he lähtivät itse vapaaehtoisesti. Lännen toimet voidaan tulkita täysin eri tavalla kuin ne tarkoitetaan, joten ainoa keino voittaa sota on mahdollistaa Ukrainan voitto.
Länsi ei suinkaan ole kirjassa syytön. Syntilista on pitkä. Esimerkiksi juuri kun Nato laajeni ensimmäistä kertaa 1999, ei mennyt montakaan kuukautta kun Serbian pommitukset alkoivat. Samalla länsi on tyytyväisenä ottanut vastaan venäläisten rahat, heidän jälkikasvun, heidän varkaat, heidän kaasun ja muun valtiolta varastetun ja varastajat, ja ollut hiljaa. Tämä kaikki pitäisi avata, ensimmäisenä kaikki venäläisten länteen tuoma raha sekä nämä rahat tuoneet pitäisi heti julkistaa.
Kirja loppuu ajatukseen, että Venäjän on muutettava visio menneisyydestään, jotta sillä voi olla tulevaisuus.
Tartuin kirjaan, kun luin siitä ja ymmärsin sen käsittelevän sotaa ennen kaikkea tavallisten venäläisten näkökulmasta. Kyllä kirja silti pyörii pitkälti valtionjohdon ja muun eliitin parissa. Mutta kyllä siinä käydään myös läpi laajemmin kansan mielialoja, mitkä asiat vaikuttavat ja millaisia mielialoja on.
Kirjassa on paljon tuttua. Mutta ehkä hieman sekavasti makuuni. Yhteenvetoluku kannattaa ehdottomasti lukea ensimmäisenä. Se mitä halutaan sanoa ja millä argumenteillatuntuu välillä hukkuvan. Sanoisin, että tästä kaikesta huomaa kirjan tehdyn kiireellä, muutamassa kuukaudessa. Vyörytys on jatkuvaa, kokonaiskuva ei aina hahmotu tai punainen lanka näy. Kirjassa on paljon hyvää asiaa ja sanottavaa, mutta tiiviys ja selkeys puuttuvat (kuten tästä arviostakin). Jäin kaipaamaan vielä selkeämmin kansan näkemyksen erittelyä, mitä mieltä se on ja miksi ja millä perusteilla ja aineistoilla kirjoittaja on tätä mieltä. Eli siis enemmän maaseutua ja provinssia, vähemmän poliitikkoja, ajattelijoita ja muita yläluokkia.
Ennen kaikkea kirjassa korostetaan, että sota on venäläisten, kaikkien venäläisten sota. Ei siis Putinin ja hänen lähipiirinsä. Venäjällä järjestettiin isompia mielenosoituksia Navalnyin puolesta kuin sotaa vastaan. Ja samaan aikaan ukrainalaiset ovat uskaltaneet itse nousta kahteen kertaan omaa johtoaan vastaan, joten venäläisiä ei pidä tutkailla eri kulmasta ja voivotella heidän johdon kovia otteita mielenosoittajia kohtaan. Miksi Venäjällä venäläiset ovat antaneet ajautua tilanteeseen, jossa heidät voidaan pelotella näin hiljaiseksi? Tämä ei ole tapahtunut yht’äkkiä sodan alettua vaan pitkän ajan kuluessa.
Kirjoittaja käy läpi sekä millaista propagandaa venäjällä tuotetaan ja miten se vaikuttaa. Samalla kun mietitään mikä on venäläisten itseymmärrys ja miten he näkevät oikeutuksen valtionsa toimille.
Sotaa ei ehkä tueta aktiivisesti, mutta se hyväksytään hiljaisesti. Samalla kun sille tarjotaan erilaisia oikeutuksia ja tarinoita, joista venäläiset saavat valita itsellensä sopivan. Tai ainakin olla uskomatta mihinkään muuhunkaan kilpailevaan, länsimaiseen versioon. Aivan kuten venäläisessä propagandassa yleensä. Propaganda ei myöskään luo tyhjästä väitteitään vaan se vahvistaa jo olemassa olevia. Joten täysi epäusko sodan syihin olisi erittäin vaikeaa, suorastaan mahdotonta kognitiivisen dissonanssin takia.
Sodan syynä nähdään ennen kaikkea se, miten Venäjä näkee itsensä, identiteettinsä ja historiansa. Ja koska Ukraina oleellinen osa tätä ymmärrystä, sen miettiminen miksi ukrainalaiset eivät pidä venäläisistä johtaisi tämän venäläisten tarinan kyseenalaistamiseen. Ei siis kysytä.
Sinällään tarina on tuttu. Venäjä nähdään erityisenä valtiona. Nimenomaan valtiona. Sen on oltava vahva valtio, jolla vahva johtaja. Se on suurvalta. Se on imperiumi, mutta ei kolonialistinen sellainen. Venäjällä on suuri tehtävä, joka pitää toteuttaa. Venäläiset ovat huomattavasti henkisempiä ja vähemmän korruptoituneita kuin länsi. Ja Ukraina on osa tätä Venäjän ymmärrystä. Jos Ukraina ei ole osa tätä, Venäjän ymmärrys itsestään jonain tavallista hienompana kyseenalaistetaan.
Sodassa nousseet puheet nazismista liittyvät toiseen maailmansotaan. Se on venäläisiä yhdistävä asia. Se on asia, josta he ovat ylpeitä. Sitä ei voi eikä saa kyseenalaistaa, koska silloin kyseenalaistaa koko Venäjän olemuksen ja oikeutuksen. Venäjällä on vahva ja hieno visio menneisyydestä, jota tarjotaan ihmisille, koska visiota tulevaisuudesta ei ole.
Miksi sitten tällainen pöhkö näkemys Venäjästä, sen historiasta ja olemuksesta määrittelee toimintaa nykypäivänä? Suurin syy on käsittelemätön menneisyys. Venäjän historia on kaappi, joka on täynnä luurankoja. Ukrainan sota on näistä uusin. Ja venäläiset elävät täällä kaapissa eivätkä halua kolistella, etteivät luurangot herää. He eivät ole valmiita avaamaan kaappia ja käsittelemään menneisyyttään ja traumojaan. Eikä toisaalta maalla ole tarjota mitään muutakaan. Eteenpäin ei päästä ennen kuin menneestä päästää irti.
Lopussa kirjoittaja vetää asioita yhteen seuraavasti:
Sota ei voi loppua ennen kuin venäläiset luopuvat taistelustaan todellisuutta vastaan ja aloittavat menneisyyden käsittelyn. Venäjän koko 1900-luvun historia on toinen toistaan seuraavia sortotoimia, joissa kohteena ovat muut maat ja venäläiset itse. Venäläisten näkemys venäläisistä uhreina on kyseenalaistettava ja heidän on myönnettävä tekonsa, jotta samalla voidaan kyseenalaistaa venäläisten näkemys venäläisyydestä ja valtionsa oikeuksista sekä etupiireistä. Tätä uudenlaista luomista ei ole helpottanut sota. Se on vain vahvistanut vanhaa ja lukinnut ajatuksia.
Kirjoittajan mukaan sotaa ei voida voittaa vaikuttamalla venäläisiin. Lännen käsitys maasta liberaalina, vapautusta odottavana valtiona on väärä. Se ei ole sellainen. Kuvaa vääristävät länsimaisten kontaktit vähälukuiseen liberaaliin eliittiin. Ja sitä paitsi suurin osa toisinajattelevista on jo lähtenyt maanpakoon. Lenin ajoi vastustajat maanpakoon, nyt he lähtivät itse vapaaehtoisesti. Lännen toimet voidaan tulkita täysin eri tavalla kuin ne tarkoitetaan, joten ainoa keino voittaa sota on mahdollistaa Ukrainan voitto.
Länsi ei suinkaan ole kirjassa syytön. Syntilista on pitkä. Esimerkiksi juuri kun Nato laajeni ensimmäistä kertaa 1999, ei mennyt montakaan kuukautta kun Serbian pommitukset alkoivat. Samalla länsi on tyytyväisenä ottanut vastaan venäläisten rahat, heidän jälkikasvun, heidän varkaat, heidän kaasun ja muun valtiolta varastetun ja varastajat, ja ollut hiljaa. Tämä kaikki pitäisi avata, ensimmäisenä kaikki venäläisten länteen tuoma raha sekä nämä rahat tuoneet pitäisi heti julkistaa.
Kirja loppuu ajatukseen, että Venäjän on muutettava visio menneisyydestään, jotta sillä voi olla tulevaisuus.
November 19, 2023
An article stretched out to book length.
April 10, 2025
Russia is an atrophied nation with a deeply ingrained inferiority complex, government-sponsored paranoid and decimation of trust, and a population with apathy that shocks the Western mind. Why don't Westerners put more effort into understanding this nuclear power?
Jade McGlynn's book "Russia's War" aims to explain why Russia's population, instead of being shocked and angry at what the Russian government has done and is doing in Ukraine, is either indifferent or supportive (to varying degrees) of the war. The author's credibility comes from her research at King's College London's Department of War Studies, with a focus on Putin and how the Russian nation has become wracked by autocracy. McGlynn also spent several years living in Russia, and conducted interviews extensively utilized in this book from all angles of the Russian social sphere, particularly from the pro-Russia or apathetic camps, as the book seeks to explain Russian support of the war.
This is a topic that desperately needs to be explored in the West. For years, even decades, there has been a perpetual idea that all Russia needs is for the old autocrats in power to die off and wither away, and the younger generation will rise up and embrace democracy and Western values. This is a myth that absolutely needs to be dispelled. In my opinion, the strongest work of this book is how the author decisively illustrates that Russia simply doesn't work that way, and to think in such terms is to misunderstand the country from the get-go. There is no Russian class waiting in the wings to embrace democracy: most of those people have fled abroad, and any smoldering sentiments are actively and skillfully stamped out by the Russian government.
McGlynn paints Russia in a new light, one that most of the West either ignores or is not familiar with. If George Orwell were alive today, he may very well have replaced Britain with Russia as the setting for '1984'. This Russia, the "real" Russia, is the story of a population that has been emotionally beaten into submission - where patriotism is above all, and merciless propaganda from the Russian government acts as a nefarious version of tinnitus: it drills through your brain, into your soul, and you can't escape it. Russians will kill and die for the Russian people, but will turn and walk away from a dying non-Russian on the street. This isn't true for every single Russian, of course, but per McGlynn's analysis, this is simply what decades (if not centuries) of autocratic rule has done. You can't blame them for being the way they are after reading this book.
At the same time, McGlynn provides a mirror for the Western reader to look at themselves as they read this. Not 100% of the cynical, apathetic Russian culture is self-created: foreign policy missteps and a decades-long (and ongoing!) fundamental misunderstanding of Russia has materially contributed to it. You could write multiple books just on the Russian inferiority complex: the West would feature in several chapters.
This is a four-star book over a five-star book because the author mixes a pretty impressive work of research with her own feelings on the war. I am a stickler for a fair and thorough analysis, and while this is indeed what the author accomplished, you don't have to look far to find McGlynn lambasting Russia for the heinous crimes committed in Ukraine and the horrendous ways that Russia's collective mental health has disintegrated. I don't disagree with those views, but to be a true end-all, be-all of "How to Understand Russia" books, I would have liked to see a bit less in this department.
Anyone interested in the Russian war on Ukraine should read this. It provides critical understandings of Russian culture and the Russian people that the West simply either can not or does not provide on a consistent basis. It deserves a prominent place on the bookshelf of works that effectively explain "real Russia" to a non-Russian. Four stars.
Jade McGlynn's book "Russia's War" aims to explain why Russia's population, instead of being shocked and angry at what the Russian government has done and is doing in Ukraine, is either indifferent or supportive (to varying degrees) of the war. The author's credibility comes from her research at King's College London's Department of War Studies, with a focus on Putin and how the Russian nation has become wracked by autocracy. McGlynn also spent several years living in Russia, and conducted interviews extensively utilized in this book from all angles of the Russian social sphere, particularly from the pro-Russia or apathetic camps, as the book seeks to explain Russian support of the war.
This is a topic that desperately needs to be explored in the West. For years, even decades, there has been a perpetual idea that all Russia needs is for the old autocrats in power to die off and wither away, and the younger generation will rise up and embrace democracy and Western values. This is a myth that absolutely needs to be dispelled. In my opinion, the strongest work of this book is how the author decisively illustrates that Russia simply doesn't work that way, and to think in such terms is to misunderstand the country from the get-go. There is no Russian class waiting in the wings to embrace democracy: most of those people have fled abroad, and any smoldering sentiments are actively and skillfully stamped out by the Russian government.
McGlynn paints Russia in a new light, one that most of the West either ignores or is not familiar with. If George Orwell were alive today, he may very well have replaced Britain with Russia as the setting for '1984'. This Russia, the "real" Russia, is the story of a population that has been emotionally beaten into submission - where patriotism is above all, and merciless propaganda from the Russian government acts as a nefarious version of tinnitus: it drills through your brain, into your soul, and you can't escape it. Russians will kill and die for the Russian people, but will turn and walk away from a dying non-Russian on the street. This isn't true for every single Russian, of course, but per McGlynn's analysis, this is simply what decades (if not centuries) of autocratic rule has done. You can't blame them for being the way they are after reading this book.
At the same time, McGlynn provides a mirror for the Western reader to look at themselves as they read this. Not 100% of the cynical, apathetic Russian culture is self-created: foreign policy missteps and a decades-long (and ongoing!) fundamental misunderstanding of Russia has materially contributed to it. You could write multiple books just on the Russian inferiority complex: the West would feature in several chapters.
This is a four-star book over a five-star book because the author mixes a pretty impressive work of research with her own feelings on the war. I am a stickler for a fair and thorough analysis, and while this is indeed what the author accomplished, you don't have to look far to find McGlynn lambasting Russia for the heinous crimes committed in Ukraine and the horrendous ways that Russia's collective mental health has disintegrated. I don't disagree with those views, but to be a true end-all, be-all of "How to Understand Russia" books, I would have liked to see a bit less in this department.
Anyone interested in the Russian war on Ukraine should read this. It provides critical understandings of Russian culture and the Russian people that the West simply either can not or does not provide on a consistent basis. It deserves a prominent place on the bookshelf of works that effectively explain "real Russia" to a non-Russian. Four stars.
January 4, 2025
I gave the book 5* almost immediately for the fresh in Western analytics point of view that this is not just Putins war, but Russia's war. I think the key part of Russian view on the war is the following quote: "For Russians it is more natural to care about statue of Pushkin rather than killed children". This summarised most of my conversations with ordinary Russians about the war.
The book is an interesting research into Russian understanding of war. The author has very deep knowledge of Russian culture and lots of connections in Russian society, there are lots of interviews in the book with different people. She almost doesn't introduce western point of view with western arguments and follows mostly Russian points with Russian actors. She shows how Russian try to shift blame on others, how propaganda works and doesn't discuss if there was anything wrong with Ukraine except directly citing Russian propaganda. And that is very nice.
Now there are several things that are missing and would make this book much better:
- there is a need for interview with Russian solidiers and what they think. It should have been relatively easy to get interviews with POW in Ukraine
- opinions and lies made by Russians often stated as they are and not explained that those are not true.
This book only focuses on Russian view, so it worth reading some other book that explains Ukrainian point of view better to understand the difference.
The book is an interesting research into Russian understanding of war. The author has very deep knowledge of Russian culture and lots of connections in Russian society, there are lots of interviews in the book with different people. She almost doesn't introduce western point of view with western arguments and follows mostly Russian points with Russian actors. She shows how Russian try to shift blame on others, how propaganda works and doesn't discuss if there was anything wrong with Ukraine except directly citing Russian propaganda. And that is very nice.
Now there are several things that are missing and would make this book much better:
- there is a need for interview with Russian solidiers and what they think. It should have been relatively easy to get interviews with POW in Ukraine
- opinions and lies made by Russians often stated as they are and not explained that those are not true.
This book only focuses on Russian view, so it worth reading some other book that explains Ukrainian point of view better to understand the difference.
August 31, 2023
It's not Putin's Russia; it's Russia's Putin.
This is an insightful look behind the scene of Russia's 'special military operation' in Ukraine. The author is indeed an expert on all things Russian, having lived and studied in Russia for many years. She is, however, decidedly anti-Russian in her interpretations of her research and analysis. This doesn't come easy to her: "Over the last eight years of watching Russian state media, there have been moments where I have paused to ask myself, what if they are right? The West does have its flaws, just think of the Iraq War, of the 2008 crash – what if Russia is right in saying that we (the West, NATO) are helping the Islamic State or have staged an attack?" Yet she valiantly resists the temptation to turn coat and go native. In this struggle, she loses her perspective and refuses to admit the possibility of Russia emerging victorious from this militarized conflict with the West over Ukraine. This, however, is a real possibility--particularly when China joins the fray by moving on Taiwan, possibly followed by North Korea attacking South Korea etc. All bets will then be off.
This is an insightful look behind the scene of Russia's 'special military operation' in Ukraine. The author is indeed an expert on all things Russian, having lived and studied in Russia for many years. She is, however, decidedly anti-Russian in her interpretations of her research and analysis. This doesn't come easy to her: "Over the last eight years of watching Russian state media, there have been moments where I have paused to ask myself, what if they are right? The West does have its flaws, just think of the Iraq War, of the 2008 crash – what if Russia is right in saying that we (the West, NATO) are helping the Islamic State or have staged an attack?" Yet she valiantly resists the temptation to turn coat and go native. In this struggle, she loses her perspective and refuses to admit the possibility of Russia emerging victorious from this militarized conflict with the West over Ukraine. This, however, is a real possibility--particularly when China joins the fray by moving on Taiwan, possibly followed by North Korea attacking South Korea etc. All bets will then be off.
August 3, 2025
A fascinating study of Russian social media, Telegram channels, surveys, and personal interviews to explore the historic, social, and cultural reasons so many Russians support the war in Ukraine. The study illustrates not only that propoganda works but that we're attracted to it. We choose to believe lies that strengthen our national and tribal identities.
This isn't merely Putin's war, and until the Russian people confront the reality of the past and stand up to the brutality of the present, this war will continue even if the "Special Military Operation" ends.
The response of the West, however, should be to help Ukraine win more than to see Putin defeated and to become stronger itself by addressing its own hypocricies and propaganda.
While acknowledging the dangers that Russians face in speaking out against the war, we might all do well to consider how often we fail to confront our own lies and injustices.
This isn't merely Putin's war, and until the Russian people confront the reality of the past and stand up to the brutality of the present, this war will continue even if the "Special Military Operation" ends.
The response of the West, however, should be to help Ukraine win more than to see Putin defeated and to become stronger itself by addressing its own hypocricies and propaganda.
While acknowledging the dangers that Russians face in speaking out against the war, we might all do well to consider how often we fail to confront our own lies and injustices.
March 11, 2024
Decent read, a little academic at times with multiple poll results from a nation of people who probably answered them under duress or at the very least, under cloud of misinformation.
Still, a pretty interesting insight into the psyche of your average Russian and how they receive and process news and information.
It’s also quite sobering to realise that the one credible end game for the Ukrainian war (popular revolt) is about as realistic as Putin saying he made a mistake and leaving of his own accord.
Still, a pretty interesting insight into the psyche of your average Russian and how they receive and process news and information.
It’s also quite sobering to realise that the one credible end game for the Ukrainian war (popular revolt) is about as realistic as Putin saying he made a mistake and leaving of his own accord.
September 20, 2025
Excellent but uncomfortable
This is an excellent and well-written book. But it also makes for an uncomfortable read. Why? Because it shows that the fond thought in the West that the Russo-Ukrainian War is ‘Putin’s War’, and if only he disappeared, there would be peace, is wrong. This is Russia’s war, a war that is popular and is at least tacitly supported by most Russians. And unless this changes, the war will go on. Strongly recommended.
This is an excellent and well-written book. But it also makes for an uncomfortable read. Why? Because it shows that the fond thought in the West that the Russo-Ukrainian War is ‘Putin’s War’, and if only he disappeared, there would be peace, is wrong. This is Russia’s war, a war that is popular and is at least tacitly supported by most Russians. And unless this changes, the war will go on. Strongly recommended.
June 15, 2023
This is a detailed analysis of the events leading up to the 2022 Ukraine invasion and the Russian people's support, both explicit and implicit, of the conflict. It's often portrayed as "Putin's War", but it's not really and his removal would probably see someone even worse in charge!
July 19, 2023
Great read, and well researched. Dr. McGlynn has also been calling spades in her commentary on the war
October 24, 2023
An absolutely essential contemporary account of the root causes of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A must read for anyone studying modern Europe.
November 18, 2023
This is a must-read for anyone who wants to begin understanding why Russian society doesn't just accept the Russo-Ukraine War but supports it. An excellent study of the propaganda mechanisms in play.
December 14, 2023
Extremely good book spoiled by using word narrative like million times. Especially disturbing while listening the finnish translation.
March 4, 2024
Audiobook. Interesting insight and conclusions - but on reflection on completing the audiobook I felt it could have been a long article rather than a full book.
August 2, 2024
Thought it was a really interesting book.
August 6, 2024
Great read, difficult subject
January 12, 2025
Excellent. Highly recommend.
August 27, 2025
Venäjän hyökkäyssota Ukrainaan ei ole vain Putinin sota vaan sille on vankka kannatus venäläisten keskuudessa. Kirja avaa hyvin niitä taustoja ja syitä miksi enemmistö venäläisistä kannattaa sotaa.
December 8, 2025
It's dreadful, but it is quite short.
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