"Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" (T. S. Eliot)
The main claim of this work is that the unchecked development of the information economy has cemented a societal infrastructure that is radically at odds with the culture, society and mode of political organization that was once liberal democracy. As we shift away from old-school democracy and its social and cultural institutions, we are entering a new regime Han calls Infocracy. The characteristic feature of Infocracy is the atomization - one might say pulverization - of human life at all levels (from the personal, interpersonal, societal, political, economic, and cultural) into bits of information which form complex emergent patterns as those bits get shuffled around networks of dizzying complexity.
This pulverization has sweeping consequences for every level of human life, according to Han. As he sees it, the biggest victims are key cultural and social constructs that make possible a functioning democracy. Chief among these constructs is the Enlightenment ideal of the autonomous rational subject, who freely supports democracy by entering into reasoned debates with other such individual subjects. This once-autonomous individual, who once participated in political systems by means of reasoned communication with others, now increasingly tends to dissolve into a dizzyingly impersonal mass of information as she voluntarily interacts with "smart" gadgets throughout the course of her day (gadgets that can potentially record each of her movements, from her heart rate fluctuations to the direction of her attention as she flits her cursor across webpages). According to Han, our thirst for ever more precise information that quantifies every nook and cranny of our lives ultimately enslaves us since it leads to the dissolution of the remaining bastion of freedom: the private sphere. Due to the influx of "smart" gadgets connecting us to the world wide web at our most personal moments (e.g. during a walk in nature with loved ones), the private sphere has become public information.
I actually wish Han had developed with greater rigour his analysis into how our intensified reliance on digital, smart technologies in our efforts to constructs our sense of self leads to a pulverization of the sense of a coherent self with a coherent, individual worldview. When we interact with personalized algorithms, at a superficial glance, we may seem to ourselves to be opening greater platforms for individual expression by creating a more personalized info "feed." In fact, what we're actually doing is we are training algorithms to better train us (and others statistically like us in their behaviours). We are training them to be better at capturing and fracturing our attention and at more effectively dissolving our remaining sense of individual agency.
Moreover, through our continued interaction in this virtual space, we contribute to the creation of a virtual eidolon of ourselves. We become progressively invested in feeding, shaping and sustaining this virtual eidolon. Over time, it takes on an eerie life of its own. To the degree that we are invested in nurturing this eidolon, we become progressively more uprooted from the individual sources of our identity. Increasingly, the soft skills that lead to success in society depend not on how you present yourself as a flesh-and-blood individual, but rather on how good you are at crafting, propagating and marketing this virtual eidolon of yourself in the Infosphere.
Through all this, the parameters of our agency are completely transformed, as is our sense of identity, split, as it increasingly is, between the increasingly alienated flesh-and-blood subject, and her virtual self-construct into which more and more of her attention and energy is increasingly poured and which filters her moment-to-moment interactions with the world. The upshot is that you are never simply looking at the budding spring flowers with your own eyes any more, even when you are alone, trying to get away from it all while walking through the woods. Instead, you are always looking at those tender shoots through the eyes of your virtual eidolon, never failing to quantify to yourself the value your percept of the flower could have if it were transformed into a bit of information that can be used as currency in the Infosphere, that is, as something that can attract "shares" and "likes." Thus, you bring the Infosphere into the woods with you, and the woods become swallowed up by the Infocracy. And there is a new kind of suffering, uprooting, alienation, and a new gnawing spiritual emptiness, that become rather commonplace experiences as we routinely reduce ourselves, what we perceive, and our relations to the social, natural and cultural worlds to information. We live and suffer through these experiences without being able to put words to them or to understand them.
Not only is there, in practice, no more distinction between private and public spaces, but strictly speaking we cannot speak of either as a coherent "space" anymore. The Infosphere is a new kind of habitat for the human animal, one unlike any other we've known. This poses some serious psychological challenges for us to contend with, since the extent to which our increasing addiction to virtual spaces and virtual communities is conducive to well-being (or else brings psychological harm) is not yet fully known. But Han points out that, perhaps even more alarmingly, this change of habitat also poses disturbing social, cultural, and political challenges for us. I mentioned above the dissolution of the social infrastructure that supports democracy. Han has a truly excellent discussion of how the social practice of reasoned argument that lies at the basis of democracy is quickly deteriorating once it migrates to the Infosphere.
He identifies as crucial contributors to this accelerating deterioration certain prophets of the new Infocratic, post-rational era who proclaim that argument - as a tool that individuals use to arrive at the truth of things by engaging in a clash of individual perspectives - is made obsolete by Big Data. The half-baked idea of these prophets of the Infocracy is that an AI that can find patterns of breathtaking complexity on the basis of heaps of information about human behaviour, ranging from the most minute rates of eye saccades all the way to the collective conditions for political polarization, has no need for arguments. Probabilistic pattern-recognition on the basis of enormous enough quantities of information (more than most of us can even imagine holding within our purview in a lifetime) can generate much more accurate predictions about how to restructure society "for the best of all." A consequentialist ethics' wet dream come true, I suppose.
The crucial claim the prophet of the Infocracy makes, and which Han treats with (to my mind) appropriate scorn, is that in this way, Big Data replaces the need for reasoned argument, debate, such that even political parties and platforms start to seem like relics from the distant past. Complex information-processing technologies have made individual reasoning obsolete. And given the tight connection between knowledge (or information, rather, since knowledge and wisdom are also going the way of the dodo, if Han is right) and power, this has sweeping political consequences. If Han is right, argument, the tool that finite, individual minds use to test their personal perspectives of what matters against one another in order to arrive at an intersubjectively-binding view of the truth, is tacitly and increasingly being replaced with impersonal statistical pattern-recognition as the basis for decision making. Or maybe it's not even appropriate to speak of "decision"-making anymore. And it's all happening more quickly than we can recognize what is going on, never mind figuring out a means of responding intelligently.
Han is right to suggest that understanding how the Infocracy is restructuring the fundamental context within which we relate to ourselves, one another, and the environment is a precondition for responding intelligently to surface manifestations of this shift that we are witnessing around us (e.g. the alliance between technocrats and the far right, the rise of surveillance capitalism, social media as a tool for the formation of echo chambers, etc). He is also right to point out that since mere information knows nothing of the higher-level meaningful unities in terms of which we make sense of ourselves and our societies (unities like the notion of the individual and the community as a cultural totality), we cannot expect a political order increasingly based on information-processing to be one in which we can feel at home.
However, my biggest beef with this work is that it consists of a string of aphoristic assertions that are too often without rigorous argumentative support. Han present some astute (and very important) observations, but does not back them up with rigorous argumentative support. This is a bit ironic, given the content of the book.