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The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity
Bousquet's landmark book examines the impact of key technologies and scientific ideas on the theory and practice of warfare and the handling of the perennial tension between order and chaos on the battlefield. Spanning the entire modern era, from the Scientific Revolution to the present, it offers a systematic account of modern warfare as the constitution of increasingly complex assemblages of bodies and machines whose integration rests upon a military assimilation of scientific thought.Reflecting the pervasive influence of scientific conceptual frameworks upon warfare, modern armies have been successively organised by reference to the paradigmatic technologies of the clock, engine, computer, and network. Conversely, major scientific developments and technological breakthroughs have become intertwined with the experience of war, especially since the Second World War's unprecedented mobilisation of scientific rationality and technical expertise. This increasingly tight symbiosis between science, technology, and war is at the heart of both the tremendous powers and enduring pathologies displayed by the contemporary military machine.In this new and revised edition, Bousquet extends the analysis to encompass the latest developments in the scientific way of warfare in the midst of renewed great power competition and a wave of technological innovation in artificial intelligence and robotics.
395 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 15, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
September 8, 2012
Starts a little slow, but gets going with an insightful commentary of the cyber-based warfare style typical of the Cold War. The author then poses a very valid question over the popular modern theories of combat aided by networks. Are these truly a new way of war, or is it just more information for the standard hierarchal leaders to make centralized decisions?
Overall a quality read and method to think about styles of warfighting.
Overall a quality read and method to think about styles of warfighting.
April 30, 2012
The Scientific Way of Warfare describes the impact of scientific thinking on conflict from the sixteenth century to the present. While Bousquet supplies no original research or additional facts to the historiography of science and war, he fully develops a new idea that helps one decipher and understand how wars are fought. War, he begins, is a quest for certainty, and this quest drives military theorists to behave like scientists aiming to extract reproducible patterns from the environment (p. 9). Furthermore, the study of physical forces results in the design and use of devices, articulating a relationship between science and technology (p. 15). Science uncovers the natural rules and laws that govern the physical world. Technology represents the objects that utilize those laws to gain certainty and impose order on the battlefield. Seeking to understand the underlying principles of war, the military thinker aims to give order to action and to create predictability within chaos.
From this underlying premise, Bousquet creates a series of four regimes built around specific scientific ideas that are reflected in military theory and practice (p. 4). He uses metaphors to supply meaning and impose a clear structure over these complex regimes of military thought (p. 24).
The first regime Bousquet describes as mechanistic warfare using the clock metaphor. Exemplified by precise drills and movements, mechanistic battles were won when disciplined soldiers and units operated in precise and repeatable ways. Imagine two rows of soldiers facing one another, firing volley after volley. The victor would be the row that stood with more discipline and had more efficient firing movements. The idea that structure would predispose victory aligns with the scientific thinking of Newton. According to Newton, the natural world behaved in rational and predictable ways that could be described by mathematics and geometry (p. 39). Fredrick the Great's clockwork army and the defensive geometry of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban's forts epitomized this regime.
In the eighteenth century, linear certainties gave way to the notion of entropy, an ever-present and constant decay of nature into disorder (p. 83). In this second regime, called thermodynamics, Bousquet used the metaphor of the engine to convey meaning. The engine is more complex than the clock, converts energy into motion, and creates its own energy in the form of heat. It was a source of motive power central to the period's industrialization (p. 30). The focus on energy culminated in the ultimate expression of coercive power, the atomic bomb. Science also begot technological advancements that massively increased the size and capabilities of the armed forces, increased the scope and scale of conflict, and necessitated decentralization. Though warfare became more complex than in the past, the "…irreversible drive towards physical disorder" created an incentive for change (p. 83).
New science again spurred adaptation as thermodynamic warfare gave way to cybernetic warfare. This third regime developed from the thoughtful combination of information and communications to create feedback processes. The computer with its central processor was the metaphor. Information would flow to the processor, which would issue instructions that would inevitably produce feedback making decision-making more effective and efficient. Cybernetic warfare asserts that uncertainty results from a lack of information, something technology could remedy (p. 150). This belief brought the sense that one could see first, act first, and destroy an enemy so long as they had superior technology. It minimized decentralization and ignored emergence and contingency on the battlefield. Here Bousquet cautions his readers that the cybernetic system creates an artificially closed environment, highlighting the failure in Vietnam as evidence (p. 115). Despite the US military's computerization, it could not control nor predict the battlefield in southeast Asia.
Bousquet condemns cybernetic warfare, but its diffusion of computers and the emergent network brought about the final regime, chaoplexic warfare. The new regime and its network metaphor stemmed from chaos and complexity theory and embraced uncertainty, feedback loops, and self-organization (p. 154-155). Science changed its mind, declaring linearity as the exception and finding non-linear processes in nature and on the battlefield the norm (p. 156). Decentralized self-organizing teams were better suited than centralized systems for dealing with contingency (p. 167). John Boyd, the famous fighter pilot who created the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, best represented this new way of network thinking (p. 177).
We currently remain in debate within the chaoplexic regime, according to Bousquet. Elements of certainty have crept back into military thinking, inducing moves towards centralized control encouraged by science and technology (p. 203). Conversely, the decentralized fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan did not win the United States a victory, though it did secure the Taliban one (p. 225). Bousquet claims the US military did not achieve decentralization, but he ignores the benefits of control (p. 233).
Bousquet fails to address the need for both decentralization to allow decision-making where the information is found, and centralization to mass finite resources where needed. This natural tension exists on a spectrum, and the level of either decentralization or control is predicated by the amount of certainty. Militaries seek certainty to exert some level of control, and even a little control can be decisive on a battlefield. The trick is balance; keep the quest for control open to the need for the flexibility found in decentralization.
The metaphors Bousquet uses are accessible and help illuminate the problem of how military thinking has changed over time. The writing is clear and straightforward; the reader does not need a background in military theory or science to understand the message. If you read the first edition, do not bother with the second. While Bousquet included a few references to the latest news from Iraq and Afghanistan, he did not add anything substantive. The arguments remain the same. Overall, he does achieve his aim of supplying readers with a conceptual lens for thinking about war (p. 28). Bousquet sees these metaphors as a way to analyze the present using metaphors that articulate the past. They are useful to those interested in understanding science's effect on military thinking.
From this underlying premise, Bousquet creates a series of four regimes built around specific scientific ideas that are reflected in military theory and practice (p. 4). He uses metaphors to supply meaning and impose a clear structure over these complex regimes of military thought (p. 24).
The first regime Bousquet describes as mechanistic warfare using the clock metaphor. Exemplified by precise drills and movements, mechanistic battles were won when disciplined soldiers and units operated in precise and repeatable ways. Imagine two rows of soldiers facing one another, firing volley after volley. The victor would be the row that stood with more discipline and had more efficient firing movements. The idea that structure would predispose victory aligns with the scientific thinking of Newton. According to Newton, the natural world behaved in rational and predictable ways that could be described by mathematics and geometry (p. 39). Fredrick the Great's clockwork army and the defensive geometry of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban's forts epitomized this regime.
In the eighteenth century, linear certainties gave way to the notion of entropy, an ever-present and constant decay of nature into disorder (p. 83). In this second regime, called thermodynamics, Bousquet used the metaphor of the engine to convey meaning. The engine is more complex than the clock, converts energy into motion, and creates its own energy in the form of heat. It was a source of motive power central to the period's industrialization (p. 30). The focus on energy culminated in the ultimate expression of coercive power, the atomic bomb. Science also begot technological advancements that massively increased the size and capabilities of the armed forces, increased the scope and scale of conflict, and necessitated decentralization. Though warfare became more complex than in the past, the "…irreversible drive towards physical disorder" created an incentive for change (p. 83).
New science again spurred adaptation as thermodynamic warfare gave way to cybernetic warfare. This third regime developed from the thoughtful combination of information and communications to create feedback processes. The computer with its central processor was the metaphor. Information would flow to the processor, which would issue instructions that would inevitably produce feedback making decision-making more effective and efficient. Cybernetic warfare asserts that uncertainty results from a lack of information, something technology could remedy (p. 150). This belief brought the sense that one could see first, act first, and destroy an enemy so long as they had superior technology. It minimized decentralization and ignored emergence and contingency on the battlefield. Here Bousquet cautions his readers that the cybernetic system creates an artificially closed environment, highlighting the failure in Vietnam as evidence (p. 115). Despite the US military's computerization, it could not control nor predict the battlefield in southeast Asia.
Bousquet condemns cybernetic warfare, but its diffusion of computers and the emergent network brought about the final regime, chaoplexic warfare. The new regime and its network metaphor stemmed from chaos and complexity theory and embraced uncertainty, feedback loops, and self-organization (p. 154-155). Science changed its mind, declaring linearity as the exception and finding non-linear processes in nature and on the battlefield the norm (p. 156). Decentralized self-organizing teams were better suited than centralized systems for dealing with contingency (p. 167). John Boyd, the famous fighter pilot who created the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop, best represented this new way of network thinking (p. 177).
We currently remain in debate within the chaoplexic regime, according to Bousquet. Elements of certainty have crept back into military thinking, inducing moves towards centralized control encouraged by science and technology (p. 203). Conversely, the decentralized fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan did not win the United States a victory, though it did secure the Taliban one (p. 225). Bousquet claims the US military did not achieve decentralization, but he ignores the benefits of control (p. 233).
Bousquet fails to address the need for both decentralization to allow decision-making where the information is found, and centralization to mass finite resources where needed. This natural tension exists on a spectrum, and the level of either decentralization or control is predicated by the amount of certainty. Militaries seek certainty to exert some level of control, and even a little control can be decisive on a battlefield. The trick is balance; keep the quest for control open to the need for the flexibility found in decentralization.
The metaphors Bousquet uses are accessible and help illuminate the problem of how military thinking has changed over time. The writing is clear and straightforward; the reader does not need a background in military theory or science to understand the message. If you read the first edition, do not bother with the second. While Bousquet included a few references to the latest news from Iraq and Afghanistan, he did not add anything substantive. The arguments remain the same. Overall, he does achieve his aim of supplying readers with a conceptual lens for thinking about war (p. 28). Bousquet sees these metaphors as a way to analyze the present using metaphors that articulate the past. They are useful to those interested in understanding science's effect on military thinking.
January 30, 2013
Great book that got off to a bit of a slow start.
Bousquet's stated aim is to track the interaction between scientific ideas, and the theories and practices of western warfare. (3) However, the underlying focus appears to be the critique of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a perpetuation of the cybernetic approach to warfare, not the chaoplexic approach that it advocates. (232) I think he achieves both aims well.
A key theme established at the outset of the book and clearly evident throughout is the metaphor as the means through which the interaction between science and warfare occurs. (25) To this end, the book divides the analysis into four distinct scientific "regimes" with associated metaphors:
(1) Mechanistic - Clockwork
(2) Thermodynamic - Combustion engine
(3) Cybernetic - Computers
(4) Chaoplexity - Ants
In each chapter Bousquet does an excellent job of first explaining the scientific advances that led to the change of regime, and then switches to identifying how changing scientific perspectives moulded military thoughts. The fact that he focuses on the actually concept of how war should be fought, not the necessarily the tools that are used to fight them, made this book more useful and not just a list of how military hardware has improved.
Perhaps the best aspect of the book was its accessibility. Bousquet does an excellent job in explaining difficult concepts without appearing to "dumb it down" too much. I actually walked away with a better understanding of chaos and complexity theory, as well as the theories of John Boyd, based on the small chapters devoted to this, then from a book read earlier that was focused solely on the topic.
In summ: Great book. On the "to be read when I actually have time to absorb it more fully list"
Bousquet's stated aim is to track the interaction between scientific ideas, and the theories and practices of western warfare. (3) However, the underlying focus appears to be the critique of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a perpetuation of the cybernetic approach to warfare, not the chaoplexic approach that it advocates. (232) I think he achieves both aims well.
A key theme established at the outset of the book and clearly evident throughout is the metaphor as the means through which the interaction between science and warfare occurs. (25) To this end, the book divides the analysis into four distinct scientific "regimes" with associated metaphors:
(1) Mechanistic - Clockwork
(2) Thermodynamic - Combustion engine
(3) Cybernetic - Computers
(4) Chaoplexity - Ants
In each chapter Bousquet does an excellent job of first explaining the scientific advances that led to the change of regime, and then switches to identifying how changing scientific perspectives moulded military thoughts. The fact that he focuses on the actually concept of how war should be fought, not the necessarily the tools that are used to fight them, made this book more useful and not just a list of how military hardware has improved.
Perhaps the best aspect of the book was its accessibility. Bousquet does an excellent job in explaining difficult concepts without appearing to "dumb it down" too much. I actually walked away with a better understanding of chaos and complexity theory, as well as the theories of John Boyd, based on the small chapters devoted to this, then from a book read earlier that was focused solely on the topic.
In summ: Great book. On the "to be read when I actually have time to absorb it more fully list"
December 14, 2024
Antoine Bousquet’s The Scientific Way of Warfare offers a fascinating exploration of how scientific and technological advancements have shaped the evolution of military strategy from the Enlightenment to the present day. Bousquet’s central argument is that warfare has been continually influenced by scientific paradigms, from the mechanistic views of the clockwork universe to the complexities of cybernetics and chaos theory.
The book is both a historical and philosophical investigation, blending an analysis of military theory with broader reflections on how science and war intersect. For readers interested in the intellectual underpinnings of modern conflict, Bousquet’s work delves into how technologies like computation and systems theory have redefined what warfare looks like, with a particular focus on control, information, and unpredictability in the 21st century.
While Bousquet’s writing is dense at times, his ability to draw connections between scientific thought and military application is insightful. The book is especially engaging for those who appreciate a multidisciplinary approach, touching on politics, technology, and philosophy as much as military history. Overall, The Scientific Way of Warfare is a thought-provoking read for anyone interested in the deeper intellectual currents shaping the future of war.
The book is both a historical and philosophical investigation, blending an analysis of military theory with broader reflections on how science and war intersect. For readers interested in the intellectual underpinnings of modern conflict, Bousquet’s work delves into how technologies like computation and systems theory have redefined what warfare looks like, with a particular focus on control, information, and unpredictability in the 21st century.
While Bousquet’s writing is dense at times, his ability to draw connections between scientific thought and military application is insightful. The book is especially engaging for those who appreciate a multidisciplinary approach, touching on politics, technology, and philosophy as much as military history. Overall, The Scientific Way of Warfare is a thought-provoking read for anyone interested in the deeper intellectual currents shaping the future of war.
July 7, 2020
Overall, a good lash-up of complexity theory and strategy, with a ton of military history thrown in. For readers who follow science, and want to more clearly see how science shapes strategy (or, more broadly, the mental models of society in a given era), this is a good work. Those who aren't fans of military history may struggle a bit with the first chunk of the book, but the current strategic concepts- especially as the U.S. considers how to deal with China- are interesting and relevant to current events.
August 5, 2013
Bousquet's thesis is fatally flawed. He attempts to circumvent the fixed chronology of time through metaphor but his thesis is derivative of time and a linear progression and the availability of scientific principles and technologies by culture being incorporated into ways of warfare. Once latter concepts (the acceptance of non-linearity and embrace of complexity) are shown to have not only been expressed but embraced in the former metaphorical blocks (Clausewitz's inherent grasp of non-linearity or Whitehead's Process and Reality or Boyd's acknowledgment of military theorists dating back millennia utilizing OODA-like processes) the progression falls apart. Take his diatribe against NCW at the end of the book where he likens it to a reassertion of cybernetics. If he was sticking to his thesis and this was the technology at the time then it is legitimate, but once he crosses into futurology and value judgments his book is less an explanation than an opinion piece. Cultural perceptions of warfare shift but there is simply not sufficient evidence to establish a causal chain.
As an extension of the flaws of metaphor, Bousquet does a terrible job handling the transitions, particularly the division between cybernetics and chaoplexity (seriously? This isn't German, you can't just smash nouns together). The fact that he identifies NCW as a hallmark of chaoplexity then slams it for being too cybernetic is a perfect example. Additionally, the metaphor falls apart on the transition when you start to consider the actual conflicts in which this technology was used, not just the scientific jargon and doctrine floating through journals. Chaoplexity starts somewhere around mid-70s and onward but in what world does Desert Storm or Kosovo display a comfort with ambiguity and movement to decentralize control? Was the driving need to rapidly mobilize through centralized C2 networks not a significant step on the road to WWI? Bousquet tries to sidestep this issue by claiming that the thought processes from previous regimes perpetuate forward in time, but it can't also work in reverse or the thesis falls apart. Part of this problem might be that his departure points for each age are metaphorical and not within the same disciplines, hence his explanation of the mechanistic age could equally apply to the cybernetic age with only a slight modification of the technology and processing power available.
Bousquet's description of the rise of decentralized conflict, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare is that scientific notions of complexity and chaos are reflected in methods of war, but this skirts the substantive issues. Asymmetric warfare as a dominant tactic has been growing exponentially since WWII but has been present for centuries. Clausewitz declared the phenomenon to be a 19th century development based on his observations of Napoleon in Spain during the Peninsular Wars. Post-WWII the rates rose dramatically not because of technology, but as a response to the rapidly consolidating of hegemonic power into a bipolar and then unipolar world (after the collapse of the USSR). Asymmetry as a component of warfare is a response to the methods of war and wielding of power and is aided by and expressed through the available technology, but certainly not defined by it.
As an extension of the flaws of metaphor, Bousquet does a terrible job handling the transitions, particularly the division between cybernetics and chaoplexity (seriously? This isn't German, you can't just smash nouns together). The fact that he identifies NCW as a hallmark of chaoplexity then slams it for being too cybernetic is a perfect example. Additionally, the metaphor falls apart on the transition when you start to consider the actual conflicts in which this technology was used, not just the scientific jargon and doctrine floating through journals. Chaoplexity starts somewhere around mid-70s and onward but in what world does Desert Storm or Kosovo display a comfort with ambiguity and movement to decentralize control? Was the driving need to rapidly mobilize through centralized C2 networks not a significant step on the road to WWI? Bousquet tries to sidestep this issue by claiming that the thought processes from previous regimes perpetuate forward in time, but it can't also work in reverse or the thesis falls apart. Part of this problem might be that his departure points for each age are metaphorical and not within the same disciplines, hence his explanation of the mechanistic age could equally apply to the cybernetic age with only a slight modification of the technology and processing power available.
Bousquet's description of the rise of decentralized conflict, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare is that scientific notions of complexity and chaos are reflected in methods of war, but this skirts the substantive issues. Asymmetric warfare as a dominant tactic has been growing exponentially since WWII but has been present for centuries. Clausewitz declared the phenomenon to be a 19th century development based on his observations of Napoleon in Spain during the Peninsular Wars. Post-WWII the rates rose dramatically not because of technology, but as a response to the rapidly consolidating of hegemonic power into a bipolar and then unipolar world (after the collapse of the USSR). Asymmetry as a component of warfare is a response to the methods of war and wielding of power and is aided by and expressed through the available technology, but certainly not defined by it.
January 30, 2013
Very well laid out read. The easy to grasp structure helps with what might otherwise be a very hard to grasp subject. Bousquet's thesis is that since the 17th Century, with the advent of the machine age, Western warfare has modeled the dominant scientific theories of the time.
Bousquet begins with an outstanding overview of his thesis, which, truth be told, is robust and serves as a superb overview of the entire book, leaving the reader to decide where (or whether) to go in depth in each epoch. The first is the machine age, represented by the clock, and reflected by the Prussians almost-maniacal dedication to drill, which produced an army that functioned like clockwork. Next is the age of thermodynamics, represented by the steam engine and reflected in organizational changes, motorization, and advancements in firearms that owed their genesis to a new found focus on energy.
The next two eras are split into two chapters each. The first describes the science and the second describes the military application. Both science chapters do a great job of laying out the major concepts, though the chaoplexic one made my brain begin to dribble out of my ear a bit. The first one, on cybernetics, is easy to understand. It's companion chapter explores the associated obsession with numbers, operations research, and its cousin, systems analysis. It culminates with a scathing review of McNamara's performance during Vietnam, painting a picture of "the Whiz Kids" as a bunch of naive nerds blinded by cybernetics and a tragic and misguided belief in its ability to eliminate uncertainty. The chapter examining the (possible) embrace of chaoplexic warfare is worth reading for the discussion of Boyd alone. Actually, after that point, my brain dribbled out a little bit again. I appreciated the chapter, but it was a tough read at points. I'll definitely have to take another (few) looks to wrap my brain completely around it. Bottom line is that Bousquet thinks the so-called network-centric warfare of today's military may give more lip service than actual credence to chaoplexic theories. He sees NCW as still too mired in old, failed, methods of cybernetics, focused on negative feedback as if more information could actually eliminate uncertainty (rather than the needed positive reinforcement model that would allow for growth and flexibility).
Bousquet begins with an outstanding overview of his thesis, which, truth be told, is robust and serves as a superb overview of the entire book, leaving the reader to decide where (or whether) to go in depth in each epoch. The first is the machine age, represented by the clock, and reflected by the Prussians almost-maniacal dedication to drill, which produced an army that functioned like clockwork. Next is the age of thermodynamics, represented by the steam engine and reflected in organizational changes, motorization, and advancements in firearms that owed their genesis to a new found focus on energy.
The next two eras are split into two chapters each. The first describes the science and the second describes the military application. Both science chapters do a great job of laying out the major concepts, though the chaoplexic one made my brain begin to dribble out of my ear a bit. The first one, on cybernetics, is easy to understand. It's companion chapter explores the associated obsession with numbers, operations research, and its cousin, systems analysis. It culminates with a scathing review of McNamara's performance during Vietnam, painting a picture of "the Whiz Kids" as a bunch of naive nerds blinded by cybernetics and a tragic and misguided belief in its ability to eliminate uncertainty. The chapter examining the (possible) embrace of chaoplexic warfare is worth reading for the discussion of Boyd alone. Actually, after that point, my brain dribbled out a little bit again. I appreciated the chapter, but it was a tough read at points. I'll definitely have to take another (few) looks to wrap my brain completely around it. Bottom line is that Bousquet thinks the so-called network-centric warfare of today's military may give more lip service than actual credence to chaoplexic theories. He sees NCW as still too mired in old, failed, methods of cybernetics, focused on negative feedback as if more information could actually eliminate uncertainty (rather than the needed positive reinforcement model that would allow for growth and flexibility).
August 24, 2013
As technological artifacts and the study of nature became more intertwined into technoscience, the importance of social organization for the success of technological artifacts became paramount. Even when comparable technologies were used by warring armies for example, those that had more suitable organizations were also more successful..... This metaphor of social organization based on the prominent technology of the time can be seen in the language as well.... clockwork became used in everyday language at the time of mechanization, while entropy was used more extensively with the extensive implementation of thermodynamics.... Cybernetics became quite important throughout WWII and continue to be of importance until today although there are many conceptual and theoretical issues that beset it.... finally, the metaphor of the network is becoming more and more important with time..... Complex systems which are formed around networked fabrics are becoming more important with time leading to what the author refers to as a chaoplexic system
June 28, 2009
Fantastic. Provides a Foucauldian analysis of the scientific way of warfare, 'the array of scientific rationalities, techniques, frameworks of interpretation, and intellectual dispositions which have characterized the approach to the application of socially organized violence in the modern era'. You learn a lot about the scientific rationalities that have underpinned the conduct of war as well as how these have been applied strategically and tactically since the 17th century.
March 20, 2014
Profound book that provides a logical framework and rigorous support for the concept of the "chaoplexic" lens. Looks at war as an interconnected system in the context of historical scientific metaphors / paradigms (Kuhn), war strategy (Clausewitz/Fuller), technological pathology (van Creveld), and most importantly, the influence of uncertainty (Boyd). This is a must-read for strategists...I'll have to read it at least another time or two -- blew my mind.
December 17, 2013
Outstanding book on the nexus of scientific advancement and its impacts upon military theory in the West. First read at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the last chapter on "chaoplexic" warfare is exceptional. Should be read following Azar Gat's A History of Military Thought.
May 25, 2023
thoughtful and overwhelming
Being a student of military history and command and control this was a very good review. The eye opening is the concepts discussed in chaoplextic conduct war and the idea of man-machine symbiosis.
Being a student of military history and command and control this was a very good review. The eye opening is the concepts discussed in chaoplextic conduct war and the idea of man-machine symbiosis.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews