Philip Goff has become something of a world authority and spokesman for panpsychism, the idea that all things "have a mind or mindlike quality" [1]. Goff wrote a fine article on it for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Panpsychism has become more intriguing as more people become dissatisfied with materialism (aka physicalism) and its shaky cousin, dualism. Physicalism has failed to come up with even a theory of how matter can produce consciousness (the famous "hard problem" of David Chalmers). Physicalism can't account for how matter leads to subjectivity and values. Calling the latter two emergent properties of Darwinist evolution of matter only begs the question.
There are serious problems in panpsychism, at any rate. Do atoms have conscious awareness or only aggregates of atoms? If the latter, where do we draw the line? If a pebble has consciousness, does a rock have more? How about a mountain?
How does the "objectivity" implied by shared objects of experience fit in? If Tom and Vicky go to a museum, look at a painting, and discuss it, doesn't that prove the painting exists as something consistent outside their individual subjectivities? If so, is the painting's own consciousness "consistent" with that of the two people looking at it? In what way?
What about abstractions, ideas, numbers and other "eternal objects"? Aren't they kinds of things? If not, why not? If so, do they have consciousness too?
Goff doesn't try to give conclusive answers to such questions. He's not trying to overturn scientific methodology either. But what he would like (and I've heard him say so in podcasts) is for science to keep an open mind. That seems laudable enough. But, on the other hand, a metaphysician's primal thirst is unlikely to be quenched by the mere idea and practice of keeping an open mind.