A reasonable account of Johnson's fall, as told by a journalist/think tanker/hopeful MP. As a 'first draft of history', it works well as a blow-by-blow account of the events leading up to Johnson's resignation (the postscript, on the leadership election that followed, is weaker).
But this could have been so much more. For starters, anybody who followed the events in the newspaper coverage at the time will know almost everything here already, even to the extent of re-using quotes from 'a source close to Johnson'. Almost every single quote here is unattributable, which is understandable but grates and diminishes its authority somewhat.
There's also a lack of extra analysis from Payne, except for in the postscript. He doesn't really get to grips with why things ended in the way that they did.
Here are, in my view, the key reasons for Johnson's downfall:
- Johnson always acted in his own short-term interest. Every time a scandal blew up, his strategy was to just keep fighting until the next day. This allowed the narrative of a scandal-ridden government to gain momentum. If each scandal had been dealt with immediately, in a single swoop, then it would have been harder for such a narrative to dominate.
- Johnson failed to grasp that his strong mandate after the 2019 election victory gave him room for manoeuvre in assembling his government. He would dominate it no matter what. Instead, he filled the Cabinet with his acolytes, deliberately choosing subpar ministers rather than picking the most talented politicians at his disposal. That made it harder to control the parliamentary party, meant there was discontent with his leadership from the start, and meant he failed to lead an effective government.
- Surrounding himself with acolytes meant his messaging was hopeless. In the pandemic, it was always going to be a problem that the rules implemented had a massive impact on a huge number of voters (many not interacting with anybody except those they lived with), whereas those working at No 10 continued in a Covid-existence that was very similar to their pre-Covid existence (even if we exclude the parties from the equation). There was a total failure to understand how the rules they enacted actually affected people, and a total failure to realise how their messaging would go down with voters.
- Connected to this is the notion that Johnson 'got the big calls right'. He constantly repeated this phrase, but did anyone actually buy it? His government had done well on the vaccine rollout and on responding to the Ukraine war, but (especially with the vaccines) it was pretty clear what needed to be done, and it was implementation that mattered rather than decision-making.
- His government was always reactive, rather than proactive. His only two successes were reactions to issues as they came up. Where was the proactive policymaking to deliver on the 2019 manifesto? Instead time was spent trying to privatise C4 and dealing, every day, with the scandals that the government failed to control.
Those reasons could be accurate or could be nonsense, but combined they make up almost as much analysis as Payne offers in an entire book. Lots of his analysis also relies on the usual tropes about Johnson and his character, rather than events as they happened.
Payne also has some questionable takes of his own. For example, he says that Johnson mattered more than any other 'leader' since Blair. I'm assuming by 'leader' he actually means 'UK prime ministers', in which case I would argue for Cameron as the one who matters the most, setting the tone for British and Scottish politics for the ensuing decade with his two referendums. If opening up to non-PMs, Farage is there too. Yes, Johnson 'got Brexit done', but the rest of 'why he mattered' is that he happened to be in power when the pandemic happened and when Putin decided to invade Ukraine - events he had nothing to do with. Payne also ignores some scandals completely or almost completely (Johnson's holidays, wallpapering, and various attempts to undermine democratic norms and make obvious the failings of the 'good chap' model of government.