Vietnam At War: The History 1946-1975

by Phillip B. Davidson

Weaving together the histories of three distinct conflicts, Phillip B. Davidson follows the entire course of the Vietnam War, from the initial French skirmishes in 1946 to the dramatic fall of Saigon nearly thirty years later. His connecting thread is North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, a remarkable figure who, with no formal military training, fashioned a rag-tag militia into one of the world's largest and most formidable armies. By focusing on Giap's role throughout the war, and by making available for the first time a wealth of recently declassified North Vietnamese documents, Davidson offers unprecedented insight into Hanoi's military strategies, an insight surpassed only by his inside knowledge of American operations and planning. Eminently qualified to write this history, Davidson--who served as chief intelligence officer under Generals Westmoreland and Abrams--tells firsthand the story of our tragic ordeal in Indochina and brings his unique understanding to bear on topics of continuing controversy, offering a chilling account, for example, of when and where the U.S. considered using nuclear weapons. The most comprehensive and authoritative history of the conflict to date, Vietnam at War sparkles with a rare immediacy, and brings to life in compelling fashion the war that tore America apart. We witness the chaos in Saigon when fireworks celebrating the Tet holiday are suddenly transformed into deadly rocket and machine-gun fire. We sit in on high-level meetings where General Westmoreland plans operations, or simply engages in some tough "headknocking" with subordinates. And in the end we learn that even the seemingly limitless resources of the U.S. military could not match the revolutionary "grand strategy" of the North Vietnamese. With its easy movement from intimate memoir to trenchant military analysis, from the conference rooms of generals to the battle-scarred streets of Hue, this is military history at its most gripping. A monumental, engrossing, and unforgettable chronicle, Vietnam at War is indispensable for anyone hoping to understand a conflict that still rages in the American psyche.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, Asia, American History, War

850 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1988

About the author

Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson was the chief U.S. military intelligence officer in Viet Nam (MACV J-2) from May 1967 to May 1969, and later wrote two books about the Viet Nam conflict. He had also served in World War II, following his graduation from the USMA (West Point) in 1939; and was a member of General MacArthur's G-2 (Intelligence) staff during the Korean War.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 3 out of 5]

“I wrote this book to explain to my own satisfaction how the United States won every battle in and over Vietnam and yet lost the war. Such a defeat is unprecedented in the annals of military history. And we did lose the war. Our objective was to preserve South Vietnam as an ‘independent, non-Communist state,’ and we obviously failed to do that. Refusing to accept this defeat, or saying that we won the shooting war, may assuage our bruised egos, but it oversimplifies the conflict and distorts our understanding of its true nature…”
- Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975


It is rare for a book to so thoroughly capture the essence of its subject. Phillip B. Davidson’s Vietnam at War truly feels like a literary analogue of the First and Second Indochina Wars. Unfortunately, this is not due to evocative writing or an ineffably ability on Davidson’s part to put you on the ground, amidst the tumult of thirty years’ of conflict in Southeast Asia.

Rather, this book is a quagmire, neatly – if unintentionally – mirroring the experiences of both France and the United States.

At first, things seem okay, if not great, and you start to invest. As you proceed, it doesn’t really get better, but at least it’s not getting appreciably worse either. Suddenly, however, everything grinds to a halt, becoming a slog. The best thing – the smart thing – would be to quit. Except by this point too much time and effort has been expended to simply leave. The sunk costs take hold, and fallaciously encourage you to continue.

This happened to France and America while fighting in Vietnam, and it happened to me, in a far, far more trivial way, while reading about it in Vietnam at War. To be sure, there are some interesting observations to be found, but those were not entirely worth the effort.

***

Vietnam at War is a big book, weighing in at a hefty 811 pages of text. It is also, to its credit, quite ambitious, attempting to distil three decades of warfare, politics, and shifting fortunes into a single volume.

Structurally speaking, Vietnam at War is split into two sections. The first covers the First Indochina War, pitting France against the Viet Minh. The latter section encompasses the Second Indochina War, with the United States and South Vietnam facing North Vietnam and the Vietcong. To a lesser extent, it also relates the Third Indochina War, wherein the North quickly conquered the South upon the exit of the United States.

If nothing else, the organization is good, with datelined chapters providing at least a patina of coherence on a complex, interrelated series of wars.

***

Of Vietnam at War’s two parts, the first is better. Davidson spends a lot of time with Vo Nguyen Giap, and does a nice job of explaining the stages of revolutionary war, and how Giap and the North Vietnamese applied this concept over time, always recognizing that the clock was ticking for the occupying forces. There is also value in Davidson’s methodical approach to building the big picture.

With that said, the writing can be mind-numbing. Davidson’s biographical sketches are decent, but his narration of the numerous battles are tedious and technical. His style – using the term loosely – is to list the order of battle, and then engage in a lifeless progression of which unit moved where. For instance, this is a random sentence that I plucked from a random page: “On 8 March, the 9th NVA Regiment of the 320th NVA Division cut Highway 14 north of Buon Blech, isolating Ban Me Thuot.” The line – which does not exactly stir the soul – accurately captures Davidson’s penchant for dates, military components, and place names, without anything to give the material drama.

To be sure, Davidson was a professional soldier, not an author, and one might argue that this is how the military writes. However, the best piece of prose in the entire book – regarding the Battle of the Ia Drang – actually comes from the official account of the U.S. Army.

Long story short: it’s hard to make the Battle of Dien Bien Phu boring, but Davidson manages. While his retelling of the French-Vietnamese clash is firmly within the category of “fine,” there are a ton of really good books on this era that far surpass this.

***

The second half of Vietnam at War had me wishing for “fine.”

Davidson – who passed away in 1996 – graduated West Point in 1939 and served as an intelligence officer in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, rising to the rank of lieutenant general. At times, he uses his experience to good effect, with nuanced military insights and an insider’s perspective. On the other hand, it makes objectivity difficulty, if not impossible.

When dealing with the French portion of the war, objectivity doesn’t matter, as Davidson had not yet arrived in country. That changes in the second half, when he begins to insert himself into the story. Davidson still does a good job with arranging the overall picture. His tone, though, changes completely.

For the roughly five-hundred pages that comprise the American-Vietnam War, Davidson intersperses his plodding march down the timeline with increasingly vitriolic arguments about the war’s strategy, conduct, and perception.

Some of Davidson’s conclusions are pretty conventional. He begins by laying blame with the Johnson Administration, and rightfully so. Instead of making hard decisions, Lyndon Johnson made no decision at all, allowing the mission to expand by inches, until it was too large to abandon, and too small to win. In this area, Davidson manages to criticize the players without questioning their patriotism.

This restraint ends when Davidson turns his ire on journalists, “leftists,” and college students, who he variously accuses of cowardice, ignorance, or of being communist dupes, while using adjectives such as “shrill” and “shrieking” to describe them. The constant return to this theme exhibits an ardency bordering on perseveration, and displays a strange panic at the thought of Americans exercising their constitutionally-derived rights to engage in the political process.

In the meantime, Davidson demonstrates a hesitancy – understandable, perhaps – to criticize American military commanders. For instance, the chapter on General William Westmoreland is almost fawning, with Davidson calling him “the most handsome man of his generation.” He also does what Michael Scott used to do on The Office, compiling a list of negative traits that consist entirely of virtues that are exploited by others for their own gain. Given that Davidson served under both Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams – and that Westmoreland was still alive when this came out – his propositions are questionable. Tellingly, even other pro-victory proponents – such as Lewis Sorley – have sharply criticized Westmoreland’s performance.

The end result is that it’s hard to take Davidson at his word, as his own work and reputation is at stake.

It’s also worth noting that General Giap’s appearances in the second half are few and far between. Partly this is reality, as Giap was sidelined by the Politburo. Nonetheless, this means that the Vietnamese side of the story disappears completely for long stretches.

***

As promised, Davidson answers his question about why America lost. None are exactly surprising.

Mostly, Davidson insists that we should have used greater force, as though the 7.5 million tons of ordinance dropped in Vietnam – twice the amount used to plaster the regimes of Hitler and Hirohito – was an exercise in restraint. He also lists tactics that he feels were denied the military, despite many – such as mining Haiphong, bombing Hanoi, and entering Cambodia –actually being tried, without North Vietnam begging to surrender. There is even talk of nuclear weapons. Eventually, Davidson agrees that these should not have been used; at several points, however, he openly toys with the idea, as though splitting atoms over another Asian nation came with no geopolitical, military, or moral consequences.

Davidson also argues that the United States should have declared war. On this, we agree, though for totally different reasons. For me, it would’ve meant a referendum on whether we should’ve been in Vietnam at all. For Davidson, it would have allowed for censorship. It’s hard to see how this would’ve helped, since the American government – censorship or not – already did its level best to hide the truth of the war, to its detriment.

Clearly, the answers provided did not satisfy me. Just as bothersome, though, is the question he did not engage at all: why were we there in the first place? Before discussing what it would’ve taken to win, we need to start by asking if we should’ve been fighting at all.

***

It’s been fifty years since America left Vietnam, and a lot has happened in the interim. When Davidson wrote this, just eight years separated him from the fall of Saigon. Understandably, he felt very strongly about what went wrong. I disagree with his opinions, but I respect them, as well as his long service to his country. Nevertheless, even if Davidson is right, and we could have “won” the Vietnam War, there is little evidence that this would have been worth the cost in lives ended or upended. That Vietnam at War sidesteps this issue is simply the starkest problem in a book riddled with them.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An informative, evenhanded military history of the French and American wars in Indochina.

Davidson’s coverage of Westmoreland is largely favorable, and he argues that Westmoreland had no real choice other than to choose a war of attrition. He also looks at the performance of other MACV commanders, and particularly Giap. His coverage of people involved is perceptive if a bit uneven.

Some more coverage of Geneva would have helped. Also, the section on the American war sometimes feels like it’s more focused on politics than the operational picture. There is less than you might expect on episodes like My Lai and the Tet Offensive. Some more coverage of allied participation would also have helped.

An insightful, measured and absorbing work overall.

[Anne Cupero · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good at the beginning. Perspective of General Giap and his methods at Dien Bien Phu is interesting and relevant. However, his apologist tone with regard to the American military nagged at me. So the military did everything right, did they? And every military official was correct in every decision that they made? This became too much to bear and I just wanted to put it down.

[Den Shergin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant analysis of military and political aspects (at a strategic level) of several conflicts in Vietnam, starting from pushing out French troops and to complete victory of Northern Vietnam in 1975. I really liked the detailed bios of key persons of the conflicts, as well as holistic analysis of international situation and mass psychology besides just military contacts.

[M Tucker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lieutenant General Phillip B Davidson has written a very informative book covering both the First and Second Indochina Wars, primarily from a military point of view. He does not simply recount the military operations and the important events of the war but provides succinct and insightful critical analysis.

Lieutenant General Davidson gets high marks, in my opinion, for identifying Le Duan as the real leader in the North. This book was published in 1988 and any student of this conflict will find it hard to locate a contemporaneous text that identifies the significance of Le Duan. But that only indicates what a consummate intelligence professional General Davidson is, he was J2 for Westmoreland and Abrams. Thanks to more recent scholarship, especially Lien-Hang Nguyen’s Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam, we now know that Ho had been supplanted by Le Duan, and his number two Le Duc Tho, around 1959.

I did encounter an interesting, perhaps unusual, episode in the book. In the chapter “A War That Nobody Wanted” (pp 354-355) General Davidson examines Westmoreland’s critics and the search and destroy strategy of attrition adopted from 1965 to about mid-1968. He takes General Dave Palmer to task for his blunt assertion, in his book Summons of the Trumpet, that attrition is not a strategy. It represents the complete lack of a strategy, according to Palmer. Palmer says, “…the United States was strategically bankrupt in Vietnam in 1966.” Now, it is obvious that either Palmer overstated or he did not completely express his argument; I think the latter. Davidson then embarks on a very entertaining and interesting argument also lacking complete expression. Davidson lists WWI, WWII, the American Civil War, as examples of wars of attrition and argues, correctly, that attrition is a well-known strategy to military professionals. But, here Davidson stumbles, he knows what the differences are between those earlier wars, excluding WWI, and Vietnam but chooses to ignore them to make his point that Westmoreland was wrongly criticized or too harshly criticized for the strategy he adopted in Vietnam. In WWII, and during the Civil War campaigns from 1864 onward, the US military had the strategic offensive and therefore the initiative. That is vital and Davidson knows it. He is a professional. In Vietnam, Johnson and his civilian advisors in Washington purposely surrendered the strategic initiative. It was much more like WWI, without front lines and trenches, and that strategy favors the side that simply outlasts the other, time is the limiting dimension. It is a repugnant, brutal strategic situation that simply wastes lives. General Palmer was thinking along those lines and indicates that when he says that the strategy of attrition, while in a posture of strategic defense (not mentioned in his book), simply “…uses blood in lieu of brains.” In Vietnam it was to simply try to kill more of the enemy than they are willing to tolerate while minimizing your own casualties by doing that killing using massive firepower. Chasing the crossover point. I’m not sure why General Davidson chose not to more completely examine those differences but his primary point was to defend Westmoreland’s attrition strategy. But then, later on page 453, he says of the attrition strategy and the air campaign, “’more of the same,’ a fruitless war of perseverance, whose only hope was that ‘something would turn up.’” So Davidson recognizes that attrition was all Westmoreland was left with and it was a “fruitless” strategy and that the only hope the US had was for some undefined chance opportunity to “turn up.” That sounds pretty “bankrupt.” Davidson makes clear, and Palmer does as well, that attrition was the only strategy that Westmoreland was left with; it was not a choice.

I thought perhaps Palmer’s use of the word “bankrupt” was what got Davidson upset but much later in the story (page 516), after a long examination of Tet, Westmoreland’s troop request and Westmoreland’s hope that General Wheeler could convince the president that a different strategy, one taking the strategic offensive, could be arranged, Davidson uses the “b” word. He says, “Regardless of who should be blamed for the failure of American strategy in Vietnam, in early March 1968 it was clear that the past concepts of gradualism and attrition were bankrupt.” I don’t understand the earlier attack on General Palmer’s characterization of the strategy. Just an unusual episode in his story.

General Davidson is troubled by how history will remember General Westmoreland. He covers the CBS controversy and spends some time investigating the MACV commander’s strengths and weaknesses. Davidson has a very positive opinion of Westmoreland and bemoans the negative opinions expressed by some of his detractors. On page 385 Davidson says, “Nobody knows what his final place in history will be, but I am confident that future historians will be far more generous to Westmoreland than his contemporaries have been.” Lieutenant General Davidson wrote those words prior to 1988 and he passed away in 1996 so he had not encountered the works of Lewis Sorely. Sorely, a West Point graduate who served in Vietnam, published a book in 2011 titled Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. Sorely basically blames Westmoreland for supposedly ignoring pacification and Vietnamization and blames him for the eventual loss of the Republic of Vietnam. In another book, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam, Sorely again savages Westmoreland and his strategy. General Davidson would have been exceedingly dismayed and, I’m sure, would have vehemently defended his former commander.

However, the author is not a Westmoreland sycophant, he levels criticisms as well. In fact all the MACV commanders are spotlighted and, I think, fairly evaluated. What Davidson does best in this work is to cover all the important military engagements and analyses and critiques the results. He does this as well with the other “wars” of pacification and Vietnamization. The massive weaknesses of the Vietnamization efforts are clearly described, and I think the eventual failure of building a modern army in South Vietnam is the penultimate tragedy of that war. The ultimate tragedy, of course, is ultimate failure after 25 years of war; beginning with the establishment of MAAG-Indochina in 1950.

In the final chapter the author provides a critical analysis of “Why We Lost the War.” He does an excellent job of describing the strategic advantages the Communists adopted and the strategic deficiencies the US and the GVN adopted.

I do have one quibble with the author. On page 806 the author is continuing his examination of the characteristics the Communists adopted in fighting a revolutionary war. General Davidson says that the protracted nature of the war “was one of its great strengths.” To oppose such a strategy the US should have “attempt[ed] to shorten the conflict.” But instead of doing that the author says (in italics), “[the US] adopted the very concept which would protract the hostilities-the strategy of limited war.” Most of the wars the US has fought, prior to WWI, have been limited wars, Civil War excepted. Korea was a limited war. It was the particular type of limited war that McNamara forced the military to accept in Vietnam that was the problem. It was McNamara who came up with the notion of “gradualism.” It was McNamara and Johnson who placed such extreme limits on military action that doomed the US to the tragic strategy it was left with. McNamara’s limits made the military effort impotent. It did nothing more than begin to fill body bags and the Hanoi Hilton with Americans and litter the countryside with dead Vietnamese. It was a strategy that could not stand up to revolutionary protracted war. I think Davidson just had a belly full of the “bean counters” telling his commanders that limited war in Vietnam meant that the Communist homeland and sanctuaries were off-limits to ground forces and much of the militarily important targets in the North were off-limits to bombing.

In the end the author says, “…the United States lost the war in the way all wars are lost-to a superior strategy…” It is important to note that the author is not saying that a better strategy would have guaranteed victory. His lengthy survey of the multitude of other elements that hobbled the development of the RVNAF into a powerful modern fighting force clearly shows the enormous difficulty the US faced. In this wonderful and detailed book General Davidson demonstrates that it was the self-imposed limits on the military, lack of a winning strategy, lack of motivation of both the American and South Vietnamese people, the corruption of the GVN and the inability of the US to develop a self-sustaining modern military for the Republic of Vietnam that led ultimately to defeat.

This is an outstanding book and the reader will come away with a very good idea of what happened in Vietnam and the cascading blunders that led to the death of many hundreds of thousands, the end to the Republic of Vietnam and ultimate defeat for America.

[Charlie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Since the U.S. had pulled out of Vietnam before I finished high school, I didn't know much about America's involvement in Vietnam. I learned a lot from this book. I must admit that I got a bit lost when he described Corps, battalions and platoons, etc. and battle strategies. But, he is a military guy describing military matters. I appreciated the emphasis he made on the different aspects of the war (military, political, psychological, etc.) I guess I am guilty of only thinking of war in terms of planes and tanks and artillery, but this book gave me insights into many other factors involved in winning and loosing a war. I was appalled to learn that many American servicemen lost their lives because of decisions based on political gain, military advancement, egos, jealousies, weakness in leadership and just plain stupidity. It really made me sad and angry. I am grateful for Gen'l Davidson's good work. I will keep this book as a refence.

[Steven Voorhees · Rating 4 out of 5]

A scintillating, ultra-granular and exhaustive study of the Viet Nam Conflict, starting with Ho Chi Minh's nationalist struggle in 1945-46 through to North Vietnam's conquering of the South on April 30, 1975. Practically every event in between -- the Communist defeat of the French; the entry and gradual entrapment of U.S. forces, analysis of military strategy (or lackthereof) -- is reported by Davidson. He argues North Vietnamese Gen. Giap was THE figure in the conflict. Thus, it was one of military and nationalistic strategy. The U.S. failed to grasp this. Moreover, America didn't realize it was fighting a revolution -- not just a piece on the Cold War chessboard. To extend the chess analogy: the North Vietnamese played chess. The U.S. and French played checkers.

[Mac · Rating 5 out of 5]

Buy, Borrow or Burn: Buy.

My favourite in depth account of the Vietnam War. I have read this twice and it flows well and covers the entire history of conflict during this period.

One Word: Thorough.

[An Le · Rating 5 out of 5]

Lt. General Davidson's Vietnam At War is a surprisingly comprehensive for a work of history which covers over 30 years of deeply complex wars in Indochina. Davidson bolsters the military history in his tome with his own experiences as a soldier and chief of intelligence in Vietnam. I find this book to be a balanced in its historical assessments of the French and American experiences in Indochina. Davidson does not overstate the military and political successes of North Vietnam nor does he contribute to the myth of Vo Nguyen Giap's genius. He gives credit to the enemy where he was cunning while taking comfort in his mistakes. While the military history presented in this work is thoroughly researched and indisputable, some of Davidson's conclusions are contestable, such as the assertion that some level of censorship of the media may have helped shield the American public from political dau tranh. In short, this book was one of the best works of military history I have read on this period.

[Teddee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perspective of the US military which sets forth the thesis that the war was ended by the media which undermined public support and painted the war as a disaster when in fact the US was winning the war in all military respects