Barbarosa: Kako je Hitler izgubio rat

by Jonathan Dimbleby, Nikola Pajvančić (Translator)

Kako je Hitler izgubio rat

„Do sada najbolji prikaz najveće vojne operacije u istoriji.“
Endru Roberts

Prekretnica drugog svetskog rata

Ciljevi Operacije Barbarosa, Hitlerovog napada na Rusiju juna 1941, bili su: uništenje sovjetskog komunizma, likvidacija Jevreja i stvaranje životnog prostora za višu nemačku rasu. Međutim, ovaj ambiciozni poduhvat doveo je naposletku do uništenja Trećeg rajha i imao je katastrofalne posledice po Nemačku, čiji su milioni vojnika poginuli, ranjeni i nestali u borbama. Bila je to kolosalna greška – i glavni razlog Hitlerovog poraza u Drugom svetskom ratu.

Koristeći neobjavljivane arhivske materijale, kao i neprevođene ruske izvore, Džonatan Dimblbi prvi put stavlja Operaciju Barbarosa na odgovarajuće mesto u istoriji. Od njenih korena u pepelu Prvog svetskog rata do njenog uticaja na posleratnu Evropu, opisuje njene vojne, političke i diplomatske aspekte iz svih uglova i daje punu i živu sliku te divovske borbe čija priroda i posledice do sada nisu ovako temeljno istražene.

Napisano na osnovu brižljivo proverenih činjenica i sa mnogo humanosti, Barbarosa je delo koje će preobraziti naše shvatanje Drugog svetskog rata i dvadesetog veka.

„Autor vešto i sa smislom za detalje oživljava zapanjujući obim ovih događaja.“
– Sunday Times

„Živa, pedantna istorijska tapiserija, koja gusto plete konce nemačke i sovjetske vojne strategije, političke kalkulacije Zapada i nemilosrdne ljudske cene rata.“
– Telegraph

„Dimblbi nam veličanstveno prikazuje pogrešne strateške procene i samoobmane na obe strane.“
– Spectator

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War II, Military History, War, Russia, Military Fiction

616 pages, Paperback

First published April 15, 2021

About the author

Jonathan Dimbleby is a writer and filmmaker based in England. His five-part series on Russia was broadcast by BBC2 and accompanied by his book Russia: A Journal to the Heart of a Land and its People. Destiny in the Desert was recently nominated for the Hessell-Tiltman History Prize.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 was the biggest, bloodiest and most barbarous military enterprise in the history of warfare. The specific purpose of Operation Barbarossa, as the Fuhrer codenamed this cataclysmic venture, was also the most decisive campaign of the Second World War. Had Hitler achieved its objective – the annihilation of the Soviet Union – he would have been the master of Europe’s destiny. As it was, by the time his armies reached the gates of Moscow less than six months later, any prospect he might once have had of realizing his delusional version of a Thousand Year Reich had already vanished…”
- Jonathan Dimbleby, Operation Barbarossa: The History of a Cataclysm

Everything is bigger in Russia. Thus, it makes sense that the greatest invasion of history’s greatest war would cross over her borders.

On June 22, 1941, Adolf Hitler unleashed an attack of incredible magnitude against Joseph Stalin and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Along a front nearly 2,000 miles long, three German army groups consisting of around 3.3 million men, some 600,000 motorized vehicles, thousands of tanks, and a surprisingly large number of horses, plunged into the USSR, marking the beginning of one of the grimmest periods in the long history of humankind.

By Christmastime, there would be over a million German casualties, and 4.5 million Soviet, a toll so large that it is hard for the mind to conceive of it. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a million of anything, not stars or ants or grains of rice.

Unsurprisingly, there are a lot of books about Operation Barbarossa. Many of them, however, are really detailed studies, some of them academic monographs. If you want to learn about this catastrophic encounter, but don’t want to make it your life’s work, then Jonathan Dimbleby’s Operation Barbarossa is a really good pick. And if you just want to get your footing before learning more, it’s also a solid place to start.

***

Context is good. Context is our friend. Without context, events cannot be understood. They just drift aimlessly in time and space, without real meaning. I love context.

You probably sense the “but” coming, and here it is: Operation Barbarossa probably has too much. Specifically, Dimbleby starts things off in 1922, with the Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and the Soviet Union. It’s not just a quick summary, either, but twenty plus pages. This is a bit much, and makes for a slow start.

Indeed, Dimbleby takes over 130 pages to get to the beginning of the invasion. Of course, some of that time is well spent, especially with regard to deconstructing the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in which Germany and the Soviet Union publicly agreed to avoid aggression with each other, and privately decided to carve up Poland between themselves.

***

Operation Barbarossa hits its stride when the titular event finally kicks off. Dimbleby approaches this gargantuan assault from the strategic and operational levels. In other words, he looks at the big-picture objectives that the Germans were trying to accomplish, and how they tried to do that within the theater. Much of the ultimate failure of Hitler’s gamble rested upon murky thinking at these levels, as the up-jumped runner from the First World War kept changing his mind as to where the heaviest blow – north, center, or south – needed to fall. This wasted an enormous amount of time which – as Dimbleby frequently points out – he did not have. This is especially true given the delay engendered by Hitler’s pre-Barbarossa Balkan incursion, brought about by Italy’s ill-conceived attack on Greece. It should be noted that while Dimbleby tries to keep everything in frame, his focus – as he acknowledges at the start – is on Army Group Center, which thrust toward Moscow. Army Group North and Army Group South are discussed mainly to the extent they impacted the move on Moscow.

Tactics – how the actual battles unfolded through the movement of individual military units – is almost entirely ignored. However, Dimbleby provides the ground-level view by the judicious use of first-person accounts of those involved in the fighting. Unlike many histories, which simply throw witness testimonies on the page, without much further development, Dimbleby chooses his participants well and – where possible – follows them throughout the course of Barbarossa.

One of the bits of received wisdom about Germany’s failure is that it was done in by the mud of autumn, and the snow and cold of winter. Obviously, this is a gross simplification, challenged even contemporaneously. The weather was bad, but it fell upon the just and unjust alike. As Dimbleby explains, it was Germany’s failure to prepare for these inevitabilities that doomed their efforts. For instance, despite Napoleon Bonaparte’s well-known example, Hitler sent forth his troopers without winter clothing.

It is one of the rare graces bestowed upon the 20th century world that Hitler was such a clod. His forceful propensity to ignore the advice of talented generals, and to devolve instantly into childish rants, proved of immense benefit to his opponents. These opponents – it must be added – often outfought Hitler’s legions, after recovering from the disastrous opening months of Barbarossa.

***

Apart from the purely martial aspects, Dimbleby occasionally cuts away to follow other threads. For example, he spends a chapter exploring the strained relationship between Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. Up until Germany invaded the Soviet Union in summer 1941, Great Britain – which had been fighting Hitler since 1939 – found itself opposite Russia. It had even come close to going to war with the Soviets after they invaded Finland. All that changed when Germany barged through the front door, and Great Britain and the Soviet Union found themselves wary allies.

Another major theme is the “Holocaust by bullets,” a widespread effort by rear-echelon death squads to eliminate Soviet Jewry. As Dimbleby grimly states, this effort – fronted by the Schutzstaffel (SS) but abetted by the Wehrmacht – proved the more successful prong of Hitler’s overarching scheme. Hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children were murdered in places like Babi Yar. The psychological toll on Germany’s willing executioners eventually prompted Nazi leadership to devise more efficient and depersonalized methods of annihilation, culminating in the industrialized liquidation by gas at places like Auschwitz.

***

Dimbleby’s thesis is that Operation Barbarossa was the decisive moment of the Second World War, and that Hitler lost the instant he launched it. Reasonable minds can disagree on this point. Honestly, I found the analysis a bit unsophisticated. It is in the first instance contradictory, especially depending on your definition of “decisive.” If we take it to mean settling the issue, then this is clearly not the case. Dimbleby even acknowledges this in describing how the very next year, Hitler’s minions undertook another massive offensive, only to be stopped at Stalingrad, yet another in a line of allegedly-decisive moments.

Furthermore, Dimbleby’s proposition hews to the standard, wholly conventional belief that the Second World War was decided on the battlefield. He does not address the convincing countertheory that war in general, and this war in particular, turns on logistics. In other words, it does not matter how much material is destroyed on the battlefield – numbers upon which Dimbleby ruminates at length – but how much material gets to the field in the first place. To that end, Allied – see Western – efforts in the air and on the sea were arguably the thumb on the scale. This is not a hidden insight, and Dimbleby is probably well aware of this, since he wrote an entire volume on the Battle of the Atlantic, and how it “won the war.”

In any event, this mushy reasoning is not really a deal breaker, as this is an avowedly popular history, and popular histories are fueled by simplistic codas.

***

Whatever his conclusions about Soviet triumphs, Dimbleby is extremely clear-eyed about the normalization of brutality that governed both the Soviet and Nazi regimes. He suggests that the Soviets won the war, but he also reminds you that they were hardly virtuous and innocent victims, having already digested half of Poland, parts of Romania, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. More to the point, before Hitler attacked him, Stalin might have held the title of worst person ever.

On the flipside, Dimbleby does not fall into the trap of glamorizing or heroizing the German soldier. It is easy – and rather seductive – to both celebrate their fighting prowess, while lumping them in with the millions of other victims of Hitlerism. Dimbleby ably demonstrates through eyewitnesses that many German soldiers truly believed in Hitler’s vision of widespread ethnic cleansing in order to secure vast tracts of land for German smallholders.

***

Operation Barbarossa almost entirely succeeds at being what it sets out to be: a mainstream, easily accessible narrative of an epic and ugly collision of totalitarian states. It is not comprehensive, and it has some holes, but it is a stark journey into a hell of mankind’s own making, to a place where death reigned supreme, destroying the guilty and innocent alike.

[StefanP · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sutra odlazim iz ove zemlje nade i vraćam se u naše zapadne države – zemlje očaja.
Džordž Bernard Šo

Zanimljiva je činjenica da svaka ona sila koja je izvršila invaziju na ruski životvorni prostor ne samo što je bila poražena u sramoti, nego je Rusija samo par godina poslije ušetala u njihove prestonice. Iako je Napoleon izvojevao neke privremene pobjede kod Smolenska i Borodina nadomak Moskve, ali samo nekoliko godina poslije, 1814. Rusija će ući u Pariz. Izgladnjela i smrznuta francuska i vojska njenih satelita je padala po poljanama Moskve i drugih gradova, da bi na kraju bila u potpunosti rastvorena. To bi trebalo da bude neki znak, ili upozorenje šta može da se desi. Ali ne i Fireru koji će nešto više od sto godina kasnije pokrenuti najveći i najsuroviji pohod u istoriji ratovanja. Dok je Napoleon pokrenuo invaziju 24. juna, dotle je Hitler pokrenuo operaciju Barbarosa istog mjeseca, samo dva dana ranije, 22 juna. Krajnji cilj jeste „Prodor na istok” (Drang nach Osten) i preuzimanje životvornog prostora slovenskih zemalja koji do danas traje. Dok čitate Rat i Mir ne možete da se otrgnete utisku kako je uopšte Rusija dobila neku bitku, a kamoli rat, sličan utisak se stiče i sa ovom knjigom. Rusija izgleda uvijek traljavo započinje rat, sa stravičnim i nepotrebnim gubicima, a onda samo pročitate Rusija je pobijedila, tako je i ovdje slučaj. Ali nema sumnje da su nacisti potkraj 1941. ostali bez svih realnih izgleda za pobjedu. Uprkos svemu, sudbinu Vermahta je zapečatio ,,Veliki otadžbinski rat” a ne Dan D. Naravno da treba pružiti pijetet prema stradalima u Normandiji i na drugim frontovima, ali nju uzdizati kao neku važnu kariku u lancu uništenja Berlina, Rima i Tokija, je van svake pameti. Kičma Vermahta i njegovih pratilaca se lomila na Istočnom frontu, u Rusiji.

Pisac ovu knjigu započinje manje poznatim Rapalskim ugovorom iz aprila mjeseca 1922. koga su potpisale Njemačka i Sovjetski Savez. Taj ugovor je trebao da bude protivteža, ili neka vrsta prkosa i opiranja Versajskom sistemu. Tim ugovorom Boljševici su razvili mnogostruku saradnju sa Njemačkom, produživši saradnju koja je uspostavljena još 1887. kada je potpisan tajni sporazum poznat kao Ugovor o reosiguranju po kome su se zemlje potpisnice složile da održavaju neutralnost, i pruže jedna drugoj vojnu podršku. Sam ugovor je propao tri godine kasnije kada je smijenjen Gvozedni Kancelar, ali diplomatski odnosi su trajali sve do predvečerja Prvog svjetskog rata, da bi se nakon toga opet nastavili u vidu gorepomenutog Rapalskog ugovora. Zahvaljujući Rapalskom ugovoru koji je podrazumijevao vojnu i ekonomsku saradnju, Rajhsver je otvorio pilotsku školu u Lipecku na samo četiri stotine šezdeset kilometara južno od Moskve i postrojenje za hemijsko oružje u Volsku na udaljenosti od tri stotine kilometara južno od Samare. Moskva je dobila program razmjene gdje će se ruski oficiri školovati na njemačkim vojnim akademijama. Boljševička vlast je iskoristila kredite njemačkih banaka za kupovinu industrijskih mašina da bi obnovila vojnoindustrijski kompleks, koji je uništen u Prvom svjetskom ratu i revoluciji, i koji gledaj čuda je uništen od istih onih koji im sada odobravaju kredite. U januaru 1941. Berlin i Moskva su potpisali novi komercijalni ugovor vrijedan šest stotina pedeset miliona rajhsmaraka. Tako je Njemačka postala još zavisnija od ruskih energenata, pored nafte, ona je postala zavisna i zbog žitarica, bakra, nikla i drugih materijala koje su od važnosti za ratnu ekonomiju Rajha.

Dimblbi polazi od toga da je Jugoslavija ta koja je bila barijera na putu Vermahta ka Istoku. Da je ona znatno usporila operaciju Barbarosa koja bi se zasigurno odigrala i prije juna, eventualno do sredine maja. Zato i ne treba da čudi zašto je Hitler nudio knezu Pavlu, Solun i neke druge pogodnosti, ukoliko Jugoslavija ostane neutralna. Znao je da će Srbi pružiti žestok otpor, a ako ništa vodiće krvav gerilski rat, što se ispostavilo kasnije kao tačno. Jugoslavija nažalost nije ostala neutralna, htjela je da pokaže snagu Vermahtu, onom Vermahtu koji je prije nje zgazio Francusku, Holandiju, Belgiju, Norvešku i druge zemlje, praktično čitavu Evropu. I tako se nađu neke budale koje žele da pokažu prkos, a onda kada su vidjeli da nemaju nikakve šanse, pobjegli su u druge zemlje, a narod je ostao da strada. Kako god, ispostavilo se da su to bile dragocjene nedelje za Sovjetski Savez. Jer je uništenje Jugoslavije i Grčke iziskivalo obimno premještanje ljudstva i naoružanja iz Poljske, a period idealnih vremenskih uslova prije dolaska ruske zime je znatno skraćen.

Mislim da je ova knjiga sasvim dovoljna da čitalac sazna samu suštinu propasti operacije Barbarosa, i sve okolnosti koje su se dešavale prije i poslije. Vrlo interesantno i brzo čitanje, zaista.

[Chris Steeden · Rating 4 out of 5]

My local bookshop set-up a Zoom with Jonathan Dimbleby. The historian Andrew Roberts interviewed him first before a Q&A session. It really was a fantastic interview. There were also some great questions from the Zoom attendees. I would, of course, have preferred this to be in the local hall where they do these author interviews but times as they are this is the second-best thing.

This is a big book but you still cannot cram in everything that happened during Operation Barbarossa. Hitler bit off more than he could chew and Dimbleby puts across a good argument, or rather lays out the facts, on the ill-fated campaign. It does end up being more of a detailed general overview of the battle for the East. Hitler saw the East as the place for a populated Germany to spread out on agricultural land.

Get in, defeat the Russians and set-up areas for the Germans to move into. As we know this plan did not come to fruition for many reasons and Dimbleby goes over them. Be it the winter, the unpreparedness of the German army, the Red Army putting up a bigger fight than Hitler expected and then the English and the US aiding the Russians.

One thing to be aware of it that Dimbleby is English so there is a lot of to-and-fro with the politics between London and Moscow. I am not a World War II reader to be honest and some of these bits were a bit dry for me. Due to this I would say that you really do need more than just a passing interest in World War II to pick up this heavy book and read it all. The actual battle scenes are interspersed with snippets from soldier’s journals. It is brutal beyond belief. The deaths and casualties are horrendous.

I had read in one of the UK Sunday newspaper magazines that Dimbleby said his father would have found this book contentious, so I asked Dimbleby, on the Zoom, to go into that a bit more. He said that his father, like many other Englishmen of that era, would probably not agree that this is where Hitler lost the war. What about D-Day and other major Battles on the Western Front? You have got to say that after reading this though and just the statistics around the deaths and everything else like war materiel that had to be produced how Germany could have got over this to eventually win would have been a step to far.

[Zeb Kantrowitz · Rating 5 out of 5]

There are three types of histories, one for the academics, one for the non-historians, and a few that qualify as a hybrid of both. This book is a 'goldilocks' book in that it gives you lots of technical info without overwhelming you with data that belongs in an appendix.

Mostly because Dimbleby has worked from books written by the Generals who were involved on both sides (their opinions even things out). He has also dug into German Army daily reports for most of the units involved, many of which have remarkable honest reports. When the Division report for the units on the spearpoint complain about lack of warm cloths, reasonable orders from the German High Command and the lack of food and fuel, you get to see what the average Wehrmacht solder felt.

Sadly, most of the reports from the Russian side is written by the Survivors (those Stalin didn't kill or send on suicide missions), the reports tend to be slanted towards Stalin being a brilliant strategist who never makes a mistake. (If I didn't care about casualties, I could just order my army to attack, attack, attack even when they were retreating.) There are few comments from the average Russian Soldier who either didn't live long enough to write memoirs, but Dimbleby does use soldier's letters to give a feeling how the average soldier experienced the war.

It's easy to see why from the beginning, there was no chance that the German Army wouldn't be able to make it to Moskow. Hitler kept dithering as to his major priority, and twice took troops away from Group Center, which slowed their momentum. By the time the Wehrmacht had made within a 100 kilometers from Moskow, more soldiers were dying from frostbite and the wounded were being abandoned, and most units were down as much as 60% in troops and weapons. Stalin could bleed his troops white (losing 4.5 million troops to the German 3.2 million) and then replace them, whereas the Germans had already killed off a generation of experienced troops.

[Martin Poulsen · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book has a strangely anglocentric focus on a military battle involving Germany and Russia. Several chapters are dedicated to Britain's involvement which was not of a very high importance. For instance there's a full chapter dedicated to a short meeting between the British envoy Eden and Stalin which amounted to nothing except a communique stating that no agreement could be made without the participation of the Americans. What a waste of pages.

The book is full of misspelled German names and places, for instance the famous German military graveyard Invalidenfriedhof in Berlin is mentioned several times (p 108 and 258) incorrectly as Invalidendom. The Invalidendom is a church in Paris.
But there are some vivid accounts of the battle and especially of Hitlers disputes with his generals.

[Jaap Hoogenboezem · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book claims to be a single volume description of operation Barbarossa, but the actual operation gets little real attention. There is a lot to read on great power diplomacy, on the Holocaust, and on some of the fighting, but the book is not a military history of Barbarossa. There is nothing about the planning, not even an order of battle is given, we don’t get to know why the eventual plan was as it was, as if there is only one way to attack Russia with an army of three million man, there is hardly anything on logistics, and the book only treats the activities of Army Group Center. And why it how Barbarossa was the operation that lost Hitler the war, as the subtitle claims, is not really clear, at least, only in a general sense that Russia was a formidable enemy which the Wehrmacht leadership has underestimated. On all aspects of the book there are better studies. What could perhaps be said is that this book brings together many of those works, which is perhaps a good thing. But lack of treatment of the actual operation, an invasion by three Army Groups, is offsetting all the merits a single volume on Barbarossa could have.

[Bojan Mihajilovic · Rating 5 out of 5]

The SSSR defeated Nazi Germany. There is no other truth. Thank you, Jonathan Dimbleby, for publishing this book at the moment when it is so "cool" to talk against every accomplishment Russia has ever made. I am not saying that Stalin and the SSSR were good guys, but related to this, we cannot distort the facts. Also, people often forget about the chronology of the events. No one knew in the beginning what would happen in Germany and around the world. There were a lot of sympathisers of Hitler even in the US. So, Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that SSSR is usually accused of is just one of many pacts signed between a lot of countries and Germany at that time.

Treaties of Nazi Germany

Western propaganda will try to make D-Day in 1944. the most important event in WW2, but the beginning of the end of Germany was in December 1941, when the German offensive against the SSSR (called Operation Barbarosa) stopped, and they were fighting for their lives from that moment on in the same way as Napoleon did 100+ years before.

Before D-Day, we already had the Barbarosa operation finished with German withdrawal, we had the African campaign over with German defeat, and we already had the Allies' capture of Sicily and Salerno. So, in 1944, the D-Day operation was just an attempt by the Allies (USA) to set foot in the field before the division of Europe. In this book, even the battle for Stalingrad is barely mentioned. 

Barbarosa lasted 5 months. During that period, 1 million Germans and 4.5 million Russians lost their lives. All that time, Stalin tried to persuade Churchill to build another front in Europe and to help him in any way. Same for the USA and Rusvelt.

Churchill hesitated because he wasn't sure who he hated the most: Faschists or Bolsheviks. During WWI, the UK fought on the side of "whites" against Bolshevicks, and after Bolshevicks won, the UK and SSSR were not considered friends. So, for them, the best-case scenario would be to just watch how Germany and the SSSR kill each other.

USA with Rusvelt also hesitated. The economy was in bad condition, and they wanted not to be involved in the Europian conflict.

Until the end of 1941, for the SSSR, the UK delivered 676 aircrafts and 446 tanks. The USA delivered 29 aircrafts. If they wanted the defeat of the Nazis more, why didn't they deliver more? Even the money they gave to the SSSR was just a 10-year loan (which Russia paid after the war).

[Christina Rothfusz · Rating 3 out of 5]

When Hitler decided to invade Russia, he was sure that their shock and awe campaign would have them in Moscow before winter and moving on to the rest of Europe unstoppable. But, like Napoleon before him, he would soon learn that Russia is a tough nut and withdraw in defeat.

The brutality displayed by both sides in this conflict is hard to read and even harder the sheer incompetence of leadership costing millions their lives.

When I started the book I was chatting to a colleague who's Grandfather fought for Germany and died at Stalingrad, he send me a photo and it was hard having this in the back of my mind while reading.

A bit to much spend on the politics in the UK and USA at the time but it is a small complaint.

[Wessel · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wauw, hier ging ik goed op. Goed geschreven, spannend en menselijk.

Het boek begint in 1921 en niet zoals ik had verwacht van te voren in 1940, zodat het de verschillende dynamieken tussen landen (en vooral ministers van buitenlandse zaken) gemakkelijk uitlegt. De inval begint, en hoewel het beeld van operatie Barbarossa een barbaars-moord-festijn is, weet de schrijver de psychologische werking op de soldaten goed te beschrijven. Zowel Duitse maar ook Russische soldaten worden hierdoor veel menselijker, en brengt het leed van de gehele operatie goed naar voren.

Het mooiste hoofdstuk vond een van de laatste, waarbij brieven van Russische families centraal staan, die zijn gestuurd naar front-soldaten. De totale wanhoop die uit de brieven blijkt, zijn tragisch en enorm verdrietig om te lezen

[Katie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dimbleby says very little new about Barbarossa, but instead writes a wonderful, comprehensive, and fair assessment of Hitler's doomed betrayal of the Soviet Union, writing with clarity and purpose. The only aspect of the book that I found disagreeable was the over-emphasis for chapters at a time on what was happening in British politics at the time - an important element of the story, but one that should have received focus of less length.

Overall, a very good work of popular history - do read if interested in the campaign!

[Randy Reigstad · Rating 3 out of 5]

I finished this book a few days ago. I've been thinking how I should review it. Have you ever finished a book and then think I wish I wouldn't have read it in the first place. It's hard for me to accept how two men (Hitler and Salin) exploded so much grief and sorrow on their own people. The book was OK, I gave it 3 stars bit it could have been 150 or 200 pages shorter. I guess if you are a great Scaler of WW2 history it filled the bill but for a person like me, I don't want to get that far into the weeds. I have mixed feelings about reading the book.

Randy Reigstad

[Shaun Webb · Rating 5 out of 5]

Expertly covers the conflict as well as the global context and political wheelings and dealings. Highly recommend.

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

War, as Union Civil War hero William Tecumseh Sherman lamented, is hell. Sherman is right broadly, but glides over the gradations of the landscape: some wars are more hellish, more raw, fires that burn seemingly forever and singe all parts of a country and its people. The Eastern Front of the Second World War is, tragically, one of the most hellish conflicts in world history - brutal for both German and Russian rank-and-file; genocidal for Jews and others caught between the warring powers; and destructive to the lives and lands of millions unlucky enough to have inhabited the "bloodlands of Europe" at its bloody zenith.

Jonathan Dimbleby has made a fine overview of Operation Barbarossa and the first six months of Nazi Germany's invasion of Soviet Russia. The narrative is not confined solely to the battlefields, or even the Eastern Theater. British and American reactions to Germany's move, and the cautious maneuvering of Britain, the USSR, and the USA within a nascent anti-Nazi front and soon-to-be-realized military alliance, are given attention, particularly the fraught relations between Churchill and Stalin in 1941.

While Dimbleby is less revisionist, at least in focus, than other authors like David Stahel, who portray the dream of Nazi conquest of the USSR as all but illusion after the opening few months of Barbarossa, the Russian war effort is highlighted and enormous flexibility in maintaining military and industrial strength praised. Without the USSR's efforts and sacrifices, the Nazi regime was unlikely to be stopped barring joint Anglo-American invasion at a much steeper price than that exacted on the shores of Normandy in June 1944. Ironically, Stalin and the Soviets may have done more than any other power to save the world from Nazism and preserve democracy in some quarters (though not those eventually falling under Soviet sway).

For the Nazis, the story is one of strategic confusion and inefficient authoritarianism. Hitler himself directs the invasion of Russia, while flip-flopping on key objectives and utterly neglecting the supply chain and other logistical hazards of the massive invasion front. Nazi generals decided to kowtow to Hitler's megalomania than push back on military incompetence, with few examples like Guderian standing out (occasionally) for strategic competence.

What cannot be overstated is the misery unleashed by Hitler. From the top on down through to the Nazi infantrymen, the military strategy may not have been clear, but the genocidal one was: kill Soviets, wipe out the Jewish people, and erase any morality when crossing the German borders and into the communities of others. Barbarossa demonstrates how fanatically devoted Hitler, Himmler and others were to such evil aims, perhaps even sacrificing military adeptness for the sake of inflicting that much horror, suffering, and death on the unfortunate Jews and others that the armies came across.

War is indeed hell, and the Second World War, on the Eastern Front, demonstrates just how dark, cold, and horrifying that hell can become.

[John McDonald · Rating 5 out of 5]

When I learned that Dimbleby would take up his pen to write a history of Hitler's invasion of Russia during WWII, I anticipated its publication. Some time ago, I read his account of the war in the Atlantic during WWII from the time of Hitler's declaration of war on Great Britain, an account that was thoroughly researched, clearly written, and frank: he did not, for example, proclaim the military or even naval genius of Winston Churchill who while able to rally his nation made strategic decisions that were ill-advised, counterproductive, and most often, against the advice of his military and naval commanders.

I was not disappointed (except for one oversight I would have liked to have seen him cover).

The invasion of Russia, as Dimbleby correctly states, was motivated by Hitler's deranged angst over Lebensraum and genocidal hatred of Jews and minorities who impeded his creation of a truly pure European Aryan race, which of course included the destruction of the Jewish people. Destruction, in Hitler's mind, is not an overplay. That is precisely what he wanted of the Jews and envisioned that end would be accomplished in a large way once Russia had been conquered. Hitler's military orders reflected not simply an obsession over these factors but his dedication of purpose to eliminating (i.e. killing and destroying) the Jewish people and culture, along with communists, the disabled, and Roma, among others.

Hitler misjudged badly the resistance he would encounter. He misjudged the military implications of invading Russia on the eve of the infamous Russian winter, moving military traffic through the vast regions of the Ukraine on a march to Moscow, and establishing multiple fronts--6 major fronts on the West forming a half-circle around the western part of Russia with a 7th planned but not really effective so long as the Panzer divisions and army groups could not penetrate and move toward Moscow. When late autumn and winter arrived, a whole set of tactical and strategic plans went awry. But, Hitler had his plan. He refused to modify or concede, and he left his officers short of everything necessary to accomplish the missions they were ordered to meet.

But, it was on the arrival in the periphery of Moscow that the German armies and Nazi killers sent to murder the Jews and other "inferior" people began to understand the brutality of the resistance that Russian soldiers and Stalin were willing to inflict. The resistance was not easy by any means. Indeed every day brought new concerns about adequate military forces and equipment. But the Russians fought for something--their homeland and homes--much as the valiant Ukrainians are doing now against Russia. Not to mention Russian weather. Hitler planned, indeed ordered, that all military operations would conclude for the onset of the Russian winter. He did not consider the Russian autumn when rain turned roads into mud and troops and equipment convoys were stalled and eventually made inoperable. When the operation, which began in June rolled into November and December, German forces were confronted with a factor they could not control--the weather and the consequences of moving through a vast nation to the outskirts of Moscow.

Time ran out for Hitler, and a lot of it had to do with fading German forces, equipment, and an inability to move traffic through Russia as temperatures dropped.

Somehow, Hitler believed that the lessons that every military strategist had learned or should have learned from Napolean's attempts to conquer Russia were not applicable to him. His hubris and his hatreds told him his was a military and political genius superior to anyone in history and he would not budge even to allow retreat when his armies were stalled.

There was only one aspect of this wonderful work that was lacking and that I would have appreciated more about.

From my own studies, I have concluded that an army's Quartermaster may be the most important tactical officer in every division but when the importance of supplying the armies is ignored, failure is not far behind. Operation Barbarossa failed, in large part, because inadequate attention to and planning for shortages were not considered. Food, fuel, clothing, tractors, construction equipment, field hospitals, support staffs, building materials, bridge builders and contractors, telecommunications, and everything else required to live life in War and how to get the needed commodities, fuel, and other necessities to the front inadequate supply while conducting war at the same time, was a colossal failure in every respect. This failure to provide for adequate supplies pre-ordained the failure of the entire operation.

The invasion and siege of Leningrad lasted 872 days. Soldiers did not have adequate boots, winter gear, and food. Napolean instructed that "an army marches on its stomach", advice Hitler simply did not concede. I would have liked to have read much more about how Hitler and Stalin went about providing their armies to actually fight a war. The losses in this operation were gigantic. Dimbleby reported that at least 15 millions soldiers died on both sides. Another 6 million or so were slaughtered as part of Hitler's genocide. Another 3 million died as prisoners of war of Germany, 140,000 of them executed by the SS. While it is accepted that 3 million Jews were executed or gassed by the Nazi SS and soldiers, some researchers believe the number to be twice that, at least 6 million Jews, communists, and others.

Stalin, too, was brutal even to his own people. Around 680,000 Soviets were executed, but some researchers believe that 6 million Soviets were executed by Stalin's order or approval.

Dimbleby states: "the savagery of the war on the Eastern Front--which became as pointless and as terrible as any war of attrition could ever be--would result in the deaths of tens of millions of soldiers and civilians and the wanton destruction of countless thousands of human habitations."

In all this time, Hitler left Berlin in June of 1941 for his Wolf's Lair in Bavaria. He never returned to Berlin until April 1945, where, with the Soviet armies fast upon Berlin, Hitler killed himself in a cowardly tribute to his own anger and ineptitude, having wreaked horror on the world, the British people, the Atlantic seaman, and most of Europe.

[Jimbo · Rating 3 out of 5]

A solid account, but nothing new, I don’t think. More detailed maps would help understand the individual battles more.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

Operation Barbarossa - Catastrophic

The overall understanding of Operation Barbarossa has been broaden greatly by this book. Just as The Pacific and Flags of Our Fathers helped me better understand the state of the world leading up to the Japanese transition from the Edo (Tokyo) Shogunate to Empire. Matthew Perry and his American fleet of steel gunboats forced the Japanese into the Industrial era. This began the Meiji period and the building of the Japanese Empire.

I knew only the highlights in Eastern Europe leading to WW2. WW1 led to the downfall of the Russian Empire and the Russian Revolution. The growth of the communist state and the fear it saw the other world powers through, is fascinating. Germany and Fascism may have been at odds, but no less so than the commercial Empires of the UK and burgeoning US.

In addition, the details of how the invasion of Russia was to be performed months earlier and in a much more organized fashion were unknown to me. The scope of the campaign, the numbers of soldiers and equipment involved are overwhelming. The number of soldiers to end up killed or more so prisoners or war and the civilians to be killed or made into refugees are incomprehensible. This was made worse by the barbaric actions taken to eliminate Slavs, and Jews. This turned the locals against what were initially looked at as ‘liberating’ German troops in many cases.

The lack of information led the High Command (at Hitler’s call and weak to opposed him) to vacillate between pressing Moscow and taking Leningrad to link up with the Finns and encircle the capital, or Kiev and the Caucasus beyond for resources. What if the Balkans had not required suppression first? What if Britain had been better subdued? What if Africa had turned out differently? What if Japan had not felt the need to move into Indonesia, a result of American sanctions and embargos? Would the Japanese have invaded Soviet Far East, requiring more troops be held away from Moscow?

A big point made in that General Mud, though a massive factor in operations in late 1941, did not determine the outcome. Though the weather affected both sides, this was more of a problem for the Germans, with greater distances to transport men, machines, and supplies. But the bigger factors were the dwindling combat strength of the Centre Group armies. Bock’s forces were at 1/3 to ½ strength. This was not sustainable and they had reached the limit of exhaustion.

The second crime of the German High Command, after the failed gamble of Barbarossa and Typhoon, was the refusal to admit defeat and to cost millions more casualties on both sides in both the military and civilian sectors, as the conflict stretched out to its forgone conclusion as the Soviet strengths grew and the Wehrmacht weakened. This led to the elements of the Cold War that lasted for the next 40 years, and has repercussions playing out today in Ukraine.

[Sembray · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thanks to Penguin for sending me a proof copy in exchange for an honest review, which you can find below.

The struggle between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union played a crucial role in the Second World War, and yet it can be overlooked by the Western World. Events such as D-Day and the Battle of Britain are far more familiar than Operation Barbarossa, the name given to the German invasion of the Soviet Union. This book provides an excellent overview of what Dimbleby argues was the fatal error made by Hitler, making full use of Russian archival sources to construct a compelling and timely narrative.

All wars are necessarily brutal and horrific, but the conflict on the Eastern Front was without doubt one of the most savage in history. The invading German forces, indoctrinated in Nazi propaganda stating that the Slavic peoples were effectively subhuman, committed countless atrocities on both prisoners of war and civilians, while also carrying out the unspeakable barbarity of the Holocaust. Spurred on by these acts of cruelty, the Red Army sought revenge in turn, as well as showing little mercy to any of its own soldiers who attempted to flee from the fighting. Dimbleby captures the horrors of industrialised warfare on a mass scale, ensuring that the staggering statistics are always visualised and the human costs of war are fully understood. The overarching narrative of an overconfident nation believing its own propaganda and expecting an easy victory then being frustrated by its own logistical difficulties as well as often suicidally brave resistance is also reminiscent of Russia's current invasion of Ukraine. This serves as a powerful reminder that the tragic folly of wars inflicted by megalomaniac dictators on innocent populations is an eternal threat, even in the heart of supposedly civilised Europe.

While the author captures the military struggle of Barbarossa and the suffering of the troops and civilians involved, he also impressively links this struggle to its wider context. The role of other powers, principally Britain and the United States, are covered in great detail. Additionally, Dimbleby captures both the historical precedents for Hitler's gamble, dating back to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, as well as the consequences on the post-war shaping of Europe. He argues that by leading to the Soviet Union inheriting a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Operation Barbarossa remains one of the most significant events not just in the course of the Second World War but in the entire history of the 20th century.

This book provides an excellent overview of an enormously important event, detailing the political and military struggles as well as the social tragedy involved. I would thoroughly recommend it to anyone interested in military history, but the readable writing style and emotional human stories contained within elevate this to the level of superior history enjoyable by anyone with a yearning to learn about one of the most far-reaching and impactful decisions of the past century.

[Richard Olney · Rating 5 out of 5]

I chose to read this book as while i have a working knowledge of what happened in the Second World War what i knew of what i would call as a Brit, the Eastern Front was very sketchy.

And i'm glad i chose it, further reading will tell whether it's as comprehensive as the testimonials in the front of the book suggest but its certainly comprehensive. We move from the years just after The Great War, through the rise of the Nazis in Germany, the beginning of the war in western europe to the Nazi assault on the Soviet Union until, with the German retreat from Moscow the end of Operation Barbarossa.

I found the book very readable, sometimes forcing myself to put it down to absorb what i'd just read for fear that the speed in which i had meant it hadn't really sunk in. There is much horror in this book, the chapter on the murder of the Jewish populations of the territories the Nazis advanced through was especially harrowing, not for the first time the scale of the numbers is impossible for me to imagine. And the armed forces on either side's conduct during the campaign, is also scarcely believable. I suspect the truth of what happened will never be known, the mind boggles if the numbers and testimonies quoted here are underestimates.

The epilogue briefly detailing what happened next sort of serves as a happy ending0.

For all that it's a hard read, i'm glad i read it, and now and again maybe in the Summers when there's light and warmth to provide comfort i might look again for books on the Eastern Front. For the moment though it's probably time to read something lighter!

[Stuart · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wanting to learn more about the Eastern Front in WWII, I chose this book as I had recently read, and been impressed by, Dimbleby’s Battle of the Atlantic. I was similarly impressed by this book, although it is less focused on Barbarossa than I expected and contains much information about the wider state of the war in the latter half of 1941, as well as the background that preceded the involvement of the USSR.

This focus on the larger picture means that the book starts rather slow if you are primarily interested in Barbarossa: the war doesn’t start until Chapter 5 and Barbarossa itself not until Chapter 8. But this background is important and is referred to during later parts of the book. There is also a huge amount of space given over to the wider political environment at the time, including niche details about the politics of the UK and US that hardly seem relevant to Barbarossa. Despite this, these details are vital for an understanding of the wider war at this point and I did appreciate their inclusion.

As well as the macro scale politics, there is also plenty of individual trauma and horror. From first hand descriptions of Nazi atrocities from both victims and perpetrators, to personal letters from privates to generals alike; the inclusion of these gives a much appreciated personal touch and conveys the sickening horror of the Nazi invasion.

Overall I am greatly impressed by this thorough history of the start of Russian involvement in WWII. This book is more than just a history of Barbarossa and I greatly recommend it to anyone interested in both the operation itself and of WWII more generally.

[Brian Lobodzinski · Rating 5 out of 5]

This excellent book on the early stage of Operation Barbarossa is a Tour de Force which should be compulsory reading for anyone interested in the campaign. While not as detailed as Prit Buttar's masterpieces on different elements of wars on the Eastern Front Mr Dimbleby covers the opening year in enough detail and analysis to satisfy most readers. German hubris, Russian panic and desperation as well as the frustration faced by commanders on both sides in dealing with their political masters come across clearly. His descriptions of the ordeal both soldiers and civilians faced make the reader feel as if he is there with them. I dread to think what would have happened if the Commanders on the ground had been given free rein and the invasion had stared at least a month earlier as had originally been planned(delayed due to Operation Punishment and the Italian misadventure in the Balkans).

I can't say that I 'enjoyed' reading the book's contents but I found it informative and appreciated the volume of work in writing it.

If anyone still doubts the effect of war even after reading this work then look at the present war in Ukraine, started by an equally megalomaniac dictator, where people trying to live a normal life are facing some of the horrors inflicted on the Russian population in World War Two.

Buy it and thank God that most of Europe has never been involved in a conflict like this since 1945.

[David Harvey · Rating 4 out of 5]

In general this book is a good overview of Operation Barbarossa, but it is arguably too wide in scope.

In its favour, the author places Barbarossa in context, beginning with the end of the First World War which helps the reader to understand the geopolitics that made the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and then war between the Nazis and Soviets, possible. The wider political and diplomatic situation leading up to, and during, Barbarossa is clearly explained throughout. The author also conveys the real sense of tragedy and disaster that followed from Hitler's fateful decision to attack the Soviet Union.

That said, the account of the Operation itself from a military perspective is not sufficiently detailed, and is largely explained from the point of view of Army Group Centre. More detail and better maps would have been welcome here so that the reader can understand the military and tactical situation on the ground. The book's strength in providing a rich overview of Barbarossa is thus also it's weakness as it arguably attempts to do too much.

This is a strong and well-written overview for those wanting to learn about Barbarossa but it will be found wanting by readers who are seeking a comprehensive military account of the epic clash between the Wehrmacht and Red Army.

[Josey · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was clearly very well researched and awash with facts and snippets from soldiers' journals and official military documents. Sometimes it was utterly heartbreaking, graphic, and very hard to read, and really made me think about just how utterly wasteful war often is.

You don't need a history qualification to be able to access this, but I'd say a rudimentary understanding of each belligerent in the Second World War and how they interacted with one another would certainly be beneficial. I already had an interest in this subject, for example.

Dimbleby also includes a lot of information from the British and USA perspectives, which, in my opinion, was quite dry in some places, but I found it interesting and relevant enough nonetheless.

My Good Reads "Want to Read" list ballooned when I discovered Dimbleby's Select Bibliography nestled in the back of this tome, so my bank balance (nor my long-suffering non-bookworm fiancé) has nothing positive to add to this review! I would recommend this to anyone who wants a better understanding of the events in the East of Europe and Asia which led to the collapse of the Nazi regime.

[Filip Krstić · Rating 5 out of 5]

A comprehensive account of the largest military operation in the Second World War and in general in the history of mankind. A very detailed introduction to the events that preceded the outbreak of the Second World War, but which are necessary for understanding its cause and of course the consequences it left for the entire world and the European continent.
I would especially emphasize the uncertainty surrounding the very outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Stalin's refusal that such a thing could happen at all, and the consequences that such an attitude had in the first months of the operation. The possibility of making different alliances before the very beginning of the operation that would turn the course of history in those crucial moments for all mankind.
Book gives great insight into the military tactics, mistakes, bravery and incredible fates that the war caused on both sides.
Extensive use of historical sources, that contribute to the personal experience of individuals in the war, so that they are not reduced to a mere number in war statistics.

[ROL · Rating 3 out of 5]

4 stars would be too generous, but 3 is slightly harsh. An interesting overview of Operation Barbarossa, particularly for those who haven't read much on it before. The book is also extremely good at bringing to life the horrors of the front and the barbarity along and behind the lines.

However you cannot avoid that the book only really scratches the surface of the Operation, not least in its neglect of Army Groups North and South in favour of a focus on the march to Moscow.

Perhaps I also need to read up further on the subject, as to be honest some of the arguments felt a bit off. For example he really plays up the British role on a front we weren't even fighting on, though he only seems to rate Cripps and Eden among the extensive British cast. Similarly, there's a weird inconsistency behind Dimbleby highlighting the futility of generals trying to stand up to Hitler, while excoriating those same generals for failing to do so. I don't know enough to argue otherwise, but I get the sense that other historians views will vary significantly from this book's.

[Philip Kuhn · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a very good book on Barbarossa. It encompasses the entire scope of the attack and its effects. The high level meetings between British and Soviet leaders, the tensions the attack created are covered. The devastating effects on the local Soviet population is also covered. This book covers everything, not just the military angle. If you want strictly a military coverage, read David Stahel's "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's failure in the East". I've read it several times, it's excellent.

One of the major points Dimbleby's book makes is that the Holocaust did NOT start in January 1942, but in June 1941 with Barbarossa. The SS Einsatzgruppen spread out behind the Army and murdered people by the tens of thousands. The German Army was a willing accomplice. He details several gruesome episodes that prove his point. Only the method changed in Jan 1942--from shooting Jews to death to gassing them.

Highly recommended for WWII buffs.

Philip Kuhn

[Mervyn Whyte · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brilliantly written, utterly absorbing read with one major shortcoming: there's nothing new in it. Okay, some of the quotes from diaries and letters I haven't read before, but the rest is very familiar. And I don't consider myself to be a student of Operation Barbarossa or the war between Russia and Nazi Germany. Some of the anecdotes I've read half a dozen times in other books. Indeed I was anticipating them coming up as the story was being told. There's also the 'problem' of Dimbleby being a journalist and not an historian. On the plus side it means the story rattles along at a fair pace, and - despite the book's length (500 pages excluding endnotes and bibliography) - a great deal has been fitted in. But there isn't much by way of analysis. Still, you can't have it all. Sit down and - absorb, rather than enjoy - the read. And shake your head at the cruelty, immorality and staggering amount of suffering.

[Stuart · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoyed this book. Its a lengthy one and took me a while to finish but its worth it.


Clearly its a very well researched book covering a wide range of subject's around the German invasion of Russia.

The book focuses a lot on the political picture at the time. So you get a better understanding into what's going on with the Russian, allied and German governments leading up to the invasion and during the war Which is a fascinating insight and really informative..

The battlefield view is an eye opener, as dimbleby covers everything from attrition, poor logistics, sacking of generals, command disagreements, war crimes and execution of soldiers for cowardice. Your knowledge of the subject will certainly benefit from reading this book.

[Joe McMahon · Rating 5 out of 5]

An acquaintance who served in Guderian's panzers soon lost an arm and was sent west. Among his later-life complaints about Hitler were the north-south diversions chronicled in this book by Jonathan Dimbleby. This acquaintance pointed to the ruin on the treads caused by the unnecessary extra use. The author places mud and winter low on the list of the reasons for the Nazi reverses in December of 1941. More important causes were insufficient planning of supplies (fuel, coats, food, tank replacements). Also, the Nazis created a make-believe enemy and used this error when judging their own needs.
---
I am puzzled that the author does not explain what the Germans did about the different railway gauge, 1524 mm vs. international 1435 mm.

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 2 out of 5]

It's really 2 3/4 stars, per my more detailed review here, but, the redesigned Goodreads still doesn't offer half-star ratings, let alone quarter-star ones, and this book is WAY too overrated by others to get a third star on full stars.

There's not enough information on background strategic or large-level tactical planning. There's no information on the home-front side re things like lack of Germany being on a total war footing. The interpretation of the Balkans sideshow delaying Barbarossa is rejected by the majority of WWII historians. And, that's not all. Hit that link above for more. (I am not totally fond of how that other site works on some things, but ...)

[Zoran Tošić · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Cena u krvi gotovo prevazilazi ljudsku sposobnost shvatanja. Misao da je smrt jednog čoveka tragedija, ali smrt miliona statiskika - sadrži zrno istine.

Um i srce umeju da se nose sa smislom konkretno gubitka, ali ako razmišlja o smrti 15 miliona vojnika na frontu između juna 1941. i maja 1945. čovek će se istovremeno užasnuti i otupeti. Individualne smrti - ljudske glave otkinute šrapnelom, ljudska koža što visi sa drveta, ljudska utroba razmazana po kabini aviona - teraju nas da zgroženi ustuknemo.

Međutim, kada je rat u pitanju, razmere, koliko god ih um teško pojmio, bitne su isto koliko detalji. "

Izuzetna knjiga koja pomaže u shvatanju obima, strahota, patnji i ljudske surovosti tokom najveće i najsurovije vojne operacije u istoriji čovečanstva.