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Open Minded: Searching for Truth about the Unconscious Mind
A provocative look at the unconscious mind that challenges contemporary perceptions and exposes the indefensible science that fostered them.
How much of a role does the unconscious play in our decision making? In Open Searching for Truth about the Unconscious Mind, authors Ben R. Newell and David R. Shanks would not very much. Behavioral science and public discourse have placed an outsized emphasis on the unconscious mind when it comes to understanding human behavior. Pursuing trails of fraud, intrigue, and claims about the power of unconscious thought, Newell and Shanks scrutinize the science that has contributed to our conventional wisdom and offer an important counterpoint to the ever-stronger traction that the unconscious mind has gained in public debate, such as the now ubiquitous claim that unconscious bias plays a large role in people’s decisions and behavior.
Open Minded is divided into two the first examines the modern understanding of the conscious mind, and the second shifts the focus to how to reform current research. Focusing on the core processes of decision making, Newell and Shanks cut through many questionable claims about unconscious behavior. Then, they delve into the nuts-and-bolts of methodology, challenging not only psychology and the behavioral sciences but also medicine and science more broadly. In this against-the-grain approach, Newell and Shanks chart new possibilities for how we may be more open to understanding how our minds actually work.
How much of a role does the unconscious play in our decision making? In Open Searching for Truth about the Unconscious Mind, authors Ben R. Newell and David R. Shanks would not very much. Behavioral science and public discourse have placed an outsized emphasis on the unconscious mind when it comes to understanding human behavior. Pursuing trails of fraud, intrigue, and claims about the power of unconscious thought, Newell and Shanks scrutinize the science that has contributed to our conventional wisdom and offer an important counterpoint to the ever-stronger traction that the unconscious mind has gained in public debate, such as the now ubiquitous claim that unconscious bias plays a large role in people’s decisions and behavior.
Open Minded is divided into two the first examines the modern understanding of the conscious mind, and the second shifts the focus to how to reform current research. Focusing on the core processes of decision making, Newell and Shanks cut through many questionable claims about unconscious behavior. Then, they delve into the nuts-and-bolts of methodology, challenging not only psychology and the behavioral sciences but also medicine and science more broadly. In this against-the-grain approach, Newell and Shanks chart new possibilities for how we may be more open to understanding how our minds actually work.
- GenresPsychology
234 pages, Paperback
Published August 8, 2023
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December 27, 2023
A fascinating tour de force that questions the role of the unconscious mind/subconscious in decision-making. Even where the authors make arguable points, they always cause the reader to reflect and reconsider certain assumptions that have become popular among psychologists and educated laypeople.
The main thesis of the book is this: modern psychology has a tendency to claim far-reaching, unconscious influences on behaviour, arguing that many such claims are based on weak research methods and whose support often crumbles upon closer scrutiny. The authors argue that much of what we consider unconscious is actually accessible in our conscious minds, and that a more satisfying, rigorous understanding of human judgment and decision-making is possible without relying much on the inaccessible unconscious.
Chapter 2 dives into a critique of neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet’s experiments that have been used to undermine the conception of libertarian free will (that human choices originate in the human brain, in a spooky uncaused way). Specifically, they challenge common interpretations: when using more specific indicators of movement preparation, like lateralized readiness potentials, the alignment between conscious urge and neural activity becomes evident, challenging Libet's interpretation. Similarly, the readiness potential, which Libet took as evidence of unconscious movement preparation, seems to be related more to preparing for clock judgments than actual movement initiation. Thus, the authors conclude that there’s more of a conscious role in decisions and judgment that Libet and others have posited. My view is that these studies do nothing to re-establish the basis for (libertarian) free will, but perhaps do establish more conscious proximate causes for certain behaviours.
The authors also dive deep into understanding how humans catch balls—which has been interpreted as being guided unconsciously; but detailed studies suggest that people do have at least some conscious awareness of the processes they use to catch balls.
This chapter—and book overall—do an excellent job underscoring the importance of rigorous experimental design and our interpretation of results in understanding the relationship between unconscious brain processes and conscious decisions/judgments/intentions.
Chapter 3 targets the interpretation of initial priming studies, which posited the role of the unconscious in making people more or less likely to exhibit certain behaviours and attitudes after being exposed to a “prime” (e.g., being exposed to words related to old age). The authors point out that most of these initial priming studies failed to replicate using larger sample sizes and better methods. While semantic priming is not called into question (thinking of “bread” makes someone more likely to think of “butter”), the more sensational priming hypotheses are questioned as statistical flukes.
Chapter 4 looks at the framing and anchoring biases, which are often thought to operate unconsciously. Yet again, Newell and Shanks supply evidence from methodologically creative and rigorous studies indicating that people are generally aware of having their judgment affected by different frames of the same information, or of (often random) anchors. A la Gigerenzer’s “ecological rationality”, the authors argue that, in part, some of these “biases” originate due to reasons other than being misled in some inexplicably unconscious way. For example, those who know less about a subject are more inclined to weigh irrelevant anchors highly, whereas experts are able to disregard them. Framing could also be understood as a rational response to the framers trying to convey information in a way that is beneficial to the consumer. The authors summarize, “it appears that when people are uncertain of an answer, are aware of an anchor, and trust that the provider is following conversational norms, anchors can have a very large effect on people’s judgments. In contrast, when people have expertise, are incentivized, or have reason to disbelieve the relevance of an anchor, the impacts are smaller.” p. 69
Chapter 5 questions all things related to unconscious biases: that bias can be inferred from group disparities (it can’t); that discrimination and bias are synonymous (they’re not—discrimination can often be rational and non-biased if it’s the best metric we have for a selection criterion); the Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures bias reliably and validly (it doesn’t); and more.
Chapter 6 uses numerous examples to argue that there is little basis for a role of the unconscious mind (including during sleep) in decision-making and even in creativity. The role of intuition specifically is not necessarily understood as unconsciously driven, but rather—as Einstein and Herbert Simon defined it—is the outcome of recognition and prior experience.
Chapter 7 finishes part I by criticizing dual-process theory that dichotomizes the “fast” and “slow” thinking (popularized by Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow, and of course Kahneman & Tversky’s work on biases and heuristics). Specifically, the authors use two examples—logical syllogism recognition and the Stroop task—to argue against this binary interpretation of reasoning and for a more continuous version. They conclude that there is currently not strong evidence either way to validate or refute, and thus to falsify, (this specific) dual-process theory.
Part II is mostly old hat for people familiar with the replication crisis and many of the bad statistical and methodological practices that likely contributed to it: p-hacking, HARKing, lack of pre-registration, under-powered studies, etc. But the authors do a good job clearly explaining how these issues contributed to prematurely accepting hypotheses about the role of the conscious mind.
I have a couple broader criticisms of the book:
1) “Presumption of consciousness”. Jonathan Evans—who Newell & Shanks criticize in the book and in the literature—issued this criticism in a response letter to an article by Newell & Shanks, and I think it somewhat applies to the book. Is the burden of proof on those who claim the existence of the unconscious, or on those who clam that the conscious can always explain behaviour? In general, whoever is making the claim has the burden of proof, but Newell & Shanks seem to posit that conscious mechanisms will almost always be uncovered to replace unconscious ones. Part of the issue here is that unconscious mechanisms often are imputed whenever we fail to find conscious ones, whereas conscious mechanisms must be more acutely demonstrated. To their credit, Newell & Shanks propose several more rigorous modelling approaches that would help to more firmly establish the role of the unconscious.
2) Selective sampling of the literature. The reader must infer that the examples used in the book are typical, i.e., that most evidence of the unconscious is of the flimsy sort that collapses when strong methodology is used. Is this the case? As a non-expert but very interested lay-reader, I simply cannot tell.
Notwithstanding these critiques, this was a fascinating, stimulating, and at times very dense read that is sure to cause a stir. Recommended reading.
The main thesis of the book is this: modern psychology has a tendency to claim far-reaching, unconscious influences on behaviour, arguing that many such claims are based on weak research methods and whose support often crumbles upon closer scrutiny. The authors argue that much of what we consider unconscious is actually accessible in our conscious minds, and that a more satisfying, rigorous understanding of human judgment and decision-making is possible without relying much on the inaccessible unconscious.
Chapter 2 dives into a critique of neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet’s experiments that have been used to undermine the conception of libertarian free will (that human choices originate in the human brain, in a spooky uncaused way). Specifically, they challenge common interpretations: when using more specific indicators of movement preparation, like lateralized readiness potentials, the alignment between conscious urge and neural activity becomes evident, challenging Libet's interpretation. Similarly, the readiness potential, which Libet took as evidence of unconscious movement preparation, seems to be related more to preparing for clock judgments than actual movement initiation. Thus, the authors conclude that there’s more of a conscious role in decisions and judgment that Libet and others have posited. My view is that these studies do nothing to re-establish the basis for (libertarian) free will, but perhaps do establish more conscious proximate causes for certain behaviours.
The authors also dive deep into understanding how humans catch balls—which has been interpreted as being guided unconsciously; but detailed studies suggest that people do have at least some conscious awareness of the processes they use to catch balls.
This chapter—and book overall—do an excellent job underscoring the importance of rigorous experimental design and our interpretation of results in understanding the relationship between unconscious brain processes and conscious decisions/judgments/intentions.
Chapter 3 targets the interpretation of initial priming studies, which posited the role of the unconscious in making people more or less likely to exhibit certain behaviours and attitudes after being exposed to a “prime” (e.g., being exposed to words related to old age). The authors point out that most of these initial priming studies failed to replicate using larger sample sizes and better methods. While semantic priming is not called into question (thinking of “bread” makes someone more likely to think of “butter”), the more sensational priming hypotheses are questioned as statistical flukes.
Chapter 4 looks at the framing and anchoring biases, which are often thought to operate unconsciously. Yet again, Newell and Shanks supply evidence from methodologically creative and rigorous studies indicating that people are generally aware of having their judgment affected by different frames of the same information, or of (often random) anchors. A la Gigerenzer’s “ecological rationality”, the authors argue that, in part, some of these “biases” originate due to reasons other than being misled in some inexplicably unconscious way. For example, those who know less about a subject are more inclined to weigh irrelevant anchors highly, whereas experts are able to disregard them. Framing could also be understood as a rational response to the framers trying to convey information in a way that is beneficial to the consumer. The authors summarize, “it appears that when people are uncertain of an answer, are aware of an anchor, and trust that the provider is following conversational norms, anchors can have a very large effect on people’s judgments. In contrast, when people have expertise, are incentivized, or have reason to disbelieve the relevance of an anchor, the impacts are smaller.” p. 69
Chapter 5 questions all things related to unconscious biases: that bias can be inferred from group disparities (it can’t); that discrimination and bias are synonymous (they’re not—discrimination can often be rational and non-biased if it’s the best metric we have for a selection criterion); the Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures bias reliably and validly (it doesn’t); and more.
Chapter 6 uses numerous examples to argue that there is little basis for a role of the unconscious mind (including during sleep) in decision-making and even in creativity. The role of intuition specifically is not necessarily understood as unconsciously driven, but rather—as Einstein and Herbert Simon defined it—is the outcome of recognition and prior experience.
Chapter 7 finishes part I by criticizing dual-process theory that dichotomizes the “fast” and “slow” thinking (popularized by Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow, and of course Kahneman & Tversky’s work on biases and heuristics). Specifically, the authors use two examples—logical syllogism recognition and the Stroop task—to argue against this binary interpretation of reasoning and for a more continuous version. They conclude that there is currently not strong evidence either way to validate or refute, and thus to falsify, (this specific) dual-process theory.
Part II is mostly old hat for people familiar with the replication crisis and many of the bad statistical and methodological practices that likely contributed to it: p-hacking, HARKing, lack of pre-registration, under-powered studies, etc. But the authors do a good job clearly explaining how these issues contributed to prematurely accepting hypotheses about the role of the conscious mind.
I have a couple broader criticisms of the book:
1) “Presumption of consciousness”. Jonathan Evans—who Newell & Shanks criticize in the book and in the literature—issued this criticism in a response letter to an article by Newell & Shanks, and I think it somewhat applies to the book. Is the burden of proof on those who claim the existence of the unconscious, or on those who clam that the conscious can always explain behaviour? In general, whoever is making the claim has the burden of proof, but Newell & Shanks seem to posit that conscious mechanisms will almost always be uncovered to replace unconscious ones. Part of the issue here is that unconscious mechanisms often are imputed whenever we fail to find conscious ones, whereas conscious mechanisms must be more acutely demonstrated. To their credit, Newell & Shanks propose several more rigorous modelling approaches that would help to more firmly establish the role of the unconscious.
2) Selective sampling of the literature. The reader must infer that the examples used in the book are typical, i.e., that most evidence of the unconscious is of the flimsy sort that collapses when strong methodology is used. Is this the case? As a non-expert but very interested lay-reader, I simply cannot tell.
Notwithstanding these critiques, this was a fascinating, stimulating, and at times very dense read that is sure to cause a stir. Recommended reading.
September 14, 2023
This book challenges one of the most pervasive claims about the human mind, that part of cognition is unconscious, as well as some related hugely influential claims (notably the system 1, 2 distinction). Regardless of your position on these issues, the book offers an incisive, scholarly, and expert overview of some of the most popularised findings in psychology. The authors are world-leading experts in their field and provide a critical, balanced analysis throughout. Even as a general introduction to some popular, influential findings in psychology, the book succeeds admirably. More generally (that is, beyond the immediate question of unconscious and psychological research), the book offers a compelling perspective on modern philosophy of science, the challenge of replicability, and ways to address what sometimes must seem a bleak and depressing view of scientific progress. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in one of the most fascinating debates in psychology (concerning the existence or not of unconscious thought), an insightful historical consideration of many key findings, and an introduction to some of the key challenges concerning scientific practice. Finally, the writing style is very accessible and enjoyable.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews