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Philosophical Remarks
When in 5/1930, the Council of Trinity College, Cambridge, had to decide whether to renew Wittgenstein's research grant, it turned to Bertrand Russell for an assessment of the work he'd been doing over the past year. His verdict: "The theories contained in this new work...are novel, very original & indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician who likes simplicity, I should like to think that they are not, but from what I have read of them I am quite sure that he ought to have an opportunity to work them out, since, when completed, they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy." Philosophical Remarks] contains the seeds of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind & of mathematics. Principally, he here discusses the role of indispensable in language, criticizing Russell's The Analysis of Mind. He modifies the Tractatus's picture theory of meaning by stressing that the connection between the proposition & reality isn't found in the picture itself. He analyzes generality in & out of mathematics, & the notions of proof & experiment. He formulates a pain/private-language argument & discusses both behaviorism & the verifiability principle. The work is difficult but important, & it belongs in every philosophy collection."—Robert Hoffman, Philosophy
"Any serious student of Wittgenstein's work will want to study his Philosophical Remarks as a transitional book between his two great masterpieces. The Remarks is thus indispensible for anyone who seeks a complete understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy."—Leonard Linsky, American Philosophical Association
"Any serious student of Wittgenstein's work will want to study his Philosophical Remarks as a transitional book between his two great masterpieces. The Remarks is thus indispensible for anyone who seeks a complete understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy."—Leonard Linsky, American Philosophical Association
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
357 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1921
9 people are currently reading
337 people want to read
About the author
Ludwig Wittgenstein
260 books2,950 followersLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1929) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
June 5, 2025
Transitional work, mainly on mind and maths. Wittgenstein here views philosophy as untying “knots in our thinking”. Those knots often arise from attempts to find an external authority for thought/sensation. See: “For me, there are only two things involved in the fact that a thought is true, i.e. the thought and the fact; whereas for Russell there are three, i.e. thought, fact and a third event, which, if it occurs, is just recognition.” Also: “The worst philosophical errors always arise when we try to apply our ordinary - physical - language in the area of the immediately given.”
July 5, 2019
ویتگنشتاین در مقدمه می گوید این کتاب برای کسانی نوشته شده است که دوستانه با روح آن مواجه شوند. او روح کتاب خود را با روح جریانهای بزرگ تمدن اروپایی و امریکایی متفاوت می داند. او ماهیت این تمدن ها را پیشرفت به معنای ساختن ساختارهای بزرگ تر و پیچیده تر می داند.
Ich kann mit der sprache nicht aus der Sprache heraus. p.54
Man kann eben nicht vor den Anfang anfangen. p.98
Ich kann mit der sprache nicht aus der Sprache heraus. p.54
Man kann eben nicht vor den Anfang anfangen. p.98
October 8, 2024
A “TRANSITIONAL” WORK BETWEEN THE “TRACTATUS” AND THE “INVESTIGATIONS”
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Philosophical Investigations' are among the acknowledged “classics” of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years. The Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books.
This book was written in 1930, when Cambridge University was deciding whether or not to renew Wittgenstein’s research grant. These ‘remarks’ form a ‘bridge’ between the Tractatus, and the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein wrote in the Foreword, “This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand. THAT spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery---in its variety; the second at its centre---in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.”
He observes, “How strange is logic were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language, and not with OURS!” (ATOC, I, 3) He says, “Hypothesis and postulate. No conceivable experience can refute a postulate, even though it may be extremely inconvenient to hang on to it. Corresponding to the greater or slighter convenience, there is a greater or slighter probability of the postulate. It is senseless to talk of a measure for this probability.” (ATOC, XXII, 232)
He states, “I do not believe that Logic can talk about sentences in any other than the normal sense in which we say, ‘There’s a sentence written here’ or ‘No, that only looks like a sentence, but isn’t,’ etc., etc. The question ‘What is a word?’ is completely analogous with the question ‘What is a chessman?’ Isn’t it agreement and disagreement that is primary, just as recognition is what is primary and identify what is secondary? If we see a proposition verified, what higher court is there to which we could yet appeal in order to tall whether it REALLY is true?” (I, 18-19)
He wonders, “But why is it easier to imagine life without end than an endless series in space? Somehow, it’s because we simply take the endless life as never complete, whereas the infinite series in space ought, we feel, already to exist as a whole.” (XII , 145)
He notes, “It is clear that there isn’t a relation of ‘being situated’ which would hold between a colour and a position, in which it ‘was situated.’ There is no intermediary between colour and space. Colour and space saturate one another. And the way in which they permeate one another makes up the visual field.” (XX, 206)
He points out, “This is all concerned with the problem ‘How many grains of sand make a heap?’ You might say: any group with more than a hundred grains is a heap and less than ten grains do not make a heap: but this has to be taken in such a way that ten and a hundred are not regarded as limits which could be essential to the concept ‘heap.’ … The boundaries … are still only like the walls of the forecourts. They are drawn arbitrarily at a point where we can still draw something firm. Just as if we were to border off a swamp with a wall, where the wall is not THE boundary of the swamp, it only stands around it on firm ground. It is a sign which shows there is a swamp inside it, but not, that the swamp is exactly the same size as that of the surface bounded by it.” (XX, 211)
Not nearly as interesting as either the Tractatus or the Philosophical Investigations, this book is still very important for anyone wanting to follow the development of Wittgenstein’s thought.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' and 'Philosophical Investigations' are among the acknowledged “classics” of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years. The Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books.
This book was written in 1930, when Cambridge University was deciding whether or not to renew Wittgenstein’s research grant. These ‘remarks’ form a ‘bridge’ between the Tractatus, and the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein wrote in the Foreword, “This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand. THAT spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by way of its periphery---in its variety; the second at its centre---in its essence. And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.”
He observes, “How strange is logic were concerned with an ‘ideal’ language, and not with OURS!” (ATOC, I, 3) He says, “Hypothesis and postulate. No conceivable experience can refute a postulate, even though it may be extremely inconvenient to hang on to it. Corresponding to the greater or slighter convenience, there is a greater or slighter probability of the postulate. It is senseless to talk of a measure for this probability.” (ATOC, XXII, 232)
He states, “I do not believe that Logic can talk about sentences in any other than the normal sense in which we say, ‘There’s a sentence written here’ or ‘No, that only looks like a sentence, but isn’t,’ etc., etc. The question ‘What is a word?’ is completely analogous with the question ‘What is a chessman?’ Isn’t it agreement and disagreement that is primary, just as recognition is what is primary and identify what is secondary? If we see a proposition verified, what higher court is there to which we could yet appeal in order to tall whether it REALLY is true?” (I, 18-19)
He wonders, “But why is it easier to imagine life without end than an endless series in space? Somehow, it’s because we simply take the endless life as never complete, whereas the infinite series in space ought, we feel, already to exist as a whole.” (XII , 145)
He notes, “It is clear that there isn’t a relation of ‘being situated’ which would hold between a colour and a position, in which it ‘was situated.’ There is no intermediary between colour and space. Colour and space saturate one another. And the way in which they permeate one another makes up the visual field.” (XX, 206)
He points out, “This is all concerned with the problem ‘How many grains of sand make a heap?’ You might say: any group with more than a hundred grains is a heap and less than ten grains do not make a heap: but this has to be taken in such a way that ten and a hundred are not regarded as limits which could be essential to the concept ‘heap.’ … The boundaries … are still only like the walls of the forecourts. They are drawn arbitrarily at a point where we can still draw something firm. Just as if we were to border off a swamp with a wall, where the wall is not THE boundary of the swamp, it only stands around it on firm ground. It is a sign which shows there is a swamp inside it, but not, that the swamp is exactly the same size as that of the surface bounded by it.” (XX, 211)
Not nearly as interesting as either the Tractatus or the Philosophical Investigations, this book is still very important for anyone wanting to follow the development of Wittgenstein’s thought.
January 27, 2023
The part I'm going to write here is going to show how much I've learned from Philosophical Remarks, but what I don't write will demonstrate just how much I didn't understand a single fucking thing i read.
The philosophical career of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a stange one indeed. Starting out with a work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, so monumental and important that everything after it was essentially a reaction to that book. Whether it be to affirm what was stated in the rather short Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or to move beyond the decidedly narrow logic of Wittgenstein's first book.
In Philosophical Remarks we mainly see a development of Wittgenstein's conception of truth statements, as well as a furthering of Wittgenstein's logico-linguistic theory of truth.
This especially comes through via the addition of phenomenology to Wittgenstein's thesis, as well as in his increasing disillusion with mathematics as the foundation for interpersonal understanding.
And where those to things interject with one another is in how Wittgenstein rather skillfully points out is how certain mathematical and logical ideas are either completely meaningless or contain certain elements that don't convey meaning, as the information or concepts in the mathematical ideas doesn't adhere to human (or rather, phenomenological) experience of humans. And this might be Wittgensteins biggest break with the logical positivists and analytical philosophers, at least in this book.
The philosophical career of Ludwig Wittgenstein is a stange one indeed. Starting out with a work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, so monumental and important that everything after it was essentially a reaction to that book. Whether it be to affirm what was stated in the rather short Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus or to move beyond the decidedly narrow logic of Wittgenstein's first book.
In Philosophical Remarks we mainly see a development of Wittgenstein's conception of truth statements, as well as a furthering of Wittgenstein's logico-linguistic theory of truth.
This especially comes through via the addition of phenomenology to Wittgenstein's thesis, as well as in his increasing disillusion with mathematics as the foundation for interpersonal understanding.
And where those to things interject with one another is in how Wittgenstein rather skillfully points out is how certain mathematical and logical ideas are either completely meaningless or contain certain elements that don't convey meaning, as the information or concepts in the mathematical ideas doesn't adhere to human (or rather, phenomenological) experience of humans. And this might be Wittgensteins biggest break with the logical positivists and analytical philosophers, at least in this book.
July 12, 2020
An important part of Wittgenstein’s body of work. Reading it has helped me better understand his thought and its development (and continuity) over time. I am sure that I will reread this book a number of times.
November 28, 2013
Although I served as a teaching assistant to a number of faculty in philosophy and linguistics while at Loyola University, I started and ended this work with Bill Ellos, S.J., a Wittgenstein specialist who had me read most of the philosopher's work and then publish and deliver a paper on him at a professional conference. Ironically, while I found Wittgenstein intriguing as a person, I was not much impressed with him as a philosopher and never took a class in which he was mentioned.
This book's contents are all jumbled in my mind with those of his Philosophical Investigations as I went directly from one to the other is a very short period of time.
This book's contents are all jumbled in my mind with those of his Philosophical Investigations as I went directly from one to the other is a very short period of time.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews