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The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory
In this new edition, Arthur Fine looks at Einstein's philosophy of science and develops his own views on realism. A new Afterword discusses the reaction to Fine's own theory.
"What really led Einstein . . . to renounce the new quantum order? For those interested in this question, this book is compulsory reading."—Harvey R. Brown, American Journal of Physics
"Fine has successfully combined a historical account of Einstein's philosophical views on quantum mechanics and a discussion of some of the philosophical problems associated with the interpretation of quantum theory with a discussion of some of the contemporary questions concerning realism and antirealism. . . . Clear, thoughtful, [and] well-written."—Allan Franklin, Annals of Science
"Attempts, from Einstein's published works and unpublished correspondence, to piece together a coherent picture of 'Einstein realism.' Especially illuminating are the letters between Einstein and fellow realist Schrödinger, as the latter was composing his famous 'Schrödinger-Cat' paper."—Nick Herbert, New Scientist
"Beautifully clear. . . . Fine's analysis is penetrating, his own results original and important. . . . The book is a splendid combination of new ways to think about quantum mechanics, about realism, and about Einstein's views of both."—Nancy Cartwright, Isis
"What really led Einstein . . . to renounce the new quantum order? For those interested in this question, this book is compulsory reading."—Harvey R. Brown, American Journal of Physics
"Fine has successfully combined a historical account of Einstein's philosophical views on quantum mechanics and a discussion of some of the philosophical problems associated with the interpretation of quantum theory with a discussion of some of the contemporary questions concerning realism and antirealism. . . . Clear, thoughtful, [and] well-written."—Allan Franklin, Annals of Science
"Attempts, from Einstein's published works and unpublished correspondence, to piece together a coherent picture of 'Einstein realism.' Especially illuminating are the letters between Einstein and fellow realist Schrödinger, as the latter was composing his famous 'Schrödinger-Cat' paper."—Nick Herbert, New Scientist
"Beautifully clear. . . . Fine's analysis is penetrating, his own results original and important. . . . The book is a splendid combination of new ways to think about quantum mechanics, about realism, and about Einstein's views of both."—Nancy Cartwright, Isis
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1986
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About the author
Arthur Fine
7 books6 followers
Arthur I. Fine
(b. 1937) is a leading American philosopher of science and a professor at the University of Washington. A past president of the Philosophy of Science Association, Fine is best known for proposing the Natural Ontological Attitude as a solution to the problems of scientific realism. He is the author of The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and The Quantum Theory (1986, revised edition 1992) and editor of numerous volumes in the field. He received his undergraduate education at Shimer College and later the University of Chicago, via early entrance to college, and completed his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1963. (from Shimer College Wiki)
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June 18, 2024
BOTH A HISTORICAL WORK, AND AN INTERPRETIVE ONE
Arthur Fine (born 1937) is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Washington. He wrote in the Preface to this 1986 book, “The essays in this volume that have been previously published represent a body of work developed over a long period of time. There is a strong temptation to use this occasion not only to correct and improve them, but also to unify and regularize their style. I have resisted it, deciding instead to let them show the character of their particular times and places, so far as possible, without cosmetic surgery.”
He states in the first chapter, “Einstein [was] perhaps [quantum theory’s] foremost critic… What bothered Einstein most of all was actually twofold. First, he could not go along with the idea that probability would play an irreducible role in fundamental physics. His famous, ‘God does not play dice’ is a succinct version of this idea… [But] usually he expressed this concern positively, by affirming his interest in pursuing causal (or determinist) theories… his concerns … had a second focus…. he says of the quantum theorist, ‘Most of them do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality.’ The risky, or as I like to call it, the ‘shaky game’ puts into jeopardy what Einstein saw as the traditional program of physics, the attempt to construct a model of an observer-independent reality, and one that would stand the test of time. The image of the shaky game… attaches as well… to all the constructive work of science and of the philosophical or historical programs that seek to place and understand it…. These are shaky because… their outcome is uncertain. Indeed not even the rules of the game are fixed… What he saw, I think, was that just because science is a shaky game, the realist program was at risk.” (Pg. 1-2)
He explains, “in coming down strongly on the side of coherence and consistency, I would hope to challenge those skeptical about such accounts to respond and, in this way, to increase our understanding of things. In coming out for the truth of scientific stories … and in rejecting positivist epistemology, I may run the risk of being identified with the opposite philosophical camp, that of the realists. But I have no love for realism… chapter 7 … develops a ‘metatheorem’ demonstrating how the philosophically fashionable… strategy for supporting realism simply … begs the question… This sets the stage for a discussion of the natural ontological attitude (NOA) as a way of saving the concept of truth… In its antimetaphysical aspect, NOA is at one with Einstein’s motivational realism… That attitude, to let science stand on its own and to view it without the support of philosophical ‘isms,’ is what characterizes NOA.” (Pg. 8-9)
He says of Einstein, “He took the advice of the quantum theorists, which was his own to begin with, and attended carefully to the consequences of the theory, especially for macroscopic bodies. He argued that the theory was unable to account for … even the simplest of these phenomena unless we understand the theory never to treat individual systems but only statistical aggregates of such systems. So understood, he had a deep respect for the theory and for its predictive success… [But because] quantum theory is essentially statistical, he felt that it could not be fundamental in the sense of providing a framework for all of physics. He hoped, instead, that the framework of general relativity … would enable one to establish the new concepts and the theoretical basis from which the quantum theory would emerge as a statistical approximation.” (Pg. 24)
After the publication of the EPR paper, “[Niels] Bohr’s response to EPR marks a definite break from his previously stated view… Bohr had always argued that the disturbance created by a measurement of a particular variable caused a real change in the physical situation … But here Bohr switched from this doctrine of actual physical disturbance to what one might call a doctrine of semantic disturbance… I think it is fair to conclude that the EPR paper did succeed in neutralizing Bohr’s doctrine of disturbance. It forced Bohr to retreat to a merely semantic disturbance and thereby it removed an otherwise plausible and intuitive physical basis for Bohr’s ideas.” (Pg. 35)
He points out, “While there can be no doubt that Einstein turned away from positivism to realism, or that realism was important in his thinking about the quantum theory, there is considerable room for speculation concerning exactly what Einstein’s realism involves. For despite the many brief and casual references to realism in his writings, Einstein was not disposed to discuss the various elements of his realism in a systematic fashion.” (Pg. 87) Later, he adds, “Einstein was deliberately evasive concerning the significance of his realism… Einstein’s realism is not the robust metaphysical doctrine that one often associated with that label… is it a realism worthy of the name at all?” (Pg. 105)
He asserts, “Realism is dead. Its death was announced by the neopositivists who realized that they could accept all the results of science, including all the members of the scientific zoo, and still declare that the questions raised by the existence claims of realism were mere pseudo-questions. Its death was hastened by the debates over the interpretation of quantum theory, where Bohr’s nonrealist philosophy was seen to win out over Einstein’s passionate realism. Its death was certified, finally, as the last two generations of physical scientists turned their backs on realism and have managed, nevertheless, to do science successfully without it… realism is well and truly dead, and we have work to get on with, in identifying a suitable successor.” (Pg. 112)
He suggests, “The war between Einstein, the realist, and Bohr, the nonrealist, over the interpretation of quantum theory was not, I believe, just a sideshow in physics, nor an idle intellectual exercise. It was an important endeavor undertaken by Bohr on behalf of the enterprise of physics as a progressive science. For Bohr believed… that Einstein’s realism, if taken seriously, would block the consolidation and articulation of the new physics and, thereby, stop the progress of science. They were afraid… that Einstein’s realism would lead the next generation of the brightest and best students into scientific dead ends.” (Pg. 124)
He asserts, “It seems to me that when we contrast the realist and the antirealist … a third alternative emerges… It is the core position itself, and ALL BY ITSELF… The core position is neither realist nor antirealist; it mediates between the two… Thus, let me introduce the acronym NOA… for ‘Natural ontological attitude’… NOA sanctions ordinary referential semantics and commits us, via truth, to the existence of individuals, properties, relations, processes, and so forth referred to by the scientific statements that we accept as true… NOA is not committed to the progressivism that seems inherent in realism…should the tradition change, say, in the manner of the conceptual revolutions that [Thomas] Kuhn dubs ‘paradigm shifts,’ then nothing in NOA dictates that the change be assimilated as being progressive… NOA is perfectly consistent with … wholesale changes of reference…. [NOA] sanctions reference and existence claims, but it does not force the history of science into prefit molds.” (Pg. 129-131)
Later, he adds, “NOA is inclined to reject ALL interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc., of truth, just as it rejects the special correspondence theory of realism and the acceptance pictures of the truthmongering antirealisms. For the concept of truth is the fundamental semantic concept… NOA is fundamentally a heuristic attitude, one that is compatible with quite different assessments of particular scientific investigations… All that NOA insists is that one’s ontological attitude … be governed by the very same standards of evidence and inference that are employed by science itself…. [NOA] trusts in our native ability to get the message without having to rely on metaphysical or epistemological hearing aids.” (Pg. 149-150)
He notes, “In charging the instrumentalist Copenhagen theorists with playing a shaky game with reality, Einstein was certainly correct. But it would be an error of judgment on our part to suppose that when the realist moves beyond the truth of the quantum theory to construct its interpretation, he is doing anything other than playing a game himself, and one rather TOO shaky because, granted truth, the rules of this realist game have now been cut loose from any ongoing scientific practice.” (Pg. 171)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying quantum theory and its development.
Arthur Fine (born 1937) is emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Washington. He wrote in the Preface to this 1986 book, “The essays in this volume that have been previously published represent a body of work developed over a long period of time. There is a strong temptation to use this occasion not only to correct and improve them, but also to unify and regularize their style. I have resisted it, deciding instead to let them show the character of their particular times and places, so far as possible, without cosmetic surgery.”
He states in the first chapter, “Einstein [was] perhaps [quantum theory’s] foremost critic… What bothered Einstein most of all was actually twofold. First, he could not go along with the idea that probability would play an irreducible role in fundamental physics. His famous, ‘God does not play dice’ is a succinct version of this idea… [But] usually he expressed this concern positively, by affirming his interest in pursuing causal (or determinist) theories… his concerns … had a second focus…. he says of the quantum theorist, ‘Most of them do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality.’ The risky, or as I like to call it, the ‘shaky game’ puts into jeopardy what Einstein saw as the traditional program of physics, the attempt to construct a model of an observer-independent reality, and one that would stand the test of time. The image of the shaky game… attaches as well… to all the constructive work of science and of the philosophical or historical programs that seek to place and understand it…. These are shaky because… their outcome is uncertain. Indeed not even the rules of the game are fixed… What he saw, I think, was that just because science is a shaky game, the realist program was at risk.” (Pg. 1-2)
He explains, “in coming down strongly on the side of coherence and consistency, I would hope to challenge those skeptical about such accounts to respond and, in this way, to increase our understanding of things. In coming out for the truth of scientific stories … and in rejecting positivist epistemology, I may run the risk of being identified with the opposite philosophical camp, that of the realists. But I have no love for realism… chapter 7 … develops a ‘metatheorem’ demonstrating how the philosophically fashionable… strategy for supporting realism simply … begs the question… This sets the stage for a discussion of the natural ontological attitude (NOA) as a way of saving the concept of truth… In its antimetaphysical aspect, NOA is at one with Einstein’s motivational realism… That attitude, to let science stand on its own and to view it without the support of philosophical ‘isms,’ is what characterizes NOA.” (Pg. 8-9)
He says of Einstein, “He took the advice of the quantum theorists, which was his own to begin with, and attended carefully to the consequences of the theory, especially for macroscopic bodies. He argued that the theory was unable to account for … even the simplest of these phenomena unless we understand the theory never to treat individual systems but only statistical aggregates of such systems. So understood, he had a deep respect for the theory and for its predictive success… [But because] quantum theory is essentially statistical, he felt that it could not be fundamental in the sense of providing a framework for all of physics. He hoped, instead, that the framework of general relativity … would enable one to establish the new concepts and the theoretical basis from which the quantum theory would emerge as a statistical approximation.” (Pg. 24)
After the publication of the EPR paper, “[Niels] Bohr’s response to EPR marks a definite break from his previously stated view… Bohr had always argued that the disturbance created by a measurement of a particular variable caused a real change in the physical situation … But here Bohr switched from this doctrine of actual physical disturbance to what one might call a doctrine of semantic disturbance… I think it is fair to conclude that the EPR paper did succeed in neutralizing Bohr’s doctrine of disturbance. It forced Bohr to retreat to a merely semantic disturbance and thereby it removed an otherwise plausible and intuitive physical basis for Bohr’s ideas.” (Pg. 35)
He points out, “While there can be no doubt that Einstein turned away from positivism to realism, or that realism was important in his thinking about the quantum theory, there is considerable room for speculation concerning exactly what Einstein’s realism involves. For despite the many brief and casual references to realism in his writings, Einstein was not disposed to discuss the various elements of his realism in a systematic fashion.” (Pg. 87) Later, he adds, “Einstein was deliberately evasive concerning the significance of his realism… Einstein’s realism is not the robust metaphysical doctrine that one often associated with that label… is it a realism worthy of the name at all?” (Pg. 105)
He asserts, “Realism is dead. Its death was announced by the neopositivists who realized that they could accept all the results of science, including all the members of the scientific zoo, and still declare that the questions raised by the existence claims of realism were mere pseudo-questions. Its death was hastened by the debates over the interpretation of quantum theory, where Bohr’s nonrealist philosophy was seen to win out over Einstein’s passionate realism. Its death was certified, finally, as the last two generations of physical scientists turned their backs on realism and have managed, nevertheless, to do science successfully without it… realism is well and truly dead, and we have work to get on with, in identifying a suitable successor.” (Pg. 112)
He suggests, “The war between Einstein, the realist, and Bohr, the nonrealist, over the interpretation of quantum theory was not, I believe, just a sideshow in physics, nor an idle intellectual exercise. It was an important endeavor undertaken by Bohr on behalf of the enterprise of physics as a progressive science. For Bohr believed… that Einstein’s realism, if taken seriously, would block the consolidation and articulation of the new physics and, thereby, stop the progress of science. They were afraid… that Einstein’s realism would lead the next generation of the brightest and best students into scientific dead ends.” (Pg. 124)
He asserts, “It seems to me that when we contrast the realist and the antirealist … a third alternative emerges… It is the core position itself, and ALL BY ITSELF… The core position is neither realist nor antirealist; it mediates between the two… Thus, let me introduce the acronym NOA… for ‘Natural ontological attitude’… NOA sanctions ordinary referential semantics and commits us, via truth, to the existence of individuals, properties, relations, processes, and so forth referred to by the scientific statements that we accept as true… NOA is not committed to the progressivism that seems inherent in realism…should the tradition change, say, in the manner of the conceptual revolutions that [Thomas] Kuhn dubs ‘paradigm shifts,’ then nothing in NOA dictates that the change be assimilated as being progressive… NOA is perfectly consistent with … wholesale changes of reference…. [NOA] sanctions reference and existence claims, but it does not force the history of science into prefit molds.” (Pg. 129-131)
Later, he adds, “NOA is inclined to reject ALL interpretations, theories, construals, pictures, etc., of truth, just as it rejects the special correspondence theory of realism and the acceptance pictures of the truthmongering antirealisms. For the concept of truth is the fundamental semantic concept… NOA is fundamentally a heuristic attitude, one that is compatible with quite different assessments of particular scientific investigations… All that NOA insists is that one’s ontological attitude … be governed by the very same standards of evidence and inference that are employed by science itself…. [NOA] trusts in our native ability to get the message without having to rely on metaphysical or epistemological hearing aids.” (Pg. 149-150)
He notes, “In charging the instrumentalist Copenhagen theorists with playing a shaky game with reality, Einstein was certainly correct. But it would be an error of judgment on our part to suppose that when the realist moves beyond the truth of the quantum theory to construct its interpretation, he is doing anything other than playing a game himself, and one rather TOO shaky because, granted truth, the rules of this realist game have now been cut loose from any ongoing scientific practice.” (Pg. 171)
This book will be of keen interest to those studying quantum theory and its development.
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