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Without the State: Self-Organization and Political Activism in Ukraine
Without the State explores the 2013–14 Euromaidan protests – a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine – through in-depth ethnographic research with leftist, feminist, and student activists in Kyiv. The book discusses the concept of "self-organization" and the notion that if something needs to be done and a person has the competence to do it, then they should simply do it.
Emily Channell-Justice reveals how self-organization in Ukraine came out of leftist practices but actors from across the spectrum of political views also adopted self-organization over the course of Euromaidan, including far-right groups. The widespread adoption of self-organization encouraged Ukrainians to rethink their expectations of the relationship between citizens and their state. The book explains how self-organized practices have changed people’s views on what they think they can contribute to their own communities, and in the wake of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has also motivated new networks of mutual aid within Ukraine and beyond. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, including the author’s first-hand experience of the entirety of the Euromaidan protests, Without the State provides a unique analytical account of this crucial moment in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history.
Emily Channell-Justice reveals how self-organization in Ukraine came out of leftist practices but actors from across the spectrum of political views also adopted self-organization over the course of Euromaidan, including far-right groups. The widespread adoption of self-organization encouraged Ukrainians to rethink their expectations of the relationship between citizens and their state. The book explains how self-organized practices have changed people’s views on what they think they can contribute to their own communities, and in the wake of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has also motivated new networks of mutual aid within Ukraine and beyond. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, including the author’s first-hand experience of the entirety of the Euromaidan protests, Without the State provides a unique analytical account of this crucial moment in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history.
- GenresUkraine
302 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 2, 2022
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January 11, 2023
It's an interesting experience to read a book about a movement you used to be a part of :)
January 3, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Бог-то ваш оказался фраером
Расфуфыренным фраерком
А я Владимир Ульянов-Ленин
Я тот, кто умывает кипятком
Автор исследует политический и социальный вопрос существование левых организаций в современной Украине, их роли в современной политике и с какими сложностями они сталкиваются в своей повседневной деятельности. Автор пишет и о правых организациях, но только в рамках их взаимодействия с левыми. Чаще всего такое взаимодействие принимало форму конфронтации:
Over the course of the first week on Maidan, I saw harassment and direct attacks on people with signs referencing feminism three more times, including one evening when extreme-right provokatory assaulted feminist protesters with pepper spray.
Тут стоит отметить, что нынешний феминизм является левой повесткой, поэтому не стоит удивляться тому, что нынешний феминизм в Украине рассматривается в лучшем случаи нейтрально, а в худшем, как источник дестабилизации украинской государственности, её независимости. Как замечает автор, феминизм идёт вразрез с милитаризацией общества, которая стала реакцией на известные события на востоке Украины в 2014 и 2022. Речь идёт о том, что милитаризация, это всегда верховенство права сильного (легитимация насилия), но главное, это верховенство мужчины. Когда идёт война, общество слушает военных и всё что подрывает их авторитет, рассматривается в качестве угрозы. Феминизм, в данном случаи, как раз и может рассматриваться в качестве оружия врага, как способ, которым русские могут подорвать единение страны. Это особенно актуально, учитывая, что нынешний феминизм, явление левой идеологии. А какова позиция левой идеологии в сегодняшней Украине? Сегодня в Украине левая идеология ассоциируется не со шведским социализмом (социал-демократизмом), а с Советским прошлым, точнее не с историческим прошлым, а с идеологией Москвы, ибо в Украине СССР прямо ассоциируется как продолжение Российской Империи, с одной стороны, и Российской Федерацией, с другой. Что означает, что левая политика, это политика сегодняшнего врага.
Many leftists explained to me that, even when they were teenagers, long before Maidan, they felt limited in their political options because they were already learning a kind of national ideology that privileged a dichotomy between a pro-Ukrainian, anti-Soviet stance and any position that could be interpreted as sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
Поэтому не удивительно, что современный феминизм может рассматриваться некоторыми людьми в Украине как способ подрыва политической стабильности и единения народа вокруг одной фигуры – украинского солдата. Который, как любой может понять, всегда является мужчиной, сколько бы женщин не служило в армии.
To a large extent, feminist activism that advocates a better future for women through legislation, such as exists in the EU, is at odds with Ukraine’s national ideology, because it might threaten national unity by questioning traditional gender norms and family structures that are fundamental to the national idea.
Тут важно ещё добавить тот факт, что европейские левые могут ассоциироваться с представителями пацифизма или как их ещё иногда называют «полезными идиотами», с людьми которые предлагают Украине пожертвовать своими территориями ради мира. Третий фактор, который может объяснить такую острую враждебность к левой идеологии является то, что Янукович и его партия тесно связаны с коммунистической партии Украины, что означает, что левая идеология также ассоциируется с Партией Регионов, Януковичем и сотрудничеством с Россией.
The connection of these particular feminists to leftist activists – also marginalized on Maidan – confirmed what many people already believed about feminism, which is that it is deeply linked to socialism and Soviet communism.
Разумеется, большая часть книги посвящена не феминизму, а левым организациям в тот момент, когда происходили события на Майдане в 2014 и их роли в этом событии. Тут нужно отметить, что самоорганизующиеся группы являются важным элементом демократии. Не нужно быть экспертом по США, чтобы знать, что в США почти каждый человек состоит в какой-нибудь организации, клубе по интересам и пр. Как сказано в книге Gender Violence in Russia: The Politics of Feminist Intervention по поводу РФ, важный индикатор незрелости российского демократического общества является то, что в России в середине 90-х, участие россиянина в какой-либо организации оценивалось в 0.65, что в целом являлось наименьшим в рамках всего мира, ибо «Americans, in contrast, have an average of 3.59 organizational memberships; post-authoritarian Brazilians 2.13». Так что выводы автора насчёт похожей ситуации в Украине, выглядят более перспективно в плане построения устойчивой демократии, невзирая на то, о какой организации/группе идёт речь. Автор в своей книге отчётливо обрисовывает ситуацию участия людей в различных, в основном левых, политических организациях, даже не смотря на проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются левые активисты. Разумеется, появление политических организаций снизу стало результатом всеобщего недовольства официальными политиками и тем уровнем демократии, который был построен в Украине:
The editors attempt to draw from opinion polls to show that most people in Ukraine at the time were not satisfied with the quality of Ukraine’s democracy. The events of later that fall proved the polling data correct – that many people felt it was time to hold politicians accountable for building better democratic institutions.
Кстати, о радикалах справа, но перед этим сделаю важное замечание: радикальные правые организации не доминирует в политической повестке Украины, что означает, что подобные организации существуют в каждой стране и лишь по отношению к Украине была использована лупа, чтобы преувеличить опасность со стороны Правого Сектора и пр. Тем не менее, автор перечисляет интересные лозунги, которые можно было наблюдать, когда происходил «Ленинопад»:
As the crowds cheered Komuniaky – na hilliaku (Hang the communists), Lenin teetered back until, ultimately, crashing headfirst to the ground behind the plinth.
<…>
After rounds of Slava natsiï – smert' voroham (Glory to the nation – death to enemies) and Ukraïna ponad use (Ukraine above all), protesters began to chant Razom – i do kintsia (Together to the end)
<…>
The marble plinth had already been defaced with Nazi symbols and a “White Pride” tag; on top, where the Lenin statue had been just hours earlier, was a sign reading Ukraïntsi – vy naikrashchi (“Ukrainians – you are the best!”) and two flags: that of the European Union and the red and black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
Так что же получается, россияне правы в своих заявлениях по поводу неонацистских группировок? Как я написал выше, подобные организации существуют в каждой стране. Малочисленные, но яркие они заслонили собой всех остальных участников Евромайдана. За «Ленинопадом» было не видно главного – свержение диктатуры Януковича, его репрессивных законов (которые были приняты в те дни) и его коррупционную сущность, которую так хорошо символизирует золотой батон, который был найден в его апартаментах. Тем не менее, действительно, многие авторы, пишущие о современной Украине, либо ничего не пишут о сущности праворадикальных групп либо стараются преуменьшить их радикализм и их влияние в обществе. С моей точки зрения, они хоть и не представляют всё украинское общество, тем не менее, не являются просто «отбросами общества», маргиналами.
The political shifts during phase two of Maidan led to the discrediting of Opposition leaders and the rise of groups such as Right Sector, whose members legitimized the use of force by presenting themselves as non-aligned and uncorrupted by the current state of Ukrainian politics – key elements that reflect self-organization.
Как пишет автор, при столкновении с силовиками Януковича, именно праворадикальным группам удалось дать отпор Беркуту и вынудить Януковича пойти на диалог с оппозицией. Без помощи праворадикальных групп, с которыми объединились все, включая левых, Янукович смог бы устоять, подавить народные выступления и наверняка построил бы жёсткую диктатуру. Другими словами, эти люди спасли страну от диктатуры. В то же самое время, эти группировки были далеки от миролюбия, как и Янукович со своим Беркутом. Свергнув Януковича, они одновременно углубили кризис между востоком и западом Украины и почувствовали свою значимость. Поэтому когда начинали вспыхивать анти-Майданы на востоке Украины, первыми кто поехал подавлять их были как раз члены этих групп, а также другие непонятные молодые люди. Именно между столкновениями Правого Сектора и участниками анти-Майдана появились первые жертвы, но уже на востоке страны:
«On the night of 14 March, violence reached its peak, when two Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street» (The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition).
Дальше ситуация эскалировала всё сильнее и сильнее и на первый план выходила не борьба с диктатурой Януковича, а борьба с российским влиянием. Возможно, именно тут мы находим причину бескомпромиссности украинской политической элиты, т.е. отказ от имплементаций Минских соглашений сначала Порошенко, а потом и Зеленским.
The author explores the political and social question of the existence of left-wing organizations in modern Ukraine, their role in contemporary politics, and the difficulties they face in their daily activities. The author writes about right-wing organizations, but only in the framework of their interaction with the left. Most often, such interaction took the form of confrontation:
Over the course of the first week on Maidan, I saw harassment and direct attacks on people with signs referencing feminism three more times, including one evening when extreme-right provokatory assaulted feminist protesters with pepper spray.
It is worth noting that current feminism is a leftist agenda, so it should not be surprising that current feminism in Ukraine is viewed at best neutrally and at worst as a source of destabilization of Ukrainian statehood and independence. As the author notes, feminism is at odds with the militarization of society, which was a reaction to the well-known events in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The point is that militarization is always about the rule of the strong (legitimizing violence), but more importantly, it is about the rule of men. When there is a war, society listens to the military, and anything that undermines their authority is seen as a threat. Feminism, in this case, can be seen as a weapon of the enemy, as a way for the Russians to undermine the unity of the country. This is especially relevant given that the current feminism is a phenomenon of leftist ideology. And what is the position of leftist ideology in today's Ukraine? Today in Ukraine, leftist ideology is associated not with Swedish socialism (social democracy) but with the Soviet past, not with the historical past, but with the ideology of Moscow because in Ukraine, the USSR is directly associated with a continuation of the Russian Empire, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other. This means that leftist politics is the politics of today's enemy.
Many leftists explained to me that, even when they were teenagers, long before Maidan, they felt limited in their political options because they were already learning a kind of national ideology that privileged a dichotomy between a pro-Ukrainian, anti-Soviet stance and any position that could be interpreted as sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
It is therefore not surprising that modern feminism may be seen by some people in Ukraine as a way of undermining political stability and the unity of the people around one figure - the Ukrainian soldier. Who, as anyone can realize, is always a man, no matter how many women serve in the army.
To a large extent, feminist activism that advocates a better future for women through legislation, such as exists in the EU, is at odds with Ukraine’s national ideology, because it might threaten national unity by questioning traditional gender norms and family structures that are fundamental to the national idea.
Here, it is important to add the fact that the European Left can be associated with representatives of pacifism, or as they are sometimes called "useful idiots," with people who offer Ukraine to sacrifice its territories for the sake of peace. The third factor that can explain such a sharp hostility to leftist ideology is that Yanukovych and his party are closely associated with the Communist Party of Ukraine, which means that leftist ideology is also associated with the Party of Regions, Yanukovych, and cooperation with Russia.
The connection of these particular feminists to leftist activists – also marginalized on Maidan – confirmed what many people already believed about feminism, which is that it is deeply linked to socialism and Soviet communism.
Of course, most of the book is not about feminism but about left-wing organizations at the time of the Maidan events in 2014 and their role in this event. It should be noted that self-organizing groups are an important element of democracy. You don't need to be an expert on the USA to know that in the USA, almost every person is a member of some kind of organization, interest club, etc. As stated in the book "Gender Violence in Russia: The Politics of Feminist Intervention" about the Russian Federation, an important indicator of the immaturity of the Russian democratic society is that in Russia in the mid-90s, a Russian's participation in any organization was estimated at 0.65, which was the lowest in the whole world ("Americans, in contrast, have an average of 3.59 organizational memberships; post-authoritarian Brazilians 2.13"). So, the author's conclusions about a similar situation in Ukraine look more promising in terms of building a sustainable democracy, regardless of which organization/group we are talking about. In his book, the author clearly outlines the situation of people's participation in various, mostly left-wing, political organizations, even despite the problems faced by left-wing activists. Of course, the emergence of political organizations from below was the result of general dissatisfaction with official politicians and the level of democracy that had been built in Ukraine:
The editors attempt to draw from opinion polls to show that most people in Ukraine at the time were not satisfied with the quality of Ukraine’s democracy. The events of later that fall proved the polling data correct – that many people felt it was time to hold politicians accountable for building better democratic institutions.
Speaking of radicals on the right, but before I do, I will make an important note: radical right-wing organizations do not dominate the political agenda of Ukraine, which means that such organizations exist in every country only in relation to Ukraine a magnifying glass has been used to exaggerate the danger from Right Sector and so on. Nevertheless, the author lists interesting slogans that could be observed when the "Leninfall" was taking place:
As the crowds cheered Komuniaky – na hilliaku (Hang the communists), Lenin teetered back until, ultimately, crashing headfirst to the ground behind the plinth.
<…>
After rounds of Slava natsiï – smert' voroham (Glory to the nation – death to enemies) and Ukraïna ponad use (Ukraine above all), protesters began to chant Razom – i do kintsia (Together to the end)
<…>
The marble plinth had already been defaced with Nazi symbols and a “White Pride” tag; on top, where the Lenin statue had been just hours earlier, was a sign reading Ukraïntsi – vy naikrashchi (“Ukrainians – you are the best!”) and two flags: that of the European Union and the red and black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
So the Russians are right in their statements about neo-Nazi groups? As I wrote above, such organizations exist in every country. Small in number but vibrant, they overshadowed all the other participants in Euromaidan. Behind the "Leninopad," the main thing was not visible - the overthrow of Yanukovych's dictatorship, his repressive laws (which were passed in those days), and his corrupt nature, which is so well symbolized by the golden loaf that was found in his apartment. Nevertheless, it is true that many authors writing about contemporary Ukraine either do not write anything about the essence of right-wing radical groups or try to minimize their radicalism and their influence in society. In my view, although they do not represent the entire Ukrainian society, they are not simply "the dregs of society," the marginalized.
The political shifts during phase two of Maidan led to the discrediting of Opposition leaders and the rise of groups such as Right Sector, whose members legitimized the use of force by presenting themselves as non-aligned and uncorrupted by the current state of Ukrainian politics – key elements that reflect self-organization.
As the author writes, when confronted with Yanukovych's security forces, it was right-wing radical groups that managed to fight back against Berkut and force Yanukovych to dialog with the opposition. Without the help of the right-radical groups, with whom everyone united, including the leftists, Yanukovych would have been able to resist and suppress the people's demonstrations and would surely have built a brutal dictatorship. In other words, these people saved the country from dictatorship. At the same time, these groups were far from peaceful, as were Yanukovych and his Berkut. By overthrowing Yanukovych, they simultaneously deepened the crisis between eastern and western Ukraine and felt self-important. Therefore, when anti-Maidan protests began to erupt in eastern Ukraine, the first people who went to suppress them were members of these groups as well as other obscure young people. It was between the clashes between Right Sector and anti-Maidan participants that the first victims appeared, but already in the east of the country:
«On the night of 14 March, violence reached its peak, when two Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street» «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine Elites, Protest, and Partition».
Further on, the situation escalated more and more, and it was not the fight against Yanukovych's dictatorship that came to the fore but the fight against Russian influence. Perhaps this is where we find the reason for the uncompromising nature of the Ukrainian political elite, i.e., the refusal to implement the Minsk agreements, first by Poroshenko and then by Zelensky.
Бог-то ваш оказался фраером
Расфуфыренным фраерком
А я Владимир Ульянов-Ленин
Я тот, кто умывает кипятком
Автор исследует политический и социальный вопрос существование левых организаций в современной Украине, их роли в современной политике и с какими сложностями они сталкиваются в своей повседневной деятельности. Автор пишет и о правых организациях, но только в рамках их взаимодействия с левыми. Чаще всего такое взаимодействие принимало форму конфронтации:
Over the course of the first week on Maidan, I saw harassment and direct attacks on people with signs referencing feminism three more times, including one evening when extreme-right provokatory assaulted feminist protesters with pepper spray.
Тут стоит отметить, что нынешний феминизм является левой повесткой, поэтому не стоит удивляться тому, что нынешний феминизм в Украине рассматривается в лучшем случаи нейтрально, а в худшем, как источник дестабилизации украинской государственности, её независимости. Как замечает автор, феминизм идёт вразрез с милитаризацией общества, которая стала реакцией на известные события на востоке Украины в 2014 и 2022. Речь идёт о том, что милитаризация, это всегда верховенство права сильного (легитимация насилия), но главное, это верховенство мужчины. Когда идёт война, общество слушает военных и всё что подрывает их авторитет, рассматривается в качестве угрозы. Феминизм, в данном случаи, как раз и может рассматриваться в качестве оружия врага, как способ, которым русские могут подорвать единение страны. Это особенно актуально, учитывая, что нынешний феминизм, явление левой идеологии. А какова позиция левой идеологии в сегодняшней Украине? Сегодня в Украине левая идеология ассоциируется не со шведским социализмом (социал-демократизмом), а с Советским прошлым, точнее не с историческим прошлым, а с идеологией Москвы, ибо в Украине СССР прямо ассоциируется как продолжение Российской Империи, с одной стороны, и Российской Федерацией, с другой. Что означает, что левая политика, это политика сегодняшнего врага.
Many leftists explained to me that, even when they were teenagers, long before Maidan, they felt limited in their political options because they were already learning a kind of national ideology that privileged a dichotomy between a pro-Ukrainian, anti-Soviet stance and any position that could be interpreted as sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
Поэтому не удивительно, что современный феминизм может рассматриваться некоторыми людьми в Украине как способ подрыва политической стабильности и единения народа вокруг одной фигуры – украинского солдата. Который, как любой может понять, всегда является мужчиной, сколько бы женщин не служило в армии.
To a large extent, feminist activism that advocates a better future for women through legislation, such as exists in the EU, is at odds with Ukraine’s national ideology, because it might threaten national unity by questioning traditional gender norms and family structures that are fundamental to the national idea.
Тут важно ещё добавить тот факт, что европейские левые могут ассоциироваться с представителями пацифизма или как их ещё иногда называют «полезными идиотами», с людьми которые предлагают Украине пожертвовать своими территориями ради мира. Третий фактор, который может объяснить такую острую враждебность к левой идеологии является то, что Янукович и его партия тесно связаны с коммунистической партии Украины, что означает, что левая идеология также ассоциируется с Партией Регионов, Януковичем и сотрудничеством с Россией.
The connection of these particular feminists to leftist activists – also marginalized on Maidan – confirmed what many people already believed about feminism, which is that it is deeply linked to socialism and Soviet communism.
Разумеется, большая часть книги посвящена не феминизму, а левым организациям в тот момент, когда происходили события на Майдане в 2014 и их роли в этом событии. Тут нужно отметить, что самоорганизующиеся группы являются важным элементом демократии. Не нужно быть экспертом по США, чтобы знать, что в США почти каждый человек состоит в какой-нибудь организации, клубе по интересам и пр. Как сказано в книге Gender Violence in Russia: The Politics of Feminist Intervention по поводу РФ, важный индикатор незрелости российского демократического общества является то, что в России в середине 90-х, участие россиянина в какой-либо организации оценивалось в 0.65, что в целом являлось наименьшим в рамках всего мира, ибо «Americans, in contrast, have an average of 3.59 organizational memberships; post-authoritarian Brazilians 2.13». Так что выводы автора насчёт похожей ситуации в Украине, выглядят более перспективно в плане построения устойчивой демократии, невзирая на то, о какой организации/группе идёт речь. Автор в своей книге отчётливо обрисовывает ситуацию участия людей в различных, в основном левых, политических организациях, даже не смотря на проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются левые активисты. Разумеется, появление политических организаций снизу стало результатом всеобщего недовольства официальными политиками и тем уровнем демократии, который был построен в Украине:
The editors attempt to draw from opinion polls to show that most people in Ukraine at the time were not satisfied with the quality of Ukraine’s democracy. The events of later that fall proved the polling data correct – that many people felt it was time to hold politicians accountable for building better democratic institutions.
Кстати, о радикалах справа, но перед этим сделаю важное замечание: радикальные правые организации не доминирует в политической повестке Украины, что означает, что подобные организации существуют в каждой стране и лишь по отношению к Украине была использована лупа, чтобы преувеличить опасность со стороны Правого Сектора и пр. Тем не менее, автор перечисляет интересные лозунги, которые можно было наблюдать, когда происходил «Ленинопад»:
As the crowds cheered Komuniaky – na hilliaku (Hang the communists), Lenin teetered back until, ultimately, crashing headfirst to the ground behind the plinth.
<…>
After rounds of Slava natsiï – smert' voroham (Glory to the nation – death to enemies) and Ukraïna ponad use (Ukraine above all), protesters began to chant Razom – i do kintsia (Together to the end)
<…>
The marble plinth had already been defaced with Nazi symbols and a “White Pride” tag; on top, where the Lenin statue had been just hours earlier, was a sign reading Ukraïntsi – vy naikrashchi (“Ukrainians – you are the best!”) and two flags: that of the European Union and the red and black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
Так что же получается, россияне правы в своих заявлениях по поводу неонацистских группировок? Как я написал выше, подобные организации существуют в каждой стране. Малочисленные, но яркие они заслонили собой всех остальных участников Евромайдана. За «Ленинопадом» было не видно главного – свержение диктатуры Януковича, его репрессивных законов (которые были приняты в те дни) и его коррупционную сущность, которую так хорошо символизирует золотой батон, который был найден в его апартаментах. Тем не менее, действительно, многие авторы, пишущие о современной Украине, либо ничего не пишут о сущности праворадикальных групп либо стараются преуменьшить их радикализм и их влияние в обществе. С моей точки зрения, они хоть и не представляют всё украинское общество, тем не менее, не являются просто «отбросами общества», маргиналами.
The political shifts during phase two of Maidan led to the discrediting of Opposition leaders and the rise of groups such as Right Sector, whose members legitimized the use of force by presenting themselves as non-aligned and uncorrupted by the current state of Ukrainian politics – key elements that reflect self-organization.
Как пишет автор, при столкновении с силовиками Януковича, именно праворадикальным группам удалось дать отпор Беркуту и вынудить Януковича пойти на диалог с оппозицией. Без помощи праворадикальных групп, с которыми объединились все, включая левых, Янукович смог бы устоять, подавить народные выступления и наверняка построил бы жёсткую диктатуру. Другими словами, эти люди спасли страну от диктатуры. В то же самое время, эти группировки были далеки от миролюбия, как и Янукович со своим Беркутом. Свергнув Януковича, они одновременно углубили кризис между востоком и западом Украины и почувствовали свою значимость. Поэтому когда начинали вспыхивать анти-Майданы на востоке Украины, первыми кто поехал подавлять их были как раз члены этих групп, а также другие непонятные молодые люди. Именно между столкновениями Правого Сектора и участниками анти-Майдана появились первые жертвы, но уже на востоке страны:
«On the night of 14 March, violence reached its peak, when two Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street» (The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine: Elites, Protest, and Partition).
Дальше ситуация эскалировала всё сильнее и сильнее и на первый план выходила не борьба с диктатурой Януковича, а борьба с российским влиянием. Возможно, именно тут мы находим причину бескомпромиссности украинской политической элиты, т.е. отказ от имплементаций Минских соглашений сначала Порошенко, а потом и Зеленским.
The author explores the political and social question of the existence of left-wing organizations in modern Ukraine, their role in contemporary politics, and the difficulties they face in their daily activities. The author writes about right-wing organizations, but only in the framework of their interaction with the left. Most often, such interaction took the form of confrontation:
Over the course of the first week on Maidan, I saw harassment and direct attacks on people with signs referencing feminism three more times, including one evening when extreme-right provokatory assaulted feminist protesters with pepper spray.
It is worth noting that current feminism is a leftist agenda, so it should not be surprising that current feminism in Ukraine is viewed at best neutrally and at worst as a source of destabilization of Ukrainian statehood and independence. As the author notes, feminism is at odds with the militarization of society, which was a reaction to the well-known events in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. The point is that militarization is always about the rule of the strong (legitimizing violence), but more importantly, it is about the rule of men. When there is a war, society listens to the military, and anything that undermines their authority is seen as a threat. Feminism, in this case, can be seen as a weapon of the enemy, as a way for the Russians to undermine the unity of the country. This is especially relevant given that the current feminism is a phenomenon of leftist ideology. And what is the position of leftist ideology in today's Ukraine? Today in Ukraine, leftist ideology is associated not with Swedish socialism (social democracy) but with the Soviet past, not with the historical past, but with the ideology of Moscow because in Ukraine, the USSR is directly associated with a continuation of the Russian Empire, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other. This means that leftist politics is the politics of today's enemy.
Many leftists explained to me that, even when they were teenagers, long before Maidan, they felt limited in their political options because they were already learning a kind of national ideology that privileged a dichotomy between a pro-Ukrainian, anti-Soviet stance and any position that could be interpreted as sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
It is therefore not surprising that modern feminism may be seen by some people in Ukraine as a way of undermining political stability and the unity of the people around one figure - the Ukrainian soldier. Who, as anyone can realize, is always a man, no matter how many women serve in the army.
To a large extent, feminist activism that advocates a better future for women through legislation, such as exists in the EU, is at odds with Ukraine’s national ideology, because it might threaten national unity by questioning traditional gender norms and family structures that are fundamental to the national idea.
Here, it is important to add the fact that the European Left can be associated with representatives of pacifism, or as they are sometimes called "useful idiots," with people who offer Ukraine to sacrifice its territories for the sake of peace. The third factor that can explain such a sharp hostility to leftist ideology is that Yanukovych and his party are closely associated with the Communist Party of Ukraine, which means that leftist ideology is also associated with the Party of Regions, Yanukovych, and cooperation with Russia.
The connection of these particular feminists to leftist activists – also marginalized on Maidan – confirmed what many people already believed about feminism, which is that it is deeply linked to socialism and Soviet communism.
Of course, most of the book is not about feminism but about left-wing organizations at the time of the Maidan events in 2014 and their role in this event. It should be noted that self-organizing groups are an important element of democracy. You don't need to be an expert on the USA to know that in the USA, almost every person is a member of some kind of organization, interest club, etc. As stated in the book "Gender Violence in Russia: The Politics of Feminist Intervention" about the Russian Federation, an important indicator of the immaturity of the Russian democratic society is that in Russia in the mid-90s, a Russian's participation in any organization was estimated at 0.65, which was the lowest in the whole world ("Americans, in contrast, have an average of 3.59 organizational memberships; post-authoritarian Brazilians 2.13"). So, the author's conclusions about a similar situation in Ukraine look more promising in terms of building a sustainable democracy, regardless of which organization/group we are talking about. In his book, the author clearly outlines the situation of people's participation in various, mostly left-wing, political organizations, even despite the problems faced by left-wing activists. Of course, the emergence of political organizations from below was the result of general dissatisfaction with official politicians and the level of democracy that had been built in Ukraine:
The editors attempt to draw from opinion polls to show that most people in Ukraine at the time were not satisfied with the quality of Ukraine’s democracy. The events of later that fall proved the polling data correct – that many people felt it was time to hold politicians accountable for building better democratic institutions.
Speaking of radicals on the right, but before I do, I will make an important note: radical right-wing organizations do not dominate the political agenda of Ukraine, which means that such organizations exist in every country only in relation to Ukraine a magnifying glass has been used to exaggerate the danger from Right Sector and so on. Nevertheless, the author lists interesting slogans that could be observed when the "Leninfall" was taking place:
As the crowds cheered Komuniaky – na hilliaku (Hang the communists), Lenin teetered back until, ultimately, crashing headfirst to the ground behind the plinth.
<…>
After rounds of Slava natsiï – smert' voroham (Glory to the nation – death to enemies) and Ukraïna ponad use (Ukraine above all), protesters began to chant Razom – i do kintsia (Together to the end)
<…>
The marble plinth had already been defaced with Nazi symbols and a “White Pride” tag; on top, where the Lenin statue had been just hours earlier, was a sign reading Ukraïntsi – vy naikrashchi (“Ukrainians – you are the best!”) and two flags: that of the European Union and the red and black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
So the Russians are right in their statements about neo-Nazi groups? As I wrote above, such organizations exist in every country. Small in number but vibrant, they overshadowed all the other participants in Euromaidan. Behind the "Leninopad," the main thing was not visible - the overthrow of Yanukovych's dictatorship, his repressive laws (which were passed in those days), and his corrupt nature, which is so well symbolized by the golden loaf that was found in his apartment. Nevertheless, it is true that many authors writing about contemporary Ukraine either do not write anything about the essence of right-wing radical groups or try to minimize their radicalism and their influence in society. In my view, although they do not represent the entire Ukrainian society, they are not simply "the dregs of society," the marginalized.
The political shifts during phase two of Maidan led to the discrediting of Opposition leaders and the rise of groups such as Right Sector, whose members legitimized the use of force by presenting themselves as non-aligned and uncorrupted by the current state of Ukrainian politics – key elements that reflect self-organization.
As the author writes, when confronted with Yanukovych's security forces, it was right-wing radical groups that managed to fight back against Berkut and force Yanukovych to dialog with the opposition. Without the help of the right-radical groups, with whom everyone united, including the leftists, Yanukovych would have been able to resist and suppress the people's demonstrations and would surely have built a brutal dictatorship. In other words, these people saved the country from dictatorship. At the same time, these groups were far from peaceful, as were Yanukovych and his Berkut. By overthrowing Yanukovych, they simultaneously deepened the crisis between eastern and western Ukraine and felt self-important. Therefore, when anti-Maidan protests began to erupt in eastern Ukraine, the first people who went to suppress them were members of these groups as well as other obscure young people. It was between the clashes between Right Sector and anti-Maidan participants that the first victims appeared, but already in the east of the country:
«On the night of 14 March, violence reached its peak, when two Anti-Maidan activists were killed in a shootout between the Right Sector and the Anti-Maidan on Rymarska Street» «The Donbas Conflict in Ukraine Elites, Protest, and Partition».
Further on, the situation escalated more and more, and it was not the fight against Yanukovych's dictatorship that came to the fore but the fight against Russian influence. Perhaps this is where we find the reason for the uncompromising nature of the Ukrainian political elite, i.e., the refusal to implement the Minsk agreements, first by Poroshenko and then by Zelensky.
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