Real Soldiering: The US Army in the Aftermath of War, 1815-1980

Modern War Studies

by Brian McAllister Linn

What happens to the US Army after the battles are over, the citizen soldiers depart, and all that remains is the Regular Army? In this pathbreaking work, Brian Linn argues that in each decade following every major conflict since the War of 1812 the postwar army has undergone a long, painful, and remarkably consistent recovery process as it struggled to build a new model force to replace the “Old Army” that entered the conflict. Departing from the Washington-centric institutional histories of the past, Linn sets his focus on soldiering in the field, distilling the lived experiences of officers and troopers who were responsible for cleaning up the messes left in the wake of war. Real Soldiering provides the first comprehensive study of the US Army’s transition from war to peace. It is both a wide-ranging history of the army’s postwar experience and a work detailing the commonalities of American soldiering over almost two centuries. Linn challenges three common historical confusing Washington policy with implementation in the field; conflating postwar armies with prewar armies; and describing certain postwar eras as distinct and transformational. Rather, Linn examines the postwar force as a distinct entity worthy of study as a unique and important part of US Army history. He identifies the common dilemmas faced by the service in the aftermath of every war. These problems included such military priorities as defense legislation, preparing for the next war, and adapting to new missions. But they also incorporated often overlooked—but for those who lived through them more important—consistencies such as officer acquisition and career management, personnel turbulence, insufficient personnel and equipment, and many others. Real Soldiering represents over four decades of research into the US Army and is deeply informed by Linn’s experiences teaching and working with soldiers. It breaks new ground in lifting out the similarities of each postwar army while still appreciating their individual complexities. It identifies the leaders and the methods the service employed to escape the inevitable postwar drawdowns. Insightful and entertaining, provocative and empathetic, and a work of history with immediate relevance, Real Soldiering will resonate with military historians, defense analysts, and those who have proudly worn the US Army uniform.

336 pages, Kindle Edition

Published June 30, 2023

Reviews

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 4 out of 5]

War is Hell but Peacetime’s a Bitch, a review by Colonel (ret) Mike Kershaw of Real Soldiering: The US Army in the Aftermath of War, 1815 – 1980 by Brian McAllister Linn.
Shortly before my retirement, a few of us had lunch with (then) Brigadier General Craig Nixon, formerly commander of the Ranger Regiment and an officer of exceptional insight. He had just informed us that he would retire at his current rank and one of us posed the question, “Who will lead the Army in the future?”. Craig scoffed somewhat and replied with his characteristic directness, “The current generation of general officers won’t determine the trajectory of the next Army; it’s the next generation of General Officer on whom that task will fall.” Craig was describing well, in his own manner, the challenges our Army faces after every conflict and who will be in position to solve them.
Brian McAllister Linn, a frequent chronicler of the US Army has set out, in a more deliberate format, to explain what Craig was pointing out to us that day and place these challenges in historical context. Is the purpose of an Army in peacetime to prepare for future conflict or maintain the service’s existence? Is each period between wars ‘exceptional’ in its own right or do common challenges present themselves regardless of ‘era’? Which Army – the one directed by Washington or the one in the field – can we look to for answers to the above questions? Brian McAllister Linn is a professor of history at Texas A&M and author of several books on the US Army to include The Philippine War, 1899-1902 and Elvis’s Army, a study of the 1950s Army, among others. Linn is a native Hawaiian, an avid surfer and fan of one of the most important novels of the US Army on the eve of World War II, James Jones’ From Here to Eternity . (Full disclosure, I had lunch with him in College Station shortly after I retired) from which he draws several prescient observations.
His central argument seems to be that the US Army goes through a decades long process after each major conflict to build a new “model army’ to replace to ‘old (prewar) Army’. In the first five years, the focus is on institutional lessons learned and reforms. In the second five years, leaders manage the inevitable cutbacks, requirements and consequences – usually resulting in charges of an unbalanced or ‘hollow’ army. Linn believes the first real Army was created after the War of 1812 – the Revolutionary Army being immediately demobilized and that the first ‘new model army’ is raised in 1815. After the War of 1812, he posits, the nation accepted the requirement to maintain a standing force of regulars which needed to be imbued with a common doctrine. Its missions originally were to serve as a frontier constabulary, man harbor/coastal defenses and be prepared for ‘western warfare’ or what we would today call ‘large scale, combat operations’ (LSCO). What impeded this Army was its dispersal to meet these requirements and troop reductions enacted in 1821 (10K to 6K).
However, it was during this period that a doctrine began to take shape, the founding of West Point as a school for ‘technical branches’ – engineers and artillery – being chief among the period’s accomplishments. He characterizes the Army as a ‘Federal Construction Agency’, in large part due to its role in the expansion of the nation as well as the construction of harbor defenses and frontier fortification. This defensive strategy was referred to as – the ‘3d System’ and relied on the Navy, fortifications and a militia to maintain order and fight when needed.
He divides his analysis of the remaining periods into the Post Civil War Army; Postscript to Imperial Wars (Frontier and Spanish-American); the Aftermath Army (post WWI); the Aftermath of WWII and Korea and the Post Vietnam “Hollow Army”, which my peers and I entered in the 1980s. Each period is characterized by the Army’s attempts to capture lessons learned but hobbled by the inevitable manpower and resource cutbacks as the nation seeks some sort of ‘peace dividend.
From an institutional standpoint, he looks at the establishment of the various Army professional schools and how they develop in their roles over time – West Point, Leavenworth (initially a tactical school) and the General Staff and War Colleges. He also examines the changing roles between the militia (or later, National Guard) and Regular establishment along with the role of reserves. West Point’s challenges come under Linn’s critical analysis as well. I only learned during my own graduate studies that the Academy had a reputation as a place where military families protected their offspring from combat during World War II (General Hank “the Gunfighter” Emerson’s memoirs). In fact, I recall distinctly a battalion commander from a Vietnam era class telling me his two older brothers had gone to Vietnam as Marines. As a cadet, frankly, we were more concerned with the recent cheating and honor scandals that Linn documents as well. What I wasn’t aware of was that this ‘draft dodging’ reputation had a precedence. Although there was no shortage of casualties in either the Mexican-America or Civil War (when the Academy was much smaller), during World War I, for example, there were only 32 battle deaths of West Pointers among the American Expeditionary Force. Hundreds of cadets apparently resigned after the Armistice, taking advantage of post-war downsizing, confirming the stereotype of it as a ‘haven for elite draft dodgers and snobs’. One hopes the many reforms the Academy has undergone since this period have helped change that perception.
The Army’s postwar manning problems – which we face acutely today – are something our predecessors would be familiar with. Linn can be at times hard to follow, as he jumps from anecdote to analysis with great frequency. However, he points out the historical basis of many of the problems my own generation observed during our service – reduction in force efforts (driven often by a post conflict, ‘hump of veterans’), favoritism among sons of general officers’, cronyism and issues like alcoholism, drug abuse and absenteeism that most of us got a glimpse of when we first entered the service and often had to revisit.
Finally, one of Linn’s most valuable lens of examination is based on one of my favorite lines from a movie, “When the legend become fact; print the legend!” . Linn highlights the difference between what is being promulgated by the Army’s headquarters and what is being implemented in the field. This is, in part, what often makes his narrative so difficult to follow – but I think also, given my own experience in tactical units primarily, so valuable.
Brian McAllister Linn has written an important book which hopefully will be read and considered by serving officers and policy makers. He analysis reminds me again of Craig Nixon’s method of evaluating problems - segregating those which are conditional – the ‘era exceptionalism’ Linn hints at – and those which are foundational. A considered reading of Linn’s text might help those in our officer corps and political leadership in determining where to focus their efforts in an era of diminishing resources.

[Gary Klein · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a relatively straight forward book revealing a not surprising pattern after the U.S. Army's major conflicts. It was probably longer than it needed to be to deliver his narrative. We transition from a post-[insert war] Army to a pre-[Next War] Army in about a decade after a conflict, including the associated implementation of changes.

Even after ending hostilities, conflicts often result in the Army having more commitments, but the Army gets smaller because of demobilization. In between wars, the Army has a history of handling a lot of mayoral duties, including taking care of our facilities, gate guard, and other life support tasks; which helps offset lower financial allocations than we may ideally want.

In the end, the challenges are a product of the ebb and flow of resource support, where the Army will always want more, but our society rightfully wants to spend as much as needed and nothing more, which is understandable as well.

[Jessica · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book wasn’t bad. The chapters were _long_. And I don’t think the author met his intent for the book. I didn’t quite get the “What happens to the US Army after the battles are over, the citizen soldiers depart, and all that remains is the Regular Army?” However, I still thought it was a good historical review of many of the policies affecting personnel that many military historians don’t go into depth with.

[Frank A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall good lay down of what happens to the Army in between conflicts. History may not repeat itself but it sure does rhyme. This book definitely helped me understand where the Army came from. Highly recommended for Army officers and enthusiasts.