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Justice, Gender, and the Family
In the first feminist critique of modern political theory, Okin shows how the failure to apply theories of justice to the family not only undermines our most cherished democratic values but has led to a major crisis over gender-related issues.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1989
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About the author
Susan Moller Okin
22 books18 followersliberal feminist political philosopher, and author of Justice, Gender, and the Family and Women in Western Political Thought.
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
April 13, 2017
A course book that's 30 yo and written from an american POV? Yeah, that doesn't work.
Liberalism does NOT equal feminism. Liberal feminism is white feminism. Feminism needs to be red, it needs to be left-wing, intersectional, pro-labourers, at the very least it needs to be socialist. This book isn't.
Also, it's tedious to read.
Liberalism does NOT equal feminism. Liberal feminism is white feminism. Feminism needs to be red, it needs to be left-wing, intersectional, pro-labourers, at the very least it needs to be socialist. This book isn't.
Also, it's tedious to read.
February 22, 2016
In my review of Okin's Women in Western Political Thought I suggested that the book would be improved if it had more scope, if it discussed more philosophers. Justice, Gender, and the Family fulfills this wish, leaving me feeling a little silly. Okin here offers a similar feminist critique to a host of major recent philosophers from different ideologies (from conservatives through liberals) as she presented in WWPT. She asks "What would this theory of justice look like if it took women seriously as moral agents rather than just implicitly assuming all moral agents are male heads of households who are supported by the domestic services of a wife." The theories usually don't fare well under this analysis.
I think Okin treats the philosophers she studies fairly, but I think she is a little too quick to extend her judgments of their philosophical programs generally. Two examples. Okin rightly condemns Alasdair MacIntyre's Aristotelianism and Thomism for outright sexism and the privileging of an elite caste. Okin argues that MacIntyre offers little in the way of amendments to this aristocratic morality of domination, and in my experience with MacIntyre, I agree. But Okin seems to assume this must be true for all Aristotelians. But Okin must be aware of a number of neo-Aristotelians who take feminism very seriously indeed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen spring to mind.
Likewise, her treatment of Robert Nozick, while in my view quite devastating, cannot easily be extended to cover all libertarians, and certainly not all classical liberals. Her critique turns on a reductio ad absurdum of strong or absolutist property rights. But this approach would scarcely faze a modern Hayekian, who justifies the liberal order by an appeal to the beneficial consequences for individuals of certain defeasible (rather than absolute) norms.
Okin concludes with a powerful case that even modern marriage, unless it is a marriage of equals, makes women vulnerable, whether the wives work outside the home or not. If a wife doesn't work outside the home, she is economically dependent on the husband, and this creates a real power imbalance. Especially if children are involved, divorce worsens the economic condition of the woman (since expensive custody will typically go to her and her earning power has atrophied). But the situation is not much better if the woman works outside the home. In this case, the woman often works the "double day", continuing to do most of the domestic work while also working outside the home. Moreover, many workplaces (I think this has improved since Okin wrote in the late 80s, but likely only for some high skill/high status careers) still implicitly assume that there is "someone else at home" taking care of domestic duties. The woman's career and potential for advancement are thus hindered by needing to leave the job for childcare, domestic errands, family leave, etc. The exit option of divorce will still threaten a much worse economic position. This is exacerbated by the failure to fully take into account that the husband's earning power is typically by far the family's most valuable asset. Court divorce settlements do not reflect this asset as really belonging to the family, but to the male. Thus alimony payments are usually of shorter duration and of lower amount than a family asset model would recommend.
Okin carefully avoids the mistake of the radicals, and presents a positive picture of what the family can be. A marriage of equals - in power, economic means, and respect - supported by legal, economic, and cultural institutions that recognize the reality of human dependence and domestic *labor*, can provide a powerful foundation for society. Unlike the hierarchical family that is shielded from the considerations of justice, the egalitarian family in which justice is exemplified can more readily cultivate citizens capable of understanding and defending justice in the broader public world.
I think Okin treats the philosophers she studies fairly, but I think she is a little too quick to extend her judgments of their philosophical programs generally. Two examples. Okin rightly condemns Alasdair MacIntyre's Aristotelianism and Thomism for outright sexism and the privileging of an elite caste. Okin argues that MacIntyre offers little in the way of amendments to this aristocratic morality of domination, and in my experience with MacIntyre, I agree. But Okin seems to assume this must be true for all Aristotelians. But Okin must be aware of a number of neo-Aristotelians who take feminism very seriously indeed. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen spring to mind.
Likewise, her treatment of Robert Nozick, while in my view quite devastating, cannot easily be extended to cover all libertarians, and certainly not all classical liberals. Her critique turns on a reductio ad absurdum of strong or absolutist property rights. But this approach would scarcely faze a modern Hayekian, who justifies the liberal order by an appeal to the beneficial consequences for individuals of certain defeasible (rather than absolute) norms.
Okin concludes with a powerful case that even modern marriage, unless it is a marriage of equals, makes women vulnerable, whether the wives work outside the home or not. If a wife doesn't work outside the home, she is economically dependent on the husband, and this creates a real power imbalance. Especially if children are involved, divorce worsens the economic condition of the woman (since expensive custody will typically go to her and her earning power has atrophied). But the situation is not much better if the woman works outside the home. In this case, the woman often works the "double day", continuing to do most of the domestic work while also working outside the home. Moreover, many workplaces (I think this has improved since Okin wrote in the late 80s, but likely only for some high skill/high status careers) still implicitly assume that there is "someone else at home" taking care of domestic duties. The woman's career and potential for advancement are thus hindered by needing to leave the job for childcare, domestic errands, family leave, etc. The exit option of divorce will still threaten a much worse economic position. This is exacerbated by the failure to fully take into account that the husband's earning power is typically by far the family's most valuable asset. Court divorce settlements do not reflect this asset as really belonging to the family, but to the male. Thus alimony payments are usually of shorter duration and of lower amount than a family asset model would recommend.
Okin carefully avoids the mistake of the radicals, and presents a positive picture of what the family can be. A marriage of equals - in power, economic means, and respect - supported by legal, economic, and cultural institutions that recognize the reality of human dependence and domestic *labor*, can provide a powerful foundation for society. Unlike the hierarchical family that is shielded from the considerations of justice, the egalitarian family in which justice is exemplified can more readily cultivate citizens capable of understanding and defending justice in the broader public world.
October 18, 2016
I part ways from Okin on a number of points (both with respect to assumptions and conclusions), but I nonetheless have to appreciate the strength of her argument and the importance of this book for bringing gender and family issues to the attention of theorists of justice (especially men, especially liberals and communitarians) who neglected or are neglecting these issues. She also has a biting wit that I deeply enjoyed throughout the book, perhaps the greatest height of which was her uproariously funny (yet logically valid) illustration of the incoherency of Nozick's theory of justice which showed how the inclusion of women into the entitlement theory would result in a bizarre matriarchy as women justly acquire full ownership rights to the fruits of their labor (children! human beings!) combined with justly acquired raw materials (freely given or easily purchase-able sperm). Throughout the book, she develops a critique of one of the most persistently frustrating aspects of Western political thought throughout most of history: the tendency to take as its subject the ageless adult man who somehow springs up out of the ground like a mushroom without beginning as a helpless infant or ending as an elderly person who is at least in most cases dependent on aid in some ways (though she does not really develop this latter point, mentioning it only in passing). If despite these points of agreement she still adheres to some ideas about justice, gender, and the family with which I disagree, well, I would be honored to engage in feminist debate with such a formidable interlocutor - one who is nearly able to save liberalism from itself. Liberals, neglect her at your peril.
July 13, 2011
A deep discursive critique (as well as an analytical framework for a critique) of liberal to communitarian theories of justice from a feminist standpoint. I don't think this is suitable for undergrads, however - they just don't have the background.
June 3, 2024
Sad that for every chapter of this book I managed to read it the day after the exam it was most relevant to
May 18, 2013
In her book Susan Okin wishes to eliminate gender and promote gender neutrality, in an attempt to end gender-based discrimination. She proposes that the most effective discourse would be through education. According to her, sexist education and social norms perpetuate sexism. Okin’s concerns lie mostly in the private sphere; she takes issue with the lack of government consideration for the role of women in the family. She criticizes most political philosophies on the concept of justice for neglecting the “personal” from the “political”. Essentially, Okin rejects the stereotypical role of women in the family and criticizes the division of labor in the private sphere, which in turn is reflected on the public sphere. More specifically, despite legislation that states otherwise, women do not have equal rights in the work place. The lack of transparency makes it virtually impossible for women to assess the fairness of their income and when there is transparency they can only view their male colleagues’ pay through a glass ceiling. The private and public spheres are intertwined and because there are specific laws that are supposed to protect women, it does not signify that there is equality.
July 5, 2013
Persuasively argues that the major Anglo-American philosophical theories of justice (Nozick, McIntyre, Walzer, Rawls, etc.) have failed to take gender and the family into account in any meaningful way. (Her criticisms of Nozick and McIntyre in particular seemed fairly devastating.) According to Okin, principles of justice have to be applied to the family because it is a major source of inequality between the sexes and because it's the place where children first learn what it means to be just. I was more convinced by her critique of existing theories than by her efforts to deploy Rawls (and to a lesser extent Walzer) for gender-egalitarian ends. But that might have more to do with my general skepticism about Rawls' approach.
February 15, 2012
Great book. Rethinks classic theories of justice through the lens of the reality of gender-unequal societies and, most importantly, family structures. I can't really say it better than Matt Yglesias does in his brief recommendation of the book:
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/201...
Also, it provides a philosophic basis for equally shared parenting. But it doesn't stop there, it also provides larger policy prescriptions for remedying some of the lingering problems of inequality.
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/201...
Also, it provides a philosophic basis for equally shared parenting. But it doesn't stop there, it also provides larger policy prescriptions for remedying some of the lingering problems of inequality.
July 14, 2012
As an undergrad I read this in conjunction with other texts in a class meant to inform the grounding of human rights. This was one of the easier texts to read we read. Okin writes clearly and the book is concise. It would seem necessary for those interested to first read Kymlicka as some of her most salient points are critiquing his views on multiculturalism.
January 2, 2009
Backhanding everyone with feminist critique.
December 14, 2009
A must read for any political philosopher. I should have read this a long time ago--don't make the same mistake.
November 12, 2010
Life-changing.
October 31, 2014
I love Susan Moller Okin!
July 25, 2022
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, philosopher and feminist theorist Susan Moller Okin systematically critiques contemporary political and social ethics from a feminist perspective. In particular, she takes aim at late twentieth-century theories of justice such as those of John Rawls, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer, and Robert Nozick; these philosophers, she insists, overlook the fact of gender, understood as “the deeply entrenched institutionalization of sexual difference,” in their reflections on social and political life (6). Okin offers two reasons for why this is the case: one is that most theories silently assume the traditional, gender-structured family. Not unlike classical pre-modern and early-modern thinkers, contemporary political philosophers presume that “the ‘individual’ who is the basic subject of their theories is the male head of a fairly traditional household” (9). Concomitant with this presumption, these theorists fail to examine the justice of family life in view of whatever standard of justice their respective accounts propound. The second reason contemporary political philosophers overlook the fact of gender has to do with their use of gender-neutral terms in a “false, hollow way” (8). That is, the use of such gender-neutral terms obscures “the fact that so much of the real experience of ‘persons’ . . . does in fact depend on what sex they are” (11). In sum, the most influential theories of justice of the past century are effectively “about men with wives at home,” and this, for Okin, is a major problem.
More specifically, Okin asserts that there are three reasons why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender. First, she claims that it is simply obvious that women must be included in any adequate theory of justice. For Okin, this is rather self-evident unless we think with Aristotle that somehow women are naturally subordinate to men. Okin observes that when we try to insert women into contemporary theories of justice, the inadequacy of these theories becomes immediately apparent. For example, with respect to Michael Walzer’s account of distributive justice that relies heavily on immanent and widely shared cultural interpretations of the various spheres that constitute social life, Okin contends that we have no stable body of shared conceptions about the distributive principle appropriate to the responsibilities associated with the domestic sphere—or, to the extent that we do share some ideas about how to distribute domestic responsibilities, these reinforce gender injustice. In short, “theories of justice that apply to only half of us simply won’t do. . . . In a just society, the structure and practices of families must afford women the same opportunities as men to develop their capacities, to participate in political power, to influence social choices, and to be economically as well as physically secure” (15). Theories of justice must be able to account for and justify this normative conclusion.
The second reason why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender is that “equality of opportunity, not only for women but for children of both sexes, is seriously undermined by the current gender injustices of our society” (14). While some political philosophers have appropriately identified that the family presents a problem to equal opportunity, they have not, Okin maintains, appreciated that the principal equal opportunity problem “is the disparity within the family, the fact that its gender structure is itself a major obstacle to equality of opportunity” (16). Okin claims that this is true in two ways: first, the standard division of labor within the family burdens women more than men and denies them the freedom to enter the workforce on par with men. It therefore perpetuates the commonly held notion that professional success is the exclusive province of men with wives at home or women with no children. Until this division of labor is revised, equality of opportunity will remain more or less a fiction for women. Second, the current gender structure of the family leaves women vulnerable to the effects of separation or divorce, which leaves many women and children impoverished. That is, insofar as the standard division of labor inhibits access to and advancement within the professional workforce, separation or divorce is often catastrophic for women unable to support themselves and their children. Theories of justice that fail to explicitly theorize gender conceal these phenomena, which pose a serious threat to their visions of a just, well-ordered society.
The final reason why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender is that the family must be just if we are to have a just society, “since it is within the family that we first come to have that sense of ourselves and our relations with others that is at the root of moral development” (14). This is one of Okin’s most astute and powerful observations in Justice, Gender, and the Family. In some sense, her point dates back to Aristotle, who stressed the role the family plays in the cultivation of moral virtue. And Okin notes that Rousseau, Tocqueville, Mill, and Dewey all similarly underscored the importance of the family for the moral development of individuals. These theorists, however, nevertheless failed to insist on just relations within the family as a condition for the possibility of proper moral development; all defended the hierarchy of domestic life just as most of them spurned hierarchy in political and economic institutions outside the household (19). Conversely, Okin claims that “unless the first and most formative example of adult interaction usually experienced by children is one of justice and reciprocity, rather than one of domination and manipulation or of unequal altruism and one-sided sacrifice, and unless they themselves are treated with concern and respect,” children are unlikely to cultivate what Rawls calls the sense of justice (17). Put simply, it is impossible to expect justice in society if the family itself is an unjust institution. The domestic sphere should therefore mirror the just, well-ordered society and foster support for the principles by which such a society is ordered.
Okin concedes that John Rawls is one of the only contemporary theorists of justice who “treats the family seriously as the earliest school of moral development” (21). For Rawls, the stability of a well-ordered society depends on the ability of its members to develop a sense of justice, and the family plays a fundamental role in how this sense of justice is acquired. Where Rawls errs, however, is in his assumption that the family is already just. His theory completely discounts how family institutions are in most societies “a relic of caste or feudal societies in which responsibilities, roles, and resources are [not] distributed . . . in accordance with the principles of justice” (22). To this, Rawls could perhaps respond that justice as fairness is an exercise in ideal theory in which “strict compliance” with the principles of justice is assumed. This would warrant the further assumption that families in a well-ordered society are just. Still, Okin observes that Rawls himself speaks of families as “private institutions” to which the standards of justice do not apply, which is precisely the point to which she objects (ibid.). Rather than assume that justice prevails within families or insist on a distinction between the public and private spheres that reserves the principles of justice for the former, we should enact policies that promote justice within families and minimize the effects of gender. For Okin, such policies should include childcare subsidies, childcare options at the workplace, and a requirement by law that entitles both members of a married couple to an equal share of the household income, even if one spouse only performs unpaid domestic labor. Paid parental leave and universal pre-school are other policies that would similarly minimize the effects of gender.
One basic tension to which Okin calls attention in Justice, Gender, and the Family implicates her contention that the principles of justice, whatever we decide they are, should apply to the domestic sphere. On the one hand, we tend to ascribe considerable latitude and liberty to families as if they were miniature, autonomous states; on the standard liberal view, families are free within a rather wide set of limits to run themselves in accordance with the commitments and ideals of those who inhabit them (or, in reality, those men who dominate them). On the other hand, the liberty families enjoy allows for the cultivation within them of illiberal values that, over time, encroach upon the public sphere and potentially threaten democratic political institutions. If this is true, then there should be stricter limits as to how much freedom liberalism permits the family to enjoy. It is not, as many liberal theorists seem to assume, an innocent institution. At the very least, an adequate theory of justice should not maintain a sharp and impermeable distinction between the public and private realms, since that distinction overlooks how important the family is as the first school of justice. Still, there is a tension here: just how far into family life should the principles of justice and other liberal values intrude? At what point should we worry about public overreach into private life? Okin presents several persuasive reasons for why “the personal is political” and the public/private dichotomy breaks down: domestic life is not immune from the dynamics of power; the existence and parameters of the private sphere result from political decisions; domestic life is where most early socialization takes place; and the standard division of labor within families raises barriers to women’s political participation (128-133). Yet one can concede these points and nevertheless seek to draw some line, perhaps one that is more porous, between the public and the private, such that individuals still enjoy some freedom to work out the division of labor and responsibilities in their personal family lives (171). Exactly where this line is drawn should be the result of an open-ended and fair conversation at both the interpersonal and political levels between equal interlocutors, one in which women’s lived experiences are front and center, and not cordoned off as irrelevant to matters of justice.
More specifically, Okin asserts that there are three reasons why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender. First, she claims that it is simply obvious that women must be included in any adequate theory of justice. For Okin, this is rather self-evident unless we think with Aristotle that somehow women are naturally subordinate to men. Okin observes that when we try to insert women into contemporary theories of justice, the inadequacy of these theories becomes immediately apparent. For example, with respect to Michael Walzer’s account of distributive justice that relies heavily on immanent and widely shared cultural interpretations of the various spheres that constitute social life, Okin contends that we have no stable body of shared conceptions about the distributive principle appropriate to the responsibilities associated with the domestic sphere—or, to the extent that we do share some ideas about how to distribute domestic responsibilities, these reinforce gender injustice. In short, “theories of justice that apply to only half of us simply won’t do. . . . In a just society, the structure and practices of families must afford women the same opportunities as men to develop their capacities, to participate in political power, to influence social choices, and to be economically as well as physically secure” (15). Theories of justice must be able to account for and justify this normative conclusion.
The second reason why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender is that “equality of opportunity, not only for women but for children of both sexes, is seriously undermined by the current gender injustices of our society” (14). While some political philosophers have appropriately identified that the family presents a problem to equal opportunity, they have not, Okin maintains, appreciated that the principal equal opportunity problem “is the disparity within the family, the fact that its gender structure is itself a major obstacle to equality of opportunity” (16). Okin claims that this is true in two ways: first, the standard division of labor within the family burdens women more than men and denies them the freedom to enter the workforce on par with men. It therefore perpetuates the commonly held notion that professional success is the exclusive province of men with wives at home or women with no children. Until this division of labor is revised, equality of opportunity will remain more or less a fiction for women. Second, the current gender structure of the family leaves women vulnerable to the effects of separation or divorce, which leaves many women and children impoverished. That is, insofar as the standard division of labor inhibits access to and advancement within the professional workforce, separation or divorce is often catastrophic for women unable to support themselves and their children. Theories of justice that fail to explicitly theorize gender conceal these phenomena, which pose a serious threat to their visions of a just, well-ordered society.
The final reason why it is unacceptable that contemporary theories of justice overlook the fact of gender is that the family must be just if we are to have a just society, “since it is within the family that we first come to have that sense of ourselves and our relations with others that is at the root of moral development” (14). This is one of Okin’s most astute and powerful observations in Justice, Gender, and the Family. In some sense, her point dates back to Aristotle, who stressed the role the family plays in the cultivation of moral virtue. And Okin notes that Rousseau, Tocqueville, Mill, and Dewey all similarly underscored the importance of the family for the moral development of individuals. These theorists, however, nevertheless failed to insist on just relations within the family as a condition for the possibility of proper moral development; all defended the hierarchy of domestic life just as most of them spurned hierarchy in political and economic institutions outside the household (19). Conversely, Okin claims that “unless the first and most formative example of adult interaction usually experienced by children is one of justice and reciprocity, rather than one of domination and manipulation or of unequal altruism and one-sided sacrifice, and unless they themselves are treated with concern and respect,” children are unlikely to cultivate what Rawls calls the sense of justice (17). Put simply, it is impossible to expect justice in society if the family itself is an unjust institution. The domestic sphere should therefore mirror the just, well-ordered society and foster support for the principles by which such a society is ordered.
Okin concedes that John Rawls is one of the only contemporary theorists of justice who “treats the family seriously as the earliest school of moral development” (21). For Rawls, the stability of a well-ordered society depends on the ability of its members to develop a sense of justice, and the family plays a fundamental role in how this sense of justice is acquired. Where Rawls errs, however, is in his assumption that the family is already just. His theory completely discounts how family institutions are in most societies “a relic of caste or feudal societies in which responsibilities, roles, and resources are [not] distributed . . . in accordance with the principles of justice” (22). To this, Rawls could perhaps respond that justice as fairness is an exercise in ideal theory in which “strict compliance” with the principles of justice is assumed. This would warrant the further assumption that families in a well-ordered society are just. Still, Okin observes that Rawls himself speaks of families as “private institutions” to which the standards of justice do not apply, which is precisely the point to which she objects (ibid.). Rather than assume that justice prevails within families or insist on a distinction between the public and private spheres that reserves the principles of justice for the former, we should enact policies that promote justice within families and minimize the effects of gender. For Okin, such policies should include childcare subsidies, childcare options at the workplace, and a requirement by law that entitles both members of a married couple to an equal share of the household income, even if one spouse only performs unpaid domestic labor. Paid parental leave and universal pre-school are other policies that would similarly minimize the effects of gender.
One basic tension to which Okin calls attention in Justice, Gender, and the Family implicates her contention that the principles of justice, whatever we decide they are, should apply to the domestic sphere. On the one hand, we tend to ascribe considerable latitude and liberty to families as if they were miniature, autonomous states; on the standard liberal view, families are free within a rather wide set of limits to run themselves in accordance with the commitments and ideals of those who inhabit them (or, in reality, those men who dominate them). On the other hand, the liberty families enjoy allows for the cultivation within them of illiberal values that, over time, encroach upon the public sphere and potentially threaten democratic political institutions. If this is true, then there should be stricter limits as to how much freedom liberalism permits the family to enjoy. It is not, as many liberal theorists seem to assume, an innocent institution. At the very least, an adequate theory of justice should not maintain a sharp and impermeable distinction between the public and private realms, since that distinction overlooks how important the family is as the first school of justice. Still, there is a tension here: just how far into family life should the principles of justice and other liberal values intrude? At what point should we worry about public overreach into private life? Okin presents several persuasive reasons for why “the personal is political” and the public/private dichotomy breaks down: domestic life is not immune from the dynamics of power; the existence and parameters of the private sphere result from political decisions; domestic life is where most early socialization takes place; and the standard division of labor within families raises barriers to women’s political participation (128-133). Yet one can concede these points and nevertheless seek to draw some line, perhaps one that is more porous, between the public and the private, such that individuals still enjoy some freedom to work out the division of labor and responsibilities in their personal family lives (171). Exactly where this line is drawn should be the result of an open-ended and fair conversation at both the interpersonal and political levels between equal interlocutors, one in which women’s lived experiences are front and center, and not cordoned off as irrelevant to matters of justice.
January 1, 2021
In contrast to the book I quit on this summer that wanted to provide a rigorous philosophical definition of misogyny, to unclear ends, this book wields some of the tools from philosophy to advance arguments that the concept of justice should be extended to include women and families--most often, it had not.
There's nothing unclear about these concepts that requires conceptual analysis-in these areas of real world practical ethics, I prefer Moller Okin's approach that is focused on practice and argument.
There's nothing unclear about these concepts that requires conceptual analysis-in these areas of real world practical ethics, I prefer Moller Okin's approach that is focused on practice and argument.
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April 25, 2021I'm not disinclined to subscribe to the arguments presented by the author. They're rather cogent. What I'm not inclined to align with is the author's solution, however. Given the short shrift she herself gives her solution in comparison to the other sections of the book that are written in more depth and detail, I don't believe she is either.
May 23, 2023
Really appreciated how Okin wanted to make our political system function and not just toss it out. Learned a lot and thought about things I never would have.
September 23, 2025
Find viele Ansätze des Buches gut, jedoch fehlt mir die Perspektive statt Ehen nur zu reformieren das patriarchale Konzept der Ehe als Ganzes zu überdenken
July 15, 2016
All I can say about this book is that I absoutely loved it. Okin provides a broad, clear and insightful overlook of the role of gender in traditional political philosophy which helps understanding much better the role of women in politics and society. Her focus on the family is a relly helpful tool for understanding the private-public divide, and the way in which traditional gender roles within the private affect women in the public sphere. Finally, the conclusion hapter provides her own account of what a fair society which takes into account women could look like... and what's nice, the author also provides a series of reccommendations for getting there. Once again: I absolutely loved it.
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May 3, 2018yet to complete the book
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews