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Sealing Their Fate: The Twenty-two Days That Decided World War II
As the Japanese fleet prepared to sail from Japan to Pearl Harbor, the German army was launching its final desperate assault on Moscow, while the British were planning a decisive blow against Rommel in North Africa. The British conquered the desert, the Germans succumbed to Moscow’s winter, and the Japanese awakened the sleeping giant of American might. In just three weeks, from November 17 to December 8, the course of World War II was decided and the fate of Germany and Japan was sealed.
With new insight and a fresh perspective, David Downing tells the story of these crucial days, shifting the riveting narrative from snowbound Russian villages to the stormy northern Pacific, from the North African desert to Europe’s warring capitals, and from Tokyo to Washington.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published May 5, 2009
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153 people want to read
About the author
David Downing
122 books497 followersDavid Downing is the author of a political thriller, two alternative histories and a number of books on military and political history and other subjects as diverse as Neil Young and Russian Football.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
May 4, 2021
In twenty-two days, from 17 November and 8 December 1941, the history of the world was changed. The Soviet Union thwarted the German advances on Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov. The Allies, led by the Eighth Army, launched Operation Crusader in North Africa, held off a German counter-attack, relieved Tobruk and forced the Axis back to the Gazala line. The Germans rejected formalising their association with the Arabs’ Grand Mufti, and Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose. And the Japanese, having decided against joining the Axis’ attack on the Soviet Union, covertly undertook their final preparations, before electing to enter the war with attacks on Pearl Harbor, Malaya and the Philippines.
With his day-by-day description, Downing expertly weaves these epochal events together.
Downing explains that the Tripartite Pact ‘was weaker than most twentieth-century alliances’ with ‘no contingency plans for coordinated action, let alone a joint global strategy.’ The Germans, along with the British, thought that Russia would not be able to withstand the German blitzkrieg and were expecting a easy, and quick, victory. The Japanese were focused on protecting their supply sources in Asia and pre-empting the entry of the United States into the conflict.
Along the way we learn how Hitler’s decision to focus on road transport, meant that the rail infrastructure was not sufficiently advanced to provide to the troops on the Eastern Front as winter set in. Despite the deteriorating conditions, inadequate equipment and lack of supplies, the Germans continued to slowly advance. But by November, Hitler was ruing that Operation Barbarossa had not started a month earlier, which, he thought, would have allowed the Germans to take Leningrad and attack Moscow.
German overconfidence meant that in April 1941 Hitler and Ribbentrop pressed for a Japanese attack on Singapore, rather than insisting that the Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. By July 1941, just three weeks into their invasion of the Soviet Union they seemed to have come to a realisation of the enormity of the campaign on which they had embarked, and they advanced the case for the Japanese to attack the Soviets in Siberia.
At this point, Japan’s – and he might have added, Germany’s – ‘only hope of victory – and a faint one at that – had lain in attacking the Soviet Union in July 1941. A reinforced Barbarossa might have knocked the latter out of the war without triggering an American entry...’. Instead, as Downing points out, in this fateful three week period, Ribbentrop gave the Japanese a blank cheque to attack the US, when he confirmed Germany would declare war on the United States and insisted on no reciprocal Japanese declaration of war on the Soviet Union.
Downing reminds us that ‘the Japanese political and military establishment had found it easy to start their war in central China, but, after four years and over two hundred thousand Japanese deaths, an acceptable conclusion to hostilities remained beyond its reach.’ This should have been a lesson when Japan was deciding whether or not to attack the United States. Some voices in Japan advocated caution. Admiral Onishi cautioned Japan “should avoid anything like the Hawaii operation that would put America’s back up too badly”. The President of the Privy Council, Yoshimichi Hara, told the military “Your plans are inadequate”.
However when Admiral Yamamoto was given responsibility to plan the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he found himself in “a strange position... having to pursue with full determination a course of action which is diametrically opposed to my best judgement and firmest conviction”. Yamamoto ‘knew that whatever the short-term benefits of a successful raid on Pearl Harbor might be, the best he could hope for was an eighteen month postponement of the inevitable.’ Downing highlights however that, despite his reservations Yamamoto’s plan for Operation ‘Z’ (originally called Operation Hawaii’) was influenced by his love of gambling.
The Japanese misplaced optimism was mirrored by American over-confidence and hubris. One US advertisement trumpeted on 29 November that “despite the claims of air enthusiasts no battleship has yet been sunk by bombs”. The US repeatedly missed clear signals that an attack was imminent, including failing to translate a crucial message intercepted on 2 December 1941 for four weeks. In the Philippines, General McArthur concluded “it would be impossible for the Japanese to attack the Philippines before the following April [1942]”. Just two days before Pearl Harbor and the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur confidently predicted that “The inability of an enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security”. Downing concludes that ‘Hawaii, Malaya, the Philippines – three different command structures had been caught napping by the Japanese, a display of serial incompetence...’ and that MacArthur ‘seemed intent on giving the best possible impression of a rabbit transfixed by oncoming headlights.’
North Africa, Downing emphasises, was a critical stepping stone for the Allies, principally because they had too few transport ships. The CIGS, Alan Brooke noted “It was plain to me that we must clear North Africa to open the Mediterranean, and until we had done so we should never have enough shipping to stage major operations”.
However, General Auchinleck’s attempt to clear North Africa, Operation Crusader, was marred by the British inability to “grasp the idea of coordinating tanks and guns” and the practice of their armoured forces of ‘a night withdrawal into leaguer’ which allowed the Germans to occupy the very positions which battle had denied them. Them, when Auchinleck’s plan started to fall apart, the British and South Africans found ‘ever-more roundabout reasons for keeping out of’ the battle and left New Zealanders and Australians to fight on, virtually encircled. These flaws encouraged Rommel to make a ‘dash for the wire’ – the Egyptian-Libyan border - which came close to thwarting the Allied efforts to relieve Tobruk. However, in doing so, as General Crüwell pointed out, Rommel made the same mistake of the British, giving up to the enemy a battlefield on which Afrikakorps has won a victory.
Allied operations were further distracted by Churchill’s hare-brained proposals. In 1940 and 1941 Churchill had sent Wavell’s limited forces to Greece, and wanted to send a substantial portion of Longmore’s limited air forces to Turkey. In 1942, he wanted to send two divisions and ten squadrons for the defence of the Caucasus even if that meant weakening the forces in North Africa. Dunning highlights that when this was, sensibly, opposed by the chiefs of staff, Churchill raged at them and “performed an harrumphing theatrical exit”. As Brooke noted Churchill’s behaviour was “pathetic and entirely unnecessary”.
This is an engaging story, thoroughly researched and well told. One of the challenge of some well-researched authors, is they include too much information. However, although it is full of information and titbits, Downing has written a more readable book by his decisions on what to leave out.
In doing so, he sets out a convincing argument to support his thesis that these were ‘the twenty-two days that decided World War II’.
With his day-by-day description, Downing expertly weaves these epochal events together.
Downing explains that the Tripartite Pact ‘was weaker than most twentieth-century alliances’ with ‘no contingency plans for coordinated action, let alone a joint global strategy.’ The Germans, along with the British, thought that Russia would not be able to withstand the German blitzkrieg and were expecting a easy, and quick, victory. The Japanese were focused on protecting their supply sources in Asia and pre-empting the entry of the United States into the conflict.
Along the way we learn how Hitler’s decision to focus on road transport, meant that the rail infrastructure was not sufficiently advanced to provide to the troops on the Eastern Front as winter set in. Despite the deteriorating conditions, inadequate equipment and lack of supplies, the Germans continued to slowly advance. But by November, Hitler was ruing that Operation Barbarossa had not started a month earlier, which, he thought, would have allowed the Germans to take Leningrad and attack Moscow.
German overconfidence meant that in April 1941 Hitler and Ribbentrop pressed for a Japanese attack on Singapore, rather than insisting that the Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. By July 1941, just three weeks into their invasion of the Soviet Union they seemed to have come to a realisation of the enormity of the campaign on which they had embarked, and they advanced the case for the Japanese to attack the Soviets in Siberia.
At this point, Japan’s – and he might have added, Germany’s – ‘only hope of victory – and a faint one at that – had lain in attacking the Soviet Union in July 1941. A reinforced Barbarossa might have knocked the latter out of the war without triggering an American entry...’. Instead, as Downing points out, in this fateful three week period, Ribbentrop gave the Japanese a blank cheque to attack the US, when he confirmed Germany would declare war on the United States and insisted on no reciprocal Japanese declaration of war on the Soviet Union.
Downing reminds us that ‘the Japanese political and military establishment had found it easy to start their war in central China, but, after four years and over two hundred thousand Japanese deaths, an acceptable conclusion to hostilities remained beyond its reach.’ This should have been a lesson when Japan was deciding whether or not to attack the United States. Some voices in Japan advocated caution. Admiral Onishi cautioned Japan “should avoid anything like the Hawaii operation that would put America’s back up too badly”. The President of the Privy Council, Yoshimichi Hara, told the military “Your plans are inadequate”.
However when Admiral Yamamoto was given responsibility to plan the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he found himself in “a strange position... having to pursue with full determination a course of action which is diametrically opposed to my best judgement and firmest conviction”. Yamamoto ‘knew that whatever the short-term benefits of a successful raid on Pearl Harbor might be, the best he could hope for was an eighteen month postponement of the inevitable.’ Downing highlights however that, despite his reservations Yamamoto’s plan for Operation ‘Z’ (originally called Operation Hawaii’) was influenced by his love of gambling.
The Japanese misplaced optimism was mirrored by American over-confidence and hubris. One US advertisement trumpeted on 29 November that “despite the claims of air enthusiasts no battleship has yet been sunk by bombs”. The US repeatedly missed clear signals that an attack was imminent, including failing to translate a crucial message intercepted on 2 December 1941 for four weeks. In the Philippines, General McArthur concluded “it would be impossible for the Japanese to attack the Philippines before the following April [1942]”. Just two days before Pearl Harbor and the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, MacArthur confidently predicted that “The inability of an enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security”. Downing concludes that ‘Hawaii, Malaya, the Philippines – three different command structures had been caught napping by the Japanese, a display of serial incompetence...’ and that MacArthur ‘seemed intent on giving the best possible impression of a rabbit transfixed by oncoming headlights.’
North Africa, Downing emphasises, was a critical stepping stone for the Allies, principally because they had too few transport ships. The CIGS, Alan Brooke noted “It was plain to me that we must clear North Africa to open the Mediterranean, and until we had done so we should never have enough shipping to stage major operations”.
However, General Auchinleck’s attempt to clear North Africa, Operation Crusader, was marred by the British inability to “grasp the idea of coordinating tanks and guns” and the practice of their armoured forces of ‘a night withdrawal into leaguer’ which allowed the Germans to occupy the very positions which battle had denied them. Them, when Auchinleck’s plan started to fall apart, the British and South Africans found ‘ever-more roundabout reasons for keeping out of’ the battle and left New Zealanders and Australians to fight on, virtually encircled. These flaws encouraged Rommel to make a ‘dash for the wire’ – the Egyptian-Libyan border - which came close to thwarting the Allied efforts to relieve Tobruk. However, in doing so, as General Crüwell pointed out, Rommel made the same mistake of the British, giving up to the enemy a battlefield on which Afrikakorps has won a victory.
Allied operations were further distracted by Churchill’s hare-brained proposals. In 1940 and 1941 Churchill had sent Wavell’s limited forces to Greece, and wanted to send a substantial portion of Longmore’s limited air forces to Turkey. In 1942, he wanted to send two divisions and ten squadrons for the defence of the Caucasus even if that meant weakening the forces in North Africa. Dunning highlights that when this was, sensibly, opposed by the chiefs of staff, Churchill raged at them and “performed an harrumphing theatrical exit”. As Brooke noted Churchill’s behaviour was “pathetic and entirely unnecessary”.
This is an engaging story, thoroughly researched and well told. One of the challenge of some well-researched authors, is they include too much information. However, although it is full of information and titbits, Downing has written a more readable book by his decisions on what to leave out.
In doing so, he sets out a convincing argument to support his thesis that these were ‘the twenty-two days that decided World War II’.
December 16, 2017
Interesting idea to present it by describing what happened each of the 22 days in the various areas but hard to read and like other reviewers, I just don't agree with it.
August 14, 2019
Well researched and written overview
Clearly outlines the short thinking, incompetence and wishful thinking of all the leaders of WWII. Nice summary of major defeats and wins.
Clearly outlines the short thinking, incompetence and wishful thinking of all the leaders of WWII. Nice summary of major defeats and wins.
November 20, 2022
Outstanding! Deep! Thought provoking!
Every history buff should read it.
Every history buff should read it.
September 8, 2009
Tells the story of 22 days chronologically across all theaters. Interesting structure, but hard to keep straight what's happening in each battle if you have to put the book down for a while. A different way to tell the story but I'm not sure I agree that the war was decided by December 8, 1941, and I expect any Americans that fought in the Pacific theater would agree with me on that.
September 7, 2014
For those who love history but don't already have a wealth of knowledge about WWII, this would be a good book. Would really give it 3 1/2 stars. At first wasn't sure I'd make it through, but the more I read, the better I liked it.
September 30, 2014
Based on the premise that 22 days in late 1941 decided the war. Fascinating stuff! Well written day by day accounts of what was going on around the world for those days. Highly recommended for those interested in the Second World War.
December 27, 2015
A very good read. It was one of those book that left me wanting to find out more abvout certain aspects of what is a very well documented period of history, but with gaps still left to fill in my own knowledge.
February 15, 2012
A really interesting look at the 3 weeks that were the turning point on 3 fronts of WW2.
June 8, 2012
If you are interested at all in WWII history, this is a great book. How did the Germans lose the war? It's all right here. Fascinating reading, really.
March 14, 2014
An excellent account of crucial days of World War 11 and the futility of war
February 18, 2016
Interesting analysis.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews