The Age of Extremes: 1914-1991

Modern History: The Four Ages #4

by Eric J. Hobsbawm

I denna grundläggande och gedigna volym om 1900-talet sammanfattar och förklarar Eric Hobsbawm det sekel vi nyligen lämnat. I tre huvudkapitel: Katastrofernas tidsålder, Guldåldern och Jordskredet –beskriver Hobsbawm hur han ser på 1900-talets utveckling i stort. Boken är sprängfylld med fakta och lärdom, efter att ha läst den har läsaren en mycket tydligare bild av det 1900-tal som verkar så splittrat och svårgripbart.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, World History, Economics, 20th Century, European History

1 pages, Audio CD

First published January 1, 1994

About the author

Eric John Ernest Hobsbawm was a British historian of the rise of industrial capitalism, socialism and nationalism. His best-known works include his tetralogy about what he called the "long 19th century" (The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848, The Age of Capital: 1848–1875 and The Age of Empire: 1875–1914) and the "short 20th century" (The Age of Extremes), and an edited volume that introduced the influential idea of "invented traditions". A life-long Marxist, his socio-political convictions influenced the character of his work.
Hobsbawm was born in Alexandria, Egypt, and spent his childhood mainly in Vienna and Berlin. Following the death of his parents and the rise to power of Adolf Hitler, Hobsbawm moved to London with his adoptive family. After serving in the Second World War, he obtained his PhD in history at the University of Cambridge. In 1998, he was appointed to the Order of the Companions of Honour. He was president of Birkbeck, University of London, from 2002 until his death. In 2003, he received the Balzan Prize for European History since 1900, "for his brilliant analysis of the troubled history of 20th century Europe and for his ability to combine in-depth historical research with great literary talent."

Reviews

[howl of minerva · Rating 5 out of 5]

So that rounds off Hobsbawm's tetralogy on the 19th and 20th centuries. 2000-odd pages of sustained historical brilliance that have changed the way I comprehend the world. In the absence of gods (and our inability to step outside of history to view it objectively) the nearest that we can come to a god's eye view is human genius.

Hobsbawm is undoubtedly such a genius, as evidenced by the universal praise this series has received from writers across the political spectrum. "I continue to believe that his great tetralogy – The Age of Revolution (1962), The Age of Industry (1975), The Age of Empire (1987) and The Age of Extremes (1994) – remains the best introduction to modern world history in the English language" writes a man whose political views could not be further from Hobsbawm's: Niall Ferguson.

An apparently omniscient, polyglot and polymathic erudition across the fields of economic, social, cultural and political history is an inexplicable feat. But in addition, Hobsbawm gathers these threads and weaves them into a coherent narrative with a verve and acerbic wit that blow the dust off those source tomes and bring them to life, in colour. A gift for phrasemaking surely doesn't hurt. Fascists are "the revolutionaries of counter-revolution." Women of the twentieth century are "suspended between the impermanence of their age and the permanence of their sex." In modern ethno-nationalism, "increasingly, one's identity had to be constructed by insisting on the non-identity of others". Hobsbawm's approach is perhaps best outlined in his description of Niels Bohr's complementarity: "There could be no single, directly comprehensive model. The only way of seizing reality was by reporting it in different ways, and putting them all together to complement each other in an 'exhaustive overlay of different descriptions that incorporate apparently contradictory notions'."

The great ideological struggles of the twentieth century have given way (at least in 'developed' countries) to a pervading individualism and the secular theocracy of the market. As Marx well understood, these forces have been the greatest engines for material, technological and scientific progress that mankind has ever seen. But the cracks that these forces, unchecked, are inducing in our personal, societal and environmental worlds are widening. For how much longer can they be plastered and papered over?

Das Dasein ist je in seinem faktischen Sein wie und 'was' es schon war. Ob ausdrücklich oder nicht, ist es seine Vergangenheit. (SuZ 20). The human being, in its actual Being, is in each individual case 'what' and how it already has been. Whether explicitly or not, it is its past. (Heidegger).

For anyone interested in understanding the modern world and their place in it, a sound grasp of modern history is indispensable. There is no better to place to start than with these books.

[Clif · Rating 5 out of 5]

History can be written in different ways. Barbara Tuchman, for example, chooses a theme (The Proud Tower) or a person (A Distant Mirror) around which to tell of the times. School textbooks simply follow a timeline, a guarantee not only of boredom but that the reader will learn next to nothing. Eric Hobsbawm writes with the intent of a comprehensive understanding of the times. His technique is to look upon history as a jewel of many facets, each of which is worth viewing and all of which are necessary to approach understanding of the whole.

I've never read a better history than this one. The subject matter, the times in which I have lived much of my life, offers the chance to compare my own take on what I have known with the far more comprehensive understanding that Hobsbawm provides.

Feminism, plate tectonics, quantum theory, fascism, video entertainment, the Cold War, free-market economics and so much more are served up fully, but are never bogged down with too much detail. The intimate connection between society, the individual and the ideologies of the 20th century are put together deftly with a clarity that allows deep but quick reading. Not a single page is boring because Hobsbawm's breadth of knowledge leaves nothing hanging unattached, out of context.

He terms the period he covers "the short 20th century", bounded by the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the dissolution of the USSR in 1989. These boundaries mark the end of one era with the First World War and the end of another with the collapse of the only remaining challenge to capitalism.

How well did capitalism do over this period? Could communism have been called a success at any point? What was the single thing without which there would have been no Hitler? What is fascism and how is it distinct from totalitarianism? What explained the popularity of Ronald Reagan? Is Mick Jagger an artist in the same way as was Renoir? What was Dada and Bauhaus?

What a shame this book could not be a text in schools below college level - yet it could not be because an adult reader can bring so much life-knowledge to the reading, about which a young person would be clueless.

For the adult reader, the many pages will fly by. This book is a rainbow at the end of which is a pot full of understanding. Thank goodness there are such people as Hobsbawm, whose wisdom and intelligence has been applied to historical work that benefits us all.

Oh - there is one thing that he misses that is a major oversight, maybe because it is so all-encompassing - and that is the pace of life has increased tremendously since the early horse-drawn carriage days of the early 1900's to today. It isn't just professional athletes, though they are symptomatic, the whole developed world is on steroids with no letup in sight.

[Callum's Column · Rating 5 out of 5]

1914-1991: the Short Twentieth Century, an Age of Extremes. It was an "era of religious war, though the most militant and bloodthirsty of its religions were secular ideologies of the nineteenth-century vintage, such as socialism and nationalism, whose god-equivalents were either abstractions or politicians venerated in a manner of divinities." The Age of Empire, particularly European, sowed the seeds of its collapse with the calamitous Great War, with empire ending in the contiguous sense with the fall of the USSR in 1991. Science, truth, and capitalism advanced, but became impossible to separate from "their conditions and consequences."

Hobsbawm lived through much of this period. Hence, this book, in part, is a historical-reflective attempt to understand how such extremes happened. Hobsbawm's prose is exceptional, and his historical narrative is a pleasure to read. But why did the Age of Extremes happen? In short, Hobsbawm argues that it was the failures of communism, fascism and capitalism. Communist and fascist failures need little explanation. Embedded capitalism transmogrified into chimerical neoliberalism which Hobsbawm elegantly debunks: "the belief that unrestricted international trade would allow the poorer countries to come closer to the rich, runs counter to historical experience as well as common sense."

Pericles once stated that just because one may not have an interest in politics does not mean politics does not have an interest in you. The twentieth century exemplifies this axiom. If one extricates themselves from civil affairs, they will be swept aside by someone who does not. In my opinion, citizens of liberal societies have a philosophically republican (not to be confused with the Republican Party) duty to engage in the affairs of the state. By internalising and proselytising this philosophy, society can advance the principle of freedom from interference. This maintains a civil order that benefits the common person and avoids the pitfalls of ideological demagogues, who tend toward inhumane confrontation.

[Kevin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I remember, a long time ago I read this when it was first published in 1994 - I was a social history student at Swansea Uni - and my lecturer told me this book was a 'departure for Hobsbawm'. I never quite or fully understood what she meant back all those years ago. My second re-read, and I still do not understand what she really meant, although being older and allegedly more wiser, I still fail to fully grasp her meaning. However, what I think she meant was Eric Hobsbawms stance on Soviet Russia; he more or less takes strips from the Eastern Bloc and what it lead to, and what was most interesting believes that an experiment like it will never happen again. This is coming from a famous Marxist historian whom was a Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) member. He takes an objective stance on the state-planned economies of the Soviet Bloc, and whilst Soviet Russia was one of the countries that had escaped the stock market collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed it due to its state-run five year plans that saw Russia become an industrial power house, it didn't stop the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of Soviet Russia between 1989 and 1991, where this book ends.

It is an aptly titled book. The Twentieth Century, or at least starting from 1914 through to 1991 (hence why it is called 'short') was probably the most bloodiest but also the most technically advanced century ever. Two massive global conflicts, a major economic collapse during the inter war years, the rise of political extremes that sparked off the second world conflict, a period of economic growth after the second world war that has never been equaled, the 1960s counter-culture wave, and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc characterises these years. Eric Hobsbawm writes in a manner that is not too academic or dry, but this book is packed full of interesting researched facts and analyses, and the chapters on the arts, stemming from the early 20thC (avant-garde) right through to 'modern-art' (however we interpret it today) were really insightful. Both art forms are tied into the eras they were developed in, more or less being mirrors of the society that they inhabited.

The final chapter I found really hit a chord that resonated loudly. Eric Hobsbawm explains the collapse of the 'golden years', the years following WW2 that saw unprecedented economic growth and prosperity, from the 1970s onwards that never saw a return to the growth on the same scale. At the time he finishes his study in 1991, the world looked quite bleak even though the collapse of the Soviet Union saw a 'victory' for free market economies and the stagnation of state planned ones. He becomes quite prophetical and also quite depressed (if that is the correct world to use) about the future; he more or less predicted our current economic woes - that we have hit another, quite severe, slump, something inherent in free market economies he claims. I would like to read what Eric Hobsbawm would make of our current world situation, and seeing as this historian is still alive (according to wikipedia he is an impressive 94 years old), and has lived through this century that he writes about would be more than interesting. Great history.

[Federico Damian · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not a history book

Hosbawm's "The Age Of Extremes..." is, best described as "A collection of Marxist Thesis on the 20th Century" than a history book. Perhaps an even better title is "A collection of Hosbawm's highly biased comment on a few 20th century historical facts".

Over the course of its roughly 400-500 pages, Hosbawm does his best make the non-communist (read: capitalist) nations look like complete monsters. He is, of course, right in that the capitalist nations often commited attrocities and war crimes, but his systematic efforts in making communism look better than it actually was achieve ignomious proportions. He stops for entire pages to comment on the wrongdoings of the United States and the United Nations towards the "poor" communist nations, yet he only mentions the horrific acts in communist nations (for example the Tiananmen Square Massacre or the Soviet Gulags) in cryptic and offhanded references. He goes so far as to state that Orwell was wrong in classifying Stalinism as a totalitarian dictatorship. How someone can actually defend the stalinist regime is beyond me.

This is a book only for people that know history, since on many ocassions the reader is expected to already know what happened at a particular time period. The books only function seems to be to describe some of the historicall currents the world was subject to in the 20th century.

To be fair, both the chapters on the beginning of the 20th century and the ones dealing with the "The Fall of Socialism" (that deals with the last days of the Soviet Union) are excellent. If anything it does seem that Hosbawn was unusually interested in writing about these two things and put all of his effort into it.

There are also chapters dedicated to the arts at the end of each of the three main sections of the book and devote very little space to explore the more recognizable changes of the century. The creation of comic books, the fall of the Hays Code (which is mentioned exactly once in an easy to overlook sentence) the comics code, the inclusion of violence in comic books and other important facts are left out, because Mr. Hosbawm feels his readers will be more interested in architecture and fahsion. Rock music and its subgeneres are also left mostly unexplored.

There is also a chapter dedicated to the scientific advances of the "short century" which is somewhat acceptably written. Of course it serves only to underscore Hosbawms own beliefs. Whenever Russia takes questionable agricultural desitions, unsupported by actual science it is presented in a neutral fashion, but when the Catholic Church accepts the Big Bang Theory they are "extracting consolation from it". There are also a few errors in this chapter. For example his claim that "a theory cannot be complete and consistent at the same time" is a missunderstanding of Gödel's incompleteness theorem (in fact there are theories known to be complete *and* consistent). It should instead read "A *sufficiently powerfull system* cannot be complete and consistent at the same time". Of course, this is a common missunderstanding, but one would expect that Hosbawm would counsult with mathematicians before writing about advanced mathematics.

The books ends with a somewhat aceptable summary of the century and Hosbawm's own conclussion of what the future challenges are. This is surprisingly a very good and accurate summary.

All in all, the readers might be able to get something useful out of this book, but only readers who are already knowledgeable in 20th century history.

[Nood-Lesse]

Ho cominciato ad ascoltare i saggi con scarsa convinzione ed ho inanellato tre letture davvero ottime: il game di Baricco, la breve storia di Harari e l’ibrido M di Scurati. Davanti alla mole del secolo breve titubavo, sapevo di essere essenzialmente un lettore di romanzi, nonostante ciò alla fine ho deciso di partire. Dopo le prime cento pagine mi sono detto che sarei arrivato a 200 e avrei abbandonato, invece ho proseguito. Ho fatto altrettanto a 300, a 400... Il libro di Hobsbawn è il progenitore dei saggi che ho citato prima, i loro autori a mio avviso lo hanno letto, saccheggiato e ne hanno individuato i limiti. Il secolo breve, titolo tanto azzeccato da divenire definizione condivisa del 900, su carta è tutt’altro che breve ed è figlio di un lavoro enorme di interconnessione di testi e di autori diversi. È un mattone pieno, non un blocco forato. E’ un testo satollo di dati statistici, e citazioni. È appesantito dall’enorme quantità di rimandi e ripetizioni, manca completamente del ritmo e del brio che i suoi successori hanno impresso alle loro opere. Probabilmente è una questione di destinatari finali, Hobsbawn non ha scritto per la stessa platea, il suo è un testo destinato a una cerchia di studiosi. Harari si è proposto come figura nuova di storico, più dinamica, più opinabile, più divulgativa, meno rigorosa.

Il fatto è che il secolo sarà pure breve ma la lettura è stata lunghissima, a tratti noiosa come una tribuna politica. Di una cosa sono certo: per Hobsbawn solo i nazisti sono persone peggiori dei liberisti, che a parere suo hanno fatto più danni della grandine in maggio. La trattazione del secolo è stata completa ha svariato dalla politica, all’arte, alla scienza, ha spaziato geograficamente rimbalzando dall’Europa agli USA ma dedicando intere sezioni al secondo e al terzo mondo. Hobsbawn ha definito il 1900 secolo breve perché a parer suo è iniziato nel 1914 con la prima guerra mondiale e terminato nel 1991 con il crollo dei regimi comunisti. In questo arco temporale ha individuato tre età distinte: quella della catastrofe con le due guerre intervallate dalla crisi economica degli anni ’30, quella dell’oro che inizia con la fine della seconda guerra mondiale e termina nel 1973, quella della frana che prende il via con la crisi energetica del 1973 e conduce il secolo allo sfascio dell’URSS.

Sono essenzialmente un lettore di romanzi, torno alla mia occupazione portando via con me la considerazione di uno dei più stimati storici novecenteschi sul secolo che stiamo vivendo: Il futuro non potrà essere continuazione del passato. Dovrei farne tesoro a livello personale, ma io non sono un Millennial sono uno dei pargoli della frana.

[Tanabrus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Corposo volume che percorre la storia mondiale dalla prima guerra mondiale all'inizio degli anni '90.
Il cosiddetto "Secolo Breve", un secolo nato con le guerre mondiali, le dittature, la caduta degli imperi e la nascita di nuove superpotenze globali. E proseguito con una nuova età dell'oro, balzi tecnologici e sociali inauditi, in un mondo che a velocità folle diventava totalmente diverso da quello del passato.
E poi le nuove crisi, la frantumazione di ogni certezza, il dubbio costante.

Benvenuti nel ventesimo secolo, con Hobsbawm che ci accompagna lungo questi ottant'anni di storia mostrandoci cause e effetti, politica e guerra, economia e ideologia, società, scienza e arte.

Una lettura non certo leggera ma, visto il tema e l'ampiezza dell'analisi, divulgativa e interessante.
Mi ha sicuramente messo voglia di recuperare i tre volumi precedenti sulla Storia Moderna di questo autore.

[Mesut Bostancı · Rating 4 out of 5]

Usually the only people tackling long general histories are conservatives. The Marxists are too busy arguing over minutiae to lend their worldview to great spans of time. So Hobsbawm offers something that was definitely missing. Even though I knew most of the events of which he spoke, he offers sort of grandfatherly perspective to what the hell happened over the last 100 years, and makes the young solipsistic leftist like me feel better, not so cast adrift in history. As long as it's not conservative revisionist crap, which I can now smell from a mile away, it sort of feels like everytime I learn something about history, it is a political act. It is 'conscientization'.

[Alejo López Ortiz · Rating 4 out of 5]

«En resumen, y contra lo que pudiera parecer, el siglo XX mostró que se puede gobernar contra todo el pueblo por algún tiempo, y contra una parte del pueblo todo el tiempo, pero no contra todo el pueblo todo el tiempo»

¡¡¡Listo!!! Terminados los 4 libros de la historia moderna del increíble historiado inglés Eric Hobsbawm. Antes de hablar sobre el autor y en particular sobre esta obra, inicio por recordarles que existen tres libros que lo anteceden y que les recomiendo leer antes de este: La era de la revolución: Europa 1789-1848, La era del capital: 1848-1875 y La era del imperio: 1875-1914. Tres libros, que junto con este último, son la muestra de erudición de Hobsbawm para explicarnos el desarrollo histórico de este planeta en la edad moderna.

El escritor británico, reconocido Marxista (sus restos mortales descansan en el cementerio de Highgate), escribió una gran cantidad de libros sobre gran variedad de asuntos históricos. Específicamente, pocos como él, analizan dos de las más importantes revoluciones del mundo moderno: la revolución francesa y la revolución industrial. Pero su creación más interesante, en el marco de la historiografía, es la del término de bandidaje social, un tema sobre el que escribió con prodigio y que modificó la visibilidad de una de uno de los aspectos de resistencia en las sociedades primitivas y campesinas, especialmente en el tercer mundo. Específicamente, sobre el tema, Hobsbawm tomaría de ejemplo a Latinoamérica para desarrollar sus tesis.

Pero bueno, llegando a esta obra, la última de su serie más famosa, podemos manifestar que es quizá uno de los ejercicios de contextualización más importantes que se hacen sobre el siglo XX. Escrita en 1994, Historia del siglo XX es el recorrido por un largo siglo que tuvo tres segmentos de tiempo desarrollados por el autor: un tiempo de catástrofes, marcado por el periodo de guerras, una edad de oro, casi tres décadas que los franceses llamarían los 30 gloriosos y que con diferencia en el tiempo de duración, marcarían el periodo de mayor auge del capitalismo. Y por último, el periodo de derrumbamiento. Una época que marcó las últimas décadas del siglo anterior y que este, nuestro actual siglo, sigue heredando con un lastre que cada vez se torna más pesado y decisivo en el fracaso de la sociedad occidental.

Pero Hobsbawm no simplemente un historiador que se encarga de relatar los acontecimientos políticos y bélicos de los periodos de tiempo que se plantea estudiar. Esta obra es una oportunidad para escudriñar los acontecimientos más importantes en la evolución económica, artística, tecnológica, científica y geopolítica de un convulsionado siglo. También el autor, en un intento global por desarrollar una visión del tercer milenio, intenta analizar la situación social, la perspectiva de los jóvenes y los potenciales retos de la humanidad, para intentar plantear hipótesis sobre un incierto tercer milenio para la época en que escribió el autor el libro. Y bueno, las hipótesis de incertidumbre de Hobsbawm en pleno 1994 son importantes, porque siguen siendo las mismas hipótesis, incluso con más incertidumbre, que tenemos tras dos décadas del actual siglo. La historia sigue siendo la misma, los errores siguen siendo calcados, y parece que leer la historia, es lo más parecido a leer las últimas noticias de cualquier diario de circulación internacional. Lean a Hobsbawm. Y juzguen ustedes.

[Justin Michael James Dell · Rating 3 out of 5]

A Not-So-Short (Tendentious) History of the Short Twentieth Century

Historiography has come a long way since the age of positivism, when it was conceived as the practice of collating historical "facts" and letting them "speak for themselves", of telling history "as it happened," to paraphrase empiricist Leopold von Ranke. The purview of the historian's profession has now expanded to encompass the pursuit and articulation of a deeper analysis and explication of the meaning of historical facts read in conjunction with one another, not their mere compilation and narration. In this respect, Hobsbawm has ably carried out his duty in The Age of Extremes, 1914-1991, a historical survey of the so-called "short" twentieth century betwixt the outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I was born in the twilight of that turbulent century, and thus I consider myself a product of that unique phase of human history, an heir to its cumulative impact (for no man can escape the crucible of his respective historical context). But what precisely was its impact? One can only begin to appreciate the thrust of something as extensive as a century - even a "short" one - by looming over it from aloft, which Hobsbawm does on the wings of his advanced contemporary age and command of historical knowledge, bringing the reader into flight with him and periodically swooping down to treat him to a closer look at its particulars. This was precisely the kind of treat I was expecting from Hobsbawm, and he delivered. I walk away from his tome with an idea of the twentieth century as a period of profound and paradoxical progression and regression - hence, “extremes” - in human affairs. Moreover, the seeds of many - perhaps most - of the twenty-first century's most pressing problems were sown in the preceding one hundred years. Apprehension of these general trends makes reading Hobsbawm's book, although a lengthy slog at times, well worth the effort.

However, as the modest three-star rating I gave this book suggests, I am not wholly enamoured of it. Hobsbawm is remiss, in my opinion, in his (seemingly intentional) avoidance of certain controversial subjects of key importance to the twentieth century, most notably that of genocide. Apart from a passing glance in its direction (pp. 50-51), there is no meaningful or in-depth engagement of this highly important concept in all 600 pages of a text whose title emphasizes the supposed "extremeness" of the century it purports to describe. That so-called "ethnic cleansings" were a salient idiosyncrasy of the twentieth century can be easily apprehended from their punctuation of its beginning, the Armenian Genocide of 1915, and its end, the massacres in the Balkans and Rwanda, the latter of which unfolded just as Hobsbawm's book was being published. His curious avoidance of the subject of the Holocaust - much less the term - strikes me as very bizarre. Hobsbawm avows that the purpose of his text is not to “tell the story of the period which is its subject,” but rather “to understand and explain why things turned out the way they did, and how they hang together,” but even given this design, such a stunning omission is inexcusable.

Then there's the matter of Hobsbawm’s political sympathies; he is, by his own admission, a Marxist. To be fair, I felt that Hobsbawm restrained his politics a lot of the time - or at least tried to - perhaps out of respect for his mainstream readership. Nevertheless, his overt leftism is palpable throughout the text and he is prone to what I can only describe (in McCarthyist parlance) as fellow traveller interpretations of communist regimes. Based on the periodization of the book (1914-1991) one can infer that the rise and fall of the Soviet Union serves as the anchor of Hobsbawm's analysis of the century, and his subtle admiration for that regime is apparent in his rather...sanguine...interpretation of its legacy and his almost comical tendency to rationalize or understate its moral outrages. Hobsbawm's apologetic tone towards the USSR is inversely related to his barely-concealed repugnance toward the USA and dim assessment of its global footprint, an interpretation that appears to be based mostly on traditional British anti-American snobbery, European chauvinism and subaltern claptrap rather than on even-handed judgment.

Despite these and other shortcomings, Hobsbawm competently charts the course of the twentieth century, offering sound, if somewhat tendentious, explanations for its key developments and trajectory. His book will help to satisfy two basic questions of the contemporary reader: (1) what brought us to where we are? and (2) what are some of the challenges that face us as we embrace a new century, indeed, a new millennium?

Overview

Hobsbawm divides the Short Twentieth Century into three periods: the Age of Catastrophe, corresponding to the period between the beginning of the First World War and the ending of the Second, the Golden Age, which encompasses three decades of global prosperity and global economic progress, from 1945 until 1975, topped off by the Crises Decades, the period ranging from the world economic troubles of the late 1970s until the fall of the USSR in 1991.

The springboard that determined the course of the twentieth century was, as Hobsbawm calls it, the "thirty-one years' war" (22) stretching from 1914-1945, which rent asunder the "material, intellectual and moral progress" of the so-called "long" nineteenth century (13). This reversal of moral progress is a key, recurring theme with Hobsbawm. He argues, unconvincingly, that the "democratization" of war, by which he means the mutation of (Western?) warfare from limited aristocratic conflicts to total-war national struggles between entire peoples, legitimized the use of torture and evermore brutal forms of coercion, especially when these were seen as "operational necessities" in the paramount victory and survival of a particular warring party, thereby proving "beyond serious doubt" that there was moral regression during the course of the twentieth century (Of this interpretation, I am skeptical. Can one who knows anything about the Belgian colonization of the Congo honestly believe that there was any kind of moral height in the nineteenth century from which humanity descended in the twentieth? There was, owing to technological advancement, an enhancement of the scale of destruction, but that is a logistical matter, not a moral one). The destruction unleashed by the First World War destabilized the globe and was only rectified with the outbreak of the Second.

The Russian Revolution added a further complicating factor to the Age of Catastrophe. It posited a second way forward for humanity, one of stark opposition to conventional capitalist development. Hobsbawm makes the ridiculous argument that the Bolsheviks did not foist themselves on the Russian people, but merely responded to their desires: "the radicalized groundswell of their followers pushed the Bolsheviks inevitably towards the seizure of power. In fact, when they moment came, power had not so much to be seized as to be picked up" (62). This sort of the-devil-made-me-do-it explanation should be dismissed as fellow traveller propaganda. He further argues that the backward peasant demographics of Russia "pressed" the Bolsheviks into abolishing any kind of democracy in the area which they controlled, thereby resorting to the progressive argument that 'the few' instinctively knew was was better for 'the many' and were therefore justified in confiscating the latter's freedom.

In any event, the October Revolution was an "earth-shaking" event, but Hobsbawm recognizes that it was stillborn from the beginning; the Bolshevik vision could only really be realized if the revolution spread to the rest of the globe, and when that eminently failed to happen by 1920, the Soviet regime was thereby exiled to the landmass of the former Tsarist empire, and forced to develop in isolation from the rest of the world (66-67). This played directly into the hands of Stalin, who modified the original Bolshevik vision to mean "socialism in one country" and proceeded to build up the USSR at the expense of fomenting revolution elsewhere in the world.

Just as this was transpiring, the Western world was entering the Great Slump of economic hardship known as the Great Depression, an economic downturn that Hobsbawm attributes to the destruction of the First World War and a post-war economic world system that depended on German war reparations and U.S. loans. Although fluctuations are simply an inevitable part of a capitalist economy, the Great Depression was a ditch out of which the capitalist system appeared incapable of extricating itself. And this is the decisive point: the economic malaise of the 1930s, coupled with the preceding destruction wrought by the Great War, "was a catastrophe which destroyed all hope of restoring the economy, and the society, of the long nineteenth century. The period 1929-1933 was a canyon which henceforth made a return to 1913 not merely impossible, but unthinkable" (107).

For Hobsbawm, the Depression vindicated Keynesian economics in two respects. First, no solution to the economic malaise was found apart from government intervention and regulation of the economy - in other words the market, left alone, did not 'fix' itself. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the concomitant rise of fascism in central Europe demonstrated the social need for interventionist economics, particularly full employment, for an impecunious and disengaged population proved to be receptive to Hitlerian political agitation.

Thus, by the mid-1930s, with Russia and Eastern Europe firmly in the hands of communists, and Central Europe in the grip of fascism, liberal democracy and capitalism were confined to the western fringe of that continent. Their only hope of salvation was reform and modulation of classical liberalism itself. This process was already underway to a certain extent with FDR's "New Deal" in the United States, and it eventually became necessary for Western Europe to follow suit as the crisis in capitalism became more apparent. Moreover, the bellicosity of fascism eventually forced Western democracies to tilt to the Left ideologically as some of the original revulsion towards socialistic institutions yielded to a more acute fear of fascism. Hobsbawm chalks this up to the fact that fascism, while itself an extreme reaction to Bolshevism in Russia, was ultimately even more incompatible with the Western powers because it was essentially a German phenomenon. Hobsbawm is adamant that Nazism could not be transplanted to other states, and that its worldview was fundamentally at odds even with that of conservative elements in countries such as Great Britain. This eventually produced a "united front" of disparate elements in all of the non-fascist countries - what Hobsbawm elsewhere refers to as the "era of anti-fascism" - uniting conservative imperialistic throwbacks like Winston Churchill with elements of the Communist International to defeat Hitler on the basis that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". Hobsbawm declaims: "In many ways this period of capitalist-communist alliance against fascism - essentially the 1930s and 1940s - forms the hinge of twentieth-century history and its decisive moment", for "it is one of the ironies of this strange century that the most lasting results of the October [Russian] revolution, whose object was the global overthrow of capitalism, was to save its antagonist, both in war and in peace - that is to say, by providing it with the incentive, fear, to reform itself after the Second World War, and, by establishing the popularity of economic planning, furnishing it with some of the procedures for its reform" (7-8).

This rapprochement between the capitalist world and the socialist camp did not survive the end of the successfully-prosecuted Second World War. Nevertheless, as the front between capitalism and communism congealed "from Stettin to Trieste" as the Cold War set in, the structural changes to Western democracies that came as a result of their wartime shift to the Left remained in place, even in America, where there was no return to classical liberalism. This paved the way for what Hobsbawm calls the "Golden Era", the third quarter of the twentieth century in which not only the developed world, but the developing world experienced profound economic growth. This period "marked the end of the seven or eight millennia of human history that began with the invention of agriculture in the stone age, if only because it ended the long era when the overwhelming majority of the human race lived by growing food and herding animals" (9). This era was characterized by the proliferation of the welfare state and near full employment (the unemployment rate was 1.5% in Europe during this period).

The greatest immediate threat to this prosperity came from the spectre of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. Hobsbawm avers that the concept of mutually assured destruction (M.A.D.) should have rendered this a remote possibility, but for what he considers the damnable recklessness of United States' foreign policy (surprise, surprise!); supposedly benighted and apocalyptically-minded Americans were manipulated by their cynical, vote-grubbing demagogic politicians (think Joseph McCarthy and Ronald Reagan), the latter of whom consistently threatened to up the ante of nuclear confrontation for domestic political gain. It was Americans who infused the conflict with "crusader rhetoric", he declaims.

The greatest long-term threat to Golden Age prosperity came from prosperity itself. In the fascinating middle of Hobsbawm's text - where his powers of analysis are probably at their most acute - he demonstrates that the welfare state and affluence eroded social capital, particularly the class-consciousness of the working class. Life became individualized and fractures formed between certain segments of the proletariat, in which "I" took precedence over "we". Lines between labour and management became blurred. This was coupled with technological displacement of industrial labour which further reduced the proportion of blue-collar citizens in Western countries and created the 'rustbelt' phenomenon. However, the welfare state guaranteed the minimum living standards of people thrown out of labour jobs, creating an underclass of indigents. They had no one to rely on but the state.

For who else was there to turn to? Coupled with this revolution in the economic order, there was a social revolution during the same period. The rise of untrammelled individualism accompanied the destruction of the family as divorce rates soared. To my surprise, Hobsbawm bemoans the student radicalism of this period which, he asserts, had more to do with anarchism and hedonistic self-indulgence than the classical Marxism it claimed to identify with. Individual desire became the measuring rod of what was 'good'.

During the Crisis Decades, this cultural hyper-individualism, coupled with the economic malaise, paved the way for the sages of neoliberalism, an ideology which sought to return the world economy back to the economic individualism of the nineteenth century. Thatcherite Britain and Reaganite America of the 1980s were the paragons of this shift to laissez-faire economics. Hobsbawm does not conceal his annoyance that the communist economies of the Eastern bloc were collapsing just as neoliberalism was being touted as the wave of the future in the West, thereby allowing the scions of von Hayek and Friedman to claim credit for the former's downfall.

In fact, Soviet collapse was the result of the Kremlin's deferral of badly-needed reform. As previously mentioned, Hobsbawm believes that the germ cells of the Soviet Union's collapse were present at the beginning of its existence. The system of crash industrialization based on a military-style communist party command structure was able to produce a Soviet society in which the state guaranteed a minimum level of existence for its population (food, clothing, shelter) but not much else. As the world economy moved beyond heavy industry to more knowledge- and information-based industries, the Soviets fell increasingly behind. Rather than reform their socio-political structure they relied on oil exports until the structural deficiencies of the regime were unavoidable. Perestroika and glasnost were last ditch reforms that undermined the military-style structure that had allowed the Soviet Union to survive all this time, precipitating its collapse.

With its chief ideological competitor in the grave, neoliberalism reigned ascendant - until the economic downturn of the early 1990s demonstrated its own limitations. Hobsbawm considers this nadir of the Crisis Decades proof that laissez-faire economics itself is not viable, that Adam Smith's 'Invisible Hand' proved to be a mirage time and time again during the twentieth century when government had to intervene to jumpstart and regulate anarchic and failed economies. But in what seems like a plot-hole in his analysis, the Keynesian economics of the Golden Age was likewise unsustainable even by Hobsbawm's own admission. So, what then, is the solution? Hobsbawm concedes that a return to classical Keynesian economics is no longer a possibility in a world in which the nation-state and its traditional powers and mechanisms to control the economy are rapidly prostrating themselves before the mercy of the globalized marketplace. And at the same time, the rapidly expanding population of the Third World and the increasing international and intranational economic stratification of humanity makes the need for some kind of reform to the global economic system that much more urgent: "If these [Crisis] decades proved anything it was that the major political problem of the world, and certainly of the developed world, was not how to multiply the wealth of nations, but how to distribute it for the benefit of their inhabitants" (577). But how is this to be done? Hobsbawm has no solution for the reader other than some vague sense of badly-needed "reform". But, as he points out, there is scarcely impetus for such reform right now, in a world in which unbridled capitalism has no real competitor anymore - whether it be fascism, communism, or another Great Depression - challenges that encouraged a return to "realism," as he puts it . The conclusion is a kind of pessimistic, hand-wringing despair from Hobsbawm. This impetus to reform, he speculates, may eventually come from the global environmental degradation that the marketplace is unable or unwilling to correct when simply left to itself.

Final Words

The greatest irony of The Age of Extremes is its year of publication (1994) and periodization (1914-1991). Cynically echoing Francis Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis of the same period, but giving it a more pessimistic bent, Hobsbawm avers that: "there can be no serious doubt that in the late 1980s and early 1990s an era in world history ended and a new one began. That is the essential information for historians of the century" (5). But can this really be said, in hindsight? Will not historians extend the "Short" Twentieth Century just a little bit longer, to 2001? For wasn't that more truly the watershed year between one era and another. For those who have lived to experience it, the 1990s are a bygone and halcyon period scarcely recognizable today; I doubt any reasonable mind would merge them with the post-9/11 world.

[Calandrino_Tozzetti · Rating 4 out of 5]

La mia storia con questo volume è piuttosto triste: lo acquistai senza nemmeno soffermarmi sul nome dell'autore e sull'argomento trattato, giacché ero convinto si trattasse di un trattato sugli alcolici nel ventesimo secolo, del tipo "che ruolo hanno avuto i vini sfusi, il proibizionismo, la pubblicità del Cinar con Ernesto Calindri ecc".
"Il secolo BEVE", ecco cosa avevo letto. Solo dopo mi sono reso conto dell'imperdonabile svista: per una R mi ero messo in casa l'ennesimo libro di storia su fatti da me già ampiamente dibattuti nonché vissuti in prima persona.
Tuttavia, il piglio anglosassone e il profilo internazionale mi hanno incuriosito, e mi sono dunque gettato nella lettura del saggio traendone, lo ammetto, un certo piacere. Poi, chiaro: un accenno qua e là al vino, al prosecco e all'Amaro del capo avrebbe potuto anche farlo; ma non si può aver tutto, bisogno contentarsi. Ed è pur vero che la disgregazione dell'Unione Sovietica raccontata da Eric J. Hobsbawm è un po' come una gara di canottaggio con la telecronaca di Giampiero Galeazzi: indimenticabile.

[Hakan · Rating 5 out of 5]

tarihçiler dışında, tarihe merakla yaklaşanlar da biliyor: tarih olayların art arda sıralanması değil. ancak ne olduğu konusuna gelince iş zorlaşıyor. tarihin ne olduğunun, ne olabileceğinin gösterilmesi gerekiyor. bu noktada işte hobsbawm çok çok önemli bir isim. basitleştirmeden, hafifletmeden, aksine zorluğu hissettirerek tarihçilerle birlikte tarih meraklılarına hitap edebiliyor.

kısa 20. yüzyıl-aşırılıklar çağı'nın finalini oluşturduğu dörtleme tekrar tekrar okunması, dönüp dönüp bakılması gereken bir eser. olaylar-olgular okudukça yerine oturuyor ve bundan sonra devam edilirse eserin değeri ortaya çıkıyor: zamansal çerçeve nasıl çizilir, temalar nasıl belirlenir, veriler nasıl kullanılır, nasıl yorumlanır...

1789'dan 1991'e kadar uzanıyor dörtleme. devrim çağının dinamikleriyle başlayıp "yaşarken yazılan tarih" olarak sonlanıyor. modern tarihe yaklaşmak-yakınlaşmak için harika bir imkan, büyük bir şans. herkese tavsiye ediyorum.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is fortunate that Hobsbawm wrote this book as early as 1994, when the “fall of Communism” still appeared to be a world-shattering event, because, more than anything else, this is what he documents. I doubt that any historian, writing a “grand synthesis” of contemporary history today, would place so much emphasis on that event. It probably helps that Hobsbawm was himself a Marxist historian who had supported the USSR during its most “extreme” period – that of the leadership of Josef Stalin – and remained largely unregenerate even at this late date.

Hobsbawm himself admitted that he is not really suited to a dispassionate analysis of contemporary history. His greatest contributions to the profession have been his work on 19th Century labor and social history. Nevertheless, he brings his not inconsiderable training and talents as a historian to the task and does provide a fascinatingly thorough analysis of the age. Having been a major advocate for a “Long Nineteenth Century,” analyzed from 1789 (the French Revolution) to 1914 (the outbreak of the First World War), he now extends this thesis to suggest a “Short Twentieth Century” which is bounded essentially by the lifespan of the Soviet Union. The analysis he provides is very strong on economic issues and geo-politics, and also should be credited for maintaining a far more global perspective than most histories written in the West. Hobsbawm never loses sight of the “rest of the world,” even when Europe appears to be taking center stage (as during the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles). Nearly every page contains fascinating facts and information, even when one does not agree with all of his conclusions.

I feel that some of the best discussion in this book concerns the inter-war period and the rise of international Communist and Fascist movements, which is largely the reason for the title “Age of Extremes.” While his work is synthetic and does not add anything to the study of these areas, it is extremely wide-ranging and informative and useful for someone trying to understand this period without a specialist background. As one would expect, there is a great deal of discussion of the history of the USSR, and while his predisposition is visible here, he does not flinch from describing gulags, purges, and famines where they contribute to the story.

This book is worth reading for anyone preparing to teach a course concerned with any period of the twentieth century and a good “starter text” for new Graduate Students. It is probably too long and too biased for use with undergraduates, although sections could be carefully culled and added to reading packages. As I suggested at the outset, it is also a kind of time capsule from the mid-90s, demonstrating what seemed important about history at the time. I hope to have time one day to return to it myself, and see how well it has worn the test of decades.

[Andrea Giovana Pesenti · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ao terminar (finalmente) a série "Modern Series" do Hobsbawm (Era das Revoluções, do Capital, dos Impérios e o Breve Século XX) sinto que, realmente, consegui abstrair um pouco da história contemporânea (e basicamente "eurocêntrica") que iniciou com a Revolução Francesa (1789) mas que, por enquanto, não findou, muito contribuindo para minha concepção de realidade histórica e meu entendimento da atualidade que me cerca.

Este último livro é, com certeza, o menor porém o mais ousado da série, visto que, em praticamento um enxuto volume de menos de 600 páginas, o autor tenta construir um esboço do foi o "breve século XX": um extraordinário turbilhão de eventos inusitados e chocantes, extremamente complexos, de duração ilogicamente efêmera que transformaram, sem dúvida, para sempre a história da humanidade, sendo o pós ano 1968, a meu ver, "the point of no return" no qual surge um mundo totalmente (e violentamente) amputado do pré-primeira guerra mundial - um mundo sem amarras sociais ou ideológicas, sem vencedores nem derrotados, um mundo, talvez, "pós-moderno".

O autor essencialmente divide o livro em duas grandes (porém "curtas") eras, a da catástrofe - constituindo-se numa incrível mixórdia de covardice política, crise econômica, irracionalidade social e destruição em massa de vidas e mais vidas europeias, tendo como núcleos principais a fatídica Crise Econômica dos anos 30 e a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Contudo, após essa incrível borrasca que solapa a autoconfiança da europeia ocidental e inicia uma outra "guerra", adentra uma nova era de grandes saltos tecnológicos e avanços científicos em meio a governos de bem estar social que mudam para sempre a concepção humana de sociedade.

E quando o leitor pensa terem acabado as grandes explosões histórico sociais, depara-se ele com a terceira parte da obra: o desmoronamento, que equivaleria talvez a um renascimento (inusitado e desestruturado) da sociedade pós 60/70, com suas revoluções guerrilheiras e ditaduras militares, sua nova ordem mundial regida não somente mais por Estados e estadistas, mas por grandes transnacionais em livres circulação, massas de jovens escolarizados inconformados com a antiga moral e minorias antes mantidas pelos grilhões da sociedade do século XIX. E, ao final, o que virá pela frente neste novo século XXI, ninguém mais sabe.

Um obra audaciosa e de certa forma pesada para quem não tem um mínimo de conhecimento prévio, porém extremamente instrutiva e desafiante.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991 takes as its subject matter what its author, Eric J. Hobsbawm, calls "the short twentieth century," ranging from the start of World War One to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

An avowed communist in his sympathies, Hobsbawm nonetheless writes a remarkably balanced history of his times, with interesting sidelights on the art and science of the century.

In general, I prefer Tony Judt's Postwar for some of the same period, though I like Hobsbawm's classification of the "short century" into "The Age of Catastrophe" (the two world wars and the period in between), and "The Golden Age" (the postwar period. This latter category I feel is excessively ironical. Admittedly, this book was completed before September 11, 2001 and the ISIS scourge in the Middle East; and before the Great Recession beginning in 2008; but I cannot imagine that anyone would think we are living in a Golden Age. A fool's paradise, perhaps.

[Justin Evans · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great appendix to Hobsbawm's history of the long nineteenth century (French Revolution to WWI), and a pretty decent place to start for 20th century history I would say. No complaints. And i'm a real complainer.

[Gabe Steller · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wooooohooo I finally finished all four of these damn books!! And this one was like almost twice as long and I fuckin swear to god the type was EVEN SMALLER so it should count as fuckin two books but whatever.

Despite small type was still siiiick and maybe my second favorite. super enlightening chapters on the social world of the working classes in the 1910s-30s and discussion of culture under communism vs. capitalism.

But esp loved the 70’s-91 part cuz that’s all this deterioration really started. And towards the end hes talking about the new millennium and hes like man seems like theres a lot of mass shootings in America, and it seems like the undermining of public sector govt’s unable to deal with true catastrophes, and the ever growing strength of capital is sabotaging nations and their democracies all over the world, and frustrated populations may drift towards demagogues.
I mean fuck you are you kidding me!! We could see all this shit in 1991 and we could barely even begin to THINK ABOUT doing anything about it in 30 years!! F*@&$%%#$#ck!!!!!

[Steve Cooper · Rating 5 out of 5]

While the author comes to the conclusion that people generally have better lives when their governments' redistribution policies prevent significant wealth inequality and are widely accepted by the populace, the analysis Hobsbawm employs to arrive at that conclusion is not limited by any religious, ideological or economic dogma.

Not only does the book predict many of the phenomena we're encountering now, but its focus on the actors and forces with the most persistent and profound presence in history (a clarity that clearly owes a debt of gratitude to Marx) provides a perspective that we can use to understand current events.

Wisdom, gentle humour and statistics have rarely been combined so effectively.

[Bekhradaa · Rating 4 out of 5]

۱۰۱۶
فاجعه انسانی جهانگیری که جنگ جهانی دوم مسبب آن بود تقریبا بزرگترین فاجعه در تاریخ بشر است. کمترین جنبه سوگبار این فاجعه آن است که انسانها آموخته‌اند در جهانی زندگی کنند که کشتن، تبعید و شکنجه‌دادن توده‌های مردم تجربه روزمره‌ای شده که دیگر کسی را ناراحت نمی‌کند.

۱۰۳
نابودی گذشته، یا یه عبارتی نابودی آن سازوکارهای اجتماعی که تجربه کنونی فرد را به نسل‌های گذشته پیوند می‌زند، از شاخص‌ترین و خوف‌انگیزترین پدیده‌های اواخر قرن بیستم است

[Dvd (#) · Rating 4 out of 5]

Saggio monumentale, giustamente celebre, che cerca ua sintesi (quasi impossibile) del secolo più veloce e sconvolgente della storia dell'umanità: mai i cambiamenti sono stati tanti e tanto radicali nonché - più o meno - globalmente diffusi in tutto il mondo.

Diventa impossibile per noi contemporanei (tutti noi, che una fetta del secolo appena passato lo abbiamo comunque vissuto) dare un quadro coerente a tempi che abbiamo visto direttamente o di cui abbiamo avuto notizie di seconda mano: fanno parte di noi, non essendo alla fine così distanti da poter arrrivare a giudizi o pensieri completamenti scevri da pregiudizi, fossili ideologici, esperienza personale. Inoltre, applicato al secolo che ha sconvolto totalmente, come nessun altro periodo della storia umana, società e stili di vita (a livello globale) l'impresa rimarrà estremamente difficile anche agli storici di domani.

Va detto che Hobsbawm è un intellettuale di stampo marxista, ma la sua interpretazione sul socialismo reale è quantomai critica e onesta, intellettualmente soprattutto: le cause del tracollo dei regimi comunisti sono scandagliate senza pietà così come i motivi dell'inadeguatezza di tale sistema politico di fronte a quello misto sviluppato nell'Europa occidentale a partire dagli anni '50, il vero capolavoro del secolo breve. Mi trova perfettamente d'accordo anche la critica senza possibilità di appello sul turbocapitalismo liberista, nella sua veste di culto dogmatico imbecille privo di qualunque base scientifica o razionale che lo possa anche solo vagamente legittimare.
L'età moderna è cominciata con razionalismo e illuminismo, che ci hanno finalmente liberato dai preti e dai loro dogmi aprioristici, irrazionali e indimostrabili; siamo finiti oggi a credere a fandonie altrettanto campate per aria e altrettanto indimostrabili, e il culto del libero mercato pervade ogni aspetto delle nostre vite esattamente come un tempo il culto della religione. Dai preti agli economisti, che è come dire dal peggio al più peggio.

E' al lettore del ventunesimo secolo che Hobsbawm si rivolge, cercando di fornire un quadro chiaro e coerente per spiegare i 90 anni che hanno cambiato per sempre il mondo.
La divisione del periodo è fondamentalmente semplice: una prima Età della catastrofe, scatenata dalla Grande Guerra che distrugge il mondo ottocentesco e culminata in decenni di crisi e di contrapposizione ideologica, che si esplica e conclude in una seconda e ancora più devastante guerra totale; l'intermedia Età dell'oro, congelata politicamente in una guerra-non guerra, tattica e a distanza, fra le uniche potenze rimaste sul pianeta e rivoluzionata economicamente dal boom economico generalizzato, nonché (in Europa soprattutto) dalla nascita di quel felicissimo compromesso fra capitalismo e socialismo che fu lo stato sociale (scrivo fu poiché esso giace, siccome immobile, in attesa di dare il mortal sospiro); il terzo periodo è la frana che stiamo vivendo, l'immane slittamento sociale, ideologico, politico, economico cominciato negli anni '70, acuito dal demenziale neoliberismo rampante degli anni '80 e poi deflagrato incontrollabile a partire dal 1989, quando gli USA si ritrovano d'improvviso (e, per quanto se ne dica, praticamente senza preavviso) superpotenza mondiale unica e egemone e elevano il culto del libero mercato a ultimo dogma dell'umanità (siamo negli anni della fine della storia profetizzata da Fukuyama).
E nell'epocale e gigantesca deriva che noi stiamo vivendo in pieno, in cui tutto il secolo breve crolla (o raggiunge l'apice, dipende dal punto di vista), in questo stato di incertezza e di sfaldamento, che noi italiani forse stiamo vivendo con più consapevolezza di altri paesi europei di essere nel pieno di un declino inarrestabile e di una resa più o meno totale di fronte all'incedere delle cose, di avere davanti un mondo e una società che diverrà via via peggiore.

L'impotenza è la cifra dei nostri tempi, e nell'impotenza l'incertezza del domani, l'attrazione verso qualunque ipotesi di certezza, anche la più balzana, anche la più scioccamente semplice (e quindi, probabilmente e alla faccia del rasoio di Occam, quella sbagliata) purché dia all'uomo di oggi un punto di appoggio certo nella sua camminata su questa sottile lastra di ghiaccio che è la società attuale. Morte e resurrezioni delle ideologie e dei dogmi: questo sarà il XXI secolo.

A occhio, la cosa non promette nulla di buono.

[Chelsea Szendi · Rating 5 out of 5]

The first time I read this, I was a fussy new grad student, given to pick on anything. On second reading, this book simply amazes me. Bedtime reading for the kids.

[Reid tries to read · Rating 5 out of 5]

He’s got to be the best historian I’ve ever read. The dude knew way too much shit it’s crazy

[Eren Buğlalılar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hobsbawm bu kitabı 1994 yılında yazmış. Yani SSCB'nin çöktüğü, ABD'nin hegemonyasını ilan ettiği, egemen sınıfların hep bir ağızdan "artık dünya tek kutuplu" dedikleri yıllarda. Bu yıllarda büyük bir beyin göçü vardı: Solcu, sosyalist aydınlar kalabalık gruplar halinde liberalleşiyordu. Bir kere kapitalizm eleştirilecekse, üç kere Sovyetler Birliği'ne, Stalin'e vurmak gerekiyordu.

"Kısa yirminci yüzyıl bir din savaşları çağı oldu, gerçi bu dinlerin en militan ve kana susamış olanları sosyalizm ve milliyetçilik gibi on dokuzuncu yüzyıldan kalma seküler ideolojilerdi," diyor Hobsbawm. "Marksist tarihçi" diye bilinen biri yazıyor bunu.

Hobsbawm bu satırları yazarken, ABD Irak'ta 500 bin çocuğu açlıktan öldüreceği bir ambargoya başlamıştı. 2. Paylaşım Savaşı sırasında atılan bombaların 10 kat fazlasını Vietnam'ın üzerine boşaltalı 20 yıl olmuştu. Ama 20. yüzyılın en kana susamış ideolojisi sosyalizmmiş.

Hobsbawm'un böyle bir çok incisi var kitapta. "Stalin'in ve Mao'nunki gibi sahiden katliamcı diktatörlükler ya da Çavuşesku'nun Romanya'sı ya da Kim İl Sung'un Kuzey Kore'si gibi daha az megalomanyak olan tiranlıklar" diyor dünyadaki sosyalizmi anlatırken.

Meğer Mao hiç Marksizm bilgisi olmayan bir ütopyacıymış. Teoriyi ancak Stalin'den okuduğu kadarıyla biliyormuş. Fidel Castro meydanlarda uzun ve alakasız konuşmalar yapan, insanların her dediğini sorgulamadan kabul ettiği bir idolmüş. Ama bunlara karşı, Gorbaçov, SSCB'yi çökertip milyonlarca insanı kapitalizmin kucağına atan bu adam, çok makul, dünyayı nükleer savaştan kurtarmış, ülkeyi demokratikleştirmeye niyetli ama ne yazık ki başarısız olmaya yazgılı bir yöneticiymiş.

Hiroşima ve Nagasaki'ye atom bombası atılmışsa, bunun nedeni "Japonya'nın hızlıca teslim olmasını sağlamak"mış. İdeoloji bataklığının dibi yoktur. 200 bin sivili katleden atom bombalarını meşrulaştırmaya bile götürür sizi.

H.'nin nasıl bu kadar popüler bir tarihçi olabildiğini, bu kitabı okuduktan sonra anladım. Sosyalizme karşı açık bir ideolojik saldırının yapıldığı dönemde, toplumun hayalkırıklığı içindeki aydın kesimine duymak istediklerini fısıldamış: Sosyalizm bitti. Kapitalizm de öyle çok harika değil, bundan sonra ne olur bilmiyorum ama, sosyalizmin bittiğini biliyorum.

Şunu bir açıklığa kavuşturalım: H. (en azından bu kitabında) komünist filan değil. Marksizmin sosyal bilimlere sağladığı çözümleme araçlarını, kavramları alıp kullanmış. Bunları liberal görüşlerle, sosyal demokrat görüşlerle serbestçe alıp harmanlamış. 1990'lara ruhunu veren o düşünce ortamına kendi katkısını yapmış.

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found this book extremely difficult to read. Hobsbawm was born in Egypt to Viennese parents who spoke English in the home, and his syntax seems to have been permanently ruined by the experience. For example, what are we to make of this sentance? For if divorce, illegitimate, births and the rise of the single-parent (i.e. overwhelmingly the single-mother) household indicated a crisis in the relation between the sexes, the rise of a specific, and extraordinarily powerful youth culture indicated a profound change in the relation between the generations.

He apparently uses the term 'order of magnitude' to mean 'approximate'; perhaps he fails to understand it is a term with a real scientific meaning. And he loves the phrase 'looked like' as in the Germans looked like winning.

The reader also needs to understand this is not a 'history' in any ordinary sense of the word. It is more nearly a series of essays on the history of the twentieth century world. You should already have a grasp of the history in order to read and understand this book.

Having said all that, if you can stumble through the thicket that is Hobsbawm's syntax, there are a few insights you can pick up along the way. Hobsbawm is a noted British Marxist historian, and he is able to identify patterns and trends in history that other writers usually ignore. He is especially interesting on the fall of the Soviet Union. I also found his commentary on the origins of the trend of women working outside the household to be thought-provoking. But were the insights worth the effort? I'm not so sure...

[Attela · Rating 4 out of 5]

Contro: è lungo e peso; è un gigabignami del '900 e quindi molte questioni sono nominate in fretta e poco approfondite.
Pro: è un volo di ampio respiro su tutta la storia del '900 ed è quindi uno strumento prezioso per comprendere in un unico ragionamento storico il secolo nella sua complessità; non fa sconti agli errori della politica e della società, offrendo un punto di vista molto critico soprattutto sugli avvenimenti del dopoguerra, dal boom degli anni '50-'60 alle contestazioni del '68 al liberismo degli anni '80 eccetera.

[Erika · Rating 4 out of 5]

Di una chiarezza, bellezza, precisione e schiettezza senza precedenti.
Questa "resa dei conti con il 900" mi ha fatto venire voglia di leggere il più possibile di questo autore. Spero di rimediare asap.

[Mishari · Rating 5 out of 5]

من الصعب أن تتجاوز مثل هذا الكتاب !

[Matt Allen · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read this with a ton of hope: I heard this guy was a british national treasure and one of the most famous living historians. But the only thing I took from the book was his (I think accurate) theory that the 20th century was "short" and could be described as the period between the start of WWI and the end of the cold war. The rest of it was pretty forgettable. I think he's one of those historians that only makes sense if you've already spent a lifetime reading history and know the landscape pretty well. His digressions and impressions were not structured enough, logically or even chronologically. I'll go back to it when I'm a bitter old man and probably like it.

[Praveen SR · Rating 5 out of 5]

A sweeping history of the "short twentieth century", of the tumultuous period between a World War and the dissolution of Soviet Union. As is typical of Hobsbawm, we are not limited not just to the political changes of the era, but everything from the change in the nature of labour, the myriad changes in the sphere of culture and technological and scientific advancements, for which the wars in between had a major role to play. It is not quite easy to fit the whole century into a 600 page book, but Hobsbawm manages to distill all of it, without leaving hardly anything out.

[Marc Lamot · Rating 3 out of 5]

Handsome overview of 20th Century History. The last part contains rather personal impressions of an era Hobsbawm witnessed himself; rather elitist-British, and of course, blatantly pro-Sovjet-Union and communism. It's a distinction for Hobsbawm as a person to having remained loyal to a choice he made in youth, but as an historian he should have known better!