Warsaw 1920: Lenin’S Failed Conquest of Europe

by Adam Zamoyski

The dramatic and littleknown story of how in the summer of 1920 Lenin came within a hairs breadth of shattering the painstakingly constructed Versailles peace settlement and spreading Bolshevism to western Europe In 1920 the new Soviet state was a mess following a brutal civil war and the best way of ensuring its survival appeared to be to export the revolution to Germany itself economically ruined by defeat in World War I and racked by internal political dissension Between Russia and Germany lay Poland a nation that had only just recovered its independence after more than a century of foreign oppression But it was economically and militarily weak and its misguided offensive to liberate the Ukraine in the spring of 1920 laid it open to attack Egged on by Trotsky Lenin launched a massive westward advance under the flamboyant Marshal Tukhachevsky All that Great Britain and France had fought for over four years now seemed at risk By the middle of August the Russians were only a few kilometres from Warsaw and Berlin was less than a weeks march away Then occurred the Miracle of the Vistula the Polish army led by Jozef Pilsudski regrouped and achieved one of the most decisive victories in military history As a result the Versailles peace settlement survived and Lenin was forced to settle for Communism in one country The battle for Warsaw bought Europe nearly two decades of peace and communism remained a mainly Russian phenomenon subsuming many of the autocratic and Byzantine characteristics of Russias tsarist tradition

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Poland, Russia, Military History, Russian History, War

160 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2008

About the author

A historian and a member of the ancient Zamoyski family of Polish nobility. Born in New York City and raised in England. He is Chairman of the Board of the Princes Czartoryski Foundation. On June 16, 2001, in London, England, he married the artist Emma Sergeant.

Reviews

[Maziyar Yf · Rating 3 out of 5]

کتاب ورشو 1920 یکی از مهمترین و البته ناشناخته ترین رخدادهای تاریخ اروپا پس از جنگ جهانی اول را بررسی می کند ، در سال 1920 روسیه درگیر جنگ داخلی ایست اما مانند دیگر رژیم های انقلابی به صدور انقلاب هم فکر می کند ، در حقیقت اروپای ورشکسته از جنگ و مردم خسته از سیاست مداران و حکومت ها ، از نظر لنین آماده یک انقلاب از نوع انقلاب سوسیالیستی روسیه هستند ، البته لنین پربیراه هم نمی گوید ، در آلمان ، فرانسه و ایتالیا کارگران اعتصاب کرده اند ، تمام عوامل آماده انقلاب سوسیالیستی و رسیدن کمونیست ها به قدرت در اروپای غربی هستند ، به جز کشور تازه به استقلال رسیده و ضعیف لهستان .
در حقیقت پیروزی بر لهستان و فتح ورشو راه را برای سقوط برلین و بعد پاریس و رُم هموار می کند . دموکراسی های غربی بدون آنکه اطلاعی از نیت لنین داشته باشند کاملا در خطر یک انقلاب کمونیستی هستند . اما اینجاست که معجزه ویستولا یا نبرد ورشو رُخ میدهد ، روسها که به نزدیکی ورشو و رود ویستولا رسیده اند متوقف می شوند و سپس بر اثر حمله لهستان تا مرز اصلی خود بر می گردند ، دو کشور به صلح می رسند و لهستان که از نقشه جهان حذف شده بود باز بر روی نقشه ها ظاهر می شود .
اما وجود لهستان فقط 19 سال طول می کشد ، در جنگ دوم هیتلر از غرب و شوروی از شرق به لهستان نگون بخت حمله و لهستان را بین خود تقسیم می کنند ، لهستان که تلفات غیر نظامی بسیارزیادی هم داده پس از جنگ در چنگال شوروی می ماند تا سال 1989 که آزاد می شود .
نویسنده بیشتر صفحات کتاب را به چگونگی نبرد اختصاص داده اما در مقدمه و چگونگی آغاز جنگ ریشه های نبرد را که اجتناب پذیر به نظر می رسد را کاملا شرح داده است ، همین طور توضیح داده است که چگونه به خاطر این نبرد یهود ستیزی بین هر دو ملت روس و لهستان تقویت شد و چگونه غرب مشغول به تقویت بنیان دیکتاتوری در آلمان و ایتالیا به منظور مقابله با غول کمونیست شد .
در پایان کتاب نویسنده انقلابهای مخملی در جمهوری های شوروی را در امتداد نبرد ورشو دانسته و به گونه ای پدید آمدن کشورهایی حوزه دریای بالتیک و استقلال لهستان را نتیجه مبارزات طولانی مردم لهستان در طول تاریخ و از جمله در این نبرد دانسته است .

[Rosa · Rating 3 out of 5]

اسم و ماهیت کتاب کاملا گویای محتواست و به حاشیه نمیره، ساده اما کمی سنگین و با جزییات شرایط حاکم، نحوه ی نبرد و وضعیت نیروها رو تشریح میکنه که البته ممکنه برای بعضی ها خارج از حوصله باشه!
ولی شاید بد نباشه گاهی جنگ ها، انقلاب ها و کتاب هایی مشابه این کتاب رو از زاویه ی دیگه ای هم نگاه کنیم..
فصل آخر کتاب و رسیدن به عاقبت و سرنوشت اسم هایی که ‌در طول کتاب ماندگار شدن، باعث شد توجهم دوباره به آمار و ارقام و وضعیت سربازهایی که در شرایط بدی ادامه دادن یا از بین رفتن، جلب بشه و حتی به قربانی هایی گمنام تر که گاهی با حرفه یا مذهب ازشون یاد شده ...
اما مثلا همین سربازها که به اجبار یا تحت تاثیر هر تفکر مسمومی آماده ی جنگ شدن، در واقع اصلی ترین ستون ها هستن که بدون اونها نبوغ هیچ فرمانده و جاه طلبی هیچ رهبری به کار نمیاد و بیشترین آسیب و تلفات رو میبینن، سخت ترین شرایط رو تجربه می‌کنند، اغلب گمنام می‌مونن و به عدد تبدیل میشن، تا همین قدرتمند ها ( البته قدرت به مدد سنگر انسانی) موندگار بشن و افتخار برد و یا افتضاح شکست نصیبشون بشه، تا در شرایط امن و راحت برای هم کری بخونن، ادامه بدن و حتی اگه شرایط ایجاب کرد از روی خون رد بشن و دوستانه بهم دست بدن و به موجودات وحشتناک تری تبدیل بشن، زندگی های بیشتری رو نابود کنن، و این دور باطل مدام تکرار بشه و هرگز صلح و دوستی تعبیر جهانی پیدا نکنه...
خیلی آرمانی ه اما فایده ی ثبت و خوندن تاریخ ‌چیه اگه قرار نیست فهمیدن نتیجه ی این همه کشتار و تجاوز به خاک و باورهای هم، باعث تغییر دنیا بشه؟!

[Maryam · Rating 3 out of 5]

وقتی معاهده ورسای امضا شد جنگ در بسیاری از نقاط اروپا تمام نشده بود. بسیاری از کشورها مانند آلمان و روسیه هنوز درگیر ناآرامی های داخلی بودند. علاوه بر این، بسیاری از کشورهایی مانند یوگسلاوی و لهستان که حاصل این معاهده بودند، برای حفظ استقلال و تمامیت ارضی به شدت مبارزه می‌کردند. این کتاب تاریخچه مختصری از نبرد اصلی بین لهستان تازه استقلال یافته و روسیه‌ی بلشویکی در سال ۱۹۲۰ که به ادعای نویسنده نقش مهمی در جهان داشته. تمرکز اصلی کتاب بر تاریخچه نظامی مثل ترکیب ارتش‌ها، رهبری نظامی، اهداف استراتژیک، تاکتیک‌های میدان نبرد، سلاح ها و غیره‌ست و از لحاظ سیاسی جنگ رو بررسی نکرده و اگر کسی پیش زمینه‌ای از تاریخ اون زمان نداشته باشه کتاب رو درک نمیکنه.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was OK.

I'm still trying to figure out why Adam Zamoyski wrote "Warsaw 1920." Polonophile-chauvinist Norman Davies had already written a decent history of the Polish-Soviet War in 1972: White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 and The Miracle on the Vistula. Warsaw 1920 was published thirty-six years later but it offers no new revealing insights on the subject. In fact, it can claim only 138 pages, and they are very small pages at that. Perhaps the book's greatest failing for me was its narrow focus on a single battle, with only bits of background here and there. What is lacking is the history of the political side of the conflict. There is a hint, but really nothing more.

Zamoyski himself states on pg. 9 that it was the Poles who first attacked Soviet troops by taking Wilno (Vilnius) and then Minsk. The idea here, apparently, is that it is OK for the Poles to take lands that belonged to them over a century ago before Poland was partitioned, but the Russians cannot do the same thing (for which they also can bring up a claim as they DID control the land for the past century, etc, one should also note that Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc also have claims. But who has a claim matters little if they do not have an army to back that claim up with). Apparently, if you are only interested in nationalistic ideals that is OK with Zamoyski, but if you want to eventually spread the Communist ideal, that is going overboard. One has to keep in mind that when the Poles attacked the Red Army was facing Denikin in the south and on pg. 10 the author explains that the Army created in the West by the Russians was not strong enough to fight its way across Poland but rather only to fill a power-vacuum when available. The problem here is that the author, as far as I can tell, confuses what the Russians wanted to do with what they eventually would do. Just because some wanted to spread the revolution doesn't mean that's what would have happened. This can be seen by the fact that at least two of the leading Bolsheviks were against the war, Trotsky and Chicherin. Would Lenin still have attacked if the Poles didn't attack first? And then while peace negotiations were going on attack again and take the city of Dunaberg from the Russians and give it over to the anti-Bolshevik government of Lativa? A historian would not be able to give a concrete answer, but the author, apparently, can. Taking an extreme and making it seem as the only viable route is not the job of a historian. My real problem with this book is not the idea that if successful the Bolsheviks might have taken their revolution abroad, or that some wanted this from the start, but that the author is asserting this as a fact and that nothing could change it from happening, aside from, apparently, what did happen, makes sense?

If someone followed everything the Bolsheviks said and took it to heart, how can they then explain how Russian officers, known as 'enemies of the people', were then taken into the Red Army and named 'specialists' and in fact, put in charge of the Red Army (according to the author, by 1920 over 80% of the Red Army officer cadre would be made up of them)? Bolshevik rhetoric is just that, one has to be cautious in assuming that everything Lenin or anyone else said is what would have happened, especially during such a chaotic and turbulent time.

Bottom line is that the Red Army responded to a Polish threat. If there was no Polish threat there is no evidence one can point to which would undoubtedly show that the Red Army would have been used to spread the Revolution, especially considering the position Russia/Soviet Union found itself in after a bloody civil war. What happened in 1920 can be compared to what happened at the end of WWII, the Soviets did not export the revolution but they did enter Eastern Europe and Germany because they were on the COUNTERoffensive rather than an offensive. Hitler also claimed he was preempting a Soviet invasion, the Polish claim is taken seriously today while the German is known, by most, to be a complete fabrication. One can only wonder why that is.

A statement I vehemently disagree with is on pg. 13 when Zamoyski claims that for Russia and Lenin "...the best way of mobilizing support was war..." how can that be when not getting out of WWI is what ended Kerensky's run in the government and the Bolsheviks understood that they would be supported if they ended the war, thus the Brest Litovsk treaty! This can only be valid if seen in the context of the Polish invasion of Russia rather than any undertaking the Russians did before hand. With the Polish invasion many officers who had left the armed forces or never joined the Red Army in the first place came to it in droves and offered their support, such as the famous Brusilov. So, it might be argued that the Polish invasion helped increase support for the Bolshevik cause, but this is when the country is on the defensive, not the offensive, which is the author's original claim here. This can also be seen as the Poles rushed to support their troops when Warsaw was threatened, in both cases it was 'defensive' and 'counteroffensive' actions that rallied support, not outright offensive intentions.

[Erfan Hamdi · Rating 4 out of 5]

خواندن حداقل دو فصل اول این کتاب را برای آشنایی با فضای فکری روسیه و علت این علاقه قدیم و روش های نبردشان در این سمت از جهان پیشنهاد میکنم.
خواندن این کتاب شما را به تعجب میدارد که چطور شوروی همان روسیه اکنون است و چگونه بدون هیچ گونه تغییری ذهنیت شوروی از قرن ۲۰ به قرن ۲۱ منتقل شده است.
سه فصل انتهایی کتاب به جزئیات نبرد ها و لشکرکشی ها میپردازد که از حد حوصله و علاقه من خارج بود. اما سهم خود از خواندن این کتاب را گرفتم.

[Phrodrick slowed his growing backlog · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is an either-or quality to reading Adam Zamoyski’s short ut exciting Warsaw 1920. The author is writing as a person of Polish extraction with a major Pro Poland point of view. His take on the lead up to the Polish invasion of Russia is a matter of his read of history or a taint on most of the pages leading to the highly unexpected Polish victory. That victory is hardly a spoiler as that this victory can be read as a formational fact of European history at least up to the Berlin Wall. At a stretch the Russian incursion in to the Ukraine, can be read as a next chapter written, in part by that same 1920Polish victory.

Zamoyski’s essay on the state of Europe, new born Soviet Russia and likewise newly independent Poland is that Soviet Russia, needing to consolidate its very shaky existence with internal and external enemies still fighting to remove Lenin’s government had reason to attack Poland. In fact, several. One to unify patriotic Russians in support the new regime, and to begin the process of bringing about Communism in Eastern Europe. From there to the world. To this end the author presents information that the Russians were massing to attack Poland.

Against his argument, is a not included, analyzed problem that the armies being amassed were not strong enough to create a red wave from Poland to Germany. The fragile nature of Lenin’s hold on Russian minds in 1920 may not have been such that Russia, much broken by years of failed war and years more of bloody revolution and counter revolution would, reasonably have preferred that a new war be launched. In this light, Zemoyski fails to ask why Russia , sued for peace and signed the terrible treaty (terrible for Russia) of Brest-Litovsk , 3 March 1918.

Equivocation aside, there was something urgent about the way this short book was written. More so than in many other histories, I felt I had to read it quickly. The various armies traveled as fast as their horse based warfare allowed, but always I feared that a failure to get to the next page had implication on the out come of the actions 100 years ago. This was my second read into this period, and I was aware of US and British involvement, on the ground in Russia, in support of Polish units that had been part of the counter revolution in Russia.

In recommending Warsaw 1920, I suggest that this should not be your only read into this brief, but very critical, and universally overlooked war at the end of WWI. A Russian victory would most certainly have brought a Soviet army into Germany, and established, at a minimum what would much later become the countries of the Iron Curtain. Given the many failed and/or critically weakened and distrusted political entities across WW I torn and starved Europe, Lenin may very well have created a Communist Europe. Forestalling the rise of Hitler.

[Arthur · Rating 3 out of 5]

At 160 pages, including index and such, this book came across as more of a long essay than a book. Perhaps because it was broader in terms of covering not only the battles around Warsaw and the Polish counter offensive in 1920, but also that perhaps half the book predated that event. Its a lot to focus on in a rather paltry amount of pages. I felt unfulfilled.

[Hamide meraj · Rating 2 out of 5]

اول از همه بگم این کتاب، کتاب خیلی کاملی هست در مورد جنگ لهستان و شوروری ما بین دو جنگ بزرگ جهانی. حدود 1920 . علت اینکه دو ستاره دادم فقط برای این بود که خودم کتاب رو و محتوای ان رو زیاد دوست نداشتم. راستش موقع گرفتن کتاب فک میکردم بیشتر کتاب جنبه تاریخ تحلیلی وقایع اون زمان رو دارد و نگاهی نقادانه تر به اتفاقات و رخدادهای اون موقع دارد . اما بیشتر کتاب تاریخ با شرح جزییات کامل و اتفاقات و حملات دو طرف نبرد و نحوه ی ارایش نظامی انها بود. که خب من این جنبه از تاریخش برام خیلی کم اهمیت بود و زیاد دوست نداشتم. با این وجود این کتاب به من کمک زیادی کرد تا پازل ذهنیم از اتفاقات قرن بیستم کامل و کامل تر بشه.. اتفاقی که بین دو تا جنگ جهانی بزرگ رخ داد و اهمیت خیلی بالاییی داشت اما به خاطر قرار گرفتن بین دو جنگ بزرگ اصولا فراموش شده . به طور دقیق تر تلاش نافرجام لنین برای صادر کردن انقلاب به اروپا و سلطه کامل بر انها که خب محقق نشد. در ضمن یک شناخت کامل تری هم نسبت به کشور لهستان و تلاش مردمش برای ازادی و استقلال پیدا کردم.با این حال برای کسانی که این جنبه جزئی نگراز تاریخ رو دوست دارند توصیه اش میکنم.

[KOMET · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provides a concise history of a seminal battle between a newly independent Poland and Bolshevik Russia. Lenin sought to take advantage of the chaos that had taken hold in Central and Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the First World War by overrunning Poland and thereby invading Germany and using it as a springboard for European domination and worldwide revolution.

Had the Poles been defeated in August 1920, the course of European history would have been very different. It is precisely because of the Poles' success in preventing a Bolshevik victory and Europe's preoccupation with postwar recovery that the Battle of Warsaw was overlooked and quickly forgotten. Yet the impact of that battle is evidenced by "the democratic and civic instinct" in Central and Eastern Europe today, which is "largely the product of the two decades of freedom secured by [Józef] Piłsudski and his armies on the Vistula in 1920."

[Monika · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this short(ish) book on the Communist aggression on the newly formed post-war Polish State, Zamoyski describes how The Red Army (only recently emerging from conquering Deniken's White) was prevented from spreading its Iron Hold into Western Europe by a series of decisive battles stretching between Minsk and The Wisła. 20 years later the Communists would try again.

Zamoyski explains why, and interestingly, why Poland was represented badly in the International Press. The fact that this battle is little known today perhaps represents the efficacy of Communist propaganda, whose legacy is the Western ignorance of their atrocities or failures (The Katyn Massacre springs to mind).

One thing that Zamoyski doesn't hide is his bias. And while I normally greatly enjoy participating in swooning Polish Patriotism, I strongly suspect that it is not the case that every Red soldier was a pillaging, raping, venomous, brute, and every Polish soldier a swashbuckling epitome of goodness. It is likely that there was a difference in the moral behaviours of both armies, but not in such a caricature. His choice of language was striking and a bit embarrassing.
(Let me note here that the only time that Zamoyski was critical of the Poles was with regards to their generally unfavourable treatment towards the Semitic population).

I did enjoy the portraits painted of various military leaders; Tukhachievsky (20-years old, and unrelenting), Budionny (flamboyant), Gai (tenacious and savage), a younger Stalin (petulant) with the Communists. Sikorski, Piłsudski, Haller, and even De Gaulle on the allied side.

Less did I enjoy the entire middle portion of the book, which was quite a slog to make my way through. It described the movements and positions of the various military regiments and battalions and their confused tactical decisions. I suppose that I should have expected this - the book's chosen subject matter was "battle," and I'm sure Nebel des Krieges had something to do with it too. Maybe my feminine tendencies make me prefer descriptions of people rather than descriptions of battle (oh wooow, the stereotypes are true. I hate myself.) Heck, I don't even really understand Military Divisions, and no matter how hard I try I don't think I ever will.

My only moment of boyish excitement came with descriptions of cavalry-on-cavalry warfare (in the North of the country as the Poles surrounded the retreating the infamous KonArmia (could that name be any more Commie?). Quite incredible to think that at the time where planes and tanks and guns and armoured trains were in use, that there was a significant battle between advanced countries that used this form of warfare. Indeed, that the cavalry would have been chosen over these technologies in some instances. That it was preferable. Zamoyski called it "The Last great Cavalry Battle." What a thing it would have been to behold.

[Boogi Lu · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتاب  "ورشو ۱۹۲۰" یک کتاب تاریخی و از زیر شاخه تاریخ نظامی و یا تاریخ جنگ‌ها هستش و من شخصاً با این‌ که چندین عنوان کتابهای تاریخ جنگ رو خوندم تا حالا با یه جنگ این‌جوری دقیق و فنی برخورد نکرده بودم. اوضاع اون روزهای شوروی (اوایل انقلاب بلشویکی) و رابطه همیشه خاصش با سرزمین لهستان واقعا قابل توجه هستش و خیلی از وقایع بعدی‌ای که بین این دو کشور اتفاق افتاد و حتی نقش لهستان کنونی در جنگ حال حاضر اوکراین برای من معنی‌دار‌تر شدن. با نام شهرها و گذشته‌شون، اوضاع همیشه بحرانی یهودی‌ها و نقش‌شون و نام‌ها و گذشته  اشخاصی که بعدها در مسیر حرکت حکومت فراگیر کمونیستی تاثیر داشتن و یا زیر چرخ‌های آهنین اون از بین رفتن آشنا شدم. و از همه مهم‌تر شخصیت خاص و عجیب یوزف پیلسودسکی فرمانده و رهبر آن روزهای لهستان که تبدیل یک قهرمان ملی شد.
جنگ ورشو در میانه‌ی دو جنگ بسیار بزرگ جهانی اتفاق افتاد و زیاد از اون یاد نمی‌کنن ولی اصلا یه جنگ عادی نبود و تاثیر زیادی در آینده منطقه و حتی جهان داشت. "جنگی سرشار از تحرک و غافلگیری"

و باز هم هیچ وقت بعد از مطالعه و لمس یک جنگ این شگفتی دست از ذهن من بر‌نمی‌داره که چه حجم عظیمی از انسان‌ها در پی جنگ‌ها نابود می‌شن و این حجم از سنگینی بار مسئولیت رو نمی‌دونم چطور مسببان جنگ‌ها می‌تونند تحمل کنند.

[Saman]

کتاب رو اواسط فصل سه رها کردم.نمره ای هم نمیدم.به نظرم دو فصل اولش خوب بود،از علت همین جنگ 1920 گفت.بررسیش کرد.ولی بعد از اون جزئیات حمله لشگر ها رو گفت.کتاب شاید واسه یه فردی که تخصصی در نظامی گری داشته باشه جذاب باشه.برای من که این قسمتهاش و این جزئیات که فلان لشگر به اونجا حمله کرد،اون یکی دیگه به اونجا جذابیتی نداشت.ترجمه آقای بیات ترجمه روان وخوبی بود.

[Edward Lengel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Short but consistently fascinating account of this critical campaign, which changed the course of twentieth century European history. Ragtag armies equipped with hodgepodge weaponry fighting ad hoc battles under a remarkable cast of military characters!

[Sean · Rating 4 out of 5]

A trim 138 page look at the post-WWI clash between a messianic Soviet Union and a newborn (reborn?) Polish state. Zamoyski, an excellent writer, neatly filled in a gap in my knowledge of interwar Europe. It’s surprising that this story isn’t better known in the rest of the world, but as Zamoyski points out, the Polish victory prevented something from happening (the spread of Bolshevism to Poland, and from there to a likely German revolution, etc.). It’s harder to wrap your head around the importance of things that didn’t happen. But for the “Miracle on the Vistula,” we wouldn’t have had “Socialism in One Country,” and the 20th century would’ve looked quite different.

A few observations:

• Pilsudski’s early years remind me of nothing more than Stalin’s youth. “…brought up in the cult of Polish patriotism. In his youth he embraced socialism, seeing in it the only force that could challenge the Tsarist regime and promote the cause of Polish independence. His early life reads like a novel, with time in Russian and German gaols punctuating his activities as polemicist, publisher of clandestine newspapers, political agitator, bank-robber, terrorist and urban guerilla.” The biggest difference being that Stalin was handsome, and Pilsudski had gigantic, moth-like eyebrows.
• Tachanka, the Eastern European chariot. Much like the technical of today’s MENA battlefields, the tachanka was a cheap, easily constructed solution to the problem of insufficient firepower in a mobile conflict between less-than-wealthy opponents. Used extensively by the Russians, it was an open-topped, spring-suspension buggy with a heavy machine gun mounted in the rear. They often accompanied cavalry formations, and provided serious punch that could attack and withdraw swiftly.
• Armored trains. Armored trains are mentioned multiple times throughout this book – one, the Smialy, is mentioned by name – and I’ve read about them elsewhere. What I’ve never read about is how they were actually used. I imagine they’re useful for freighting VIPs about, for foiling ambushes and partisan attacks, and for defending fixed positions about a rail head, etc. I’ve come to believe that armored trains were largely ineffective, or at least of quite minor importance, or we’d hear more about them.
• Cavalry proved to be important in a dynamic conflict set in country with poor infrastructure. The Soviet “Konkorpus” under Hayk “Gai” Bzishkyan (an ethnic Armenian) proved to be particularly effective, and brutal. Zamoyski writes:
“The cavalry of the respective sides encapsulated the fundamental characteristics of the two armies facing each other: the less numerous Poles relied on smaller, trained and equipped units operating according to established rules of war; the Russians on vast numbers of ofen entirely unsuitable men, equipped with whatever was at hand, on improvisation and on ignoring received methods in order to exploit any situation. “The Russian army is a horde,” wrote the man who would lead it into Poland, “and its strength lies in its being a horde.” This would prove an advantage, given the terrain.”
• A history of underground resistance to occupation gave the Poles an interesting advantage: skill in cryptography and sigint. “… a long tradition of encryption and decryption reaching back through a century of conspiracy and resistance. Polish officers had also served in the monitoring services of the Russian, German and French armies, and as a result the intelligence-gathering unit set up by the Polish army at the beginning of 1919 had a wide knowledge of existing techniques and an unsurpassed range of skills. By the summer of that year it had broken the Russian codes, and by the beginning of 1920 it was listening in to every radio station in western Russia, and intercepting and decrypting 50 per cent of all communications reaching and leaving the Red Army’s Western and South-Western Fronts.”
• There’s record of a confrontation between Polish lancers and a Cossack cavalry unit that started off with a challenge of single combat between champions, something that might’ve been at home in the year 920. One Kuzma Kruchkov issued a challenge, and one Captain Raciecki accepted. After a brief clash, Raciecki cleaved Kruchov from collar to waist.
• The English and French sent Poland military missions and something approximating moral support, but not much else. Bitterly disappointed, at their first meeting Pilsudski asked the French representative, Maxime Weygand (one-time chief-of-staff to Marshal Foch), “How many divisions have you brought?” Weygand of course had brought none. Must’ve been an awkward meeting for Weygand.
• Blocking troops. Movies about the Second World War love to show Russian soldiers stationed behind the front lines, in place to fire on their countrymen should they try to run from the enemy. I’ve read about such things, too, but only that such blocking units existed, and never that they actually mowed down their own men. Evidently, in their desperation the Poles resorted to the same idea; we also don’t hear of them gunning down retreating Polish troops:
“[The generals] were so alarmed that they ordered a cordon of military police to take up positions behind the front line and to machine-gun any retreating troops. These measures apparently did the trick, as observers noted a sudden change of heart and even a new self-assurance in the men who had been abandoning their positions only that morning.” I’ll bet they had a change of heart.

[Akram Khatam]

چکیده ای از یک یورش مورد غفلت قرار گرفته
لهستان از ۱۶۱۲بین پروس و اتریش و روسیه تقسیم شده بود و جایی در جهان نداشت بعد از انقلاب اکتبر. لنین تمام مناطق لهستان را واگذار کرد (مانند ایران) ولی دو سال بعد اولین کشور گشایی اش با حمله به لهستان اغاز شد و علت عقب ماندگی وسیع شوروی بود که هیچ راهی بجز صدور انقلاب به اروپا پیش پایش نگذاشته بود و المان هدف بسیار خوبی بود.لنین قبل از اکتبر هم در قرداد برست لیتوفسک مناطق وسیعی را به المان بخشیده بود چون خیال میکرد بنا به اموخته های مارکس بسرعت انقلاب های سوسیالیستی همه کشورهای پیشرفته را فرا میگیرد اتفاقا در المان و مجارستان و اتریش در ۱۹۱۸ انقلاباتی رخ داد ولی بسرعت فرو نشست و این از جمله ایرادات به مارکس است که پتانسیل نظام سرمایه داری را برای مواجه با بحرانهایش ندیده بود
رهبر نظامی شوروی مردی ۲۷ ساله بود به نام توخاچفسکی که قرار بود صدور انقلاب را به همه جا هدایت کند تروتسکی کمیسر جنگ هم هدایت انرا از داخل به عهده داشت
لهستان در این هجوم وحشیانه تنها بود (مانند ایران زمانی که شوروی به ایران حمله کرد و جمهوری خلق گیلان را با کمک میزا کوچک خان ایجاد کرد.ایران قرار داد۱۹۱۹ را با انگلیس بست تا تحت حمایت او قرار گیرد ولی انگلیس به ان پایبند نماند ) انگار غرب نمیدانست در این موقعیت با کشور شورا ها چه در پیش گیرد.
اشغال لهستان مورد غفلت جهان قرار گرفت ولی شکست شوروی در ان تاریخ این منطقه را دگرگون کرد امریکا و متفقین بعد از جنگ اول کشورهایی مثل چکسلواکی و. استونی و لهستان را در شرق المان بوجود اوردند تا مانع جنگ بعدی این کشور زخم خورده شونداما اولین حمله هیتلر به لهستان بود استالین در ۱۹۳۹ قراردادی با هیتلر بست و مناطق اشغالی خود را (دوباره ) به هیتلر داد تا او در اینده به شوروی حمله نکند و روایت است که استالین در ۱۹۴۱ حمله المان به شوروی را باور نکرده بود
لهستان دارای ریشه های عمیق مسیحیت کاتولیک بود و این هویت انرا در مقابل تیلیغات لنین به جذب کارگرانش به اردوگاه و همینطور فاشیسم المان ایمن کرده بود ولی یهودی ها در این کشور به حاشیه رانده شده بودند
در ریشه کشتار سنگین یهودیان در لهستان باید اشاره کرد که شوروی بعلت خروج سنگین سرمایه توسط یهودی ها بعد از انقلاب بشدت در پی نابودی انها بودند و در لهستان هم یهودی بودن تروتسکی و بسیاری از رجال شوروی بهانه خوبی برای این کشتار بود(البته ریشه یهود کشی عوامل متعدد دیگری هم دارد).
شوروی در این جنگ سهمگین یک ساله شکست خورد و اداوات و سرمایه انسانی و سیعی را از دست داد ولی انتقام انرا در حمله همزمان با هیتلر در ۱۹۳۹ به انجا گرفت .این بار دیگر زور و سرکوب و نه تشویق به پیوستن به اردوگاه راهبر ان بود.
لهستان تا ۱۹۸۵در جرگه اردوگاه ماند و در طی جنگ دوم هسته های مقاومت بسیاری در ان شکل گرفت که رمز های انیگما المان را برای متفقین باز میکرد و که نقش مهمی در ضربه به نازیسم بود

[Ireney Berezniak · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent overview of an important, but little known event in World history.

In 1920, Lenin's army marches westward intent on spreading the socialist revolution to western and southern Europe. The path to communist paradise is blocked by the restored Polish nation, the rebirth of which was assured by the Treaty of Versailles following World War I to create a buffer between the west and the revolutionary east. Burdened with mixed and incompatible infrastructure and military technology inherited from the three empires that had partitioned Poland over a hundred years prior to recovering the nation's independence, the fledgling Polish army performs a miraculous rout of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw, thus forestalling communist expansion, and affording Europe additional time to heal from the crippling damage inflicted during the first Great War.

By author's own admission, this book was not intended to provide and in-depth analysis of the events that transpired, but rather the focus was on military maneuvering of that war. Zamoyski shares just enough of the geopolitical situation of the region to gain a basic understanding of the motivations behind the conflict and stakes at play, devoting a much more significant part of the book to military operations. As such, be prepared to pull up a map in order to visualize and track shifting positions of armies and divisions, if such is your fancy. If not, look elsewhere. Presumably, White Eagle, Red Star written by Norman Davies provides more depth and insight into this critical moment in history.

ib.

[Mads Floyd · Rating 4 out of 5]

A pleasant and brisk read. For some reason it’s been review-bombed by Arabs. No seriously, check it. Maybe they got paid by Russia with some apples or something.

[Noah Karpiak · Rating 2 out of 5]

While the book provides insight into the war, the heroic battle of the Vistula, why the West poorly represented the facts then and now, it has an obvious Polish bias which only serves to diminish the significance of the events.

[Alex · Rating 2 out of 5]

Comprehension exploration of a relatively brief conflict, but the narrow area of focus means the reader isn't provided with enough time to come to understand the key figures on either side, and the constant switching between both Polish and Russian commanders and the various divisions they command quickly causes confusion. Additionally, the author stresses the importance of the outcome of the conflict on the future of Europe, but these consequences are never explored in-depth. Great for fans of military history, but inadequate for anybody hoping for a wider picture of the geopolitical scene.

[Daniel Kukwa · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very concise presentation. You do need to come to it with a bit of pre-knowledge of the post-WWI situation for this book to be an ultimately satisfying experience, but it's worth it for the clear, straightforward presentation. Mind you, like most military histories, your head can start spinning trying to keep the geography of all the battle tactics coherent. Sometimes I think these books should come with a tabletop model, with toy soldiers to move around as you read about the battles.

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have always been interested in the history of this part of the world. This little book sheds light on a little known war which turned Bolshevik armies away from Western Europe - plucky Poland beats the red hordes. It does so with a light touch, effortlessly explaining the cut and thrust of what were the last major cavalry engagements in modern history.

[James Rooney · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a short work, somewhat less than two-hundred pages long, but it gives a solid overview and a good introduction to this incredible topic.

The Polish victory over the Red Army in 1920 must rank as one of the most unbelievable underdog wins in history, and profoundly influenced the history of interwar Europe.

Among the many effects of this war was the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet Union, the definitive failure of the Bolshevik hopes for sparking a world revolution by joining hands with Marxists in Hungary and Germany.

These could be seen as negative results, in events that did not happen. On the 'positive' side, the picture is rather more bleak.

Russia's isolation fed the atmosphere of paranoia and fear in Moscow, it led to the rise of Stalin and contributed to his increasingly repressive policies by justifying them as necessary 'extraordinary measures.'

As other works have argued, the defeat of Tukhachevsky was in many ways the defeat of Leninism and of Trotsky. The defeat of the Permanent Revolution, and heralded the triumph of Stalin's 'socialism in one country.'

This work, however, focuses primarily on the military aspect of the war and explains in great detail the course and motivations of Pilsudski's decision to invade Ukraine, for example, and naturally the central core of the narrative is concerned with the failure of the Red Army to take Warsaw in August, 1920.

Particular attention to detail is paid in Sikorski's defence of Modlin, in the defeat of the Konarmia at Brody, and the sublime conception of Pilsudski's masterstroke from the Wieprz.

But an important addition is found in the decision of Pilsudski to push his advantage by taking the offensive against Tukhachevsky which led to the Battle of the Niemen.

It can be argued that this was the real decisive moment. Tukhachevsky had attempted to reconstruct his front, issuing telegrams to the effect that he had only received a temporary setback and intended to resume the offensive once his front was repaired.

Conceivably he might have done this, if given the chance. But Pilsudski was not to give him one. The Battle of the Niemen is perhaps as important as the Vistula and deserves more recognition, all the more so in that Pilsudski achieved his brilliant victories despite no formal military training.

Not to mention that it was done against Mikhail Tukhachevsky, certainly no slouch. Easily one of the most brilliant officers of his generation and the pioneer of Soviet tactics used in WWII, Tukhachevsky had hitherto been victorious everywhere he was present.

Zamoyski offers some perspective here to potentially explain the lack of interest or knowledge of this conflict, saying that it was overtaken by the Second World War, whose scope simply dwarfs it, and whose outcome overturned all of the decisions reached.

There are numerous maps that accompany the text, which are most useful in illuminating the relative positions and manoeuvres of the two sides. It is a brisk and enjoyable read, highly recommended.

[Mastersonmcvoidson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fairly short history of the Polish-Soviet War, focusing on the Battle of Warsaw. It covers the main war between Poland and the Soviets without giving much attention to the fighting in Ukraine or elsewhere.

The book opens with the description of the general situation and gives a rundown of the state of affairs in Eastern Europe at the time of the war. It focuses primarily on the Polish conflict with Soviet Russia and gives only passing mentions to the conflicts in Latvia, Ukraine and operations in 1919. It does a good job of providing the political background and following the diplomatic developments that happened behind all the military operations, but I feel that it takes a somewhat biased view and is much more forgiving of Polish mistakes or aggression while taking a slightly harsher approach towards the Bolsheviks. This is not too explicit or too impactful, but it does leave me a bit uneasy.

The Polish-Soviet War itself starts getting covered in a bit more detail with the 1920 Polish offensive in Ukraine, which aimed to capture Kiev. The battles are described in some detail with the atrocities and damage done by both sides being described in a vivid manner.

The main focus of the book is the Battle of Warsaw, which is covered in considerable detail. My only complaint is that there are no clear numbers provided for the casualties and the forces engaged. When compared to the Battle of Warsaw, the rest of the book seems somewhat lacking in detail and I think that it would've been better if the coverage was a bit more even.

The narrative is highly readable and filled with many vivid descriptions of the events that took place, shedding light on some interesting incidents and detailing obscure developments.

A highly readable history of the Polish-Soviet War with a detailed study of the Battle of Warsaw, but it does have some flaws and the feeling of unevenness caused by the overwhelming focus on that single battle rather than the entire war leaves much of the military and diplomatic context missing. One of the better books on the Polish-Soviet War, but not flawless.

Final Rating: 7/10

[Kiki023 · Rating 3 out of 5]

A detailed operational history, focused mostly on the Battle of Warsaw. The author lays out his aims in the introduction: a concise summation of the events that led up to the battle, the battle itself, and the immediate aftermath. The goods here are in the finer details. As mentioned by other reviewers, a more comprehensive history can be found in White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War 1919-1920 and The Miracle on the Vistula. Still, the characterization of the commanders involved, particularly that of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, and details concerning the haphazard composition of the armies on both sides were interesting additions that can only aid in any understanding of the conflict. Zamoyski concludes with some thoughts on the consequences of the war. Knowing what we know of Stalin's intentions in the international arena, it is something of a stretch to say that the memory of 1920 pushed him into making a pact with the Nazis, although it may go some way towards explaining the character of the occupation once it had occurred. Furthermore, some 13 years after this was published, what could it mean to say that the "freedom" Eastern Europe enjoys now is owed to the two decades of respite won by Pilsudski and his entourage, when those very nations have slipped into an illiberal mode of government, and when those very individuals undermined the parliamentary order they had constructed so soon after its birth? History may be repeating itself, but confused conclusions aside, this is a useful entry in a subject whose literature is not very vast to begin with.

[Sebastian Palmer · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this short, well-written and handsome little book Zamoyski reminds us of an intriguing if largely forgotten chapter in European history.

With Poland acting as bulwark against the westward spread of Communism, battles that stand as the last 'hurrah' of C19th style cavalry engagements, and a large cast of colourful characters - from the major players like Pilsudski and Tuchachevsky, less well-known to us perhaps, to such giants-in-the-making as a young and insubordinate Stalin and the ever bullish Churchill, who involves Britain in this story, albeit indirectly, by sending troops to support the White Russians - there's plenty of interest in terms of both geopolitical and military manoeuvring.

Like many others I came to this via Zamoyski's splendid ‘1812’, and consequently expectations were high. Unlike some others I was not at all disappointed. This is undoubtedly a much more modest undertaking on the author's part, but he succeeds in his stated aim of introducing a very interesting subject to the general reader admirably.

And personally, as much as I enjoy door-stop sized tomes, I think it's excellent to have briefer, pithier alternatives to hand. I took this on a short holiday break - visiting my sister, then living in Spain - and read the whole book whilst away, which was most enjoyable.

As Zamoyski proved so well in 1812, he's a superb writer, and his handling of the confusing events of this campaign is a model of clarity and well organised exposition. Several maps and numerous black and white photographs support and enrich Zamoyski's lucid text.

Interesting trivia: German Chancellor Angela Merkel's paternal grandfather fought in the Polish 'Blue Army' during this conflict. Also, a Polish film has been made on the war, but I forget the title!

[Kit · Rating 4 out of 5]

Zamoyski's treatment of the little known war that saved Europe from being overrun by Bolshevik armies is a sheer joy to read. Zamoyski skillfully sets up the contestants on either side and gives the reader a glimpse into the reasons that drove the Soviet armies, drunk with victory after a brutal civil war, headlong into the nascent armies of Poland with the goal of marching triumphantly into the tumult that was Germany after WWI. Poland, having risen anew from the ashes of history, suddenly found itself standing alone against a lumbering bear smarting from the insult of having its territory amended to furnish Poland with something like historical borders. Zamoyski recounts how the Soviets were supremely confident that turbulent Germany would easily fall and then the workers' revolution would gobble up the rest of Europe. Only the small nation of Poland stood between the eager Soviets and the reeling Germans. Zamoyski details how the Poles preempted and diverted the Soviets, but the Red Armies still staggered forward until they reached the Vistula, poised to crush Warsaw and march west. The Miracle on the Vistula delivered the knock-out blow to General Stalin and the Red Army, thus saving Europe from the Bolshevik Revolution.

Zamoyski gives a rollicking good rendition of the movement and clashes of armies. Sadly the paperback version has rather poor photographs and the many maps urgently need to be in at least 3 colors. But otherwise, this is a fine primer into the crucial conflict that gets absolutely too little coverage. I'm gonna pass this book on and pick up Norman Davies take on it.

[Peter Fox · Rating 4 out of 5]

Warsaw 1920, Lenin's failed conquest of Europe, Adam Zamoyski, 138 pages plus notes, etc


This is a far smaller book than it looks. This isn't a bad thing, as there is only so much to discuss on the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920 and Zamoyski gets the balance right. He hasn't extended the coverage by padding it out. Instead he gives you plenty of facts, but doesn't go that deep that you lose the central point. Also, unlike quite a few books that focus on military events, this isn't simply a case of X unit went to Y. It would have benefited from a few more eye witness accounts, but I suspect that he used all that he has access to.


Zamoyski writes well and this rattles along nicely. It's a pretty quick read and it shines a light upon an episode that is more obscure in the West than it should be. I'm not totally convinced that a Red victory would have been as significant as he suggests, though, as it is hard to see the Soviets being strong enough to hold Poland or to go any further. However, what ifs in history, as entertaining as they are to ponder, are hard to fix.


This was an enjoyable read.

[Krisley Freitas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Trecho da introdução:

“Considerando que os bastidores políticos e diplomáticos já foram amplamente investigados por outras pessoas, concentrei-me nas operações militares, e especialmente em fazer uma síntese acessível ao leitor comum, dando uma visão ampla e sucinta do que aconteceu e como aconteceu, o que exclui necessariamente dezenas de fatos menores e o papel desempenhado por muitos atores secundários, alguns de importância crucial.”

Apesar do foco do autor ser a parte militar, poderia ter trabalhado melhor tanto as causas como as consequências da guerra no cenário político/social, o livro ficou um pouco sem início ou fim.

O livro é majoritariamente sobre a movimentação de exércitos e as dificuldades enfrentadas pelos soldados - que lutavam com falta de armas, alimentação, uniformes, transportes, etc.

Contém 10 mapas e 40 fotos.

[Faizel Bham · Rating 5 out of 5]

I first read about the “Miracle on the Vistula” in Antony Beevor’s book about the Russian Civil War. This book covers that battle, the last in history to see Cavalry playing a central and decisive role, in great detail. It sets down events in a way that is interesting and easy to understand. It covers every aspect of the event including the political situation in Poland and Russia, foreign attitudes to the conflict, the personalities of leading commanders, the weapons, training, equipment and backgrounds of the forces of both sides, the logistical issues faced by both armies and the psychological challenges faced by troops on the battlefield. It’s a short book about a battle which had important yet historically unappreciated consequences and which influenced decisions made by Stalin and others during the 2nd World War. It is extremely well-written and absolutely worth reading.

[Wej · Rating 3 out of 5]

Adam Zamoyski described the events leading to the Battle of Warsaw (1920). This history of Polish-Soviet war focuses mostly on the military campaign. Very little place is given to the politics behind it and the social context. Brief biographies of generals were included which shed light on their further actions, including their contributions in WW2. The description of military manoeuvres can be confusing at times. Luckily, the book was repleted with maps showing the positions of different forces.

Overall, this is a good and concise description of this brief war. A war which possibly is not as well known as others because its outcome was stopping something from happening (i.e. the Bolsheviks taking over the Eastern Europe and potentially Germany).