I find reading De Cive clarifies much of Hobbes’ political philosophy in Leviathan, half of which was on religion the pressing issue of his time. De Cive first clarifies in a footnote what Hobbes meant by human nature being antisocial, not solitude which men hate but vanity and diffidence in seeking the company of others for a show of superiority or conflict over desired things that cannot be shared-glory and profit. Another footnote clarifies the meaning of fear as not just flight or cowardice but diffidence-distrust of others and anxiety toward the future. That Hobbes included solitary with nasty brutish and short in Leviathan caused a lot of confusion, but elsewhere Hobbes says people do not wish to remain in such a state long. Hobbes also explicitly describes human nature as bad wheres later Hobbes says government is necessary because man is individualistic by nature rather than bad.
The second part on government, which was Hobbes’ lifelong speciality, mostly retreads what was in the Elements and kept in Leviathan. Two things stuck out: firstly, his requirement for a supermajority to institute a commonwealth given its overwhelming power and security even if with a few defections the majority consensus remains. This strengthens his majoritianism but allows refinement into a constitutional majority, such as John Calhoun’s concurrent majority. Secondly, Hobbes explicitly gives slaves, as defined by those imprisoned or bound, a negative right to flee and even kill their master since it is a relation of pure dominion rather than obligation since it arises not from protection or contract but fear, which is the condition of the state of nature continued. However they are bound by the greater laws of nature still. This was a point Locke would take up as distinguishing servitude from slavery, the former a contractual dominion versus the state of war continued.
In the third part on religion, Hobbes distinguishes the kingdom of God by nature and by covenant, the former universally binding by reason of will-not willed by reason, aligning with a voluntatist view-and the latter dictated to men directly. God’s law is revealed in three ways, the ‘dictate of right reason’ (natural causality, which inverts Grotius’ meaning of the phrase), immediate revelation via visions dreams or inspiration, and prophecy by way of miracles either performed or foretold.
Hobbes’ discussion of biblical covenants, promises by god to humanity, is mainly to dull their revolutionary force and align them with order: firstly the Adamic covenant which was abrogated, but he does not mention the Noahic covenant which would apply to gentiles after the flood and would countenance there being no right in the state of nature, although one of its demands is to establish courts of justice so is exhortive and normative. Instead Hobbes goes to the covenant with Abraham and how it applied to his patriarchal authority not commonwealth until the Mosaic covenant for the Jewish nation, which was in form a priestly kingdom but de facto held by judges, until they asked to be ruled by kings (Davidic covenant) and after the captivity returned to the Mosaic law and held out for fulfillment of the messianic covenant, which Christians believe fulfilled by Jesus and to be completed by His second coming at an unknown time. This last point was addressed to the fifth monarchists who believed Charles I’s regicide marked the end of the fourth monarchy in the book of Daniel, interpreted as Rome given Charles’ supposed ‘popish’ inclinations, and paved the way for a fifth Christian one.
A covenant theology being related to his social contract theory also supports Hobbes’ theory of religious authority as there are only seven at most, two of which applied only to the Jewish state, and Christians wait for fulfillment of the sixth or seventh by a future kingdom of Christ on a new earth while in the meantime are under secular authorities not churches who are meant to teach faith and obedience. This covenant theology and his views on human nature align with a more Calvinist view although Hobbes opposed the Presbyterian form of church government in England as he held Erastian views of state-church relations and a generally secular outlook. His discussion of religious covenants is largely to dismiss their applicability in secular society though as relevant to their use by his political adversaries such as the presbyterians, fifth monarchists, and Scottish covenanters.
In his early work written under Charles I however Hobbes tepidly endorsed apostolic succession which he did not by Leviathan in 1651, when episcopacy was abolished and replaced in 1645 by a directory of public worship which was short of a presbytery establishment, and would go on to blame Charles I’s imposition of the book of common prayer on the Scots as leading to the civil war and their national covenant rejecting Charles’ authority outright. So my conclusions are that Hobbes’ political theology could have benefited from incorporating original sin and either sacramental or covenantal obligations, depending on whether an episcopalian or presbyterian polity, explictly rather than being based upon self-interest and anarchy but these perhaps were contrary to his pretensions of political science, personal sensibilities, and due deference at the time. His distinction of paternal and lordly dominion from commonwealth deserves fleshing out as it suggests Hobbes recognized not all or even most government arose from covenants but from more natural means, although this probably didn’t serve his immediate interests either.