The Argentinian collapse of 2001 is an odd subject for someone looking to bash the international monetary system. After all, unlike the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which the author, Paul Blustein, also wrote a book on, no one claimed the Argentinian crisis had at its root sudden "hot money" capital inflows to and outflows from the country, or that the crisis was exacerbated by a merciless "austerity" imposed by the IMF. In fact, Blustein admits early on that the undoubted reason for the crash was that the IMF did not demand cutbacks in spending and higher taxes sooner, and that Argentina failed because it refused to rein in its deficits when times were good in the mid-1990s. He also admits that the IMF for most of the period was opposed to the "currency peg" of the Argentine peso to the dollar, and that it was suspicious of attempts to retain it by deep spending cuts in the midst of the crisis.
Still, Blustein makes a good case that all that does not make the IMF blameless. Far from it. The suspicions the IMF had about the Argentinian policies were kept inside the IMF, and it's the exposure of the once secret internal concerns of the IMF and the US Treasury that make this such a fascinating read. As usual, the IMF was fighting the last war, and was scared of letting the Argentinian economy it had once celebrated as a model go bankrupt so soon after the Asian crisis. So it extended every loan it could, long past the point when the everyone knew, including most of the IMF, that the odds were hopeless. We see Stanley Fisher, as deputy manager and effective chief of the IMF, agree to a new loan in December 2001, even when his staff (including economist Kenneth Rogoff) put the odds of success at 0% (Stanley Fisher is now deputy governor of the Federal Reserve). We see the IMF invite the Argentinian President and reformer Carlos Menem to be the keynote speaker at their 1998 conference, even when privately many thought his country was headed for disaster.
So Blustein makes a good case against the IMF, but it's not the typical one. Mainly he argues that it didn't have the strength of its convictions to call in its loans before they became nothing but a burden for an already indebted economy. His attempts, however, to tie the failure to the "Enronization" of financial analysts, and a growing "bubble" in emerging market debt look a little laughable in retrospect. Since the book was published, emerging markets have enjoyed an unprecedented decade with almost no defaults. The book therefore demonstrates the dangers of calling "bubble" whenever one sees financial upticks. Yet the book does show the value of dedicated journalism for exposing the skullduggery going on in the highest chambers of power, even if it's not always what one would expect.