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The Morbid Age
British intellectual life between the wars stood at the heart of modernity; it was the golden age of the public intellectual and scientist: Arnold Toynbee, Aldous and Julian Huxley, H. G. Wells, Marie Stopes and a host of others. Yet, as Richard Overy argues, a striking characteristic of so many of the ideas that emerged from this new age - from eugenics to the Freudian unconscious, to modern ideas of pacifism and world government - was the fear that the West was faced a dystopian future of war, economic collapse and racial degeneration.
Brilliantly evoking a Britain of BBC radio lectures, public debates, peace demonstrations, pamphleteers, psychoanalysts, anti-fascist volunteers, sex education manuals and science fiction, The Morbid Age reveals a time at once different from, and yet surprisingly similar to, our own.
Richard Overy is Professor of History at the University of Exeter. His books include Why the Allies Won, Russia's War, The Battle of Britain and The Dictators, which won the Wolfson and the Hessell Tiltman Prizes for history in 2005.
Brilliantly evoking a Britain of BBC radio lectures, public debates, peace demonstrations, pamphleteers, psychoanalysts, anti-fascist volunteers, sex education manuals and science fiction, The Morbid Age reveals a time at once different from, and yet surprisingly similar to, our own.
Richard Overy is Professor of History at the University of Exeter. His books include Why the Allies Won, Russia's War, The Battle of Britain and The Dictators, which won the Wolfson and the Hessell Tiltman Prizes for history in 2005.
522 pages, Paperback
First published May 7, 2009
29 people are currently reading
529 people want to read
About the author
Richard Overy
147 books351 followersRichard James Overy is a British historian who has published extensively on the history of World War II and the Third Reich.
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
Educated at Caius College, Cambridge and awarded a research fellowship at Churchill College, Professor Overy taught history at Cambridge from 1972 to 1979, as a fellow of Queens' College and from 1976 as a university assistant lecturer. In 1980 he moved to King's College London, where he became professor of modern history in 1994. He was appointed to a professorship at the University of Exeter in 2004.
His work on World War II has been praised as "highly effective in the ruthless dispelling of myths" (A. J. P. Taylor), "original and important" (New York Review of Books) and "at the cutting edge" (Times Literary Supplement.)[
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Displaying 1 - 29 of 29 reviews
February 8, 2012
I looked forward to reading this book with high hopes for an engrossing story of Britain and its people between the wars, especially as Mr Overy's other books have been so well received.
It is a highly researched account with some 90 pages of source notes and a lengthy bibliography, but for me it was overly detailed with frankly dense uninspiring prose.
Struggling through the chapters - except for a fascinating and equally disturbing one on eugenics - I felt I was reading a dull textbook from the 1950s or 60s rather than a modern social history by an eminent historian lauded for readable high quality works. There was little to enthuse me into picking up the book and so it became a struggle as I battled on to finish it.
In his introduction to the book Mr Overy writes "My new editor in New York...has rightly asked me to make the 'Englishness' of the text more accessible and has made a better book as a result".
I am not sure what he means by Englishness but I am certain that accessible is not one of the books strong points.
It is a highly researched account with some 90 pages of source notes and a lengthy bibliography, but for me it was overly detailed with frankly dense uninspiring prose.
Struggling through the chapters - except for a fascinating and equally disturbing one on eugenics - I felt I was reading a dull textbook from the 1950s or 60s rather than a modern social history by an eminent historian lauded for readable high quality works. There was little to enthuse me into picking up the book and so it became a struggle as I battled on to finish it.
In his introduction to the book Mr Overy writes "My new editor in New York...has rightly asked me to make the 'Englishness' of the text more accessible and has made a better book as a result".
I am not sure what he means by Englishness but I am certain that accessible is not one of the books strong points.
August 9, 2012
To read this, you would think that to live in England during the years between the two World Wars, you needed two Venlafaxine a day. Of course the First World War caused tremendous amounts of grief and worry, and threw the national and imperial economies of Europe into a tailspin. But Richard Overy paints a picture of a people who thought that they were the only bastion of civilization. They barely survived one total war. They lived for an entire generation thinking that another one would bring total ruination to everything holy, pure, and good. “The Twilight Years” looks at a wide range of topics, but this looming nihilism about chances for the future and its sure doom if another war was to rear its ugly head, are constant themes which fully inform all aspects of the book.
Several topics are traced here, starting with the dominant historiography of Western Europe during this time, namely the writings of Spengler and Toynbee, both of whose thoughts about history were colored by cyclical periods of cultural growth and renewal followed by eventual decadence and decline. Others thought that World War I was the symbolic end for capitalism, illustrating how it was now an unsustainable economic system and needed to be replaced with either Communism or something else; these ideas were prevalent on both the sides of the political spectrum.
What was one to do, then, in order to save culture from the barbarians trying to throw us headlong into another war? An ethos of cautious preservation and social utopia – the titular paradox - coexisted simultaneously. Eugenics was very much in vogue, especially by those who considered themselves members of the progressive Left, and felt that “weeding out” members of society who were not as physically or mentally fit was the obligation of the government if society was to continue on. Furthermore, everyone was in favor of both positive and negative eugenics. (Positive eugenics is aimed at encouraging reproduction among the genetically advantaged, while negative eugenics is aimed at lowering fertility among the genetically disadvantaged, including abortions and forced sterilizations.) One woman Overy mentions, a highly enthusiastic supporter of eugenics of all kinds by the name of Marie Stopes, disinherited her own son upon his announcement that he had married a woman who wore eyeglasses, thinking that she might pass her myopia onto their own children.
This was also the time when Freudian psychoanalysis was just beginning to both splinter off into its sub-schools (Adlerian, Jungian, et cetera), and when Freud started to become a household name. It was seen as just as big a panacea as eugenics, another eight ball to tell whether human nature was inherently good or evil. The answer was sure to predict whether or not another war would be inevitable. Not surprisingly, the “scientific” research into these questions yielded only inconclusive results. Political partisans would use it for their own advantage, hawks thinking that war was a part of the human condition, and pacifists thinking that it wasn’t. Pacifism and all of its various incarnations all over England take up a sizeable part of the book, only fading well into the 1930s when percipient observers knew that it would take nothing short of war to stop Hitler and fascism. It was fascinating to see who hung on, though, and for how long. Aldous Huxley, for example, remained an ardent pacifist even as Hitler was invading Poland.
As others have noted, this isn’t so much a social or intellectual history as it is a “history of mentalities,” mostly informed by the thought of the dominant, educated classes of the time. For all of the possibly divisive material, I didn’t detect any noticeable biases on Overy’s part. It’s clear and accessible for anyone with even a minimal background in the subject, and doesn’t assume too much of the reader in the way of the minutiae of English politics. For those interested in these smaller details, he provides a useful introduction called “Britain 1919-1939: A Chronological Introduction,” which gives foreign policy details, a list of prime ministers, and a note on the economy. All in all, this is a superb book for anyone interested in the very historically specific worries, anxieties, and preoccupations of England during the twenties and thirties.
Several topics are traced here, starting with the dominant historiography of Western Europe during this time, namely the writings of Spengler and Toynbee, both of whose thoughts about history were colored by cyclical periods of cultural growth and renewal followed by eventual decadence and decline. Others thought that World War I was the symbolic end for capitalism, illustrating how it was now an unsustainable economic system and needed to be replaced with either Communism or something else; these ideas were prevalent on both the sides of the political spectrum.
What was one to do, then, in order to save culture from the barbarians trying to throw us headlong into another war? An ethos of cautious preservation and social utopia – the titular paradox - coexisted simultaneously. Eugenics was very much in vogue, especially by those who considered themselves members of the progressive Left, and felt that “weeding out” members of society who were not as physically or mentally fit was the obligation of the government if society was to continue on. Furthermore, everyone was in favor of both positive and negative eugenics. (Positive eugenics is aimed at encouraging reproduction among the genetically advantaged, while negative eugenics is aimed at lowering fertility among the genetically disadvantaged, including abortions and forced sterilizations.) One woman Overy mentions, a highly enthusiastic supporter of eugenics of all kinds by the name of Marie Stopes, disinherited her own son upon his announcement that he had married a woman who wore eyeglasses, thinking that she might pass her myopia onto their own children.
This was also the time when Freudian psychoanalysis was just beginning to both splinter off into its sub-schools (Adlerian, Jungian, et cetera), and when Freud started to become a household name. It was seen as just as big a panacea as eugenics, another eight ball to tell whether human nature was inherently good or evil. The answer was sure to predict whether or not another war would be inevitable. Not surprisingly, the “scientific” research into these questions yielded only inconclusive results. Political partisans would use it for their own advantage, hawks thinking that war was a part of the human condition, and pacifists thinking that it wasn’t. Pacifism and all of its various incarnations all over England take up a sizeable part of the book, only fading well into the 1930s when percipient observers knew that it would take nothing short of war to stop Hitler and fascism. It was fascinating to see who hung on, though, and for how long. Aldous Huxley, for example, remained an ardent pacifist even as Hitler was invading Poland.
As others have noted, this isn’t so much a social or intellectual history as it is a “history of mentalities,” mostly informed by the thought of the dominant, educated classes of the time. For all of the possibly divisive material, I didn’t detect any noticeable biases on Overy’s part. It’s clear and accessible for anyone with even a minimal background in the subject, and doesn’t assume too much of the reader in the way of the minutiae of English politics. For those interested in these smaller details, he provides a useful introduction called “Britain 1919-1939: A Chronological Introduction,” which gives foreign policy details, a list of prime ministers, and a note on the economy. All in all, this is a superb book for anyone interested in the very historically specific worries, anxieties, and preoccupations of England during the twenties and thirties.
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February 2, 2015A set of eight chapters on the intellectual history of doom and declinism in the interwar UK. The belief that Western Civilisation was going off the rails was widespread in refined intellectual circles and and amongst an anxious public, and although no one involved in the debate could drum up a tight, working definition of civilisation (Leonard Woolf thought a sense of humour was a prerequisite) all agreed that it was imperilled on many fronts and that, if possible, Something Must Be Done About It - To-Day!
Overy has pulled together a huge array of material, from Toynbee's doorstopper tomes to public meeting ephemera and he wields his sources well. Some of the chapters are great, notably those dealing with eugenics and the peace movement's collision with the Spanish Civil War, but Overy's herculean trawl through Freudian psychoanalysis's offerings to the effort to arrest global civilisational collapse isn't for the faint-hearted.
When the book gets around to making arguments they can be quite interesting. Overy suggests that British interwar political debate was more politically engaged with European developments than given credit for. Overy argues that this interest was not polarised around the European left/right divide but reflected a cross-partisan search for alternatives to the fractured interwar world order. The hopes invested in the Soviet model and fears stirred by Fascism nestled in a wide spectrum of the public, at elite and popular level and in many cases weren't ideologically-driven.
As such, Overy argues, the role of specific events and crises in defining and propagating this morbid anxiety is overstated: this was a self-perpetuating zeitgeist, its fears of annihilation and degeneration were written into the turbulent events of the interwar period, not drawn from them.
This I fnd less convincing. Overy refers to distant (from the metropolitan UK) crises of the 1930s as 'minor border readjustments' and seeks to minimise their significance by contrasting them with the apocalyptic portents read into them by the annalists of doom. This is a tiny bit unfair: while crises like Corfu or the Manchurian Incident weren't triggers to civilisationial annihilation they were symptomatic of an unstable international order that would gradually lose the ability to effectively respond to the revisionist agendas of a new set of militarised, hypernationalist regimes, a failure usually regarded as having lead to a Bad Thing. Groups like the League of Nations Union and the Peace Pledge Union might have responded to these crises in ineffectual and melodramatic ways but they weren't wrong to think that they portended greater and worse conflicts to come.
The richness and volume of the material assembled makes the book's focus on the metropolitan UK understandable, but there is one area where I think this exclusivity is questionable. The British Empire is almost entirely absent from this thesis and I'm not sure why, as there are at least two areas where it played a role in the debate. The first in the form of racial anxieties generated by present and future structures of imperial union and secondly, through the renewed challenges to colonial rule and white supremacy, spurred on in part by this civilisational angst and personified in figures like Gandhi and Annie Besant. Maybe there just wasn't as much material on this as I think, but otherwise it seems like a strange omission.
If you're interested in the social and intellectual history of this period, The Morbid Age is definitely worth a read, but otherwise I'd give it a miss.
Overy has pulled together a huge array of material, from Toynbee's doorstopper tomes to public meeting ephemera and he wields his sources well. Some of the chapters are great, notably those dealing with eugenics and the peace movement's collision with the Spanish Civil War, but Overy's herculean trawl through Freudian psychoanalysis's offerings to the effort to arrest global civilisational collapse isn't for the faint-hearted.
When the book gets around to making arguments they can be quite interesting. Overy suggests that British interwar political debate was more politically engaged with European developments than given credit for. Overy argues that this interest was not polarised around the European left/right divide but reflected a cross-partisan search for alternatives to the fractured interwar world order. The hopes invested in the Soviet model and fears stirred by Fascism nestled in a wide spectrum of the public, at elite and popular level and in many cases weren't ideologically-driven.
As such, Overy argues, the role of specific events and crises in defining and propagating this morbid anxiety is overstated: this was a self-perpetuating zeitgeist, its fears of annihilation and degeneration were written into the turbulent events of the interwar period, not drawn from them.
This I fnd less convincing. Overy refers to distant (from the metropolitan UK) crises of the 1930s as 'minor border readjustments' and seeks to minimise their significance by contrasting them with the apocalyptic portents read into them by the annalists of doom. This is a tiny bit unfair: while crises like Corfu or the Manchurian Incident weren't triggers to civilisationial annihilation they were symptomatic of an unstable international order that would gradually lose the ability to effectively respond to the revisionist agendas of a new set of militarised, hypernationalist regimes, a failure usually regarded as having lead to a Bad Thing. Groups like the League of Nations Union and the Peace Pledge Union might have responded to these crises in ineffectual and melodramatic ways but they weren't wrong to think that they portended greater and worse conflicts to come.
The richness and volume of the material assembled makes the book's focus on the metropolitan UK understandable, but there is one area where I think this exclusivity is questionable. The British Empire is almost entirely absent from this thesis and I'm not sure why, as there are at least two areas where it played a role in the debate. The first in the form of racial anxieties generated by present and future structures of imperial union and secondly, through the renewed challenges to colonial rule and white supremacy, spurred on in part by this civilisational angst and personified in figures like Gandhi and Annie Besant. Maybe there just wasn't as much material on this as I think, but otherwise it seems like a strange omission.
If you're interested in the social and intellectual history of this period, The Morbid Age is definitely worth a read, but otherwise I'd give it a miss.
September 9, 2012
Ok I have to admit as a history graduate I have a lot of time for Richard Overy as he is always an illuminating read, always challenging and always teaching. For those who just thought that the years between 1918 and 1939 were the years when we Brits did the foxtrot, danced a lot and that upper class drunken bum, sorry Mr Churchill was a great leader are in for having their eyes open.
Overy mananges to show us younger Brits that there was much going on, that there was a great time for ideas and literature and the lucky few. He also shows the fear and the paranoia that was an undercurrent of British life and the feeling that this was a period akin to half time in sport before the next major war would come along.
This is a great book to read that offers the reader a great insight to the Britain of the inter war years and shows why Overy's scholarship is so highly regarded. This book shows how Britain saw itself looking down the barrel of a gun and the undercurrent of economic and political failure would lead to another bloody outcome.
Such a wonderful description of Britain and will educate those who think it was all sweetness and light for Great Britain that the reality was different. The only thing missing is that it misses out where Churchill voted in Parliament infavour of appeasement and the Conservative line with appeasement but that is me being picky about the drunkard. At least he was right about the victors write history because he certainly rewrote his prewar history.
I would advise anyone with an interest in European history and especially 20th Century British history this is an essential book.
Overy mananges to show us younger Brits that there was much going on, that there was a great time for ideas and literature and the lucky few. He also shows the fear and the paranoia that was an undercurrent of British life and the feeling that this was a period akin to half time in sport before the next major war would come along.
This is a great book to read that offers the reader a great insight to the Britain of the inter war years and shows why Overy's scholarship is so highly regarded. This book shows how Britain saw itself looking down the barrel of a gun and the undercurrent of economic and political failure would lead to another bloody outcome.
Such a wonderful description of Britain and will educate those who think it was all sweetness and light for Great Britain that the reality was different. The only thing missing is that it misses out where Churchill voted in Parliament infavour of appeasement and the Conservative line with appeasement but that is me being picky about the drunkard. At least he was right about the victors write history because he certainly rewrote his prewar history.
I would advise anyone with an interest in European history and especially 20th Century British history this is an essential book.
July 10, 2024
This book is not quite what I was expecting. It is a very interesting intellectual history of Britain between the wars. The chapter on eugenics, in particular, is both disturbing and highly informative.
January 10, 2010
I just finished this engaging book--"finished", that is, except for a chapter on capitalism that didn't fit my personal interests. THE TWILIGHT YEARS is that sort of book: one you can dip into at will because it's organized topically rather than chronologically.
Richard Overy writes fluently and wittily on an impressively wide range of topics, including but not limited to psychotherapy, economics, art, philosophy, social climate, and eugenics. I was quite surprised to learn that Britain during the interregnum was beset by seemingly un-British doomsday anxieties: I thought it was all Churchill and Mrs. Miniver over there. Apparently, though, that hardy attitude didn't establish itself until WWII was truly on.
I'm not a historian and don't know how professionals would receive this book; but it's fascinating for general readers. I only wish the production values had been a little higher. The text practically scoots off the top of the page and the illustrations aren't well reproduced, probably because of the paper selected. From a visual standpoint, it's not easy to read.
Pretty minor quibbles, though, with an otherwise excellent book.
Richard Overy writes fluently and wittily on an impressively wide range of topics, including but not limited to psychotherapy, economics, art, philosophy, social climate, and eugenics. I was quite surprised to learn that Britain during the interregnum was beset by seemingly un-British doomsday anxieties: I thought it was all Churchill and Mrs. Miniver over there. Apparently, though, that hardy attitude didn't establish itself until WWII was truly on.
I'm not a historian and don't know how professionals would receive this book; but it's fascinating for general readers. I only wish the production values had been a little higher. The text practically scoots off the top of the page and the illustrations aren't well reproduced, probably because of the paper selected. From a visual standpoint, it's not easy to read.
Pretty minor quibbles, though, with an otherwise excellent book.
June 3, 2022
Obviously a well-researched and ambitious book, let down by a complete lack of regard for how it might be read.
The type face was tiny, so I could only read it under an arc light. Okay, so far so Penguin. I can deal with that… but would it have killed them to put some paragraphs and headings in to break things up a bit?
I’ve found myself annotating the margins in this book, not because there were gems that I didn’t want to miss, but just to keep track on what subjects had been covered. With text this dense, having the luxury of even just one paragraph break per page would have gone a long way to keeping things readable.
But I stuck with it because the actual subject matter was fascinating. This was a detailed look, not at the events in Britain between the wars, but about what the educated elites were writing and saying about those events. It was a truly fascinating fly-on-the-wall look at the hopes and fears of a generation.
A vivid slice of history brought to life, unfortunately let down by the most tedious layout I’ve ever encountered.
The type face was tiny, so I could only read it under an arc light. Okay, so far so Penguin. I can deal with that… but would it have killed them to put some paragraphs and headings in to break things up a bit?
I’ve found myself annotating the margins in this book, not because there were gems that I didn’t want to miss, but just to keep track on what subjects had been covered. With text this dense, having the luxury of even just one paragraph break per page would have gone a long way to keeping things readable.
But I stuck with it because the actual subject matter was fascinating. This was a detailed look, not at the events in Britain between the wars, but about what the educated elites were writing and saying about those events. It was a truly fascinating fly-on-the-wall look at the hopes and fears of a generation.
A vivid slice of history brought to life, unfortunately let down by the most tedious layout I’ve ever encountered.
September 15, 2023
Enjoyable social history of the intellectual climate of interwar Britain. Replicates the same advantages and disadvantages of all history as-told-by-intellectuals; it sharpens and dramatises the central issues of the age, but leaves the working class perspective broadly silent. None the less, a highly informative history of the "superstructure" of the age, drawn from correspondence, lecture notes, diaries and publications. If the "post-war consensus" is often considered the start of a new historical period, this book successfully illustrates the final years of the previous one.
April 12, 2022
This is an intellectual history of British thought between WWI and WWII. Overy examines different strands of thought, all of which grappled with the question of why many in the UK believed society was nearing a collapse. As Overy explains, there was a pervasive sense that the existing civilization was under attack and at grave risk of being washed away. The book is deeply researched and abundantly demonstrates the breadth of the pessimism and despair that was such a prominent aspect of the public discourse.
The central question after the terrible carnage of WWI was war, whether it could be averted, and if so by what means. Overy shows that many people struggled to find a way to prevent future wars. He also shows how, particularly from the mid-1930s on, Britons became convinced of the inevitability of another European war.
But Overy grasps for reasons for the anomie. Reading the final chapter, Overy implies it was all overblown, a self-made crisis of confidence. I suggest two causes for the unease: 1) WWI had punctured Britain's smug sense of worldly mastery; no less than other nations, it had been devastated by losses in the war, and as time passed, it became increasingly clear that the halcyon days of high Empire were one, never to return, and 2) social change had also come, albeit slowly, to British class institutions and privileges, which reinforced the feeling of elites that their previously protected positions were irreversibly slipping away.
The central question after the terrible carnage of WWI was war, whether it could be averted, and if so by what means. Overy shows that many people struggled to find a way to prevent future wars. He also shows how, particularly from the mid-1930s on, Britons became convinced of the inevitability of another European war.
But Overy grasps for reasons for the anomie. Reading the final chapter, Overy implies it was all overblown, a self-made crisis of confidence. I suggest two causes for the unease: 1) WWI had punctured Britain's smug sense of worldly mastery; no less than other nations, it had been devastated by losses in the war, and as time passed, it became increasingly clear that the halcyon days of high Empire were one, never to return, and 2) social change had also come, albeit slowly, to British class institutions and privileges, which reinforced the feeling of elites that their previously protected positions were irreversibly slipping away.
May 17, 2020
This is a very impressive account of the intellectual concerns of interwar Britain, though possibly rather exhaustive for the general reader and better aimed at academia. It lacks a lightness of touch and interest in characterisation for a more general market. Even so it is packed with intellectual giants from Woolf to Wells, Keynes toFreud and its eight chapters consider enormous questions of economics, consciousness and the future of humanity. It is notable how insular British thinking was confined to Europe and the USA for nourishment.
The Morbid Age is a good title and the entire book captures the existential anxiety of the period which has a number of sources and dimensions. There are monsters aplenty and I found the eugenics chapter particularly worrying. Marie Stopes disinheriting her son for marrying a woman with the ‘defect’ of wearing spectacles is hard to forget. But so too is the ultimately futile but energetically, passionately argued and very popular pacifist movement.
There is something here that feels worryingly close to our own times.
The Morbid Age is a good title and the entire book captures the existential anxiety of the period which has a number of sources and dimensions. There are monsters aplenty and I found the eugenics chapter particularly worrying. Marie Stopes disinheriting her son for marrying a woman with the ‘defect’ of wearing spectacles is hard to forget. But so too is the ultimately futile but energetically, passionately argued and very popular pacifist movement.
There is something here that feels worryingly close to our own times.
April 4, 2021
Fairly standard history by a (probably liberal) academic. Not a bad job by the author but the subject of interwar Britain and empire in twilight during high modernity and political turmoil foreboding trouble to come (rise of fascism) that got me to read it again. This is my idea of the good stuff. Anyway, a period worth study. Book reminds me of a Clash song I like.
https://music.youtube.com/search?q=so...
https://music.youtube.com/search?q=so...
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October 26, 2023Very comprehensive and very well written
August 3, 2024
Not as gripping as his other books but the section on the development of eugenics was superb.
March 28, 2020
Underrated book, the conclusions of which need more attention in 2020.
November 1, 2025
Nice, struggled to finish it though.
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December 6, 2010The Twilight Years is a good account of intellectual history in Britain between the two wars. While incredibly well researched, it is denser than is necessary and at times very hard to read. I found the thesis interesting, but ultimately unconvincing. Overy argues that during the interwar years the idea of “civilization in crisis” permeated both academic and public discourse. The idea that civilization was in decline and would eventually be destroyed in a cataclysmic war. For this claim Overy has ample evidence, and the book is excellent in chronicling the depth to which the malaise seeped into the general consciousness. But Overy goes further, arguing that the fear of decline and war eventually became self-fulfilling, that the fear was overblown given the actual state of Britain (its relatively healthy economy, low risk of invasion, etc.), but that the fear led Britain to accept war much more readily. Overy fails, however, to establish cause and effect: while perhaps the fear was overblown, it is not clear that the facts on the ground (e.g., the hangover from WWI, effects of the international depression, and the existence of fascism) were insufficient to cause a second world war even without the cultural paranoia. This failure makes Overy’s greater claim---that the current similar cultural paranoia may itself unnecessarily lead the West to war---much less convincing. In all, the book is worth a read for those seriously interested in the intellectual history of this time, but the unnecessarily convoluted writing style makes it a hard slog.
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July 27, 2011Fascinating exploration of 'morbidity' in the Twenties and Thirties in Britain. The perception of an existential crisis in western civilisation was surprisingly widely held; Overy produces stacks of detailed evidence (if anything too much to absorb) that great political and social issues were debated at all levels of society in a golden age for workers' education and mass participation in civil society. He makes a strong case for a British connectedness with continental Europe, belying the view that the UK was bound up with imperial concerns and oblivious to developments closer to home. The amazing level of public engagement and interest in the Spanish Civil War, overwhelmingly on the republican side, as well as the high approval ratings for Stalin (massively more popular than Hitler all through the 1930s and seen as truly progressive) explode the view that this was a period in which the UK was a cosy tea-sipping backwater untroubled by world events.
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May 6, 2010KOBOBOOKS
Reviewed by The Guardian, Times Online, TLS, The Telegraph
Reviewed by The Guardian, Times Online, TLS, The Telegraph
April 19, 2011
if you are looking for a book about what everyday people were doing in Britain in the 1920s-30s, this is not that book. Rather,it is a history of ideas influential at that time, in areas such as psychology, politics, genetics (specifically eugenics), and philosophy. I did learn quite a bit that I had not my my previous reading, especially about the prevalence of the anti-war/pacifist movement. This is not, however, anything like light reading, and it was very slow going indeed at some point. More of interest to a scholar than a casual reader.
November 12, 2011
the first chapter is amazing! the rest are variations of it, so it gets a bit repetitive. but an interesting look at the society-wide and probably uniquely british belief that civilization was destined for collapse and only the british could it from its enemies both within and without. goes beyond the standard focus on interwar literature and focuses on science, eugenics, economics, and the pacifist movements.
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December 11, 2015IF YOU LOVE THE INTERWAR YEARS, I RECOMMEND CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD'S CHRISTOPHER AND HIS KIND, RICHARD OVERY'S THE MORBID AGE, JULIET GARDINER'S THE THIRTIES, ROBERT GRAVES'S THE LONG WEEKEND, THE SISTERS BY MARY S. LOVELL, AFTER THE VICTORIANS BY A. N. WILSON, AND VIRGINIA NICHOLSON'S AMONG THE BOHEMIANS. IT'S ACTUALLY MY PERIOD OF RESEARCH IF YOU'RE LOOKING FOR MORE SPECIFIC OR ACADEMIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE INTERWAR PERIOD.
September 23, 2013
Overy does an excellent job drawing the "world view" of Britain between the wars. Each chapter focuses on a different cultural phenomenon though he shows the connections between them. Some of the themes he covers are: the "death" of capitalism, the rise of eugenics, the pacifist movement, etc. An excellent overview of the period.
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November 7, 2011Very well-researched, but at times it can feel like a collection of interesting facts in search of a thesis. Nonetheless, very interesting how much the mood in the late 1930s sounds like the mood now. Almost heartening, given the Second World War didn't (quite) end civilisation like everyone expected...
March 12, 2012
Another history book where a schizophrenic writing style influences my final rating. It lurches between fascinating & gripping chapters...and bloated dry & dusty chapters. There are sections of this book I adore...a pity they sit side-by-side with so much that irritates me. Once again, I split the difference and wish for some consistency.
January 28, 2011
I'd honestly have rated this higher — it's a dense, well-written, and extremely well-referenced work — save for one problem: the two chapters that concentrate heavily on the rise of Freudian psychoanalysis's popularity in the inter-war years is a painfully boring slog.
January 11, 2013
This argues that Britain's malaise between the wars was a thing in itself that was retrospectively justified by events. Yet I have to say that this has been better handled and better explained elsewhere.
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July 9, 2015Did you ever read a book that was too depressing to finish? This is one of them. I'm not sure if the topic was grim or there were too many parallels between how things were between the world wars and right now, but this is a very hard read if one wants to maintain SOME optimism.
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February 1, 2010Can't really rate this book, because I only read the Eugenics chapter. But you history majors may like it...
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