The Department of Defense has been successfully exploiting rapidly developing advances in information technology for military gain. On tomorrow's multidimensional battlefield - or "battlespace" - the increased density, acuity, and connectivity of sensors and many other information devices may allow U. S. Armed Forces to see almost everything worth seeing in real or near-real time. Such enhanced vision of the battlespace is no doubt a significant military advantage, but a question remains: How to we achieve dominant battlefield knowledge, namely the ability to understand what we see and act on it decisively? The papers collected here address the most critical aspects of that problem - to wit: If the United States develops the means to acquire dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), how might that affect the way it goes to war, the circumstances under which force can and will be used, the purposes for its employment, and the resulting alterations of the global geomilitary environment? Of particular interest is how the authors view the influence of DBK in light of the shift from global and regional stability issues that marks the post-Cold War world. While no definitive answer has yet emerged, it is clear that the implications of so profound a change in military technology are critical to the structure and function of the U.S. Armed Forces. In working toward a definitive answer, the authors of this volume make an important contribution to a debate whose resolution will shape the decades to come. Ervin J. Rokke Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University
Reprint of book from 1996. Excellent collection of essays on use of data fusion systems to be able to know the battlespace - not just collect data but actually make it create the actual battlespace image using the enhanced presentation tools - user interfaces but also VR. Essays go through gains, potential pitfalls and what technology can do and where humans remain in full control. Written in the days of downsizing following end of Cold War and First Gulf War authors are still talking about armed forces as armed forces not anti-terrorist police into which Western armies devolved since 2001.
In light of modern time events, they also touch upon the ability to produce weapons en masse and with more affordable price tag. As I said, this was still time when west understood regular war and need for actual production to support any war effort.
There are germs of those eternal ideas of small professional forces (which went into bin of history taking into account experience from modern battlefield) of course, but also a very interesting indirect engagement concept - authors see US engaged overtly or covertly as providing sensor platform and guided weapons to their allies who would fight on the ground and actually bleed. This is so called vertical escalation - using all vertical, air and space based - ISR resources. Which brings us to US, and NATO actually firing and guiding weapons striking Russia, no matter how they deny or not (press already reported this is case) - including who maintains and runs these weapon platforms. This infrastructure was built over years.
It is obvious that US was starting to position itself in this full spectrum dominance as a gray eminence to enforce its will on other people using weapons from distance coupled with proxies and allies as ground troops (and its own troops if required as last means). Sole goal was total domination over every territory on Earth and ability to strike at any place at any time using what today is called kill-chain (in past this was called reconnaissance-strike-defense-complex).
Of course this is all, as authors say, to prevent wars :)
Very interesting concepts and views of use and applications. Highly recommended to everyone interested in military technology.