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The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan
The Taliban remain one of the most elusive forces in modern history. A ragtag collection of clerics and madrasa students, this obscure movement emerged out of the rubble of the Cold War to shock the world with their draconian Islamic order. The Taliban refused to surrender their vision even when confronted by the United States after September 11, 2001. Reinventing themselves as part of a broad insurgency that destabilized Afghanistan, they pledged to drive out the Americans, NATO, and their allies and restore their "Islamic Emirate."
The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan explores the paradox at the center of this challenging how has a seemingly anachronistic band of religious zealots managed to retain a tenacious foothold in the struggle for Afghanistan's future? Grounding their analysis in a deep understanding of the country's past, leading scholars of Afghan history, politics, society, and culture show how the Taliban was less an attempt to revive a medieval theocracy than a dynamic, complex, and adaptive force rooted in the history of Afghanistan and shaped by modern international politics. Shunning journalistic accounts of its conspiratorial origins, the essays investigate broader questions relating to the character of the Taliban, its evolution over time, and its capacity to affect the future of the region.
Offering an invaluable guide to "what went wrong" with the American reconstruction project in Afghanistan, this book accounts for the persistence of a powerful and enigmatic movement while simultaneously mapping Afghanistan's enduring political crisis.
The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan explores the paradox at the center of this challenging how has a seemingly anachronistic band of religious zealots managed to retain a tenacious foothold in the struggle for Afghanistan's future? Grounding their analysis in a deep understanding of the country's past, leading scholars of Afghan history, politics, society, and culture show how the Taliban was less an attempt to revive a medieval theocracy than a dynamic, complex, and adaptive force rooted in the history of Afghanistan and shaped by modern international politics. Shunning journalistic accounts of its conspiratorial origins, the essays investigate broader questions relating to the character of the Taliban, its evolution over time, and its capacity to affect the future of the region.
Offering an invaluable guide to "what went wrong" with the American reconstruction project in Afghanistan, this book accounts for the persistence of a powerful and enigmatic movement while simultaneously mapping Afghanistan's enduring political crisis.
448 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
August 16, 2021
The quality of essays varies but there's some illuminating analysis here that's helpful for understanding current events. "Modern Taliban?" helped clarify how to parse the 'moderate' tone Taliban projects in their outward communication. I came to understand Taliban as an amorphous group with its leadership driven as much by aspirations for modern statehood and international recognition as dedication to religious ideology.
While the book presents a much more nuanced view of the Taliban than their popular image as anachronistic tribal warlods, the historical context I gained gives me little hope as to their competence to ever modernize or properly govern Afghanistan. It's unclear where the Taliban government will fit in a world with a greatly shifted geopolitical contour than the one that incubated them thirty-some years ago.
While the book presents a much more nuanced view of the Taliban than their popular image as anachronistic tribal warlods, the historical context I gained gives me little hope as to their competence to ever modernize or properly govern Afghanistan. It's unclear where the Taliban government will fit in a world with a greatly shifted geopolitical contour than the one that incubated them thirty-some years ago.
October 25, 2021
Some helpful, insightful, and timely insights into the genesis & development of the Taliban over the years, as well as into the complexities of the political situation in Afghanistan pre/post-9/11.
September 4, 2025
they need to keep that shit over there
October 25, 2008
The Taliban and the Crisis in Afghanistan is an up-to-date collection of expert essays on the rise, fall and renaissance of the Taliban, set against the backdrop of Afghan wars that extended from the 1970s to their assumption of power in 1996 and fall in 2001.
There are no apologists for the Taliban in this book (nor should there be) but several authors marvel at their astonishing success, 1994-1996, in seizing control of 80% of Afghanistan, given the fact that they began as a group of a few dozen fundamentalist mullahs and ex-mujahideen in the Kandahar area. Several reasons are adduced: authentic revulsion at the corrupt, disorderly, criminal way of life in Afghanistan after the communist collapse; rage at the ascension of non-Pashtun rulers; manipulation by foreign intelligence agencies (principally the Pakistani ISI.)
The Pashtun variable is perhaps the one American readers must focus on most closely. Pashtuns are the largest and dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan and have ruled it for most of Afghanistan's existence (dating to the 18th century.
After the communist's fall from power, Tadjiks and other northerners (non-Pashtuns) briefly assumed control of Kabul. This certainly galled Pashtuns in general and the Taliban in particular. In terms of Pakistan, non-Pashtun rule of Afghanistan also was a problem. Why? Because most Pashtuns live in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, Pakistan prefers rule of Afghanistan by Pashtuns.
The current crisis takes shape are these facts: Karzai is a Pashtun who is surrounded by many "northern" ministers. In some Pashtun eyes, he is a sell-out. Hence, there is a diverse, neo-Taliban movement conducting operations to weaken his government and drive foreign forces out of the country, presumably leading to a reassertion of more "genuine" Pashtun rule.
The "foreign factor" is a permanent element in Afghan national existence because Afghanistan is an extremely poor state that has served as a buffer, or shuttlecock, between great powers since the early 19th century. To rule the country, a king or president typically has counted on foreign patronage. Today's patronage is US/NATO. Earlier patronage was Soviet, and, of course, British.
The political formula in play in Afghanistan right now (centralized power weakened by a symbolic Pashtun leader) seems destined to fail. A more federal approach is called for. Having fought for decades to survive, the northern Afghans (of Tadjik, Uzebek, and other ethnic affiliations) are in no mood to be ruled again by a strong central Pashtun-led government. But a weak central Pashutn-led government won't work in this country either. Hence, the attractiveness of the federal approach (although the Pashtun in Afghanistan, like the Sunni in Iraq, tend to think that is their right and calling to be in charge of a strong central government.)
This collection of essays, like all such collections, is somewhat repetitive and uneven. It veers between grand academic discourse and rat-a-tat historical reporting. There is no central thesis, nor is there a strong recommendation or prediction for the future. In some ways the book admirably defers to the complexity of a complex country with a complex history--much more complex than reported in the US media or addressed by US/NATO leaders.
There are no apologists for the Taliban in this book (nor should there be) but several authors marvel at their astonishing success, 1994-1996, in seizing control of 80% of Afghanistan, given the fact that they began as a group of a few dozen fundamentalist mullahs and ex-mujahideen in the Kandahar area. Several reasons are adduced: authentic revulsion at the corrupt, disorderly, criminal way of life in Afghanistan after the communist collapse; rage at the ascension of non-Pashtun rulers; manipulation by foreign intelligence agencies (principally the Pakistani ISI.)
The Pashtun variable is perhaps the one American readers must focus on most closely. Pashtuns are the largest and dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan and have ruled it for most of Afghanistan's existence (dating to the 18th century.
After the communist's fall from power, Tadjiks and other northerners (non-Pashtuns) briefly assumed control of Kabul. This certainly galled Pashtuns in general and the Taliban in particular. In terms of Pakistan, non-Pashtun rule of Afghanistan also was a problem. Why? Because most Pashtuns live in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, Pakistan prefers rule of Afghanistan by Pashtuns.
The current crisis takes shape are these facts: Karzai is a Pashtun who is surrounded by many "northern" ministers. In some Pashtun eyes, he is a sell-out. Hence, there is a diverse, neo-Taliban movement conducting operations to weaken his government and drive foreign forces out of the country, presumably leading to a reassertion of more "genuine" Pashtun rule.
The "foreign factor" is a permanent element in Afghan national existence because Afghanistan is an extremely poor state that has served as a buffer, or shuttlecock, between great powers since the early 19th century. To rule the country, a king or president typically has counted on foreign patronage. Today's patronage is US/NATO. Earlier patronage was Soviet, and, of course, British.
The political formula in play in Afghanistan right now (centralized power weakened by a symbolic Pashtun leader) seems destined to fail. A more federal approach is called for. Having fought for decades to survive, the northern Afghans (of Tadjik, Uzebek, and other ethnic affiliations) are in no mood to be ruled again by a strong central Pashtun-led government. But a weak central Pashutn-led government won't work in this country either. Hence, the attractiveness of the federal approach (although the Pashtun in Afghanistan, like the Sunni in Iraq, tend to think that is their right and calling to be in charge of a strong central government.)
This collection of essays, like all such collections, is somewhat repetitive and uneven. It veers between grand academic discourse and rat-a-tat historical reporting. There is no central thesis, nor is there a strong recommendation or prediction for the future. In some ways the book admirably defers to the complexity of a complex country with a complex history--much more complex than reported in the US media or addressed by US/NATO leaders.
March 25, 2009
A great collection of scholarly articles about the Taliban. Now this book is increasingly relevant as we prepare to send in more troops. Very detailed solid work for foreign policy loving people.
March 28, 2012
The only book I have ever returned to Amazon. Some very sloppy scholarship, and I questioned some of the sources, to such an extent that the book lost all credibility for me.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews