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Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11
In this pathbreaking book, Amy Zegart provides the first scholarly examination of the intelligence failures that preceded September 11. Until now, those failures have been attributed largely to individual mistakes. But Zegart shows how and why the intelligence system itself left us vulnerable.
Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot.
Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.
Zegart argues that after the Cold War ended, the CIA and FBI failed to adapt to the rise of terrorism. She makes the case by conducting painstaking analysis of more than three hundred intelligence reform recommendations and tracing the history of CIA and FBI counterterrorism efforts from 1991 to 2001, drawing extensively from declassified government documents and interviews with more than seventy high-ranking government officials. She finds that political leaders were well aware of the emerging terrorist danger and the urgent need for intelligence reform, but failed to achieve the changes they sought. The same forces that have stymied intelligence reform for decades are to resistance inside U.S. intelligence agencies, the rational interests of politicians and career bureaucrats, and core aspects of our democracy such as the fragmented structure of the federal government. Ultimately failures of adaptation led to failures of performance. Zegart reveals how longstanding organizational weaknesses left unaddressed during the 1990s prevented the CIA and FBI from capitalizing on twenty-three opportunities to disrupt the September 11 plot.
Spying Blind is a sobering account of why two of America's most important intelligence agencies failed to adjust to new threats after the Cold War, and why they are unlikely to adapt in the future.
336 pages, Paperback
First published August 6, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
May 1, 2008
In Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI and the Origins of 9/11, Amy Zegart identifies the organizational failures at the root of 9/11. In particular, Zegart attributes the CIA’s and FBI’s failures to intercept the terrorists to a failure to adapt.
In both cases,“structural problems, cultural pathologies and perverse incentive systems” prevented the CIA and the FBI from adapting to meet the terrorist threat. The organizational failures of the CIA and the FBI in turn interacted with the perverse incentives which prevented three presidents, Congress and the Senate from effectively using their power to spur organizational change when it would have mattered most.
I think this book is so damning--and frightening--precisely because it doesn't take the easy route and point fingers at individuals or particular adminstrations. Zegart makes a convincing case for why US intelligence agencies failed so badly at intercepting the terrorist attacks.
I'd always imagined the CIA and FBI as these highly efficient agencies, but after Spying Blind, I'll never look at them the same way again. From the CIA's lame duck director to the FBI's outdated computer system which took fourteen commands to enter a single document, it becomes painfully clear just how prone these seemingly invulnerable organizations are to the same failings as the rest of government. This is a quick and highly entertaining if sobering read. Recommended for anyone interested in 9/11, organizational behavior and policy disasters
In both cases,“structural problems, cultural pathologies and perverse incentive systems” prevented the CIA and the FBI from adapting to meet the terrorist threat. The organizational failures of the CIA and the FBI in turn interacted with the perverse incentives which prevented three presidents, Congress and the Senate from effectively using their power to spur organizational change when it would have mattered most.
I think this book is so damning--and frightening--precisely because it doesn't take the easy route and point fingers at individuals or particular adminstrations. Zegart makes a convincing case for why US intelligence agencies failed so badly at intercepting the terrorist attacks.
I'd always imagined the CIA and FBI as these highly efficient agencies, but after Spying Blind, I'll never look at them the same way again. From the CIA's lame duck director to the FBI's outdated computer system which took fourteen commands to enter a single document, it becomes painfully clear just how prone these seemingly invulnerable organizations are to the same failings as the rest of government. This is a quick and highly entertaining if sobering read. Recommended for anyone interested in 9/11, organizational behavior and policy disasters
April 10, 2022
Spying Blind is a solid work of scholarship into why the CIA and the FBI failed to interfere with the 9/11 plot. It is a blend of theory, examination, and explanation. Author Amy Zegart notes that some readers may skip the theory chapter, but recommends against that because, "theory matters." She is correct because that chapter offers a number of very interesting insights drawn from the the fields of organization theory and political science. The former usually deals with the study of private sector organization, and the latter treating intelligence organizations only as inputs to policy decisions, not as subjects worthy of individual examination. As a result, Zegart drew from both disciplines to build her own research scheme. Impressively, that approach required the study of twelve high level studies dealing with intelligence agency activities over the period 1993 to prior to 9/11 in 2001. Those reports offered 514 recommendations for action. Her research determined "that two-thirds of them, or 340, focused specifically on improving U. S. intelligence capabilities." Of these," "only 35--just 10 percent of the total--were fully implemented. " Otherwise, "Thirty recommendations were partially implemented, and seven were implemented to an unknown extent. But, "The vast majority, 268 recommendations, or 79 percent of the total, resulted in no action at all." Her digging into the literature is supplemented by interesting interviews with people in the agencies, in Congress, and in the Executive Branch. Her examination revealed a number of underlying problems that contributed to the massive resistance to adapting.
The 9/11 tragedy is the price we paid for the failure to adapt. Zegard provides two detailed case studies of the CIA and the FBI. She defines eleven opportunities the CIA had to act in a way that could have impeded the final organization of the attack. The FBI had twelve opportunities to act on information to do the same thing. Both of them missed every opportunity. Is there a guarantee that acting on any one of these events would have prevented the attack. No, but missing 23 events to disrupt the terrorists' organization is a sorry record. Reading the account of the CIA miscues is painful. The FBI's actions seem even worse.
In both cases organizational structural problems were the underlying cause. Zegart shows that the end of the Cold War and the need to shift from targeting other bureaucracies to stateless terrorist groups was disruptive to the CIA. Formerly it could work abroad in diplomatic circles in contact with potential sources of information; there was no such easy entre to Osama bin Laden's people.
The FBI had an 80 year history of fighting crime, largely at the local level with the object of building cases against the criminals; now, abruptly, they were tasked to stop the criminal act before it happened. The barriers to adapting to the new realities were largely organizational: they include fragmentation of responsibilities within an organization and a penchant against sharing information within or without; organizational culture highlighting the recognition given the action figures, "the guys who carry the gun and risk their life," over the desk-bound analysts; and career incentives, such as bonuses and promotions. Compounding these problems there is the overriding influence of the structure and functioning of government itself, particularly at the congressional and presidential level.
Writing in 2007, Zegart notes, "the CIA and FBI have smart and dedicated officials; they always have. The question is whether these two agencies, and the rest of the U. S. Intelligence Community, have adapted to the point where they now stand a reasonable chance of preventing the next catastrophe. The evidence is not encouraging."
The book is highly recommended for specialists in the fields of government, intelligence, and political science. But, as the author suggests, a broader array of readers will find this of interest. A personal note, I found the theory chapter very interesting, especially the discussion of population ecology as applied to organizations: Darwin visits corporate headquarters.
The 9/11 tragedy is the price we paid for the failure to adapt. Zegard provides two detailed case studies of the CIA and the FBI. She defines eleven opportunities the CIA had to act in a way that could have impeded the final organization of the attack. The FBI had twelve opportunities to act on information to do the same thing. Both of them missed every opportunity. Is there a guarantee that acting on any one of these events would have prevented the attack. No, but missing 23 events to disrupt the terrorists' organization is a sorry record. Reading the account of the CIA miscues is painful. The FBI's actions seem even worse.
In both cases organizational structural problems were the underlying cause. Zegart shows that the end of the Cold War and the need to shift from targeting other bureaucracies to stateless terrorist groups was disruptive to the CIA. Formerly it could work abroad in diplomatic circles in contact with potential sources of information; there was no such easy entre to Osama bin Laden's people.
The FBI had an 80 year history of fighting crime, largely at the local level with the object of building cases against the criminals; now, abruptly, they were tasked to stop the criminal act before it happened. The barriers to adapting to the new realities were largely organizational: they include fragmentation of responsibilities within an organization and a penchant against sharing information within or without; organizational culture highlighting the recognition given the action figures, "the guys who carry the gun and risk their life," over the desk-bound analysts; and career incentives, such as bonuses and promotions. Compounding these problems there is the overriding influence of the structure and functioning of government itself, particularly at the congressional and presidential level.
Writing in 2007, Zegart notes, "the CIA and FBI have smart and dedicated officials; they always have. The question is whether these two agencies, and the rest of the U. S. Intelligence Community, have adapted to the point where they now stand a reasonable chance of preventing the next catastrophe. The evidence is not encouraging."
The book is highly recommended for specialists in the fields of government, intelligence, and political science. But, as the author suggests, a broader array of readers will find this of interest. A personal note, I found the theory chapter very interesting, especially the discussion of population ecology as applied to organizations: Darwin visits corporate headquarters.
February 19, 2022
An excellent, well-researched, and thoroughly depressing, assessment of our Intelligence Community. While the book was published in 2007, I am confident that little progress has been made in improving these vital but hidebound agencies. The obstacles that Ms. Zegart detailed in the book are still in place. There is almost certainly a catastrophe in our future.
May 27, 2008
Reads almost like a thriller, but is actually a political scientist's account of intelligence missteps that led to 9/11. Both the CIA and the FBI are fundamentally flawed, and due for a major overhaul. You'll never view spy movies in the same way again.
June 23, 2009
The government needs to learn how to use computers...
September 2, 2022
Good read if you can handle all of the data
March 27, 2024
lwk fbi need computer
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews