Hizbu’llah is the largest and most prominent political party in Lebanon, and one of the most renowned Islamist movements in the world. In this book, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb examines the organisation’s understanding of jihad and how this, together with its belief in martyrdom, brought about the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Lebanon in May 2000.
Saad-Ghorayeb explores the nature of the party’s struggle against the West by studying its views on the use of violence against Westerners. Crucially, she also addresses the question of whether Hizbu’llah depicts this struggle in purely political or civilisational terms. The existential nature of the movement’s conflict with Israel is analysed and the Islamic roots of its anti-Judaism is unearthed.
The author explores the mechanics and rationale behind the party’s integration into the Lebanese political system, and sheds light on how it has reconciled its national idenitity with its solidarity with the Muslim umma.
Dr. Amal Saad, also known as Amal Saad-Ghorayeb (أمل سعد غريب) is a Lebanese professor of political science, with a PhD from the University of Birmingham. She is a Lecturer in Politics at Cardiff University, and was previously on the faculty at The Lebanese University and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center (CMEC).
Reading this in Beirut in November 2019, post Cedar Revolution and post 33 Day War and during what is popularly called The Lebanese Revolution may seem like a pointless exercise. It is not, because much of what Prof. Saad-Ghorayeb predicted in the book’s conclusions has come true. It’s difficult to write a coherent review of this because it’s an expansion of a PhD thesis, and is essentially eight separate essays covering different aspects of the Hizbu’llah world-view and belief-system. Saad-Ghorayeb begins by presenting us with Hizbu’llah’s attitude towards violence in different situations using the original declaration letter and Hizbu’llah’s exegisis of Qu’ranic verses to back up her arguments. Of particular interest to historians is how groups such as Hizbu’llah and their older cousins Amal Movement got started due to the social mobilization of the Lebanese Sunnis and Christians in the 1950s leaving the Shiites as something akin to a Lebanese proletariat who initially gravitated towards pan-Arab Nasserists, Baathists, or the SSNP before shifting to left-wing groups such as the PFLP, OCA or LCP after the Cairo Accords of 1969 before the formation of Amal in 1975. Along the way there is an attempt to dispel some popular Western myths about the Islamic Resistance with Saad-Ghorayab going to great pains to convincingly point out that Sayyid Husayn Fadlullah was never a spiritual leader of Hizbu’llah, he did not write the Open Letter of 1985, but some of his ideas did neatly coincide with early party thought. Briefly she spills some ink to prove that Hizbu’llah were not responsible for the US Embassy attack (April 1983), the Barracks Bombings (October 1983) and the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy and Cultural Centre in Buenos Aires and London respectively. She spends a little too much time trying to demonstrate that the Western Hostage crisis of the 1980s was not the work of Hizbu’llah, but rather smaller independent groups who were sanctioned to operate in the Southern Suburbs. This has been covered far more comprehensively by other academics and journalists such as Hala Jaber and it seems clear that groups such as Islamic Jihad, the Revolutionary Justice Organisation and the Oppressed of the Earth that claimed to carry out the kidnappings were merely independent telephone groups co-ordinated by Iran to create the illusion of a large phantom menace operating in south Beirut. The only connection between the hostages and Hizbu’llah appears to have been that Hizbu’llah may have had a hand in obtaining the release of some of the hostages. Determining the truth in such awkward and contentious matters is difficult given the opaque nature of Hizbu’llah in particular and Beirut in general in the 80s. What Saad-Ghorayeb has achieved though is in demonstrating that 1982-5 Hizbu’llah was an umbrella organization for alienated Amal members, students, members of the exiled Da’wa party and individual clerics and their followers. So Hizbu’llah membership and thinking evolved in those years, and continues to evolve in certain key areas where for example the party has gone from appearing to be some kind of extension of the Iranian Revolution to a purely Lebanese paramilitary and political group. Saad-Ghorayeb’s breakdown of Hizbu’llah thought takes what would seem to be complicated theological and political positions and makes them understandable to the non-Lebanese non-Muslim. Early, and potentially complicated incidents in Operation: PEACE FOR GALILEE which fuelled the birth of Hizbu’llah such as the desecration of the Ashura Procession in Nabatiyeh, the mass internment of southerners (as many as half the male population were interned at Ansar Prison between 1982-5) and the assassination of Shaykh Ragib Harb are described with ease and care and are seamlessly blended together to help the reader understand the situation then and how it relates to 2002. Hizbu’llah’s worldview is particularly interesting where they hold a Oppressors vs Oppressed mindset and the oppressed need not necessarily be Muslim. This view should not be confused with the Sunni view of Dar al Islam vs Dar al-Harb. In other words, Hizbu’llah are surprisingly humanistic in outlook. Similarly and surprisingly they have a secular view on domestic politics where the Taif Agreement, being sectarian in nature, is a temporary arrangement and open to modification. Hizbu’llah shifted from being an Iranian proxy, if it ever actually was, to a Lebanese group rather rapidly finding the sectarianism within Lebanon abhorrent. This position allowed Hizbu’llah to stand in Lebanese elections from 1992 to the present. However, this secular humanism does not invade the theological mind. When it comes to matters religious, Hizbu’llah is fundamentalist especially on the issue of Israel. Saad-Ghorayeb demonstrates that Hizbu’llah does not have a problem with the West per se. Their aim is not the destruction of the secular West, they merely regard the US, UK and France as arrogant and hypocritical. The struggle against the West is not existential, the struggle against Israel is because of Torah and Talmudic teachings. Despite this seemingly rational approach to religion and politics Hizbu’llah are not without their paranoid moments too regarding organizations such as the International Red Cross as potential spies (which may explain LBCI’s advice to demonstrators the other night about letting Red Cross Ambulances through their barricades empty or full, sirens going or not). The book closes with lengthy examinations on Hizbu’llah’s position on Palestine and the Jews in general. Essentially Israel is viewed by Hizbu’llah a usurper, and Hamas suicide attacks are legitimate due to the enemy being in their face and on their land for want of better terms. Hizbu’llah does not have a problem with the original Jewish inhabitants of Palestine because they are not invaders and are still people of the book. There are some subtle distinctions between Jews and Zionists that are deftly navigated by Saad-Ghorayeb bringing further clarity to the issues in a debate whose waters were muddied long ago. If there is a flaw in this work it is that Prof. Saad-Ghorayeb has used too small a sample of Hi’bu'llah representatives that are also too high up the chain of command to give a clear picture of the organization from top to bottom. Of her nine interviewees, one is the Deputy Secretary General (second only to Nasrallah himself), another is Head of the Political Council, one is Head of Amal, another is the Head of the Foreign Relations Unit with at the lower levels a media advisor to Al Manar TV and the Head of the Beirut Women’s Association. Such senior positions can convey the ideal to Prof. Saad-Ghorayeb and others, but interviewing ordinary rank and file members may present the actualité on the ground. Nevertheless this is a useful student-friendly version of what exactly Hizbu’llah was and has become, crammed with useful tidbits of information (1/4 of those killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre were Shiite) and really ought to be read by foreign diplomats and intelligence officers the world over. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand modern Lebanon, and the current, and seemingly never-ending debate of Islamic terrorism.
This book is a fantastic primer on Hizbollah as both a political movement and something that transcends that. Given the climate in the Middle East today, this book offers a very enlightening history on the movement that is Hezbollah.
The only disclaimer, however, would have to be that it is quite outdated with respect to Hezbollah's current positions. This is quite understandable given the book was published in 2002, well before the 2006 war in Lebanon and current Syrian Civil War. As such, this book should not be taken as a manifesto of Hezbollah's current politics, as the movement has evolved significantly since then. On that note, I am eagerly looking forward to Amal Saad-Ghorayeb's next book to further expand upon this evolution, as she is an incredible writer who is clearly well versed in this topic.
Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion a must read work for every researcher and student; it is a profound study that examines the stems of Hizbu’llah’s mind and ideology. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb explicates the nature of the perpetual conflict between Hizbu’llah (The Party of God) and the Zionist entity. Accordingly, Saad-Ghorayeb scrutinizes the doctrine of the most prominent party from the religious, political and sociological realms.
With her analytical approach, Saad-Ghorayeb elucidates the controversy of Hizbu’llah related to the legitimacy of cause of contra-west resistance and anti-zionism, she relies upon attestations from leading-role members of the party, as well as the writings of prominent scholars.
1- Dualist Theory of Imam Khumayni:
Saad-Ghorayeb analyzes the Dualist theory of Imam Khumayni which is based on a universal perspective as a dichotomized world depicted as ‘Oppressors’ (mustakbirin) versus ‘Oppressed’ (mustad’afin). This dichotomy, according to the author, is inspired from the “Marxist Theory and the Qur’an”.
Comparatively, Amal demonstrates the distinction between other Islamic theorists based on a division into “‘Dar Al Harb’ versus ‘Dar Al Salam’, which sets Muslims against Non-Muslims”. The Theory of Imam Khumayni was one of the reasons of the emergence of Hizbu’llah, among a Shiite society in Lebanon, where many circumstances and conditions had rendered them oppressed social groups.
The poverty and destitute of Shiite groups propelled the inhabitants of south Lebanon and Beqa’a valley to emigrate and displace toward the Capital’s suburb and the Palestinian refugees camps, where they have constituted “belts of misery” as a result of “State discrimination, negligence and abuse that it becomes synonymous with oppression”.
The despotism exercised upon the Shiites in Lebanon, didn’t motivate Hizbu’llah to adopt a sectarian policy as other Lebanese parties and compatriots. The Qu’ranic notion of “oppressed” is wide humanist to include Muslims and Non-Muslims, rendering the theory of Khumayni, adopted by Hizbu’llah, a secular vision.
The secularism of the Party of God is proved by its alliance with other secular and Non-Shiite parties, such as Ba’ath Party in Syria, PLO and Marxists Leaders ‘Castro, Ortega and Mandella’. On the other hand, the secularism of PLO “did not prevent Hizbu’llah for condemning Amal’s (movement) war of the camps against the Organization or from actively intervening on behalf of the Sunni Palestinian refugees”.
2- The Islamic State:
The ideal Islamic State, according to the Iranian Revolution, is based on the ‘Mahdist Doctrine’. Imam Al Mahdi is the twelfth and last Imam whose Shiites believe that he “have been in Occultation since 874 CE and whose eventual return to institute the rule of justice on Earth”.
Hizbu’llah’s perspective of the Islamic State is a state of Justice. Accordingly, the democracy is unfair, where the majority coerces the minority, as well as the majority, in democratic regimes, is obtained by 51% of the participants, which is considered irrelevant regarding the Humanism of Justice in Islam. The rule of the majority in democracies is depicted by Hizbu’llah as inferior to “Islamic government”. This inferiority, as described by Saad-Ghorayeb, is related to three features:
1- “The supremacy of the majority’s opinion necessarily entails the suppression of the minority”;
2- “The tendency of democratic systems to be dominated by the will of the minority, which ostensibly appears as the will of the majority”;
3- “The defectiveness and injustice of a system that only claims to represent the current generation…disregards to the rights…of future generation”.
3- Wilayat Al Faqih (The Guardianship of Jurisprudent):
The concept of Wilayat Al Faqih dates back to the first Occultation of Imam Al Mahdi, where four consecutive religious scholars “Fuqaha” had been in charge to lead the Umma. Inspired by the thought of Nasiruddin-Tusi, Imam Khumayni adopted the concept of the “Perfect Teacher” who would lead the Umma during the greater Occultation of Imam Al Mahdi.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb clarifies the “Wilayat al Faqih” throughout; starting by the Qu’ranic origin (4:62) that implies the right of Fuqaha to rule the Islamic Umma, as well as the depiction of Imam Khumayni about the Jurisprudent, ending by the role of Wilayat Al Faqih in the political thought of Hizbu’llah, which “has remained an integral part of the party’s intellectual foundations”.
In fact, Saad-Ghorayeb, could brilliantly demonstrate that the Wilayat al Faqih, as a pan-Islamist perception, doesn’t imply that Hizbu’llah, in anyway, rejects the idea of nationalism. For Hizbu’llah, the authority of the Jurisprudent, on the political realm, is different than the religious sphere.
Religiously, the Jurisprudent is the sole reference of Fatwa, for being the ‘Marja’iyat al-Taqlid’ (the religious emulation) as the Shiite theological approach of ‘Taqlid’. On the other hand, the Jurisprudent, on the political scope, issues the major guidelines such as who is the enemy.
4- Pan-Islamic Concept of Hizbu’llah:
The Umma (Muslim Nation), according to Hizbu’llah, entails both Sunni and Shiite, regardless of their adherence to the concept of Wilayat al Faqih. By consequence to the adherence of Hizbu’llah to the Wilayat al Faqih, the party became committed to supranational duties. The Iranian Revolution itself “stipulated that the Islamic character of the revolution necessitated its export to other countries in light of the universality of the Islamic message”.
Palestine cause is Islamic; the sanctity of Jerusalem to Muslims doesn’t restrain the Palestinian cause by Arab and being a raison d’être for Hizbu’llah, the Israeli Occupation for Palestine makes its liberation an Islamic duty rather than Palestinian one. The sanctity of Jerusalem and what it symbolizes to Muslims doesn’t circumscribe the Palestinian cause by Arabs. According to the Israeli-occupation for the holy land, Israel remains the perpetual enemy of the Umma.
5- Hizbu’llah’s Repudiation to the West:
The conflict between the party and the west is considered as cultural conflict in the first place, as purported by Naim Qassim. The Anti-Westernism is, historically, dated back to the seventh century. This struggle is depicted as being a Civilizational conflict. The USA is designated to be the “Pioneer of Evil”, being the oppressor of the people of the world.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb continues to explain the Hizbu’llah’s repudiation to the west, and elaborates the western plot against Islam, where USA comes as the head of the oppressors and the other western countries come in the second place, for being responsible of sustaining “the existence of the illegitimate State”, and their roles in maintaining even further Palestinian Diaspora.
“This conspiracy was first conceived in the colonial period when ‘World Arrogance’ inaugurated its ‘divide and rule’ policy by dividing the Muslim World into separate nations in order to dominate the region … [T]he west is now intend on subdividing Muslim nations even further by creating internal strife and aggravating existing religious and sectarian sensitivities as in the case of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon”.
6- Anti-Zionism:
The Israeli occupation of South Lebanon was one of the raison d’être of Hizbu’llah. After the unconditional Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, the duty of Hizbu’llah for liberating Palestine remains intrinsic according the pan-Islamic and Universalist vision of the party.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb explicates the historic animosity against Israel as an illegitimate state. On the other hand, she shows the distinction of Hizbu’llah between Judaism and Zionism, where the party considered that the nexus between them is merely the Jewish Assabiyya. “The general equation of Zionism with Judaism, merely signify that all Zionist are necessarily Jews …[r]ather than indicate that all Jews are Zionists”.
Hizbu’llah dubs the Jews as “People of the Book” according the Qu’ranic classification, but affirms that Jews are racists according the Jewish legacy of superiority. The author explains with the Qu’ranic evidence god’s indignation of the Jewish after being the ‘Chosen People’. She substantiates this vision according the deviation of ‘sons of Israel’ from Moses, as speculated by Ali Fayyad, “the deviation from Moses’ message must have occurred in the interim between Jesus’ Prophethood and Muhammad’s. What leads him to this conclusion is the Qu’ranic reference to the ‘Children of Israel’ from the Era of Moses until the Era of Jesus, and its reference to them as ‘the Jews’ during Muhammad’s time”.
An extremely lucid analysis of Hizbullah as a political-intellectual project, but at the same time Ghorayeb does not subordinate its religiously motivated and sustained morals or decision-making. She covers a lot of ground from the commitment of Hizbullah to an Islamic jurisprudence borrowed from the Iranian revolutionary experience and State, as well as, the tension between the party's pragmatic/rational politics and its highly utopian ideal of an Islamic state.
It is extensive with interpretive labour from Ghorayeb regarding the language, epistemology and intention of the party on many key issues such as its anti-judaism (not anti-semitism, you'll see), secularism and democratic alignment. Perhaps the most interesting thing regarding the book is this effort to decode/deconstruct the language of political leaders in an attempt to enter their psyche. This is a requirement for political scientists who must wonder whether Hizbullah derives its moralized political stand from Islam or whether Israel's invasion of Lebanon in the 1970s and 80s proved to be an ideologically challenging turning point for an already impoverished Shia minority.
The answer is not absolutist, but neither is it that easily deducible.
Probably the best and only book about what Hizbullah actually is in English. Well organized, thorough and honest. I learned a lot. It made me sad that the world is this way, so fiercely divided by race and religion. Hisbullah was born out of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Its main goal is to liberate the oppressed. That is its raison d'être. But there is a lot more to understand around their religious rules, their rules about violence, suicide missions, peace negotiations, etc.. They see Israel as the world's main evil and the U.S. as its accomplice, or the great Satan. The U.S., they say, is guilty of arrogance for arranging the world according to its own priorities.
I just wanted to understand this because the U.S. is ramping up war on Hizbullah in response to the war in Israel. They, in turn, will continue to wage war right back. It would seem to me that a great way to stop this would be to stop the oppression of Muslims but it doesn't look like we're going to go that route, does it? God help us.
I don’t know a lot about Islam so some of the discussions that got into specific teachings went over my head (Chapter 3 especially), but other than my own ignorance, this was a great read, and I learned a lot from it. Hizbu’llah is a complex organization, and this book does a great job of giving it the close examination and discussion that it warrants.