Most Civil War generals were graduates of West Point, and many of them helped transform the U.S. Army from what was little better than an armed mob that performed poorly during the War of 1812 into the competent fighting force that won the Mexican War. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh demonstrates how the "old army" transformed itself into a professional military force after 1814, and, more important, how "old army" methods profoundly shaped the conduct of the Civil War.
I must be getting cranky in my old age. And my patience for books to get interesting is dwindling. I abandoned this approx 25% in.
This book had alarm bells off the top, from a author I had not heard of, to a sub-title that sounded a little “term paper” ish.....
The book was just not interesting unless you’re a chief supply officer in one of the military branches .... from process, policy, to detailed .... yada yada ... got bored even writing this review. It felt like I was reading someone’s dissertation with mounds and mounds of facts but no story, no flow, no..........snore.........snore.........
Dr. Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh presents here a case study of how traditionalist, "old Army" mentalities baked into the officer corps of both Union and Confederate armies directly affected the American Civil War. Likening the "old army" mentality to an almost elite, aristocratic conservatism, he argues that neither side were fully equipped with a significant benefit in terms of officers due to variances in how both sides distributed the West Pointers they had available. Additionally, the text presents a general overview of the evolution of United States military doctrine from Baron von Steuben's "Blue Book" to the manuals of arms employed during the Civil War Era. A very technical military history more predicted upon grand strategic overviews than the minutiae of each campaign, "West Pointers and the Civil War" is a worthy companion to Baron de Jomini and General von Clausewitz in understanding nineteenth century armies.
This was somewhat interesting to start, as I was led to believe that I would learn how the Civil War caused, in large part, our nation's Army to transition from "Old Army" to "New Army." There was a small amount of this, but it was mostly a litany of Civil War battles with their players, and some times references to whether a given battle employed cavalry, or cannon, or infantry, and whether the force's leader(s) did well, or not so well, as measured by their troops and contemporaries. The concluding pages had a significant suicide as one way of dealing with "new" and Robert E. Lee leaving the military as another way. But, if you need more Civil War battle narrative this might be useful.
Started off slow and rather over detailed about the history of military stategy (for me, personally) , but about halfway in they got to the civil war information I was looking for. Then it was terrific!
An okay book that presents some key insights into Civil War engagements. One interesting point (among many) was that the highly technical nature of the ante-bellum West Point education and an emphasis on logistics in the Army Staff allowed for the creation of the large armies at the beginning of the war, but not a corresponding level of combat leadership to fully utilize these large armies. Also of interest was the perspective that the ingrained aversion to "irregular" warfare amongst the West Pointers dictated the course of the war and prevented the South from undertaking a guerrilla insurgency, which might have been more effective. Food for thought.
Hsieh's book resets the Civil War into the context of its time rather than as a means of understanding the wars or times that follow. His focus is on the Army as an institution. The Civil War split the Army as well as the country and he argues it is the nature of the Old Army that defined how the war was fought.