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Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology
This book makes a major contribution to historical scholarship on the problem of free choice and to contemporary debates over determinism and divine foreknowledge of future events. It fills a significant gap in Reformed knowledge by presenting sources in translation and commentary on works of major importance to the Protestant tradition that have been neglected for centuries. The book begins with an introductory discussion of free choice and the Reformed tradition and then moves on to examine the concept of freedom in the work of six early modern Girolamo Zanchi, Franciscus Junius, Franciscus Gomarus, Gisbertus Voetius, Francesco Turrettini, and Bernardinus de Moor. It will be valued by all students of Reformed theology.
272 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 2009
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April 26, 2021
Asselt, Willem J. van. Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology. Baker Academic, 2010.
I think the criticisms of this book are overdone and largely unnecessary. I grant that one cannot read the Reformed scholastics as recovering Scotus. Even a friendly reader such as Richard Muller criticized A. Vos and Van Asselt on that point. I think, rather, we should focus on this book’s clear strengths. We have before us a rich and rigorous discussion of medieval and post-Reformation ontology. Further, we have translations from Zachi and Voetius that you wouldn’t otherwise find. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have the writings of Turretin himself. I largely don’t care whether Turretin is the modern day equivalent of a determinist, compatibilist, or libertarian. That is not my area of strength. I defer to the experts. On the other hand, I have read Turretin fairly closely over the last decade. I have an idea of what he said. That’s what is most important in this volume.
While I remain unconvinced that the Reformed were as Scotist as the authors make them to be, much of the text is straightforward. Let’s try to ignore the later debates on whether Jonathan Edwards innovated or not. The question before the house, or the status quaestionis, is “What saith Junius?” We don’t care about trying to make them determinists or compatibilists or libertarians. We are doing historical theology. What did they actually say?
In the introduction we get a survey of modal concepts. The editors are in dangerous waters. On one hand, since the Reformed scholastics (and medievals) dealt with issues of necessity and possibility and terms denoted by posse, they engaged in modal reasoning. They might not have the fine-tuned systems we have today, but it is there. On the other hand, the more they wade in these waters the more the discussion is likely to turn to modern discussions of libertarianism and determinism, and so incur the ire of analytic theologians. Maybe that can’t be helped.
Main idea: For the Reformed, “God as the First Cause (prima causa) and creatures as secondary causes (secunda causae) concur together in their acting to produce a contingent effect” (Van Asselt 33).
Contingency “is the actuality of the stated act” (39). If p is contingent; p occurs, but p could otherwise not occur. For Aristotle, while he held to contingency, it was only in a temporal sense (41). In each moment “only one state of affairs occurs without any alternative.” Scotus, on the other hand, argues that for each moment of time, “there is a true alternative for each state of affairs.”
Zanchi
Thesis I: Man before the Fall had truly free choice towards good as well as towards bad (Creation During a Period of Six Days, Bk 3. Chap. 3).
Zanchi defines free choice as “the free agreement of the will” (55). The agreement is that the will follows the intellect. Considered in the abstract, free choice is always free in man. “But if we consider the powers,” it is a slave (63).
Key argument: even after sin, man always retains the choice that is natural to him (Zanchi, De primi hominis lapsu, Bk 1, ch. 6). At the risk of anachronism, Zanchi doesn’t seem to be operating with Edwards’ moral/natural distinction. Zanchi defines free choice as “The faculty of freely willing or not willing, anything proposed by the intellect that you will or not will” (quoted in Van Asselt, 65).
Zanchi clarifies that “the freedom of our will does not consist in that it is driven by no necessity to sinning, but in this that it is free from all coercion” (68). Therefore, whatever “necessity” means, it cannot mean coercion. The will is a faculty of the soul. All of the potencies of the soul are called faculties (74).
Following the excerpt from Zanchi, the editors give their own interpretation.
Junius
Junius expands on the necessity of the consequent angle. For example, “If Peter walks, it is necessary he moves” (114). Yet, Peter’s walking is a contingent act. “This necessary implication does not make moving itself necessary.”
Gomarus
We do not say that the judgment of reason determines the will. Reason simply judges the goodness or badness of the means (130). Free choice isn’t identical to free will. Will has to do with potency. Arbitrium is the means to be chosen (135).
Voetius
It is with Voetius that the discussion takes on new levels of sophistication. Voetius opposes the Jesuit doctrine of “complete indifference of the will,” yet he does allow indifference of a sort. His running argument looks like this:
1) God is the efficient cause of my will, but not the formal cause. The formal cause refers to my natural mode of willing.
2) In eternity there is an indifference to objects to be chosen, A, B, C. God removes A and C from the eligible objects to be chosen.
3) In time my will freely chooses B. While I might have limited choice, there is nothing forcing that choice.
4) Physical premotion: God’s applied power awakens the creature’s potency to a second act..
5) Physical premotion has a structural, not temporal priority.
(3) - (5) refute the Jesuit doctrine of indifference. As my will is premoved by God, which is another way of its being anchored by the divine decree, there cannot be indifference either with God or myself.
Reframing the Structural Moments
1st Structural moment: I am able to choose objects A, B, and C. God is indifferent to all of these.
2nd Structural moment: God selects B; he is no longer indifferent.
Human involvement:
1st: I can logically choose A, B, or C in the abstract.
2nd: In my dependent freedom, I choose B.
Turretin
Turretin expands Voetius to note that the “indifference of the will” renders prayer and God’s covenant promise irrelevant. If the will is completely indifferent, it’s not clear what God could do. Even worse, it’s not clear how God could enact his covenant promises.
Bernardinus de Moor
De Moor applies the coup de grace to Jesuitical indifference. There cannot be a complete indifference of the will because there are several prerequisites for acting that even traditional Roman Catholics concede (and here we side with the Dominicans). There is the decree of God, his infallible foreknowledge, and the judgment of the intelleting mind. The last one is particularly thorny for the Jesuits. There can’t be complete indifference because the mind is not indifferent to the perceived Good.
Terminology
Coercion: physical necessity; an outward causes which forces one to do something (39).
Rational necessity: if the intellect judges something to be good, then the will must follow.
Freedom of contrariety: possibility of the will to choose this or that object (46).
In actu primo: this is the faculty of the will in the abstract.
In actu secundo: the will in particular acts.
Bottom line between in actu primo and in actu secundo: there is a structural, not temporal order between the two.
Conclusion
I think it is safe to say that the Reformed orthodox were not “libertarians” of any sort. I’m not sure Van Asselt even claims that. There is nothing here of the “Jonathan Edwards” debate (I truly hate that discussion). While the editors probably overcook the evidence on Scotist synchronicity, their discussions remain invaluable nonetheless.
I think the criticisms of this book are overdone and largely unnecessary. I grant that one cannot read the Reformed scholastics as recovering Scotus. Even a friendly reader such as Richard Muller criticized A. Vos and Van Asselt on that point. I think, rather, we should focus on this book’s clear strengths. We have before us a rich and rigorous discussion of medieval and post-Reformation ontology. Further, we have translations from Zachi and Voetius that you wouldn’t otherwise find. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we have the writings of Turretin himself. I largely don’t care whether Turretin is the modern day equivalent of a determinist, compatibilist, or libertarian. That is not my area of strength. I defer to the experts. On the other hand, I have read Turretin fairly closely over the last decade. I have an idea of what he said. That’s what is most important in this volume.
While I remain unconvinced that the Reformed were as Scotist as the authors make them to be, much of the text is straightforward. Let’s try to ignore the later debates on whether Jonathan Edwards innovated or not. The question before the house, or the status quaestionis, is “What saith Junius?” We don’t care about trying to make them determinists or compatibilists or libertarians. We are doing historical theology. What did they actually say?
In the introduction we get a survey of modal concepts. The editors are in dangerous waters. On one hand, since the Reformed scholastics (and medievals) dealt with issues of necessity and possibility and terms denoted by posse, they engaged in modal reasoning. They might not have the fine-tuned systems we have today, but it is there. On the other hand, the more they wade in these waters the more the discussion is likely to turn to modern discussions of libertarianism and determinism, and so incur the ire of analytic theologians. Maybe that can’t be helped.
Main idea: For the Reformed, “God as the First Cause (prima causa) and creatures as secondary causes (secunda causae) concur together in their acting to produce a contingent effect” (Van Asselt 33).
Contingency “is the actuality of the stated act” (39). If p is contingent; p occurs, but p could otherwise not occur. For Aristotle, while he held to contingency, it was only in a temporal sense (41). In each moment “only one state of affairs occurs without any alternative.” Scotus, on the other hand, argues that for each moment of time, “there is a true alternative for each state of affairs.”
Zanchi
Thesis I: Man before the Fall had truly free choice towards good as well as towards bad (Creation During a Period of Six Days, Bk 3. Chap. 3).
Zanchi defines free choice as “the free agreement of the will” (55). The agreement is that the will follows the intellect. Considered in the abstract, free choice is always free in man. “But if we consider the powers,” it is a slave (63).
Key argument: even after sin, man always retains the choice that is natural to him (Zanchi, De primi hominis lapsu, Bk 1, ch. 6). At the risk of anachronism, Zanchi doesn’t seem to be operating with Edwards’ moral/natural distinction. Zanchi defines free choice as “The faculty of freely willing or not willing, anything proposed by the intellect that you will or not will” (quoted in Van Asselt, 65).
Zanchi clarifies that “the freedom of our will does not consist in that it is driven by no necessity to sinning, but in this that it is free from all coercion” (68). Therefore, whatever “necessity” means, it cannot mean coercion. The will is a faculty of the soul. All of the potencies of the soul are called faculties (74).
Following the excerpt from Zanchi, the editors give their own interpretation.
Junius
Junius expands on the necessity of the consequent angle. For example, “If Peter walks, it is necessary he moves” (114). Yet, Peter’s walking is a contingent act. “This necessary implication does not make moving itself necessary.”
Gomarus
We do not say that the judgment of reason determines the will. Reason simply judges the goodness or badness of the means (130). Free choice isn’t identical to free will. Will has to do with potency. Arbitrium is the means to be chosen (135).
Voetius
It is with Voetius that the discussion takes on new levels of sophistication. Voetius opposes the Jesuit doctrine of “complete indifference of the will,” yet he does allow indifference of a sort. His running argument looks like this:
1) God is the efficient cause of my will, but not the formal cause. The formal cause refers to my natural mode of willing.
2) In eternity there is an indifference to objects to be chosen, A, B, C. God removes A and C from the eligible objects to be chosen.
3) In time my will freely chooses B. While I might have limited choice, there is nothing forcing that choice.
4) Physical premotion: God’s applied power awakens the creature’s potency to a second act..
5) Physical premotion has a structural, not temporal priority.
(3) - (5) refute the Jesuit doctrine of indifference. As my will is premoved by God, which is another way of its being anchored by the divine decree, there cannot be indifference either with God or myself.
Reframing the Structural Moments
1st Structural moment: I am able to choose objects A, B, and C. God is indifferent to all of these.
2nd Structural moment: God selects B; he is no longer indifferent.
Human involvement:
1st: I can logically choose A, B, or C in the abstract.
2nd: In my dependent freedom, I choose B.
Turretin
Turretin expands Voetius to note that the “indifference of the will” renders prayer and God’s covenant promise irrelevant. If the will is completely indifferent, it’s not clear what God could do. Even worse, it’s not clear how God could enact his covenant promises.
Bernardinus de Moor
De Moor applies the coup de grace to Jesuitical indifference. There cannot be a complete indifference of the will because there are several prerequisites for acting that even traditional Roman Catholics concede (and here we side with the Dominicans). There is the decree of God, his infallible foreknowledge, and the judgment of the intelleting mind. The last one is particularly thorny for the Jesuits. There can’t be complete indifference because the mind is not indifferent to the perceived Good.
Terminology
Coercion: physical necessity; an outward causes which forces one to do something (39).
Rational necessity: if the intellect judges something to be good, then the will must follow.
Freedom of contrariety: possibility of the will to choose this or that object (46).
In actu primo: this is the faculty of the will in the abstract.
In actu secundo: the will in particular acts.
Bottom line between in actu primo and in actu secundo: there is a structural, not temporal order between the two.
Conclusion
I think it is safe to say that the Reformed orthodox were not “libertarians” of any sort. I’m not sure Van Asselt even claims that. There is nothing here of the “Jonathan Edwards” debate (I truly hate that discussion). While the editors probably overcook the evidence on Scotist synchronicity, their discussions remain invaluable nonetheless.
April 22, 2018
A tendentious and revisionary treatise exacerbating all of the worst flaws of Muller's PRRD project ('synchronic will', i.e. Molinesque compatibilism) with none of the redeeming virtues (depth in history as in PRRD proper), seemingly written solely to confirm the hereticated doctrine of the will present in 'Divine Will and Human Choice' (read with no emphasis on the divine will and all the emphasis on the human choice).
The 'reinterpretations' of six early Reformed thinkers presented here explicitly attempts to make the historical Reformed tradition accomodating of, receptive to, and positively demanding of the illusory 'free will' (32-37), while ruling the divine and lustrous truth of Determinism out tout court (42).
Selections from six early Reformed scholastics, such as Zanchi, Junius, and Turretin, are adduced to support this untenable conclusion. Determined will is renounced in favor of a 'third way' (free willist, essentially Molinist) between (the myth of?[1]) 'Pelagian Rome' (limited to a libarbitrist reading of the Tradition) and Reformed Determinism, making a self-contradictory mess between anthropology and theology proper in the process. Luther is explicitly pronounced a holy Determinist, and then his doctrine of (lack of) free will is denounced (234). The authors' doctrine, foisted on to the Reformed scholastics, is susceptible to infinite criticism, and makes of man an unmoved mover and uncaused cause, willing without being moved, 'persuaded but not coerced' (77, passim), language reminiscent of Arminianism, open 'theism', and every other anthropocentric 'free will' (which we may call generally 'liberist' or 'libarbitrist') movement to ever blight the church of God: by men who, with unwarranted concern, pretend to protect God's honor and justice from his own decree, being more concerned with the (misnamed) 'Augustinian' theodicy than with sovereignty and the impotence of man.
In summary, if this thesis accurately represents Reformed theology, Reformed theology is false, as Determinism is a necessary truth. In truth, it is nothing more than crypto-Arminianist revisionism of the divine Determinist truth recovered and emphasized by the Reformers - though however inconsistently and sporadically maintained by their wayward disciples who ever seem to revert to some kind of free willism - from the same country which begat Arminius five centuries ago. This conclusion is all but admitted by the authors (237), who, in the course of cracking an academic joke about being accused of Arminianism, assert that Necessitarian-Determinism 'invalidates Christian anthropology in denying the responsibility of man [which they link to libero arbitrio - Ed.] and ultimately makes God the author of sin' (236, 241): a contention refuted by Clark (cf 'Religion, Reason, and Revelation', ch. 'God and Evil') as entirely incompatible with the coherence of Christian truth, the omnipotence, creatorship, aseity, impassibility, and immutability of God.
Still, hard questions are raised about the true commitment of the revered 'Reformed fathers' to the truth of Determinism: if the answers provided by the authors are sustained, the Reformed tradition they present must be emphatically jettisoned as erroneous and destructive of truth, and Reformed theology must needs be reformed - semper reformanda. If this accurately represents the thought of the early Reformed scholastics on freedom, thank God their writings are not canonical, as they certainly are fallible - and thank God for the later authors who had more concern for consistency.
If they accurately represent the essence of Reformed theology (God forbid), it must be rejected prima facie and an explicitly Determinist theology raised in its place, whether one along the lines of Luther's explicitly Determinist 'Bondage of the Will' (in its unadulterated glory, before it was itself softened by later free willists in that communion) or along lines never heretofore imagined.
[1] For, if this is true, Catholic Bañezian-Thomism is more Determinist and predestinarian than the 'Reformed theology' imaged in this treatise, and impossible to paint as Pelagian without also tarring itself. Indeed, if the contentions of the authors are true, the Catholic objection to Reformed anthropology as being inherently crypto-Pelagian is sustained.
Soli Deo Gloria.
The 'reinterpretations' of six early Reformed thinkers presented here explicitly attempts to make the historical Reformed tradition accomodating of, receptive to, and positively demanding of the illusory 'free will' (32-37), while ruling the divine and lustrous truth of Determinism out tout court (42).
Selections from six early Reformed scholastics, such as Zanchi, Junius, and Turretin, are adduced to support this untenable conclusion. Determined will is renounced in favor of a 'third way' (free willist, essentially Molinist) between (the myth of?[1]) 'Pelagian Rome' (limited to a libarbitrist reading of the Tradition) and Reformed Determinism, making a self-contradictory mess between anthropology and theology proper in the process. Luther is explicitly pronounced a holy Determinist, and then his doctrine of (lack of) free will is denounced (234). The authors' doctrine, foisted on to the Reformed scholastics, is susceptible to infinite criticism, and makes of man an unmoved mover and uncaused cause, willing without being moved, 'persuaded but not coerced' (77, passim), language reminiscent of Arminianism, open 'theism', and every other anthropocentric 'free will' (which we may call generally 'liberist' or 'libarbitrist') movement to ever blight the church of God: by men who, with unwarranted concern, pretend to protect God's honor and justice from his own decree, being more concerned with the (misnamed) 'Augustinian' theodicy than with sovereignty and the impotence of man.
In summary, if this thesis accurately represents Reformed theology, Reformed theology is false, as Determinism is a necessary truth. In truth, it is nothing more than crypto-Arminianist revisionism of the divine Determinist truth recovered and emphasized by the Reformers - though however inconsistently and sporadically maintained by their wayward disciples who ever seem to revert to some kind of free willism - from the same country which begat Arminius five centuries ago. This conclusion is all but admitted by the authors (237), who, in the course of cracking an academic joke about being accused of Arminianism, assert that Necessitarian-Determinism 'invalidates Christian anthropology in denying the responsibility of man [which they link to libero arbitrio - Ed.] and ultimately makes God the author of sin' (236, 241): a contention refuted by Clark (cf 'Religion, Reason, and Revelation', ch. 'God and Evil') as entirely incompatible with the coherence of Christian truth, the omnipotence, creatorship, aseity, impassibility, and immutability of God.
Still, hard questions are raised about the true commitment of the revered 'Reformed fathers' to the truth of Determinism: if the answers provided by the authors are sustained, the Reformed tradition they present must be emphatically jettisoned as erroneous and destructive of truth, and Reformed theology must needs be reformed - semper reformanda. If this accurately represents the thought of the early Reformed scholastics on freedom, thank God their writings are not canonical, as they certainly are fallible - and thank God for the later authors who had more concern for consistency.
If they accurately represent the essence of Reformed theology (God forbid), it must be rejected prima facie and an explicitly Determinist theology raised in its place, whether one along the lines of Luther's explicitly Determinist 'Bondage of the Will' (in its unadulterated glory, before it was itself softened by later free willists in that communion) or along lines never heretofore imagined.
[1] For, if this is true, Catholic Bañezian-Thomism is more Determinist and predestinarian than the 'Reformed theology' imaged in this treatise, and impossible to paint as Pelagian without also tarring itself. Indeed, if the contentions of the authors are true, the Catholic objection to Reformed anthropology as being inherently crypto-Pelagian is sustained.
Soli Deo Gloria.
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