What do you think?
Rate this book
A Million Bullets: The Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan
In April 2006 a small British peace-keeping force was sent to Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. Within weeks they were cut off and besieged by some of the world's toughest the infamous Taliban, who were determined to send the foreigners home again. Defence Secretary John Reid had hoped that Operation Herrick 4 could be accomplished without a shot being fired; instead, the Army was drawn into the fiercest fighting it had seen for fifty years. Millions of bullets and thousands of lives have been expended since then in an under-publicized but bitter conflict whose end is still not in sight. Some people consider it the fourth Anglo-Afghan War since Victorian times. How on earth did this happen? And what is it like for the troops on the front line of the 'War on Terror'?
James Fergusson takes us to the dark heart of the battle zone. Here, in their own words and for the first time, are the young veterans of Herrick 4. Here, unmasked, are the civilian and military officials responsible for planning and executing the operation. Here, too, are the Taliban themselves, to whom Fergusson gained unique and extraordinary access. Controversial, fascinating and occasionally downright terrifying, A Million Bullets analyses the sorry slide into war in Helmand and asks this most troubling could Britain perhaps have avoided the violence altogether?
James Fergusson takes us to the dark heart of the battle zone. Here, in their own words and for the first time, are the young veterans of Herrick 4. Here, unmasked, are the civilian and military officials responsible for planning and executing the operation. Here, too, are the Taliban themselves, to whom Fergusson gained unique and extraordinary access. Controversial, fascinating and occasionally downright terrifying, A Million Bullets analyses the sorry slide into war in Helmand and asks this most troubling could Britain perhaps have avoided the violence altogether?
470 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2008
19 people are currently reading
177 people want to read
About the author
James Fergusson
367 books12 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name. See this thread for more information.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
March 22, 2012
A neutral and brilliant account of the British Army involvment in Helmand and how it could have been different..The chapter at the end "Amongst the Taliban" was fascinating.
November 18, 2025
يغطي الكتاب تفاصيل إرسال قوة حفظ سلام بريطانية صغيرة إلى إقليم هلمند بجنوب أفغانستان في أبريل 2006، والتي سرعان ما وجدت نفسها محاصرة ومنخرطة في قتال عنيف ضد مقاتلي طالبان.
يقدم فيرغسون رواية مباشرة وحميمة لتجارب القوات البريطانية على أرض
الواقع، بما في ذلك شهادات الجنود الشباب الذين شاركوا في العملية العسكرية 4).
يحلل المؤلف التخطيط والتنفيذ الخاطئ للعملية، وكيف انزلقت بريطانيا إلى حرب شرسة لم تكن متوقعة، والتي كان من المأمول أن تتم "دون إطلاق رصاصة واحدة".
بالإضافة إلى الجنود والمسؤولين العسكريين والمدنيين، تمكن فيرغسون من الوصول بشكل فريد إلى مقاتلي طالبان أنفسهم، مما يقدم رؤية شاملة ومثيرة للجدل للصراع.
باختصار، يقدم الكتاب نظرة ثاقبة وواقعية ومقلقة حول تورط بريطانيا في الحرب في أفغانستان وتكاليفها البشرية والعسكرية.
يقدم فيرغسون رواية مباشرة وحميمة لتجارب القوات البريطانية على أرض
الواقع، بما في ذلك شهادات الجنود الشباب الذين شاركوا في العملية العسكرية 4).
يحلل المؤلف التخطيط والتنفيذ الخاطئ للعملية، وكيف انزلقت بريطانيا إلى حرب شرسة لم تكن متوقعة، والتي كان من المأمول أن تتم "دون إطلاق رصاصة واحدة".
بالإضافة إلى الجنود والمسؤولين العسكريين والمدنيين، تمكن فيرغسون من الوصول بشكل فريد إلى مقاتلي طالبان أنفسهم، مما يقدم رؤية شاملة ومثيرة للجدل للصراع.
باختصار، يقدم الكتاب نظرة ثاقبة وواقعية ومقلقة حول تورط بريطانيا في الحرب في أفغانستان وتكاليفها البشرية والعسكرية.
April 29, 2025
Audible. Just hoping to diffuse some army terms into my brain. But tbh found it quite hard to follow at all times.
May 26, 2009
Like the operations in Afghanistan it depicts, this book is confused about what it is trying to achieve and how to go about it. It has been stuck together from lots (hundreds?) of interviews and this shows, not only in the disparateness of the telling but also in the immediacy, the fascinating detail and the feeling that you are getting a real glimpse of some of the participants points of view.
When speaking to Taliban commanders the author comes across as rather gullible, but brave to be there too.
If you want a first person perspective of a siege then Sniper One is a better book, this one covers several of them, all conducted without adequate support.
What do we learn from it? That soldiers think they have won battles when strategically they have lost them, that planning was hopeless and still is, that soldiers and units perform very well under extreme conditions, and that there will be plenty more books to come from this war.
When speaking to Taliban commanders the author comes across as rather gullible, but brave to be there too.
If you want a first person perspective of a siege then Sniper One is a better book, this one covers several of them, all conducted without adequate support.
What do we learn from it? That soldiers think they have won battles when strategically they have lost them, that planning was hopeless and still is, that soldiers and units perform very well under extreme conditions, and that there will be plenty more books to come from this war.
February 14, 2021
A good read for anybody who is interested into Afghanistan and our engagement there. The writer is extremely informed, non biased and analyses a variety of issues from different angles and in the end, meeting the Taliban himself. The book has a lot of military jargon (which is explained) and focuses mostly on the UK operations, but you will get a good idea of what has been going on there with the endless fighting. I really enjoyed reading it but if you are not interested in Afghanistan and military operations it might be overwhelming.
June 5, 2025
This is an extremely discomforting, almost disturbing book. As someone who had a family member serve in Afghanistan, I found myself becoming increasingly outraged, and at several points, couldn’t believe what I was reading. Whether it was the ill-thought out and ill-executed platoon house strategy, the obsolete and inadequate equipment, the woeful shortage of infantry for the task at hand, or the lack of a coherent plan for reconstruction and political settlement, it is clear that far too much was asked of the British armed forces in Helmand in 2006. In one sense, this book is already dated as all Western forces have pulled out of Afghanistan since Fergusson wrote it, and the Taliban are back in power. In fact, that only brings his analysis into sharper focus as the problems he highlighted in 2008 have reached their natural conclusion: with no plausible Afghan political alternative, all the Taliban had to do was survive and wait until the coalition partners' resolve ran out
Fergusson highlights a number of areas of muddled and incoherent thinking. The first is what British forces in Helmand were actually trying to achieve; was it a hearts and minds-focused counter-insurgency, or a search-and-destroy mission to neutralise the Taliban? As he comments, “Operation Herrick 4, as the Helmand deployment was called, was supposed to secure economic development and reconstruction in the region. It was, in the terminology of the planners, a ‘hearts and minds’ operation, not a search-and-destroy one. The intention was to spread the Karzai government’s remit into the recalcitrant south of Afghanistan, the Pashtun heartlands and one-time spiritual home of the Taliban - a force that, barring a handful of hardliners, was confidently assessed to have been defeated in 2001…Afghanistan would be won or lost on ‘what the little villager thinks’, and equally certain that the high expectations of Western promises were still not being met. ‘We’re spending money but we’re doing it doctrinally, through DfID, and we haven’t got time for that. People want their lives changed. And so they have been, but so far only by bombing.’”
Another such area is the failure to consider what the British Armed Forces, and in particular the Army, were structured for and capable of: “‘The Army is structured for short-duration, war-fighting operations. We compensate for the historical shortage of troops with firepower, air power in particular, but you just can’t do that in counter-insurgency. You actually want to minimize the use of firepower and maximize the number of boots on the ground, to almost freeze opposition movement. In that state you can do lots of reconstruction. But we couldn’t do that during Herrick 4 because we didn’t have enough troops.’ Britain’s Armed Forces, he went on, had failed to adapt fast or far enough to the long-term nature of modern operations. And in trying to perform a job for which they were neither structured, nor trained, equipped or numerous enough to do - first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan - they had become dangerously ‘knackered’. What was needed in future was ‘many more boots in the Army and, if necessary, a few less fighter jets and large ships’.”
These are fundamental issues of planning and reflect a failure to either understand or appreciate the importance of the operational level to prosecuting war successfully. None of this should be read as an attempt to throw shade on the courage and tenacity of the men and women who served in Afghanistan, but it simply will not do for politicians and senior officers to rely so heavily on the self-confidence, determination and can-do attitude of those they deployed.
As well as all the above, there is one further aspect of this book that is both fascinating and disturbing. Fergusson travelled to Afghanistan and met with some Taliban fighters, an experience that he recounts in the book’s closing chapter and which offers a rare insight to ‘the other side of the hill’. While he is most certainly not an apologist for the Taliban, Fergusson writes with a deliberate balance and nuance that holds out the tantalising possibility that events could have played out differently in Helmand. In an extremely discomforting passage, Fergusson reflects on watching the Taliban fighters turn to prayer at the end of their time together: “There was spirituality here, a transcendental sense of peace and purpose and closeness to death and God seldom experienced in the modern West. This, for me, was Islam at its most appealing. It was marvellous how these people were able to plug instantly into such rapturous oblivion, five times a day, and for a brief moment I frankly envied their serenity. And yet, for all its strength and purity, I was not seduced but saddened by the Taliban’s belief, and the destructive, uncompromising way in which it displaced everything else in the world.” Would it have been possible to negotiate with these men, and avoid fighting in Helmand altogether? We will never know, but it is certainly helpful to be confronted with three-dimensional human beings rather than the stereotype of mindless fanaticism that is so common when we talk about the Taliban in the West. We ought to be disgusted by many of the things the Taliban do, while not losing sight of the fact that they are flesh-and-blood human beings like us.
In the end, this is quite a sad and poignant book, but one that offers valuable insights into why the Western intervention in Afghanistan was ultimately unsuccessful.
Fergusson highlights a number of areas of muddled and incoherent thinking. The first is what British forces in Helmand were actually trying to achieve; was it a hearts and minds-focused counter-insurgency, or a search-and-destroy mission to neutralise the Taliban? As he comments, “Operation Herrick 4, as the Helmand deployment was called, was supposed to secure economic development and reconstruction in the region. It was, in the terminology of the planners, a ‘hearts and minds’ operation, not a search-and-destroy one. The intention was to spread the Karzai government’s remit into the recalcitrant south of Afghanistan, the Pashtun heartlands and one-time spiritual home of the Taliban - a force that, barring a handful of hardliners, was confidently assessed to have been defeated in 2001…Afghanistan would be won or lost on ‘what the little villager thinks’, and equally certain that the high expectations of Western promises were still not being met. ‘We’re spending money but we’re doing it doctrinally, through DfID, and we haven’t got time for that. People want their lives changed. And so they have been, but so far only by bombing.’”
Another such area is the failure to consider what the British Armed Forces, and in particular the Army, were structured for and capable of: “‘The Army is structured for short-duration, war-fighting operations. We compensate for the historical shortage of troops with firepower, air power in particular, but you just can’t do that in counter-insurgency. You actually want to minimize the use of firepower and maximize the number of boots on the ground, to almost freeze opposition movement. In that state you can do lots of reconstruction. But we couldn’t do that during Herrick 4 because we didn’t have enough troops.’ Britain’s Armed Forces, he went on, had failed to adapt fast or far enough to the long-term nature of modern operations. And in trying to perform a job for which they were neither structured, nor trained, equipped or numerous enough to do - first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan - they had become dangerously ‘knackered’. What was needed in future was ‘many more boots in the Army and, if necessary, a few less fighter jets and large ships’.”
These are fundamental issues of planning and reflect a failure to either understand or appreciate the importance of the operational level to prosecuting war successfully. None of this should be read as an attempt to throw shade on the courage and tenacity of the men and women who served in Afghanistan, but it simply will not do for politicians and senior officers to rely so heavily on the self-confidence, determination and can-do attitude of those they deployed.
As well as all the above, there is one further aspect of this book that is both fascinating and disturbing. Fergusson travelled to Afghanistan and met with some Taliban fighters, an experience that he recounts in the book’s closing chapter and which offers a rare insight to ‘the other side of the hill’. While he is most certainly not an apologist for the Taliban, Fergusson writes with a deliberate balance and nuance that holds out the tantalising possibility that events could have played out differently in Helmand. In an extremely discomforting passage, Fergusson reflects on watching the Taliban fighters turn to prayer at the end of their time together: “There was spirituality here, a transcendental sense of peace and purpose and closeness to death and God seldom experienced in the modern West. This, for me, was Islam at its most appealing. It was marvellous how these people were able to plug instantly into such rapturous oblivion, five times a day, and for a brief moment I frankly envied their serenity. And yet, for all its strength and purity, I was not seduced but saddened by the Taliban’s belief, and the destructive, uncompromising way in which it displaced everything else in the world.” Would it have been possible to negotiate with these men, and avoid fighting in Helmand altogether? We will never know, but it is certainly helpful to be confronted with three-dimensional human beings rather than the stereotype of mindless fanaticism that is so common when we talk about the Taliban in the West. We ought to be disgusted by many of the things the Taliban do, while not losing sight of the fact that they are flesh-and-blood human beings like us.
In the end, this is quite a sad and poignant book, but one that offers valuable insights into why the Western intervention in Afghanistan was ultimately unsuccessful.
July 26, 2018
A very fair portrayal of what went in at that time in my humble opinion but I am no expert. It raised more questions than it offered viewpoints. The courage of the troops was well described, as was the poor manner in which they were lead and supported, but also the complexities of leadership at this time. It also pointed out how it is easy to offer judgements AFTER operational decisions have been made. I would like to read a more up to date book now to see how things have progressed, or not.
November 17, 2021
Informative, well paced and a good read.
October 8, 2013
Excellent book to get an in-depth knowledge about the UK military intervention in Afghanistan, and what actually happened on the ground.
The author conducted numerous interviews with people who were in Afghanistan, as well as politicians, international experts and even members of Taliban!
He doesn't not paint the whole story black and white, but always tries to present all possible sides of situation.
Really interesting read.
The author conducted numerous interviews with people who were in Afghanistan, as well as politicians, international experts and even members of Taliban!
He doesn't not paint the whole story black and white, but always tries to present all possible sides of situation.
Really interesting read.
September 30, 2009
A book about British Army's operation Herrick 4 in Afghanistan. Great collection of stories from troops of various regiments supporting the Paras. Gives tremendous insight into working of the army in Afghanistan, from platoon to strategic level, including Taliban's POV. It's not a dry academic work though, it's a pageturner.
December 13, 2011
Interesting to hear more about the Afgan conflict.
Not as good as Matterhorn
Not as good as Matterhorn
September 22, 2015
Insightful but tapered towards the end.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews