Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological reflections on these accounts follow, offered by leading philosophers, theologians, and scientists. This diverse group of scholars address some fascinating underlying Do scientific accounts of religion undermine the justification of religious belief? Do such accounts show religion to be an accidental by-product of our evolutionary development? And, whilst we seem naturally disposed toward religion, would we fare better or worse without it? Bringing together dissenting perspectives, this provocative collection will serve to freshly illuminate ongoing debate on these perennial questions.
Michael J. Murray oversees the programs and evaluation departments of the John Templeton Foundation. Before joining the Foundation, he was the Arthur and Katherine Shadek Humanities Professor of Philosophy at Franklin and Marshall College. Dr. Murray received his B.A. in philosophy from Franklin and Marshall and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Notre Dame. He is the author of Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions (with Eleonore Stump), Reason for the Hope Within, Philosophy of Religion (with Michael Rea), Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion (with Jeffrey Schloss), Divine Evil?: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible (with Michael Rea and Michael Bergmann), and On Predestination and Election.
This is a really good collection of papers from top notch scholars in a range of disciplines, and from a variety of perspectives. It gives one a sense of what's now being said about the origins of religion in evolutionary cognitive science. On the key issue of whether the emerging theories (if true) undermine religious belief, I thought Michael Murray's concise contribution was helpful. (He says no.) Jonathan Haidt provides an entertaining critique of the New Atheists from an atheistic perspective. There is something for everyone here, making this a great resource for anyone with a real interest in the debate.
宗教與被害妄想症 HADD (Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device) is defined as our [irrational] tendency to "invent" personal agents (gods, others, or spirits) to inexplicable phenomena (e.g. my door opened when I was gone; it must be someone). This makes survival sense since, if the bushes nearly moved when the hunter's sight sees no one, it's better for him to assume there is a predator than not to conclude otherwise. It's called HADD because from experiences we know the more insecure we feel about our surroundings, the more positives will be registered (namely, the more superstitious we tend to be).
This one took some time to finish as it required some very deep thought.
The primary purpose of the book was to address several questions in light of the assumption that the evidence for common ancestry is powerful enough to warrant accepting (something I myself also accept).
Namely, 1) Given that humans do share a common ancestor with apes, and that evolutionary theory can provide explanations for various aspects of human psychology, does the fact that it can provide a theoretical explanation of religion undercut religious beliefs?
2) What are the implications of the fact that evolution can provide some reasonable explanations of how religious beliefs arose?
3) What implications does this have for society?
The chapters are all written by different authors, some theists, some atheists and agnostics.
Many different ideas are discussed: - The debate between evolutionary biologists / psychologists as to whether Religion is primarily a spandrel (side-effect) of some other evolutionary adaptation, or whether it is truly an adaptation which heavily benefitted human society (this book was written in the 2010s, but the growing consensus seems to be today the latter)
- The fact that the question of whether to include theistic theories or remain entirely "methodologically" naturalistic in the analysis of the development of the human mind is unavoidable, and that it is warranted (claims Plantinga) that the idea of what basic assumptions belong to science be re-evaluated (or made more clear), particularly in these theoretical and historical disciplines.
Plantinga furthermore analyses whether the fact that evolutionary psychology is plagued with naturalistic assumptions constitutes evidence against theism. The answer is no, because the assumptions themselves proceed *from the outside*, not as results of the science itself. He provides a rigorous epistemological formula for judging when scientific conclusions can really affect religious beliefs which I'll leave out here for simplicity's sake.
- The fact that belief in God, gods, and supernatural beings can be explained evolutionarily invalidates it no more than the fact that we believe 10+15 =25 can be explained as a resort to various felicitous mutations. Sometimes cognitive adaptions are assumed as necessary responses to reality.
- Many different naturally developed mechanisms such as the HADD (hyper-active agency detection device) are resorted to as potential explanations for how belief in the supernatural arose. Religion is explained by some as a providing an ever-present and inescapable motive for integrity in a society, yet which evolution has sculpted our brains to be able to engage in without allowing the intellectual implications of religious beliefs from "breaking out" into regular life and damaging us. (I wonder how many of these people are aware of the Christian (or otherwise) Martyrs - or maybe they would consider them merely "maladapted").
Overall the only thing which really frustrated me about the book was the fact that often throughout the book, moral beliefs are treated with the assumption that they are non-cognitive. This makes moral convictions open to being truly undercut as evolutionarily developed and therefore ontologically arbitrary. Yet I am convinced of the opposite. Though we do have non-cognitive moral sentiments which ride on top of (or sometimes apart from) true moral convictions, on a deeper layer of our consciousness, moral beliefs are truly cognitive and derivative from the concept of being (otherness) itself present in consciousness.