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Species and Systematics
Species: A History of the Idea (Volume 1)
The complex idea of “species” has evolved over time, yet its meaning is far from resolved. This comprehensive work takes a fresh look at an idea central to the field of biology by tracing its history from antiquity to today. John S. Wilkins explores the essentialist view, a staple of logic from Plato and Aristotle through the Middle Ages to fairly recent times, and considers the idea of species in natural history―a concept often connected to reproduction. Tracing “generative conceptions” of species back through Darwin to Epicurus, Wilkins provides a new perspective on the relationship between philosophical and biological approaches to this concept. He also reviews the array of current definitions. Species is a benchmark exploration and clarification of a concept fundamental to the past, present, and future of the natural sciences.
320 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
December 7, 2023
3 stars for giving an interesting, brief history of the concept of "species". However, his goal in telling this story is to demolish what he calls the "Received View" propagated by Ernst Mayr: that before Darwin came around everyone was an Essentialist due to the malign influence of Aristotelian logic, believing that species were real and fixed, and this was exploded by Darwin and the rise of "population thinking". I think Wilkins attack on this story is blinkered in its sources and somewhat philosophically wrongheaded.
My sense is that questions about the nature, rank, and boundaries of the _human_ species played a significant role in determining the concept of species. Wilkins almost totally ignores this, thus failing to engage with the way "race science" & nationalism led to a form of species essentialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Since Mayr's story seems to have been was explicitly referencing the way that Aristotelian philosophy led to both racial essentialism and species essentialism, this seems like a major gap. This seems related to a failure to paint a convincing picture of the 19th century biological consensus - what is the story of the rise and fall of Lamarckism? if most of Darwin's evolutionist ideas had been foreshadowed, why do his writings seem to suggest that species fixity was the default belief for him and his contemporaries?
Wilkins reading of Aristotle also seems off to me, although I'm really no expert. Wilkins treats Aristotle's "essence" solely as the verbal definition of a _noun_, instead of as a verbal definition of a _substance_, a "hylomorphic" compound of both form and matter. I guess one redeeming feature of Wilkin's narrative is that form/eidos/species, when understood as part of the pair species/genus, became part of a tradition of classification, where many "logical species" are ranged under a single genus, distinguished by their "specific differences". So perhaps what this points to is a divergence in the philosophical tradition, where the logical notion of species diverges from the metaphysical notions of form/substance, as the belief that a substance can be given a complete verbal definition breaks down.
He also rather pedantically applies Lockean metaphysical terminology about "nominal essences" versus "real essences", and identifies Essentialism with the belief in "nominal essences". This seems to correspond to a decision to only focus on logical essentialism, as opposed to substance essentialism? He doesn't really justify this choice, explain how Locke's essences relate to those of Aristotle, or justifying why it is fair to interpret Ernst Mayr's use of the term essentialism in this way.
Circling back to the question of human nature - this is precisely one place where essentialist ideas have lasted the longest. How many people still believe, implicitly or explicitly, that man is the only "rational animal"? How many of his pre-Darwinian biologists would have agreed with this? And yet Wilkins concludes that almost no biologists were ever species essentialists, and that now that we admit this "We might no longer see it needful to deny there is a human nature, for example, while remaining true to the understanding that their is no human essence". Truly don't understand what he thinks is achieved by this wordplay.
My sense is that questions about the nature, rank, and boundaries of the _human_ species played a significant role in determining the concept of species. Wilkins almost totally ignores this, thus failing to engage with the way "race science" & nationalism led to a form of species essentialism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Since Mayr's story seems to have been was explicitly referencing the way that Aristotelian philosophy led to both racial essentialism and species essentialism, this seems like a major gap. This seems related to a failure to paint a convincing picture of the 19th century biological consensus - what is the story of the rise and fall of Lamarckism? if most of Darwin's evolutionist ideas had been foreshadowed, why do his writings seem to suggest that species fixity was the default belief for him and his contemporaries?
Wilkins reading of Aristotle also seems off to me, although I'm really no expert. Wilkins treats Aristotle's "essence" solely as the verbal definition of a _noun_, instead of as a verbal definition of a _substance_, a "hylomorphic" compound of both form and matter. I guess one redeeming feature of Wilkin's narrative is that form/eidos/species, when understood as part of the pair species/genus, became part of a tradition of classification, where many "logical species" are ranged under a single genus, distinguished by their "specific differences". So perhaps what this points to is a divergence in the philosophical tradition, where the logical notion of species diverges from the metaphysical notions of form/substance, as the belief that a substance can be given a complete verbal definition breaks down.
He also rather pedantically applies Lockean metaphysical terminology about "nominal essences" versus "real essences", and identifies Essentialism with the belief in "nominal essences". This seems to correspond to a decision to only focus on logical essentialism, as opposed to substance essentialism? He doesn't really justify this choice, explain how Locke's essences relate to those of Aristotle, or justifying why it is fair to interpret Ernst Mayr's use of the term essentialism in this way.
Circling back to the question of human nature - this is precisely one place where essentialist ideas have lasted the longest. How many people still believe, implicitly or explicitly, that man is the only "rational animal"? How many of his pre-Darwinian biologists would have agreed with this? And yet Wilkins concludes that almost no biologists were ever species essentialists, and that now that we admit this "We might no longer see it needful to deny there is a human nature, for example, while remaining true to the understanding that their is no human essence". Truly don't understand what he thinks is achieved by this wordplay.
September 22, 2017
This book is a conceptual history of an idea - species, or the logic and tradition of universal taxonomy. From Aristotle to Darwin and raging debates today, the author considers how different thinkers over time have considered what is "in" and "out," and how change happens. Today, our thinking is mostly aligned with Darwin's "snowflake theory": members of a species are alike in some ways, but they are also unique individuals; variation occurs naturally and is weeded out according to how well suited it is to the conditions of life. I think this process of variation happens within each of us, too.
October 14, 2012
A useful history of an idea - careful readings of primary sources.
December 13, 2013
Lot's of missing bits and pieces, but Wilkins demolishes the received view.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews