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Desert Armour: Tank Warfare in North Africa: Gazala to Tunisia, 1942–43
Robert Forczyk covers the development of armoured warfare in North Africa from Rommel's Gazala offensive in 1942 through to the end of war in the desert in Tunisia in 1943.
The war in the North African desert was pure mechanized warfare, and in many respects the most technologically advanced theatre of World War II. It was also the only theatre where for three years British and Commonwealth, and later US, troops were in constant contact with Axis forces.
World War II best-selling author Robert Forczyk explores the second half of the history of the campaign, from the Gazala offensive in May 1942 that drove the British forces all the way back to the Egyptian frontier and led to the fall of Tobruk, through the pivotal battles of El Alamein, and the final Allied victory in Tunisia. He examines the armoured forces, equipment, doctrine, training, logistics and operations employed by both Allied and Axis forces throughout the period, focusing especially on the brigade and regimental level of operations.
Fully illustrated throughout with photographs, profile artwork and maps, and featuring tactical-level vignettes and appendices analysing tank data, tank deliveries in-theatre and orders of battle, this book goes back to the sources to provide a new study of armoured warfare in the desert.
The war in the North African desert was pure mechanized warfare, and in many respects the most technologically advanced theatre of World War II. It was also the only theatre where for three years British and Commonwealth, and later US, troops were in constant contact with Axis forces.
World War II best-selling author Robert Forczyk explores the second half of the history of the campaign, from the Gazala offensive in May 1942 that drove the British forces all the way back to the Egyptian frontier and led to the fall of Tobruk, through the pivotal battles of El Alamein, and the final Allied victory in Tunisia. He examines the armoured forces, equipment, doctrine, training, logistics and operations employed by both Allied and Axis forces throughout the period, focusing especially on the brigade and regimental level of operations.
Fully illustrated throughout with photographs, profile artwork and maps, and featuring tactical-level vignettes and appendices analysing tank data, tank deliveries in-theatre and orders of battle, this book goes back to the sources to provide a new study of armoured warfare in the desert.
- GenresWorld War II
384 pages, Hardcover
Published October 10, 2023
9 people are currently reading
26 people want to read
About the author
Robert Forczyk
59 books74 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 6, 2025
If you've read the first half of this extended study of the use and abuse of tank warfare in the entirety of the North African campaign, you know what to expect: Forczyk giving you a blow by blow of the failures of technique of the responsible parties. He has come to criticize, not praise, as there is much to be underwhelmed about.
To be honest, Forczyk is now writing a somewhat broader study then merely the use and abuse of tanks as an arm of service. He is now really writing an account of how modern combined-arms operational technique emerged from the North African combat, meaning that Forczyk is as interested in matters of field engineering, artillery and logistics as he is in the cut and thrust of tank-on-tank action, which was really not that common.
What has not changed is that Forczyk is as astringent as ever in terms of his personal estimates of the protagonists, though always with sympathy for the much-put-upon tanker forced to deal with infantry generals who had been promoted beyond their level of competence. In particular, Forczyk has no use for Claude Auchinleck, and the British historians who have tried to argue that the general was more sinned against than sinner, arguing that the man not only didn't understand tanks, but he was basically a professional failure across the board during his tenure in the Middle East theatre.
Apart from that, I also remain particularly impressed by Forczyk's efforts to work the Italian experience into his narrative.
A final thought that this is probably not a one-stop read for the North African campaign, as even though Forczyk can be acid towards a lot of the historiography of this chunk of the war, you have to be familiar with what is being critiqued to get the most out of these books.
To be honest, Forczyk is now writing a somewhat broader study then merely the use and abuse of tanks as an arm of service. He is now really writing an account of how modern combined-arms operational technique emerged from the North African combat, meaning that Forczyk is as interested in matters of field engineering, artillery and logistics as he is in the cut and thrust of tank-on-tank action, which was really not that common.
What has not changed is that Forczyk is as astringent as ever in terms of his personal estimates of the protagonists, though always with sympathy for the much-put-upon tanker forced to deal with infantry generals who had been promoted beyond their level of competence. In particular, Forczyk has no use for Claude Auchinleck, and the British historians who have tried to argue that the general was more sinned against than sinner, arguing that the man not only didn't understand tanks, but he was basically a professional failure across the board during his tenure in the Middle East theatre.
Apart from that, I also remain particularly impressed by Forczyk's efforts to work the Italian experience into his narrative.
A final thought that this is probably not a one-stop read for the North African campaign, as even though Forczyk can be acid towards a lot of the historiography of this chunk of the war, you have to be familiar with what is being critiqued to get the most out of these books.
March 18, 2024
The second volume of Robert Forczyck’s ‘Desert Armour’ duology concludes the narrative analysis of armor operations in the deserts of North Africa in the Second World War.
Minus the need to may down the doctrinal, and design development framework in the first volume, he jumps right into the fray with Rommel's preparations to renew the offensive following his defeat in Operation Crusader. Crusader, easily the most confused, see-saw fighting in the Theater during the war, had, however, exhausted both sides, and so Rommel was able to rebuild in relative security.
The ensuing Battles of Gazala, and Second Tobruk would be the period of greatest success for the German and Italians in North Africa. However, as Forczyck points out, the fighting at Gazala was not the brilliant, stunning success for Rommel that the established narrative portrays it as. The fighting there wound up being a major attritional slogging match which the Germans and Italians won, but paid dearly in doing so. The subsequent breakin to the Tobruk defenses, and the capture of roughly 30,000 British prisoners was the high point for Rommel in the desert.
It was also the low point for 8th Army, which began to collapse in this period. Rommel was aware of their collapse and ordered a pursuit. Forczyck points put, however, that this was the decision that would, ultimately, cost Rommel everything.
His forces were exhausted, his equipment badly in need of maintenance, overhaul, and repair, and his logistics were already showing signs of strain. Certainly the 8th Army was on the ropes, but they had a largely open road to Alexandria, and pursuing them deep into the interior of Egypt would only unnecessarily stretch the already taut Axis supply lines. And, as events would prove correct, there was no guarantee that Rommel could catch the British, and deliver a fatal knockout blow to them.
Despite all of that, Rommel chose the Hussar Ride over sound strategy, and in the process sealed his fate. As North Africa was a secondary theater, both the OKW, and Commando Supremo urged caution on Rommel, but he played his card of close association with Hitler and the Party apparatus in Berlin, and his drive into Egypt was essentially green lit.
Despite the need for more modern tanks on the Eastern Front, Forczyck repeatedly relates how Rommel's forces often had better equipment, in a sideshow, than the forces involved in the main event deep inside Russia. The majority of the newest Panzer models went first to North Africa, despite Rommel's inability to provide enough spare parts, or fuel, to properly maintain them, or keep them running, while Panzer formations in Russia had to routinely make do with obsolescent models, and small numbers of them, to achieve more and more against an increasingly proficient Red Army tank arm, that was steadily growing (side note: it's still incredibly impressive how well the Panzer arm did in Russia, considering how it had to fight from underneath, the entire war, and didn't even have tanks that were technologically the equal of the Red Army's until the halfway point, and still inflicted a better than 3-1 loss ratio throughout the conflict).
This wastage via distorted priorities, with Berlin giving preference to propaganda fodder, as opposed to genuine operational, and strategic necessity, was one of the symptoms of the disease which would ultimately lose the Axis powers the war.
Forczyck doesn't focus just on Rommel and the German/Italian forces, however. He spends a great deal of time detailing the change of command in the 8th Army after the two armies finally halted around El Alamein, and the changes Montgomery brought to the table.
Despite his own myth, Forczyck points out that Montgomery liked to take photo shoots with tanks, but knew practically nothing about them. He was clueless as to their strengths, and weaknesses, their logistical requirements, and routinely failed to listen to his armor commanders’ advice. Much like Rommel, Montgomery was an infantry officer, who still thought as an infantry officer, and never took the time to learn how armor operations really worked.
Despite that, the ensuing battle of attrition at El Alamein broke Rommel's forces, even if it grind down British armor strength considerably, as well, and Rommel was forced to retreat. A retreat that would not end until inside southern Tunisia.
With the arrival of the Americans through Operation Torch Forczyck spends a great deal of time discussing American armor doctrine, and how it largely failed upon contact with the Germans. Even so, the Americans, despite having to get knocked over the head by the more experienced Germans, several times, did learn their lessons. Except these lessons were never passed on through the rest of the United States Army, a tragic situation that the Americans never did rectify as showcased in the steep relearning curve they had to undergo in Sicily, Italy, and in Normandy, to relearn what they already had while in North Africa.
For all of the allure of Patton, he features only in a minor way throughout the second half of this book, and his only battle against the Afrika Korps, El Guettar, while an American victory, was a battle waged by subordinates. Patton and Rommel weren't really there to face each other.
Despite the seemingly big success at Kasserine Pass (a German victory that Forczyck downplays, and he makes a good case for doing so) against the Americans, who were roughly handled, the German and Italian situation in Tunisia was untenable. No amount of tactical, and operational successes against the Americans, British, and French, and there were quite a few of them, could make up for the Allies dominance of the Mediterranean Sea, and the strangling of the Axis supply lines with Europe.
The Italian Navy, and Air Force was largely destroyed attempting to keep a corridor of supply open to the forces in Tunisia, and in the end, it was all for naught. Tunisia, nicknamed Tunisgrad, was a worse disaster than Stalingrad, with far more material, and infrastructure damage to the Axis than the loss of 6th Armee, and a somewhat greater human toll as well. Tunisia essentially finished off the Italians, destroyed the invincibility of the Tiger tank (as Forczyck points out, it was too maintenance heavy to be wasted in such an austere environment, when it was not only badly needed in Russia, which it was designed for, and could only ever serve in small numbers in Tunisia anyway. The British and Americans were also the first to record tank kills on the Tiger, and both discovered that the big cat was vulnerable to artillery), and transformed the strategic nature of the entire conflict.
Looked at through the lens of armor operations, this duology was another excellent analysis by Robert Forczyck. What I found really revelatory was just how bad both sides were in using up tanks as disposable assets. Both sides had a tendency to run tanks into the ground, and both sides routinely had to overhaul their entire armored force during operational and strategic pauses. And the Germans ultimately wasted 17% of their armor production, which was entirely lost, on a secondary theater that gained them nothing at all.
Very highly recommended.
Minus the need to may down the doctrinal, and design development framework in the first volume, he jumps right into the fray with Rommel's preparations to renew the offensive following his defeat in Operation Crusader. Crusader, easily the most confused, see-saw fighting in the Theater during the war, had, however, exhausted both sides, and so Rommel was able to rebuild in relative security.
The ensuing Battles of Gazala, and Second Tobruk would be the period of greatest success for the German and Italians in North Africa. However, as Forczyck points out, the fighting at Gazala was not the brilliant, stunning success for Rommel that the established narrative portrays it as. The fighting there wound up being a major attritional slogging match which the Germans and Italians won, but paid dearly in doing so. The subsequent breakin to the Tobruk defenses, and the capture of roughly 30,000 British prisoners was the high point for Rommel in the desert.
It was also the low point for 8th Army, which began to collapse in this period. Rommel was aware of their collapse and ordered a pursuit. Forczyck points put, however, that this was the decision that would, ultimately, cost Rommel everything.
His forces were exhausted, his equipment badly in need of maintenance, overhaul, and repair, and his logistics were already showing signs of strain. Certainly the 8th Army was on the ropes, but they had a largely open road to Alexandria, and pursuing them deep into the interior of Egypt would only unnecessarily stretch the already taut Axis supply lines. And, as events would prove correct, there was no guarantee that Rommel could catch the British, and deliver a fatal knockout blow to them.
Despite all of that, Rommel chose the Hussar Ride over sound strategy, and in the process sealed his fate. As North Africa was a secondary theater, both the OKW, and Commando Supremo urged caution on Rommel, but he played his card of close association with Hitler and the Party apparatus in Berlin, and his drive into Egypt was essentially green lit.
Despite the need for more modern tanks on the Eastern Front, Forczyck repeatedly relates how Rommel's forces often had better equipment, in a sideshow, than the forces involved in the main event deep inside Russia. The majority of the newest Panzer models went first to North Africa, despite Rommel's inability to provide enough spare parts, or fuel, to properly maintain them, or keep them running, while Panzer formations in Russia had to routinely make do with obsolescent models, and small numbers of them, to achieve more and more against an increasingly proficient Red Army tank arm, that was steadily growing (side note: it's still incredibly impressive how well the Panzer arm did in Russia, considering how it had to fight from underneath, the entire war, and didn't even have tanks that were technologically the equal of the Red Army's until the halfway point, and still inflicted a better than 3-1 loss ratio throughout the conflict).
This wastage via distorted priorities, with Berlin giving preference to propaganda fodder, as opposed to genuine operational, and strategic necessity, was one of the symptoms of the disease which would ultimately lose the Axis powers the war.
Forczyck doesn't focus just on Rommel and the German/Italian forces, however. He spends a great deal of time detailing the change of command in the 8th Army after the two armies finally halted around El Alamein, and the changes Montgomery brought to the table.
Despite his own myth, Forczyck points out that Montgomery liked to take photo shoots with tanks, but knew practically nothing about them. He was clueless as to their strengths, and weaknesses, their logistical requirements, and routinely failed to listen to his armor commanders’ advice. Much like Rommel, Montgomery was an infantry officer, who still thought as an infantry officer, and never took the time to learn how armor operations really worked.
Despite that, the ensuing battle of attrition at El Alamein broke Rommel's forces, even if it grind down British armor strength considerably, as well, and Rommel was forced to retreat. A retreat that would not end until inside southern Tunisia.
With the arrival of the Americans through Operation Torch Forczyck spends a great deal of time discussing American armor doctrine, and how it largely failed upon contact with the Germans. Even so, the Americans, despite having to get knocked over the head by the more experienced Germans, several times, did learn their lessons. Except these lessons were never passed on through the rest of the United States Army, a tragic situation that the Americans never did rectify as showcased in the steep relearning curve they had to undergo in Sicily, Italy, and in Normandy, to relearn what they already had while in North Africa.
For all of the allure of Patton, he features only in a minor way throughout the second half of this book, and his only battle against the Afrika Korps, El Guettar, while an American victory, was a battle waged by subordinates. Patton and Rommel weren't really there to face each other.
Despite the seemingly big success at Kasserine Pass (a German victory that Forczyck downplays, and he makes a good case for doing so) against the Americans, who were roughly handled, the German and Italian situation in Tunisia was untenable. No amount of tactical, and operational successes against the Americans, British, and French, and there were quite a few of them, could make up for the Allies dominance of the Mediterranean Sea, and the strangling of the Axis supply lines with Europe.
The Italian Navy, and Air Force was largely destroyed attempting to keep a corridor of supply open to the forces in Tunisia, and in the end, it was all for naught. Tunisia, nicknamed Tunisgrad, was a worse disaster than Stalingrad, with far more material, and infrastructure damage to the Axis than the loss of 6th Armee, and a somewhat greater human toll as well. Tunisia essentially finished off the Italians, destroyed the invincibility of the Tiger tank (as Forczyck points out, it was too maintenance heavy to be wasted in such an austere environment, when it was not only badly needed in Russia, which it was designed for, and could only ever serve in small numbers in Tunisia anyway. The British and Americans were also the first to record tank kills on the Tiger, and both discovered that the big cat was vulnerable to artillery), and transformed the strategic nature of the entire conflict.
Looked at through the lens of armor operations, this duology was another excellent analysis by Robert Forczyck. What I found really revelatory was just how bad both sides were in using up tanks as disposable assets. Both sides had a tendency to run tanks into the ground, and both sides routinely had to overhaul their entire armored force during operational and strategic pauses. And the Germans ultimately wasted 17% of their armor production, which was entirely lost, on a secondary theater that gained them nothing at all.
Very highly recommended.
February 2, 2024
I enjoyed the book, but as many of the reviewers have noted, the book needs more maps and maps in the correct chapters. Shame on the Osprey editors - most of your books have incredible graphics - you let the author down!
December 18, 2023
It's a good book, but not great. If recommend it as an excellent introduction to the topic, but it's let down a little by it's lack of accuracy in some areas and terrible editing/design.
It has very few maps and they are usually long after the subject shown in them. Since they are taken from other books, they don't generally show the locations mentioned in the text. You'll need a good atlas or lots of online searching to really understand things.
There are quite a few errors of detail as well. The author consistently refers to the Grant tank as the M3A1, a model (one of the few) that the British didn't actually use and that was only produced in small numbers. He refers to British artillery by its calibre in mm rather than inches. A very strange choice since the names of the guns were things like 4.5-inch gun and he's an American. You have to translate back into inches to figure out what he's talking about. He confuses the German 10.5cm howitzer with the 10.5cn gun, which has very different performance. Lots of stuff like that.
Perhaps my biggest gripe is that he doesn't seem to realise the different reporting basis of German and British casualty reports. The Germans reported only unrecoverable wrecks, while the British reported all tanks not in action at the end of the action, even if they would be ready again in a few hours. This really makes a huge difference in interpreting the outcome of a battle.
Plus he's a tanker, through and through. He objects to the loss of tanks and a couple of dozen crew to save the lives of hundreds of infantry.
Still, despite those grumps. You'll gain a good general understanding of what happened. Just double check the facts before quoting him.
It has very few maps and they are usually long after the subject shown in them. Since they are taken from other books, they don't generally show the locations mentioned in the text. You'll need a good atlas or lots of online searching to really understand things.
There are quite a few errors of detail as well. The author consistently refers to the Grant tank as the M3A1, a model (one of the few) that the British didn't actually use and that was only produced in small numbers. He refers to British artillery by its calibre in mm rather than inches. A very strange choice since the names of the guns were things like 4.5-inch gun and he's an American. You have to translate back into inches to figure out what he's talking about. He confuses the German 10.5cm howitzer with the 10.5cn gun, which has very different performance. Lots of stuff like that.
Perhaps my biggest gripe is that he doesn't seem to realise the different reporting basis of German and British casualty reports. The Germans reported only unrecoverable wrecks, while the British reported all tanks not in action at the end of the action, even if they would be ready again in a few hours. This really makes a huge difference in interpreting the outcome of a battle.
Plus he's a tanker, through and through. He objects to the loss of tanks and a couple of dozen crew to save the lives of hundreds of infantry.
Still, despite those grumps. You'll gain a good general understanding of what happened. Just double check the facts before quoting him.
December 1, 2024
A good book overall except for two things:
1. Author does not distinguish between russia and ussr.
2. Some operations described in the book completely lack maps. Some battles' maps are placed too far away in the book from the actual description, even in wrong chapters.
Still would recommend the book if you're interested in this theater.
1. Author does not distinguish between russia and ussr.
2. Some operations described in the book completely lack maps. Some battles' maps are placed too far away in the book from the actual description, even in wrong chapters.
Still would recommend the book if you're interested in this theater.
November 28, 2023
Strong on information and analysis, weak on supporting maps and graphics.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews