Victory to Defeat: The British Army 1918–40

by Richard Dannatt, Robert Lyman

A compelling history of the decline of an army from the triumph of victory in 1918 to defeat in 1940 and why this happened. A salutary warning for modern Britain.

'A compelling history.' – The Sunday Times
'Thought-provoking.' – The Spectator
'Interesting and well-researched.' – The Sunday Telegraph

The British Army won a convincing series of victories between 1916 and 1918. But by 1939 the British Army was an entirely different animal. The hard-won knowledge, experience and strategic vision that delivered victory after victory in the closing stages of the First World War had been lost. In the inter-war years there was plenty of talking, but very little focus on who Britain might have to fight, and how. Victory to Defeat clearly illustrates how the British Army wasn't prepared to fight a first-class European Army in 1939 for the simple reason that as a country Britain hadn't prepared itself to do so. The failure of the army's leadership led directly to its abysmal performance in Norway and France in 1940.

Victory to Defeat is a captivating history of the mismanagement of a war-winning army. It is also a stark warning that we neglect to understand who our enemy might be, and how to defeat him, at the peril of our country. The British Army is now to be cut to its smallest size since 1714. Are we, this book asks, repeating the same mistakes again?

Genres: History, Military History, World War II

340 pages, Kindle Edition

Published September 14, 2023

Reviews

[Rupert Hague-Holmes · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a brilliant treatise on why the BEF were so comprehensively outmanoeuvred by the German Wehrmacht in France/Belgium in May 1940. The seeds of that failure firmly rest in the eyes of the authors in successive British governments between 1918-1939 putting thier heads in the sand denying that a war in Europe would ever happen after the Great War, aided and abetted by craven military leaders not taking the fruits of success in 1918 and developing them into military doctrine.
I have given this 4 stars rather than 5 since I was surprised that the failures in the Far East, particularly Singapore and Hong Kong, against the Japanese are not really addressed at all. The book is European centric which is surprising given Dr Lymans provenance.
However what is brought out well is the parallels between the build up to the outbreak of WW2, the run down of the Armed Forces and the appeasement of Hitler and the situation with Putin and his aggression towards former Soviet Union states.

[Simon Mee · Rating 3 out of 5]

Just because a continental enemy in the 1920s was unidentifiable should not have meant that no such enemy would not one day emerge. It is the duty of the government, then as now, if they take the security of the nation’s interest seriously, actively to imagine the unimaginable. In January 2022, a war in Europe was both unthinkable and unimaginable, but on 24 February that year it became a reality. History has an uncomfortable habit of repeating itself.

I wrote once about how we should not judge past books as being any more affected by contemporary events than books written in the present. The Rise and Fall of the British Army makes my point explicit.

As Politics

The main argument in Victory to Defeat is that the British army has again allowed itself to be run down until it became incapable of facing a major European threat, one that has now clearly manifested itself. The book is a warning siren to “Wake Up”.

The failure of the democracies in the 1930s was the naive failure to accept that any sane, rational human being wanted war — sadly, much the same could be said of Vladimir Putin in February 2022.

If we view the parallels from 90,000 feet, yeah sure – bad guys are around, and it would be good to stop them. This would possibly work in 1789 or 1066 (results may vary). When you try to get into more granular parallels, Victory to Defeat becomes clunky and maps poorly onto the present situation. Britain and its Commonwealth in the interwar period had capabilities and demands that appear vastly different than now. I don’t see present day Britain as being capable (or even wish for it to be capable) of being the major land army in Europe, or even the second, third or fourth. Ironically, that point does resonate with how Britain saw its alliance with France up to 1940, and the best parts of the book in terms of parallels is when dealing with the failure of the Allies to integrate a shared doctrine for defending France.

The French plans for a linear defence system similar to that forced on the Allies at the end of 1914 was accepted without much demur.

My issue is that the army focus in Victory to Defeat means the linkage between the different services is not properly made (other than as competitors for money). There is a solid argument that, with the resources to hand (and most importantly, what the electorate would vote for):

The challenge for the government was to ensure the security of Britain's interests while at the same time keeping an eye on the very significant views of the electorate with respect to defence.

…British interwar choices were correct. Prior to December 1941 the Royal Navy controlled the key sea-lanes and the Royal Air Force maintained an excellent air-defence network. Those elements stopped Britain from losing rather than giving them the tools to win decisively, but it seemed reasonable at the time to back the largest army in the world to cover the land war! Because Victory to Defeat rests only on one leg of the military trifecta, the point of what choices should have been made between the services is inadequately substantiated, even if the authors correctly identify the issue of splitting a shrinking pie. In absolute fairness, the authors do cover the failure of aerial bombing (both for imperial policing and strategic purposes) compared to the promises of its acolytes, but I still consider the coverage lacking in terms of discussing air-defence and the Royal Navy.

This leads to the biggest issue in terms of present day – the authors avoid delving into how Britain should contribute to European defence now from a tri-service perspective. It’s just left implied that we should rearm for a major European War and have the right army doctrine this time round (whatever that is). How you feel about Victory to Defeat in that case is up to you – is it enough that the authors suggest history is repeating? Yes, the book is about the past, not the present, but the authors summon Putin’s name enough times for me to say: “Yeah, what about it then? How should Britain dance in the concert of Europe?”

As History

Pretending for a moment that the book is not written as a paen for modern day rearmament, Victory to Defeat makes fair points about interwar doctrinal confusion. The matter of tanks and how to employ them receives a balanced appraisal, though the authors’ historiography swallows the line that Guderian was heavily influenced by the Liddell-Hart, whom it was in Guderian’s best interests postwar to suck up to.

The commitments of the Army in the interwar period are well covered and the authors show excellent skills in describing them without being bogged down in narrative recounting, which would blow out the length of the book. The authors achieve the key objective of avoiding boring the reader and holding true to the narrative thread. Victory to Defeat does feel like a very serviceable summary of the British Army through this period and the issues of overstretch (which maps better onto the commitments of the early 21st century and the war on terrorism).

As a criticism, the British focus means there are no real comparisons to the French Army’s offensive actions in 1918 (and after), which could have been worthwhile for showing similarities and distinctions with what was still THE major army on the Allies side on the Western Front. Of course, why would the authors do that, when they are writing a book with an eye to British rearmament in a different time period? If I am to damn Victory to Defeat for being a book influenced by the present day, fair enough to let it use that same influence to defend it for being lacking on certain points.

Britain had long been irritated at French insistence of its security above all else, some in Westminster arguing that French security guarantees were in fact the best way of ensuring the onset of another war. Indeed, the belief was strong among many, in government and without, that insistence on unilateral security was an intrinsic threat to the security of the group.

I consider Victory to Defeat to be a good book to the extent it is an easily digestible read that does want to demonstrate a thesis that applies to present day events. I am not sold the authors got there, but I enjoyed it well enough.


*Slightly off-topic, the rating is "unfair" as a book with 3 stars is considered "bad" - mainly because Goodreads does not have a 0 star, which causes rating inflation. For me 3 stars is a mostly good book - flawed, but still good.

[Debbie · Rating 4 out of 5]

'Victory to Defeat' asks a very simple, but rarely considered, question: how did Britain and her army go from victory in 1918 to crushing defeat at the hands of the same enemy in 1940? Through the 300-odd pages of the book, Richard Dannatt and Robert Lyman answer this question in convincing detail, considering not just the military aspects, but the political, social, and economic as well. It is an excellent analysis, given by experts in the field – Lyman spent two decades in the British Army and General The Lord Richard Dannatt was the United Kingdom's Chief of the General Staff. Their combined experience provides much-needed insight to this important subject.

Perhaps the most startling point is that generally few people – then or since – have really considered the armistice signed in 1918 to be a proper victory. Surely it's just a case that the war of attrition and better marshalling of resources on the Allied side simply wore the Central Powers down to such an extent that they agreed to a peace accord that was vindictive and led the way to a resumption of hostilities twenty years later? Germany was not, therefore, defeated militarily – its army was, after all, still on foreign soil when it surrendered – but economically and politically. As such, it has never been necessary to analyse how the Allied armies won. But as Dannatt and Lyman prove beyond doubt, this is bunkum. Lessons were learnt slowly, yes, but they were still learnt, and by 1918 and the start of the Hundred Days campaign, the British Army was at the top of its game: a well-oiled fighting machine that intelligently used all the resources at its disposal to break through the lines of trenches while still protecting the lives (as much as possible) of its infantry. This, then, is the foundation on which the book is based, and it puts all the years that came after it into a completely new perspective.

There were, of course, many reasons for the army and other military services to be cut back after the 'War to End All Wars'. After all, there would never be another war like it, and it was impossible to keep military expenditure so high. The desire for peace, and remembrance of the horrors of the mud and blood of the trenches, would make anyone want to bury their heads in the sand, regardless of any more practical motives. There weren't the economic, social, or political incentives to keep the army operational in any meaningful sense. With hindsight, this was a mistake. Likewise, the army's inability to learn from its past experience and apply it to an imagined future scenario was also faulty.

According to the authors, there was plenty, given the right conditions, that could have been done to ensure that Blitzkrieg in 1940 did not succeed, or happen at all. Yet some of the suggestions are themselves little more than wishful thinking. The situation in which Britain found itself in the 1920s was far from perfect. With little money, exacerbated by additional pressures from catastrophic international financial events, social unrest, problems with empire, as well as the Troubles, it is difficult to see how in many respects the army and government could have behaved differently. But what holds true for the 1920s is harder to apply to the 1930s, especially after 1933, and this is where ‘Victory to Defeat’ becomes particularly compelling and relevant. Although there was a determined effort to stick heads in sand, for those with the eyes and wit to see it Hitler was set on war. In recent years, there have been others who have been ideologically fixed on expansion and used the excuse of national security and imagined wrongs to gain sympathy for their actions. And the simple, astounding fact is that the United Kingdom – indeed, much of Europe – is less prepared for war now than it was in 1930.

Although ‘Victory to Defeat’ was conceived of before February 2022, its ulterior motive is to gain wider acceptance of the idea of increased military spending – a literal call to arms. The problem is that the country, perhaps rather like in the 1920s, is going through some severe political, social, and economic shocks: the needs of the military are not high on the agenda, and while there might be an argument for Keynesian spending, this could better be directed towards education, health, and all those other elements that visibly benefit the country. Pacifists will not, therefore, appreciate this book, but it is important they read it – at least to understand the very real challenges and problems faced by British governments and the military in the past. Historians find it easy to rail against the governments of the 1930s for determinedly following a policy of appeasement, for not preparing adequately, for believing there would never be another European war. ‘Victory to Defeat’ makes it easier to understand the likes of Chamberlain and Baldwin: hindsight is 20/20; foresight is blinkered and myopic. This holds true for the twenty-first century as much as for the twentieth.

[Rob Schmults · Rating 3 out of 5]

This could have been a 5 star book. But the authors waste so much ink in annoying and unnecessary over repetition of their core point. It makes the book almost painful to read - particularly chapters 5-9. A reader could skip those and miss nothing as they repeat themselves and are in return repeated elsewhere. Instead of repeating over and over how the British forgot the lessons of 1918 and had no war fighting thinking, plan, or capability in 1940, they should have spent more time on exactly how the 1918 capabilities came to be and further convincing that these were indeed the war winners, and that it was not due to a broken and dispirited enemy. They could have also spent time explaining how Britain could have done better - how a democracy overcomes war weariness and then a worldwide depression to find the will and means to invest in its military capabilities. What was a realistic path forward in terms of planning and theory - surly there is an answer here around innovating within political constraints? And what could have been done around equipping the army for whatever war fighting approach that might have been adopted despite austerity? And since understanding your enemy is also highlighted, how could that have been done? What was the level of awareness and of opportunity to know more that existed around German tactics and approaches? Clearly the authors think much could have been done within the constraints of the time and I expect they are right. Adding that in place of repeating the problem would have made this a much better book and better served their aim of providing a lesson for today.

[Malcolm Davis · Rating 2 out of 5]

Having just read a book about the inter war period in Britain i thought this would be the ideal book to follow in from it.Unfortunately I was wong.
Only 6 of the 17 chapters was of any interest.The first 4 chapters deal with the Army in the First World War.There then follows 4 of the most boring chapters I have ever read.Quoting at length from the Army's died regulations.This can only be of interest to military historians.
.
Chapters 12-17 are the only ones worth reading.They dismiss the Chamberlain revisionists by pointing out that whilst he increased defence spending,very little went to the army.He didn't want to send another BEF to France,so the seeds were shown for the 1940 disasters.
The book then lapsed back into its lethargy with a mind numbing epilogue,which it is wise to ignore.
So a truly underwhelming experience.

[Benjamin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A worthy work, very well researched although suffers from being repetitive and in some parts redundant when it recalls the well known history of appeasement in the 1930's. The book makes a good case for clearing the historical record of Britain's military performance during World War I although does sometimes feel like the facts have been arranged too much to support the author's conclusion.

[J.G. Cully · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very timely book. This book lays out in detail what happened to the British army between 1918 and 1940, and it's parallel's with many of the most recent international events are stark indeed. A must read for policy makers as well as historians. History really does repeat itself. It's important that the right lessons are learned. Excellent.

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

An admittedly Army-centric look at the failures of the interwar period for Britain, this book nonetheless offers insightful critique of the factors that saw to the embarrassing withdrawal of the British Army from the European continent in 1940. I recommend the book to all military officers hopeful of avoiding a similar embarrassment in potential future wars.

[Nick Morton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thought provoking analysis of the inter war years and its relevance to the current situation within Europe.