The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons

by Alvin Kernan

“A memoir and more . . . Kernan brings this maritime battle superbly to life. . . . And he narrates the air assault in gripping detail” (The Wall Street Journal).   The Battle of Midway is considered the greatest US naval victory, but behind the luster is the devastation of the American torpedo squadrons. Of the 51 planes sent to attack Japanese carriers only 7 returned, and of the 127 aircrew only 29 survived. Not a single torpedo hit its target.   A story of avoidable mistakes and flawed planning, The Unknown Battle of Midway reveals the enormous failures that led to the destruction of four torpedo squadrons but were omitted from official naval the planes that ran out of gas, the torpedoes that didn’t work, the pilots who had never dropped torpedoes, and the breakdown of the attack plan. Alvin Kernan, who was present at the battle, has written a troubling but persuasive analysis of these and other little-publicized aspects of this great battle. The standard navy tactics for carrier warfare are revealed in tragic contrast to the actual conduct of the battle and the after-action reports of the ships and squadrons involved.   “An incisive and laconic writer, Kernan knows his facts and presents them with deep feeling. A World War II must-read.” —Booklist   “I read The Unknown Battle of Midway in one sitting. It is a momentous piece of work, reeking of the authenticity of carrier warfare as experienced by the flight crews.” —Sir John Keegan, author of A History of Warfare   “An emotionally powerful story, not merely one of war but of its lasting effects.” —The Times Literary Supplement

Genres: History, World War II, War, Aviation, Naval History, Military History, Japan

173 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2005

About the author

Alvin Kernan is Avalon University Professor of Humanities, Emeritus, Princeton University. He served in the US Navy, 1941-45. Among his previous books are The Fruited Plain: Fables for a Postmodern Democracy and In Plato's Cave, both published by Yale University Press.

Reviews

[Eric Byrd · Rating 3 out of 5]

This half-memoir half-history is one of those bleak books that illustrate Sartre’s remark that a victory described in detail is indistinguishable from a defeat. On June 4, 1942, US Navy dive-bombers sank four Japanese aircraft carriers – all of which had been present at the attack on Pearl Harbor seven months prior – in one of the most spectacular naval revenges in history. But at other points of the battle, the American “Wildcat” fighters were found to be useless against the Japanese Zero, and the three squadrons of “Devastator” torpedo bombers were obliterated – 41 planes took off, 6 returned, and none scored a single hit on a Japanese ship. The crews of the Devastators flew obsolete aircraft, carried faulty torpedoes, and used terrible tactics: they flew straight at the Japanese carriers, low and slow, in tight formation; many were shot down by Japanese fighters before they could release, and those that did release “belly-flopped” their torpedoes into the waves, probably damaging the delicate propulsion and guidance innards. The destruction of the torpedo squadrons is always justified by the fact that their attacks kept the Japanese fighters off the American dive-bombers (the real hit men, lurking high above), and disrupted flight operations so much that the Japanese were unable to launch their own planned strike, and so hundreds of veteran Japanese pilots, waiting to take off, were incinerated in their cockpits.


Kernan, author of the completely engrossing memoir Crossing the Line: A Bluejacket’s Odyssey in WWII, was a member of one of those torpedo squadrons, not a flier but an eighteen-year-old ordinance trundler and torpedo-attacher aboard the carrier USS Enterprise. He reminds us that accidents and snafus complicate victories, that the early clashes of any war are fought by clumsy combatants desperately trying to learn their business while under fire. (The fighter and dive-bomber squadrons from the USS Hornet, nearly one-third of the American strike force, flew away from the battle, on a mistaken heading, under a commander whose navigation was rusty, and played no part.) I thought of Shiloh, in 1862, another momentous battle early in a long war, whose victor made fewer mistakes than the vanquished, where Grant and Sherman, future war masters, didn’t even think to have their troops entrench, and were surprised and nearly routed when the rebels attacked out of the dawn mist.


As in Crossing the Line, Kernan is here a keen military sociologist. Later in the war enlisted service personnel like young Kernan were permanently assigned to a carrier or a naval air station; early on, however, they were members of the squadrons, which moved about like the old baggage-laden British infantry regiments, microcosmic households with aristocrats (the pilots), scullions (junior grease monkeys like young Kernan), and several grades of variously skilled, variously privileged technicians (radiomen, armorers, metal smiths, parachute-riggers) falling in between. This household quality made the aftermath of Midway eerie for the torpedo bomber squadrons: they remained, but most of the planes were destroyed and most of the pilots dead. I dated this girl whose father was a deeply traumatized Vietnam vet, but he wasn’t the former grunt you always picture – he had been ground crew at an Air Force fighter-bomber base in Thailand, and he spoke of the horror of having to witness the steady attrition of the aircrew, week in and week out, each rotation of fresh faces containing a statistically inevitable – and often predictable - number of dead men.

[Matt · Rating 1 out of 5]

This book has nothing new other than studies conducted later in the war on the proper deployment of a torpedo from an aircraft. It is written in a minimalist attack with conclusions that do not support the intended idea of the book to honor the losses of the torpedo squadrons in the Battle of Midway. Kernan wants to attack the senior leadership that he feels sacrificed these torpedo squadron. It must be noted Kernan was a junior enlisted man in VT-6 on the U.S.S. Enterprise during the battle and this book doesn't hide the bias against the senior leadership he has held onto since June 4th 1942. Shame on him for trying to put this attack (some of which is justified) as scholarly work.

Kernan's main theories are that the Navy should have known better to utilize its torpedo bombers, while not yet having a replacement and better bomber, and the leadership should have been better and had other options but doesn't elaborate on what could have been an option. He suggests as if it's the first time this theory has been put forward that the US Navy got lucky on June 4th 1942. That the US Navy got lucky has been a theory for a while. However Kernan's other theories while interesting don't hold much water. Instead of honoring the sacrifice of these brave men who fought the Devastators at Midway and what their sacrifice meant for the Navy Kernan wants to prosecute the leaders long after the leaders had died.

If Kernan's two theories of better torpedo bombers are to be taken seriously one must affix the destruction of the bombers widely around the Navy not just to the squadron commanders. The nation if not the world was coming out of the Depression. Due to this funds were not there to test the torpedoes effectively and nor was there money to develop a new torpedo bomber. After President Roosevelt infused the Navy with money did new weapon systems become a possibility. Many of the new systems, the new fast battleships, the Fletcher class destroyers and new aircraft such as the new Avenger torpedo bombers were just coming into service. Unfortunately for the Battle of Midway there were 6 Avengers from the first production run available. Therefore the Navy was caught in transition rather than as Kernan asserts relegated to obsolete aircraft. Simply put you go to war with what you got not what's coming off the assembly line next month.

If Kernan was really interested in this argument of willful neglect by the senior leadership in utilizing obsolete equipment he would have brought up the Marines flying Brewster Buffaloes which were called by flying coffins by anyone who knew anything about the Buffaloes as supporting evidence but never brings up the Buffaloes. The combat experience and knowledge acquired from the Battle of the Coral Sea and other raids were that the Devastators could take care of themselves while the Dauntlessness needed an escort. With that knowledge it is understandable where the tactical leaders chose to defend the Dauntlessness. A larger question could be did the Japanese realize how ineffective the Devastators were and did not regard them as a threat. But with Fuchida's quotes in Kernan's work it seems that the Japanese did regard the Devastators as a threat and dealt with the threat by bringing Zeroes down to deal with the Devastators. Therefore a better conclusion is that the first part of dumb luck for the Navy was that the Devastator's faults in combat weren't revealed as a lemon earlier. The Japanese Navy was lucky recipient of the lack of knowledge of the Devestators faults. If the US Navy had realized this lesson earlier no doubt the US carriers would have had a different make up of the carrier air group for the Battle of Midway.

Kernan is right in the torpedoes being faulty they were and it was criminal. However the interesting points is that the Navy hadn't developed the correct deployment of the Mark XIII torpedo. That was also criminal, however the question should be did the Devastator have the performance needed for optimum deployment of the weapon. The answer is no. The Devestators were going to be destroyed if they were to be used and according to the knowledge of the time they had to be used (based on strategies and the lack of a replacement aircraft in full production).

The last main theory is the leadership should have been better. Again he is right but he addresses this theory partially. He does not address that the nation had been at war for six months and the separation of peace time officers to wartime leaders was taking place. This was true all over the Navy. The submarine force was brutally separating the peacetime administrators from the wartime aggressive leaders. The difference between the air arm and submarine force here is the amount of enemy contact up to the Battle of the Coral Sea the air arm had been doing isolated raids to keep the Japanese off balance while the submarine force had been continually behind the Japanese lines in contact with the Japanese Navy. The Battle of Midway was the second time the air arm was in contact with the Japanese Navy. This fact would suggest that the air arm was still thinking that peacetime theories and leaders could still be effective. It is to the credit rather the detriment of the air admirals that they made changes and became as brutal as the submarine leaders in finding the wartime leaders after Midway. However Kernan wants to present the worst possible image of the leadership.

It must be addressed that Kernan was a member of VT-6 the USS Enterprise's torpedo squadron that suffered terrible losses. Kernan attacks Jim Grey the leader of the Enterprise's fighters during the attack and all but calls Capt. Grey (USN ret.) a coward because Grey didn't come to the Enterprise's torpedo squadron's rescue. Kernan relates a 1994 public apology at a Midway symposium and ends with an attack of how Capt grey ends his apology, "Sorry about that". Based on Kernan's own evidence he is attacking Grey for not finding VT-6 in Kernan's own words was a "group grope" or confusing circumstances and then Grey didn't hear a radio call for assistance. Kernan here should know better since the Historical record is replete with the air filled with irrelevant communications between planes. It is very plausible in battle Grey didn't hear the communication. This is nothing more than decades old embitterment from when friends of his were shot down because Capt. Grey covered mistakenly covered the wrong squadron. If anyone should be empathetic to Grey it should be Kernan who for decades was erroneously blamed for shooting down Lt. Commander Edward Butch O'Hare. Kernan has been a "victim" of the fog of war as Capt. Grey was one would expect better from Kernan. Instead another "victim" to the fog of war was Grey and Kernan should have realized this and not attacked him.

Kernan directed a large amount of his attack against Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring. This attack seems warranted however Kernan stops short of attacking Capt later Admiral Marc Mitscher. This seems to place all the blame of the Hornet's air group issues on Ring when Mitscher must share some of the blame. Read Mrazek's A Dawn Like Thunder for a synopsis and better interpretation of what should have been Kernan's theory about Ring and Mitscher. Mrazek accomplished Kernan's desire in five pages where Kernan took over 160 it must be said Mrazek didn't have the axe to grind that Kernan seems to have.

What Kernan does not acknowledge in this book is that the Navy learned from Midway and made corrections. The major lesson was that the Navy changed its air group composition to less torpedo bombers and more dive bombers. Later in the war when Kamikazes were a threat the air group composition was changed to more fighters. Again as a gunner on an Avenger throughout the war Kernan would have known about these changes but he refuses to admit to them.

If a reader was just to read this book to understand the Battle of Midway the reader would have a distorted understanding of the battle and this book must be read in concert with other books that abound on the Battle of Midway just so that this book can be put into any Historical context. This book is nothing more than the airing of grievances held by Kernan as an 18 year old junior enlisted man who lost friends. That doesn't make for scholarly or impressive work of History.

[Ray Pierson · Rating 3 out of 5]

How on earth did the US win this battle with such terrible training, faulty equipment, and such lousy odds? Luck had something to do with it, but the quality of the men cannot be disputed.

[Paul · Rating 3 out of 5]

Alvin Kernan is not one to mince words. Four squadrons of American torpedo bombers went to battle at Midway on June 4, 1942.

[I]n all, fifty-one planes tried to hit the Japanese ships with torpedoes that day. Only seven landed back at base. This comes to an aircraft loss rate of over 86 percent. Out of 128 pilots and crew who were in the torpedo planes that day, 29 survived, 99 died. And not one torpedo exploded against the hull of a Japanese ship.

The kindest word Kernan can use to describe this effort is “blunder.”

Kernan argues that three aspects of American weaponry contributed to the blunder: the Grumman F4F Wildcat fighter, the Douglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bomber, and the Mark 13 aerial torpedo.

The Wildcats were supposed to provide support for the torpedo squadrons during their attack, but they were hopelessly outclassed by their Japanese counterpart, the Zero. The Wildcat had a wide turning radius and was a slow climber. Most crucially, however, it had extremely limited range, while the Zero had fittings for an auxiliary tank that allowed one to fly nearly 2000 miles before running out of fuel. The Wildcat’s only advange was its armor, which was far superior to the Zero’s and allowed badly shot-up planes to return to base. At Midway, the Wildcats were unable to fight off the Zeros, which were able to attack the Devastators almost at will.

Even with adequate fighter support, however, the Devastators were unequal to the task of attacking the latest Japanese warships. In particular, they had extremely limited range. Aircraft carriers were forced to close within 150 miles of the enemy for the Devastators to have a reasonable chance of making it back aboard after their mission. The planes were also slow and sluggish, making them easy targets for Zeros.

The Mark 13 aerial torpedo was already ten years old by the early 1940s. They were heavy and slow. The Japanese ships against which they were launched at Midway were often able to outrun them. They often porpoised, forcing Devastator pilots to fly low and slow to get even a 50-50 chance of a successful launch. Even when the torpedo reached its target, it often failed to detonate. Compounding the problem was the lack of live-fire training for pilots. Over-confidence from the manufacturer robbed any urgency from the Navy brass. The Depression economy combined with the expense of each torpedo meant that training could be a budget buster.

There were also significant command errors during the course of the battle that contributed to the demise of the torpedo bomber squadrons. One squadron of Wildcats hung around at high altitude during an attack, doing nothing as Devastators were slaughtered near the surface. The fighters had arranged for a help signal from the bombers they were escorting, but they followed the wrong Devastators into battle. Never hearing the pre-arranged signal, they never engaged the enemy.

Another squadron of dive bombers covered by ten Wildcats flew off to the north of the Japanese fleet and never saw any action. This happened despite the advice of the wing’s torpedo bomber captain, who ended up veering off from his commander’ course. His squadron of Devastators met and launched an attack on the Japanese. Nearly all of them were killed during their approach.

[Jeff Rosendahl · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite being part of the "Yale Library of Military History," and having an authority like John Keegan label it "A Momentous Piece of Work," I couldn't quite bring myself to jump on board the bandwagon. Now, if this had been one of the first histories of the Battle of Midway I ever read, back in the 1980s, maybe I might have a whole different perspective on the battle. But today, this feels a bit like, "other survivors/participants have written their story, I need to get on board with mine as well." Especially in the last chapter, it feels like the only reason Kernan has bothered to publish this now (2005) is in response to the 1996 work of a Baltimore attorney who independently researched the end of one of the fighter pilots at the battle.
However, kudos to Kernan for having done his research, although details of the deficiencies of the planes and torpedos is hardly new information that has only recently come to light. And Kernan only deals with the pivotal hour when the torpedo squadrons were attacking the Japanese, nothing about the lead up to or denouement of the battle. Still, there was a point when I had to ask myself, "Is Spruance an ineffective commander?" "Instead of being unjustifiably maligned, did Fletcher deserve the criticism?" "Is everything we've been taught about this event incorrect?" In the end, I like this book as a companion to some of John Lundstrom's work. They help flesh out a picture of an American command that has some flaws, but is mostly doing the best they can and learning as they go. The truth of the matter is: the forces were so evenly matched, the Americans determined to transform their intelligence coup into a victory despite the inferiority of their equipment, and the Japanese so overconfident that the outcome was decided more on Nagumo's decisions and luck than anything else.

[Bob · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was glad to have picked up this book, which tells of the disastrous torpedo attacks made by Midway-based TBFs and B-26s and carrier-based TBDs during the Battle of Midway. Alvin Kernan--an aviation ordnanceman assigned to VT-6 aboard USS Enterprise during this engagement--brings his insider knowledge and scholarship to this aspect of the battle. Kernan tells of the faults in the TBDs and in the Mk. 13 torpedoes the US used early in World War II and in the leadership of the US carrier task forces and air squadrons. He acknowledges the role the torpedo attacks played in keeping the Japanese carriers from launching their aircraft against the US carrier, but with the great cost in personnel and equipment. Kernan's book is a must read for those interested in the Battle of Midway.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good summary of the actions of the various torpedo, fighter, and bomber squadrons involved in the battle. Good personal information (the author was there), and includes a lot of detail that you don't usually see in a historical account.

There does seem to be some bias based on opinions formed at the time and then kept (the down side to having a first-hand account).

Overall an excellent read and I recommend it.

[George · Rating 4 out of 5]

This had some very interesting information, I wasn't aware that most of the Zekes on the carriers didn't have radios so weren't able to talk with the fighter directors. It is unfortunate that the USN ordinance boards didn't do better testing on the Torpedoes, but the planes were so outmoded it wouldn't matter. If you have an interest in WW2 history, it is worth reading.

[Eric Duncan · Rating 5 out of 5]

this certainly sweeps aside some of the glory curtains hung in myth and legend.

The errors were many and varied but it took brave men in all areas to get the job done. The huge question that remains is why brave men flew to their deaths in inadequate planes loaded with torpedoes that did it work

[Robert H Logan · Rating 5 out of 5]

ANOTHER COVERUP

Another coverup of American History which was kept under the rug by the Ringknockers of the US Navy. We won the battle due to acts of God and we’ll trained dive bomber pilots. Bad bombers, poorly trained crews and torpedoes unfit for duty.

[Jessica · Rating 3 out of 5]

I bought this book while visiting the decommissioned ship Midway for the ride back home. It was rather sad. I wonder what really happened that day and whose account is true. It's sad knowing how many of the men knew the Hornets mission would fail.

[Tom Cahill · Rating 4 out of 5]

An thoughtful narrative about bravery, sacrifice, and a perfect storm of military ineptitude. The Battle of Midway was the turning point of the Pacific War. But it was won by the dive-bomber pilots of the U.S. Navy. The American torpedo planes were slaughtered, however. This book delves into the reasons.
Among them was the useless torpedo plane that the carrier pilots flew, The Douglas TBD Devastator. The Devastator was slow and lumbering and should have been retired before Pearl Harbor. Of the 41 launched against the japanese fleet in the battle 35 were shot down. But the plane's performance was hampered by execrable torpedoes (the Mark 13, Mod. 1) that were sluggish and often didn't explode. But even though the torpedoes were awful they were expensive enough that the American pilots rarely trained with them before the battle and had no idea how to drop them effectively. Finally, the leadership of many naval commanders was piss poor and the communication between squadrons was negligible/. The worst example of this was the commander of the HORNET's air group, Stanhope Ring. Ring ignored the carrier's torpedo squadron commander, John Waldron's pleadings for fighter escort for his (Waldron's) planes leaving them to the mercy of Japanese Zeroes and AA. Ring then flew his fighters and bombers far to the north of the Japanese fleet--depriving the American carrier's of one third of their striking power. Despite this Ring still received the Navy Cross(the same award earned posthumously by Waldron for his leadership in attacking the Japanese carriers).
This is a thoughtful and well-written book. Alvin Kernan , the author, served as an aviation ordnanceman for Torpedo Squadron 6 (U.S.S. ENTERPRISE) during the battle and offers vignettes from that experience. Is it the essential text for the battle? No, but it offers insights that augment the books that are.

[Rod · Rating 1 out of 5]

Not recommended. The theme of this book, that the torpedo bombers were sacrificed at Midway for a chance at victory is a truism. Nothing new here. What is objectionable is the author's many ad hominem attacks against many of the participants, mostly Naval officers. Example: Ens. George Gay "smirked" for his photo on Life magazine (Gay was the sole survivor of Torpedo Squadron 8).

The US can do nothing right in this book. Even the code-breaking that allowed the battle to be fought on roughly equal terms is discounted. Another example. The japanese captured a downed pilot and, after "interrogation" smashed him in the head with a fire ax and dumped him, alive, over the side (while chopping off his fingers as he desperately tried to say alive.) He attributes this the to Shintoism and the historical code of the warrior, Bushido. Moral relativism at its worst. In addition, he is quite incorrect about the source of atrocious Japanese treatment of POWs. During World Wor I, many German POW's (occupying Pacific Islands) were swept up by the Japanese. This group of POWs were very well treated and flourished during the war, and many choose to remain in Japan afterward. The primary source of Japanese brutality arises from the incredibly poor treatment if its own recruits and junior servicemen during the buildup to World War II.

On the plus side, this book is short (144 small pages, with wide margins and line spacing). Plus many extended (multiple page) quotations from other sources.

He uses Fuchida's book (Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan) throughout, evidently not knowing that much of its content has been thoroughly discredited.

See "Shattered Sword" for a more thorough and objective account of the Battle of Midway.

[Urey Patrick]

157 pages - and I could not put it down. Time and pages flow unnoticed - it is a remarkable, spellbinding book. The author examines and explains the all the factors that came into play at Midway - men, weapons, tactics, movements, strategies, luck - and explains how they affected events and the outcome. He also lays out the inexplicable events surrounding the Hornet's air wing... and the historical fictions that have enveloped them. Good men died for no reason as a result. I would recommend that one of the excellent histories of the Battle of Midway be read before reading this - the author assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge of the battle and how it developed and unfolded. This is not a history of the battle, per se - but an analysis of "how" and "why" things happened the way they did.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a thorough, brutal post-mortem of the disastrous American aerial torpedo attacks that were carried out at the Battle of Midway. The author examines the myriad reasons for this disaster, from faulty torpedoes, to lack of training dropping torpedoes, to flawed doctrine on employing torpedoes, to poor leadership in the squadrons and in the higher echelons of command, to SNAFUs during combat.

Kernan also provides some great insight into what it was like to service in the US Navy in World War II, and the torpedo squadrons specifically, because he was an enlisted member of one of those squadrons. The narrative is well written and easy to follow, and while not too dry or academic, I would have liked to see a little better citation and use of primary sources.

[Gill · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is a legend that brings tears to American eyes like the story of the Alamo. The three torpedo squadrons at Midway whose doomed and ineffective attacks on the Japanese fleet nonetheless distracted their defenses from our dive bombers making the victory possible.

This book goes into great detail about the deficiencies in weapons, training, and tactics that put those pilots in the position of making those hopeless attacks in which almost all were killed. While their sacrifice was not in vain, it was an avoidable tragedy since better pre-war preparation almost certainly would have resulted in a better outcome.

War is always like that. It's important to remember that.

[Rob Neyer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Might fairly be described as a monograph, with (almost) a singular focus on the torpedo bombers deployed by the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force during the Battle of Midway ... most of them destroyed by the Japanese Navy, with not a single torpedo hit. There are only a few character studies, but they're on point, and one might also glean a fair amount of insight into the wartime navy and its equipment. If you're a true expert on this subject, or are aspiring toward expertness, this book might not be detailed enough. But how many of you could that describe?

If you're just a casual reader of military history, as I am, pretty sure you'll love it.

[William Phothisran · Rating 4 out of 5]

In my opinion, this book gave a good perspective of the U.S and how they had to overcome the overpowered Japanese Navy in the Pacific Front in World War 2. It gave real facts and how they overcame the fight. This historical non fiction book of a real life event gives and thrilling events but it couldn't keep me on my toes for so long. I find myself staring into nothingness after every 20 min or so but enough for me to keep reading after. This is go to book for people who like history and the thrills of World War 2.

[Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

like the US Army in Torch the US Navy was unprepared in training and equipment but personal bravery, better intelligence, mistakes by the enemy and some luck carried the day and turned the tide in the Pacific in World War II.

[Artie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Indirectly via the Great American Sea Writing book. Kernan's a Yale professor who was an enlisted man on the USS Enterprise during the battle. This book is a combination of scholarly research and eyewitness account. It's one of the best I've ever read on the subject.

[Jeff · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not a bad book, but I didn't think it really added anything new to my knowledge of the battle, especially since the virtual floodgates of new books on Midway opened just a few years ago.

[Snail in Danger (Sid) Nicolaides]

Seems to be a genuine professional history, which makes good use of primary sources, while still remaining accessible to lay audiences.

[wally walter · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good account about a little known part of the battle of Midway