Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security - From World War II to the War on Terrorism

by Julian E. Zelizer

It has long been a truism that prior to George W. Bush, politics stopped at the water’s edge—that is, that partisanship had no place in national security. In Arsenal of Democracy , historian Julian E. Zelizer shows this to be demonstrably partisan fighting has always shaped American foreign policy and the issue of national security has always been part of our domestic conflicts. Based on original archival findings, Arsenal of Democracy offers new insights into nearly every major national security issue since the beginning of the cold from FDR’s masterful management of World War II to the partisanship that scarred John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, from Ronald Reagan’s fight against Communism to George W. Bush’s controversial War on Terror. A definitive account of the complex interaction between domestic politics and foreign affairs over the last six decades, Arsenal of Democracy is essential reading for anyone interested in the politics of national security.

Genres: History, Politics, American History, Nonfiction, World War II, Economics

592 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2009

About the author

Julian E. Zelizer is the Malcolm Stevenson Forbes, Class of 1941 Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

Reviews

[Phrodrick slowed his growing backlog · Rating 4 out of 5]

From early on I was back and forth on this a three or four star book. So to Julian Zelizer’ Arsenal of Democracy, I am rounding up to four stars. Exactly as the sub-title says this is an attempt to describe the politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism. To the earlier reviewer who panned be book because they missed the subtitle, I understand the mistake, I made a similar one. I cannot down star a book because of my error.

Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—is a tightly written political history of mostly presidential politics and the balancing act of maintaining a particular political doctrine in the face of reality and changing public opinion. The President may propose but even with the presumptive powers of Commander and Chief execution depends on money from Congress. This tends to create a dynamic between the executive and the legislature measured by the apparent prevailing opinions of the people.

My main criticism of Zelizer’s scholarship is that being so tightly focused on National Security issues, he rarely has time to focus on prevailing domestic context. The state of the economy, the impact of various scandals and such get at best uneven coverage.

For example in the Clinton years he cannot avoid the obvious linkages between the Whitewater investigation/Lewinsky scandal, but he rarely speaks to the economic conditions that may have effected the context that informed foreign policy.

Since everything is now filtered through left/right polarized lenses. It is my belief that Zelizer has made some effort to avoid hewing to either side. Some will be unhappy that he credits the Left under Roosevelt with winning World War II, but he has no problem admitting that once isolation failed in the public mind, the right became and remains the presumptive trusted voice on national defense.

A major position in what Zelizer calls conservative internationalism is that America can better provide for its defense by avoiding international entanglements and apply superior technology to make up for manpower shortages. In short unilaterally bomb opposing nations into submission and keep the troops at home. President Clinton, for example should have be applying liberal internationalism by promoting international engagement on when and where to engage, and engaging with a preference for nation building/regime changing boots on the ground. Clinton would be criticized by the right for unilateral application of technology against terrorists and a very successful application of air power in ending the wars in Kosovo.

He makes mention and is not the first to do so, the possibility that then candidate Nixon may have blocked a possible peace agreement between North Viet Nam and The US – and then does nothing with it. He points to the advent of BIG Lie style campaigning going back decades and then never mentions the term again. Ronald Raegan pre-election is rarely discussed with much respect, but his presidency is favorably reviewed. This may be a case of reality and doctrine in collision. It does point out that to Zelizer, policies are rarely analyzed in anything like an abstract way. Policy is only analyzed within its political dimension as either executed, blocked or contributory to re election

In this manner, he is often judgement free but the reader has little guidance in forming either a full picture of the period or the possible long term effects of that policy. For example had conservative presidents executed their proposed doctrine of rolling back communism, would America been in a constant state of War? Would Russia have backed down rather than start a new war over Poland or East Germany? Readers may have their opinions, and not presenting any analysis saves many pages, but, absent analysis, is a recitation of the facts as they happened sufficient?

As compared with the many versions of American Election politics as so many advertising campaigns, Zelizer succeeds in connecting party and candidate doctrine with the votes ultimately cast. Perhaps to too great of a degree since for example it is almost never “The Economy Stupid” with Zelizer.

A reasonable, if striking conclusion from this book is that the conservative voice in America since the end of isolation as a viable foreign policy, have had a more consistent record in formulating a more complete, electorally viable view of national security policy than that of the liberal candidates. The result, never expressly said is that America has consistently edged further toward conservative thinking on matters related to the national security state. A long distance from Republican President Eisenhower’s warning against being too much with its military-industrial complex.

[Olivia Ramsey · Rating 3 out of 5]

zelizer provides a useful reference for analyzing U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period. his argument is well-developed and unique—that in fact it was partisan interests that determined national security policies, that conservatives committed the original sin of converting to conservative internationalism, and that both parties have shaped national security policy through exacerbated partisan competition.

despite that, i just didn’t enjoy the book very much. zelizer uses the term “hawk” far too much, his prose was very dry, and i just simply do not like military history. (also i had to read this 500-page book in 6 days)

read for postwar u.s. history!

[Lynn · Rating 5 out of 5]

A swift easy reading overview of national security law making from the early 20th century to 2008. It covers a lot of ground but gave me insight and information that I wasn’t aware of about particular presidents and policies. Congress was enlightening too. I never realized how often one party had 60 members in one Congress or another. Very good.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great history of politics' (mainly Congress) role in foreign policy making. The level of detail is just right, and there are some really great in-depth chapter on things like ending the draft, losing China, and missile defense. Possibly the best chapter is on detente, which never managed to gain a domestic political base of support despite fulfilling many US foreign policy goals. Zelizer's thesis isn't revolutionary, but he demonstrates it well: Politics by no means ends at the water's edge. Rather, Dems and Reps have used foreign policy to get an edge on each other and have often gone after each other in vicious ways on foreign policy. This book also shows that the US electorate does pay attention to and care about foreign affairs.

Zelizer's much more interesting argument is about the rise and fall of conservative internationalism and liberal internationalism. LI was developed by FDR and evolved throughout the early Cold War before being crushed by Vietnam. LI focused on building a network of multilateral institutions around the world with the US at its head. It pursued collective security and national mobilization for war, which means it backed the necessity of the draft. It was also much more willing to expend American resources for overseas development and even nation-building projects like Vietnam. The Vietnam War, however, discredited LI and caused many liberals to abandon it. Some of them turned to conservative internationalism, and some turned to a more human rights oriented agenda. I wonder if Zelizer thinks that Obama has brought LI back in any ways.

Conservative internationalism has a fascinating origin story. The GOP was the hardest party to get on board with the expanded US global role after WWII. They had been the staunchest resistors to FDR's attempts to get the US involved in the war and in the postwar system. The main reason they did become internationalists so quickly is anti-communism, which rallied virtually all of them. They then used anti-communism to bash the Democrats, who then did it right back once Ike became President. This dynamic, which often seemed out of control, pushed foreign policy to the right as a whole and was in part responsible for the Vietnam War. I'd like to have seen Zelizer comment on why the fear of being soft in foreign policy has been so powerful in American politics, but he does a good job showing it at work throughout this time period.

The main tenets conservative internationalism are a more unilateral approach, more skepticism of international institutions, a harsher anti-communism, and less willingness to demand sacrifice from the American people, especially in the form of the draft. Conservatives were always wary about the draft because they saw it as a massive infringement on individual liberties and an expansion of gov't power. Nixon's ending of the draft implemented a key aspect of CI, which was asking less of the American people while keeping a forward defense posture. CI went through its greatest crisis under Bush II, when the goals of transforming nations overseas while fighting stretched beyond the means of the AVF and of not raising taxes or a draft. Zelizer's chapter on the Bush administration is fair-minded, but it nevertheless makes an implicit case for the failure of CI and the need to return to LI in some fashion. CI also has many interesting variations. Nixon pursued a version of it by ending the draft, which he believed would give him freer reign to pursue diplomacy around the world, especially with the USSR and China. Reagan pursued CI based on massive defense spending and a more unilateral, confrontational approach to foreign policy. If the book had any weakness it was that Zelizer didn't do much to show how all of these different foreign policies fit under CI, although the reader can still piece together most of the connections.

I recommend this book to students of American foreign policy and/or politics. I haven't seen these topics woven together this skillfully thus far. Although it's not a totally original argument, this is an engaging book that gives vivid senses of different personalities and positions in foreign policy and politics.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a better than average book about the history of Detroit leading up to and during World War II. It is centered on the Ford company and especially Henry Ford and his son, Edsel. Some things I learned:

1. Henry Ford had this fascinatingly complex character. On the one hand he would employ anyone who could work in his plants, including a few men with no arms (they did their work on the line with their feet) and a few men with no legs. At the height of the war, 33% of the people in his plant were women. He paid good wages too. On the other hand, he does appear to have been an anti-Semite, and did not recognize the threat that Nazi Germany posed until literally Pearl Harbor.

2. Edsel Ford comes off pretty well in this book. He was the president of Ford from 1933 until his death in 1943 and he did an amazing job leading Ford into the war footing and retooling their plants and building new ones for producing war machines. He died of stomach cancer at the age of 49.

3. Harry Bennet was Henry Ford’s enforcer and head of security and ended up being a sort of Rasputin over the aging and increasingly demented Henry. This caused big problems for Ford Motor Co., and the final battle where he was eventually fired didn’t take place until 1945. It’s weird how often really rich people end up with these Rasputin-like characters who control their lives.

4. Good read. I enjoyed.

[Patrick Sprunger · Rating 5 out of 5]

Julian Zelizer has compiled comprehensive scholarship of the politics of national security, since 1945. Arsenal of Democracy is not a debate over national security policy, but rather a description of how the hawks and doves reel in the air over Washington. This approach circumvents the pragmatic and ideological arguments behind various security strategies and focuses exclusively on the way those arguments are appropriated and marketed by politicians, specifically the interplay of power and rivalry between the White House and Congress.

The author chooses to present his findings in chronological, episodic order that plays to readers' existing knowledge of the national security narrative, from the long telegram through suspension of habeus corpus. Nothing in between is missed. Zelizer covers McCarthyism, Vietnam (and its attendants The Great Society and Watergate), detente, SDI ("Star Wars"), and 9-11 all in turn. In so doing, he demonstrates the unbroken partisan strife that connects the present through to the past, contending that the party who best owns the mantle of "tough on national security" will win power, despite the fact that such toughness tends to become a liability over time.

It is a story of cyclical metamorphosis, as parties co-opt the potency of security as a brand to win elections, but fail to prevent the brand from being recast by the opposition. Rather than attack hawkishness as the problem, opposition typically styles its target as a betrayer of the trust. In this way, the mantle of security remains supernaturally charged and is continually chased as a prize. The cycle repeats, ad infinitum.

[Jason S · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book very frequently strayed from its thesis with long chapters covering trying to cover the entire history of American foreign policy and politics in the 20th century. While some sections were very interesting (like the discussions of the creation of an all voluntary military), overall the book is written like a textbook. The definition of "neo-conservative" used throughout the book is problematic, as are several key omissions (like the failure to mention the ME Peace Process attempts at the end of the Clinton Administration).