What do you think?
Rate this book
Cambridge Military Histories
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East
Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began the largest and most costly campaign in military history. Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War. The operation was planned as a Blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the East, and the summer of 1941 is well-known for the German army's unprecedented victories and advances. Yet the German Blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised Panzer groups, particularly those of Army Group Centre. Using previously unpublished archival records, David Stahel presents a new history of Germany's summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful Panzer groups on the Eastern front. Stahel's research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany's war against the Soviet Union, highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion.
500 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
108 people are currently reading
1150 people want to read
About the author
David Stahel
14 books93 followersDavid Stahel was born in Wellington, New Zealand in 1975, but grew up in Melbourne, Australia. He completed an honours degree in history at Monash University (1998), an MA in War Studies at King's College London (2000) and a PhD at the Humboldt University in Berlin (2007). His research focus has centered primarily on the German military in World War II and particularly Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. Dr. Stahel's latest book Operation Typhoon was released by Cambridge University Press in March 2013 and will be followed by another book focusing on German operations on the eastern front in November and early December 1941.
David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.
Books:
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).
Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).
(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).
Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).
Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).
David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.
Books:
Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).
Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).
(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).
Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).
Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews
October 17, 2020
David Stahel's work is a detailed, step-by-step account of the planning and preparation of Operation Barbarossa, as well as the first nine weeks of the campaign.
While the great battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941/1942 is commonly considered Germany's first major defeat in the war against the Soviet Union, Stahel argues that Barbarossa was doomed to failure as early as the summer of 1941.
The author mainly focuses on the plans and actions of Army Group Center, the largest and most powerful of the three German formations, on which the critical task of defeating the mass of Soviet forces and clearing the way for an attack on Moscow depended. Army Group Center's main strength was the multiple tanks, motorized infantry, and artillery. From the four "panzer groups", in which the Wermacht's motorized divisions were concentrated, Army Group Center possessed two, and upon them the success of the Barbarossa blitzkrieg was dependent.
Stahel traces this force's impressive initial success, measured by the seizure of territory and Soviet casualty rates, but underscores the fact that Operation Barbarossa was based on several flawed assumptions, and these would prove detrimental to the German campaign.
Two of those assumptions was that if the Nazi army destroyed the Red Army in the border areas, there would be little resistance as their forces proceeded to the depths of the USSR, and that the Soviets would not be able to reconstitute their armies after the first defeats. What the Germans hadn't prepared themselves for, however, was the actual size of the Red Army, the extent of Soviet propaganda, and the overwhelming number of Russian POWs they would have to deal with.
After the Germans inflicted heavy casualties on the five-million Red Army at the border, they were more than surprised to see it grow to eight million people instead of diminishing. Stalin had managed to effectively mobilize the whole enormous country, so the moment the Red Army was reduced by enemy forces, new troops joined. Indeed, they were mostly ill-trained, but they were, nevertheless, "fresh meat" to hurl at the enemy. The Germans, initially perplexed by this phenomenon, compared the Red Army to a monster, who grew additional heads the moment his old ones were cut off.
Another big problem for the Nazi army was that every village or town it arrived in was burnt and deserted by its population, urged by Soviet propaganda, leaving the Germans no victuals whatsoever, and the further they advanced into the Soviet Union, the more eager was the population to burn and desert.
in addition, the enormous number of Soviet POWs was also creating huge problems – staff officers encountered many thousands of Soviet POWs marching on the roads unsupervised, and the nearby forests were always teeming with enemy troops, a good number of whom had already been captured at some point. The Germans had no other choice but to leave divisions behind to watch over the occupied areas. This meant that, aside from the three security divisions already designated for the purpose, another two active divisions were withheld.
Thus, the German army was losing vital forces. On top of that, due to the vastness of the country and the great distances (up to 90 km) the men had to cover in a single day, infantry divisions and sustainment formations trying to keep pace with the motorized forces lagged further and further behind, and as Stahel shows, the capability of the Army Centre to achieve its primary goal to seize Moscow gradually degraded. According to him, that the German managed (hardly) to reach the Smolensk/Dnieper line without suffering a major defeat was largely due to the extraordinary incompetence of the Red Army commanders.
As Stahel reveals, from the very beginning, Adolf Hitler realized the economical limitations of his country and its inability to lead a war of attrition. That's why the fact that in August 1941, when the supply system was heavily overextended and the Army Center's offensive strength dispersed, the generals still argued for an offensive towards Moscow demonstrates that the tragic failure to recognize the limitations of the forces under their command was inherent to the campaign itself.
David Stahel's work is extremely well-researched, although only German sources are used. What makes it remarkable is that aside from all the other documents, the author draws upon myriad diaries and letters written by everyone from soldiers to officers to generals, adding an essential human element to his narrative. The book is supplied with maps, which highly contribute to the understanding of the Army Center's movements. I believe that Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East will appeal to any WWII buff not only because of its compelling style and impressive bibliography, but also because it definitely shines new light on the role Operation Barbarossa played in Nazi Germany's downfall in the East.
While the great battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941/1942 is commonly considered Germany's first major defeat in the war against the Soviet Union, Stahel argues that Barbarossa was doomed to failure as early as the summer of 1941.
The author mainly focuses on the plans and actions of Army Group Center, the largest and most powerful of the three German formations, on which the critical task of defeating the mass of Soviet forces and clearing the way for an attack on Moscow depended. Army Group Center's main strength was the multiple tanks, motorized infantry, and artillery. From the four "panzer groups", in which the Wermacht's motorized divisions were concentrated, Army Group Center possessed two, and upon them the success of the Barbarossa blitzkrieg was dependent.
Stahel traces this force's impressive initial success, measured by the seizure of territory and Soviet casualty rates, but underscores the fact that Operation Barbarossa was based on several flawed assumptions, and these would prove detrimental to the German campaign.
Two of those assumptions was that if the Nazi army destroyed the Red Army in the border areas, there would be little resistance as their forces proceeded to the depths of the USSR, and that the Soviets would not be able to reconstitute their armies after the first defeats. What the Germans hadn't prepared themselves for, however, was the actual size of the Red Army, the extent of Soviet propaganda, and the overwhelming number of Russian POWs they would have to deal with.
After the Germans inflicted heavy casualties on the five-million Red Army at the border, they were more than surprised to see it grow to eight million people instead of diminishing. Stalin had managed to effectively mobilize the whole enormous country, so the moment the Red Army was reduced by enemy forces, new troops joined. Indeed, they were mostly ill-trained, but they were, nevertheless, "fresh meat" to hurl at the enemy. The Germans, initially perplexed by this phenomenon, compared the Red Army to a monster, who grew additional heads the moment his old ones were cut off.
Another big problem for the Nazi army was that every village or town it arrived in was burnt and deserted by its population, urged by Soviet propaganda, leaving the Germans no victuals whatsoever, and the further they advanced into the Soviet Union, the more eager was the population to burn and desert.
in addition, the enormous number of Soviet POWs was also creating huge problems – staff officers encountered many thousands of Soviet POWs marching on the roads unsupervised, and the nearby forests were always teeming with enemy troops, a good number of whom had already been captured at some point. The Germans had no other choice but to leave divisions behind to watch over the occupied areas. This meant that, aside from the three security divisions already designated for the purpose, another two active divisions were withheld.
Thus, the German army was losing vital forces. On top of that, due to the vastness of the country and the great distances (up to 90 km) the men had to cover in a single day, infantry divisions and sustainment formations trying to keep pace with the motorized forces lagged further and further behind, and as Stahel shows, the capability of the Army Centre to achieve its primary goal to seize Moscow gradually degraded. According to him, that the German managed (hardly) to reach the Smolensk/Dnieper line without suffering a major defeat was largely due to the extraordinary incompetence of the Red Army commanders.
As Stahel reveals, from the very beginning, Adolf Hitler realized the economical limitations of his country and its inability to lead a war of attrition. That's why the fact that in August 1941, when the supply system was heavily overextended and the Army Center's offensive strength dispersed, the generals still argued for an offensive towards Moscow demonstrates that the tragic failure to recognize the limitations of the forces under their command was inherent to the campaign itself.
David Stahel's work is extremely well-researched, although only German sources are used. What makes it remarkable is that aside from all the other documents, the author draws upon myriad diaries and letters written by everyone from soldiers to officers to generals, adding an essential human element to his narrative. The book is supplied with maps, which highly contribute to the understanding of the Army Center's movements. I believe that Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East will appeal to any WWII buff not only because of its compelling style and impressive bibliography, but also because it definitely shines new light on the role Operation Barbarossa played in Nazi Germany's downfall in the East.
June 24, 2021
A book that I would have in my "shortlist of must read WW2 books" if I had one. Even if you would only read the first 30 pages or so, would you have so much better understanding about the controversies and discussions relating to everything written about the 'Ostkrieg'.
This book is based on David Stahel's doctoral dissertation that focused on the Army Group Center's attrition in the first months of Barbarossa. While this book is titled as more broad, the focus is still pretty much the same; Germany's Army Group center, and it's two Panzer groups. His main argument is that Germany lost the war in the first months of Barbarossa even before Typhoon and this is because it's most mobile divisions where ground to near annihilation from July to august. He also 'breaks' few myths about the Wehrmacht and the generals of it, although about 12 years later one couldn't say they're anymore groundbreaking.
The research is based on a lot of different sources and he constantly evaluates the worthiness of the used source. Also the research is not only based on just diaries and such but also statistical numbers which are very revealing just how precarious the German position was even before the invasion. For example he has charts to explain the composition of Panzer groups tanks and their wear and tear during the offense. Also he writes quite extensively about the supply issue how the lack of trains and trucks were a problem from the beginning of the invasion.
All in all if you're only familiar with eastern front from some cheap documentaries, one get's a whole different perspective from this book. For me this was 22nd book that covers Eastern front and yet it felt fresh and gave some food for thought.
The only minor problem with the book is that, he uses maps from Glantz' that are way too tight in their scope and for my liking don't have enough information. While the text refer's to armies and corps' by their number but also by their leader the map's only have number's. For me the army/corps boundaries would've had to be more visible and occasionally I would've liked a map where the whole of Eastern front or bigger part of it would've been visible. Yet in the light of how good the actual book is, it's only a minor flaw.
I'm interested enough to buy his other books as well.
This book is based on David Stahel's doctoral dissertation that focused on the Army Group Center's attrition in the first months of Barbarossa. While this book is titled as more broad, the focus is still pretty much the same; Germany's Army Group center, and it's two Panzer groups. His main argument is that Germany lost the war in the first months of Barbarossa even before Typhoon and this is because it's most mobile divisions where ground to near annihilation from July to august. He also 'breaks' few myths about the Wehrmacht and the generals of it, although about 12 years later one couldn't say they're anymore groundbreaking.
The research is based on a lot of different sources and he constantly evaluates the worthiness of the used source. Also the research is not only based on just diaries and such but also statistical numbers which are very revealing just how precarious the German position was even before the invasion. For example he has charts to explain the composition of Panzer groups tanks and their wear and tear during the offense. Also he writes quite extensively about the supply issue how the lack of trains and trucks were a problem from the beginning of the invasion.
All in all if you're only familiar with eastern front from some cheap documentaries, one get's a whole different perspective from this book. For me this was 22nd book that covers Eastern front and yet it felt fresh and gave some food for thought.
The only minor problem with the book is that, he uses maps from Glantz' that are way too tight in their scope and for my liking don't have enough information. While the text refer's to armies and corps' by their number but also by their leader the map's only have number's. For me the army/corps boundaries would've had to be more visible and occasionally I would've liked a map where the whole of Eastern front or bigger part of it would've been visible. Yet in the light of how good the actual book is, it's only a minor flaw.
I'm interested enough to buy his other books as well.
December 8, 2023
This book deals with the planning and preparation of operation Barbarossa and the crucial first six weeks of the campaign. It shows the different viewpoints of both the German High Command (Brauchitsch and Halder) and Hitler and the subsequent development of the German war plans. It also shows why Germany lost the war due to the completely inadequate and failure to understand the consequences of a war with Russia, its sheer size and diversity and the immense logistical challenges it would pose for their troops to maneuver and keep them supplied.
From the beginning, Brauchitsch and Halder were critical about the strategic plans for Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's focus on strategic potential of the Russia's resources in the south could only lead to a prolonged and costly campaign that would ultimately weaken the German war effort and prevent Germany from delivering the 'final-blow'. Brauchitsch and Halder believed that capturing Moscow quickly was crucial for the success of the campaign. They argued that a swift victory in the capital would deal a significant blow to the Soviet morale and potentially force the Soviets into a more favorable position for negotiations. Knowing the limits their arguments and powers of persuasion could influence Hitler's reasoning decided instead on a covert subversion of Hitler's plan in order to raise the question to conquer Moscow later on. This would later result in Hitler overriding the generals and only issue his Nach Moskou when it was already too late.
Throughout the book, Stahel makes use of both German accounts of the war and the public release of important Soviet-era documents released in the nineteen-nineties and that lead him to show that the seeds of the inevitable German defeat in the East. It is interesting to read how both the German operational commanders and Hitler underestimated Russian strength and gambled all they had on a short, decisive campaign that had to end before the Russian winter.
But where Stahel really succeeds in is presenting the attainment of objectives and assessing these against the loss of critical militairy capabilities. Despite the initial victories they did not achieve the main German aim of tearing open the Soviet front to allow an unhindered advance to the depths of the Soviet Union. These victories - impressive as they were - achieved impressive operational successes but did not open up a means on which the war could be won. Each victory just meant a further crippling of forces and as a result made the final victory ever more unattainable.
By stressing the consumption of supplies and loss of vital equipment in the motorized formations damaged or destroyed in combat and the failure for the supporting infantry armies on the flanks to keep pace with the surging motorized forces Stahel presents a clear picture on the diminishing capability of Army Group Center to capture Moscow. In this, Stahel has managed to write an interesting book that no doubt will be a great addition to the standard works on the maneuvers and battles that took place.
From the beginning, Brauchitsch and Halder were critical about the strategic plans for Operation Barbarossa. Hitler's focus on strategic potential of the Russia's resources in the south could only lead to a prolonged and costly campaign that would ultimately weaken the German war effort and prevent Germany from delivering the 'final-blow'. Brauchitsch and Halder believed that capturing Moscow quickly was crucial for the success of the campaign. They argued that a swift victory in the capital would deal a significant blow to the Soviet morale and potentially force the Soviets into a more favorable position for negotiations. Knowing the limits their arguments and powers of persuasion could influence Hitler's reasoning decided instead on a covert subversion of Hitler's plan in order to raise the question to conquer Moscow later on. This would later result in Hitler overriding the generals and only issue his Nach Moskou when it was already too late.
Throughout the book, Stahel makes use of both German accounts of the war and the public release of important Soviet-era documents released in the nineteen-nineties and that lead him to show that the seeds of the inevitable German defeat in the East. It is interesting to read how both the German operational commanders and Hitler underestimated Russian strength and gambled all they had on a short, decisive campaign that had to end before the Russian winter.
But where Stahel really succeeds in is presenting the attainment of objectives and assessing these against the loss of critical militairy capabilities. Despite the initial victories they did not achieve the main German aim of tearing open the Soviet front to allow an unhindered advance to the depths of the Soviet Union. These victories - impressive as they were - achieved impressive operational successes but did not open up a means on which the war could be won. Each victory just meant a further crippling of forces and as a result made the final victory ever more unattainable.
By stressing the consumption of supplies and loss of vital equipment in the motorized formations damaged or destroyed in combat and the failure for the supporting infantry armies on the flanks to keep pace with the surging motorized forces Stahel presents a clear picture on the diminishing capability of Army Group Center to capture Moscow. In this, Stahel has managed to write an interesting book that no doubt will be a great addition to the standard works on the maneuvers and battles that took place.
July 1, 2022
David Stahel’s book has been the best book I have read on Operation Barbarossa, and I would say I think very highly of it. It is an eye opener for sure, and is written in a way that I love. Stahel’s book is a must read for World War Two enthusiasts; it will make you view operation Barbarossa in a different light.
This is how I see the premise of the book: People paint a picture of Operation Barbarossa, that makes it seem like Germany was an unstoppable juggernaut in the early months of the conflict. It was not; it was unprepared for the campaign.
Stahel breaks down the conditions for Germany’s defeat into two sections. The first focuses on the planning, the condition of the German armed forces (panzers, infantry, air force) before the war, and the sheer incompetence of Franz Halder, Brauchitsch, the OKH, OKW, and their lack of courage to make objections or suggestions to Hitler about how the invasion should be carried out.
A person that gets talked about throughout this book a lot is Halder; Stahel really talks a lot about Halder, the Chief of Staff of the OKH, and his actions don’t exactly make him look like a strong-willed person fit for command. Halder, and Brauchitsch, along with other German generals want to take Moscow, and see an importance in it, which is not Hitler’s main objective. Halder, as portrayed in this book, was practically bordering on insubordination. One thing I notice, is the sheer hypocrisy that Halder displays, and in-fact most of the high command: They go behind Hitler’s back and do thing’s he objects to, but when they are in meetings with Hitler, they lack the will to stand up and try to convince him to their side.
The Second part focuses on the operation from the beginning, all the way to the battle of Smolensk. Stahel goes through the campaign with more focus and he has a reasoning to do this: The publics perception of Operation Barbarossa is that the early months of the operation were a success; that Germany was unbeatable, strong, powerful, and entirely prepared for the invasion of Russia; that the operation only started to crumble once Hitler, the incompetent junky, madman started to interfere with strategy.
Stahel disproves this all, and does it by giving an analysis of primary documents (such as combat journals kept by Germany divisions, diaries kept by German generals, etc), and we get this conclusion: In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, Germany was already starting to crack. Germany’s military philosophy up to that point had been to fight short wars, in which they encircle and destroy an enemy army. It was unprepared for the long distances, the logistical pitfalls, and especially the stubborn resistance the red army unleashed on them. Several days into the campaign, the Author presents primary source documents from German units complaining about the long distances, the lack of rest, the stubbornness of the Red Army, the constant dust in the air making them sick, the poor roads, and/or the partisan fighting that took place where German soldiers took heavy casualties. A big part of this book that Stahel talks about is the in-fighting between German generals, and how they started playing a blame game, and how there was arguing over objectives. For example: Guderian wanted to continue his advance further east, but another general (I think it was Kluge) wanted him to help close a pocket and a blame game went on. Stahel mentions Halder quite a bit too, and talks about how he is actively trying to convince Hitler to take Moscow by creating a situation, in which Hitler will not object to it’s capture, or where Hitler will see its importance. Stahel mentions how the army commanders around Hitler build him up with this false hope of invincibility, and they seem to be either hiding the reports about the deteriorating conditions on the battlefield, or they dismiss them.
Stahel also mentions the shock and awe of the German soldiers when they encounter the KV-1 and T-34 tanks in battle, and he’s not talking in August, or September of 1941, he’s talking in June and July. He mentions examples of multiple German tanks being knocked out by these tanks in June and July of 1941, and how they had to call in the Luftwaffe to drop bombs on the enemy tanks because they lacked anything powerful enough on the ground to destroy those tanks.
When you read this book, you get this uneasy feeling watching the many screw ups going on for the Wehrmacht, and then as the book goes on, and the obstacles grow for the Wehrmacht, you feel as though the campaign was doomed from the start. No wonder they lost the eastern front.
I have been having trouble finding a good book to read, but this helped me get out of that dilemma, therefore I give it Five stars.
Overall, I have to say this book was the best one I have read on Operation Barbarossa
This is how I see the premise of the book: People paint a picture of Operation Barbarossa, that makes it seem like Germany was an unstoppable juggernaut in the early months of the conflict. It was not; it was unprepared for the campaign.
Stahel breaks down the conditions for Germany’s defeat into two sections. The first focuses on the planning, the condition of the German armed forces (panzers, infantry, air force) before the war, and the sheer incompetence of Franz Halder, Brauchitsch, the OKH, OKW, and their lack of courage to make objections or suggestions to Hitler about how the invasion should be carried out.
A person that gets talked about throughout this book a lot is Halder; Stahel really talks a lot about Halder, the Chief of Staff of the OKH, and his actions don’t exactly make him look like a strong-willed person fit for command. Halder, and Brauchitsch, along with other German generals want to take Moscow, and see an importance in it, which is not Hitler’s main objective. Halder, as portrayed in this book, was practically bordering on insubordination. One thing I notice, is the sheer hypocrisy that Halder displays, and in-fact most of the high command: They go behind Hitler’s back and do thing’s he objects to, but when they are in meetings with Hitler, they lack the will to stand up and try to convince him to their side.
The Second part focuses on the operation from the beginning, all the way to the battle of Smolensk. Stahel goes through the campaign with more focus and he has a reasoning to do this: The publics perception of Operation Barbarossa is that the early months of the operation were a success; that Germany was unbeatable, strong, powerful, and entirely prepared for the invasion of Russia; that the operation only started to crumble once Hitler, the incompetent junky, madman started to interfere with strategy.
Stahel disproves this all, and does it by giving an analysis of primary documents (such as combat journals kept by Germany divisions, diaries kept by German generals, etc), and we get this conclusion: In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, Germany was already starting to crack. Germany’s military philosophy up to that point had been to fight short wars, in which they encircle and destroy an enemy army. It was unprepared for the long distances, the logistical pitfalls, and especially the stubborn resistance the red army unleashed on them. Several days into the campaign, the Author presents primary source documents from German units complaining about the long distances, the lack of rest, the stubbornness of the Red Army, the constant dust in the air making them sick, the poor roads, and/or the partisan fighting that took place where German soldiers took heavy casualties. A big part of this book that Stahel talks about is the in-fighting between German generals, and how they started playing a blame game, and how there was arguing over objectives. For example: Guderian wanted to continue his advance further east, but another general (I think it was Kluge) wanted him to help close a pocket and a blame game went on. Stahel mentions Halder quite a bit too, and talks about how he is actively trying to convince Hitler to take Moscow by creating a situation, in which Hitler will not object to it’s capture, or where Hitler will see its importance. Stahel mentions how the army commanders around Hitler build him up with this false hope of invincibility, and they seem to be either hiding the reports about the deteriorating conditions on the battlefield, or they dismiss them.
Stahel also mentions the shock and awe of the German soldiers when they encounter the KV-1 and T-34 tanks in battle, and he’s not talking in August, or September of 1941, he’s talking in June and July. He mentions examples of multiple German tanks being knocked out by these tanks in June and July of 1941, and how they had to call in the Luftwaffe to drop bombs on the enemy tanks because they lacked anything powerful enough on the ground to destroy those tanks.
When you read this book, you get this uneasy feeling watching the many screw ups going on for the Wehrmacht, and then as the book goes on, and the obstacles grow for the Wehrmacht, you feel as though the campaign was doomed from the start. No wonder they lost the eastern front.
I have been having trouble finding a good book to read, but this helped me get out of that dilemma, therefore I give it Five stars.
Overall, I have to say this book was the best one I have read on Operation Barbarossa
April 3, 2024
An in-depth examination of the planning and execution of the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany, why Operation Barbarossa failed and how this failure became the decisive campaign of the Second World War, dooming the Germans to defeat. Cogently written, the focus of the narrative are the operations of Army Group Center (the most powerful and important of the three army groups deployed) and its battles up until the end of August 1941, as well as the resulting conflicts within the German high command as the campaign progressed. Dr. Stahel maintains that the Wehrmacht never had the slightest chance of winning this battle and he skillfully uses the sources to back up his contention. Without going into too many details, here's how it went down: Firstly, the level of German military, economic and geographic intelligence about the Soviet Union was abysmal. Secondly, the profoundly racist outlook of the Nazi state absurdly inflated the abilities of the German military ("The German soldier can do anything!") and belittled the combat capabilities of the Russians, who turned out to be able to fight much harder and skillfully than expected, as the Germans themselves would ruefully admit. The operational concept of the invasion was deeply flawed as well, expecting that the Red Army would be destroyed in the first 6 to 8 weeks of the campaign before the Germans would reach the Dnepr-Dvina line. Finally, given the vast distances involved and the primitive state of the Soviet road network, the logistical resources available to support this huge battle were utterly, ridiculously inadequate to the task. It's hard to argue with Dr. Stahel's conclusion that the professional reputations of the German officers who planned and carried out Operation Barbarossa have been inflated beyond their true quality. One should remember that the emphasis in this book is on the progress of AG Center, and that the maps (excellent reprints from books by David Glantz) are only of that unit. Dr. Stahel has the knack for making sense of a gigantic and complicated operation, not a skill every military historian possesses. An important addition to our knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII.
December 18, 2023
The Wehrmacht lost Barbarossa due to overstretch. That basic well-known fact makes Stahel repetitive sometimes, but he's great at the creeping reality of wear n' tear on vehicles, incomplete encirclements, replacement manpower shortages, where do those Soviet formations keep coming from exactly while they should be at zero by our count and where exactly do we attack with what we have to win before winter, if we can get five minutes without plugging gaps and blunting counterattacks...can we agree on a course because The Big Leader is indecisive?
January 8, 2022
Not a light read but well worth the effort. Main theme of the book is that Germany lost the war when it invaded the Soviet Union and that Operation Barbarossa had an unrealistic chance of success because of lack of logistics, transportation, strategic direction along with poor planning, roads, weather. A sub-theme is Hitler's relationship with top command within OKW and OKH which revealed why Hitler had a distrust of his military commanders.
June 13, 2018
This is one of the most interesting books I have read recently. The research is excellent and well presented with detailed information and a logical format. It certainly shows a reality away from the myth that is so often stated.
You might go into this book with the idea of German military supremacy and you will see how actually this isn't necessarily the case. What is an important point in this book is comparing the contemporary reports and diaries with the post-war versions published by many of the generals involved. It is interesting to note the difference and lack of co-operation. It is also interesting to see the condition of the Red Army at this time and the differences in area commands and equipment.
For anyone wanting to know about the myth about the Soviets planning to invade Germany, this is also covered in the book in some detail.
This is a great book for anyone who already has knowledge or wants to read more.
You might go into this book with the idea of German military supremacy and you will see how actually this isn't necessarily the case. What is an important point in this book is comparing the contemporary reports and diaries with the post-war versions published by many of the generals involved. It is interesting to note the difference and lack of co-operation. It is also interesting to see the condition of the Red Army at this time and the differences in area commands and equipment.
For anyone wanting to know about the myth about the Soviets planning to invade Germany, this is also covered in the book in some detail.
This is a great book for anyone who already has knowledge or wants to read more.
December 24, 2022
This is an excellent operational analysis of Army Group Center during the battles of Minsk and Smolensk, and a penetrating study of Hitler and the high command. The book is limited, however, by assumptions that make no sense in the context being discussed.
As far as the campaign itself, Stahel does an excellent job explaining the strategic foundations of Barbarossa and the rationale behind it. In essence, the German high command underestimated the Soviet Union through a combination of racial/ideological arrogance and bad intelligence, then assumed they could recreate the stunning success they enjoyed in France a year earlier. Stahel does well to point out that there were critics of Barbarossa within the Axis coalition, particularly in the foreign ministry and the supply services, but contradicts his own critique, which is informed by hindsight, when discussing the similarity between the German and Allied assessments of Soviet capability. If the US and Britain believed the Soviet Union would fall to the Germans in 1941, it more or less makes sense that they chose to invade.
Additionally, there is too little discussion of the relationship between supply and operations officers within the German army to support the conclusion that bad logistical planning was a profound failing of the Wehrmacht. My suspicion is that it actually was, but Stahel doesn't demonstrate it very well. Even the western allies outran their supply lines during the rush to the Rhine in the fall of 1944, and suffered from chronic shortages of landing craft throughout 1942-44. The point is that this is an endemic issue for militaries, and you would need some kind of comparison to prove that the Germans were uniquely bad at it. If you could show that US operations officers listened to their quartermasters 50% of the time, and their German counterparts only did it 25% of the time this would be a more compelling argument.
Stahel's account of the battles for Minsk and Smolensk, accompanied by good maps and first hand accounts from soldiers, depict how devastating this campaign was for the Germans and not just the Soviets. What was expected to be a walkover turned into fierce fighting which pushed the infantry and mobile forces to their limit. It is easy to see how Stahel read his sources, with their palpable desperation, and concluded that the Germans were winning themselves to death. The shocking amount of marching done by the infantry, some of whom died from the strain, the constant ambushes of vulnerable supply columns, and the oft cited tables of diminishing tank and truck numbers paint a grim picture. The greatest strength of this book is its ability to convey the realities of these battles for the Germans. These are often glossed over by merely reciting the amount of Soviet prisoners taken and numbers of equipment destroyed.
The last several chapters and the conclusion of the book are where Stahel's flawed assumptions become apparent. He believes that the battles of Minsk and Smolensk were such Pyrrhic victories for the Wehrmacht that the war was essentially lost in July-August of 1941. No serious student of the Second World War doubts that the Wehrmacht was critically degraded during 1941. In 1942 the Germans could only launch one major mobile offensive in the East, as opposed to the the three they had launched in the previous year. Stahel believes that this loss of mobile forces in 1941 doomed Germany to a battle of attrition it didn't have the resources to win, because in the eyes of the German high command, these mobile troops were the only ones capable of destroying the Soviet Union. The problem, however, is that this view takes the following for granted:
- The United States enters the war. Hitler chose to declare war on the US in December of 1941 and this was not a foregone conclusion in August. If the Americans had not entered the war in Europe some aid would probably still have been sent to the Soviet Union and Britain, but there is a good chance that the bulk of the effort would have focused on Japan. FDR might have managed to enter the European war by instigating enough incidents in the Atlantic, but a later American entry in Europe would probably have favored the Axis.
- The successful relocation of Soviet industry. Stahel cites "When Titans Clashed" by Glantz and House, who write that A) most of the Soviet war industry was west of Moscow in 1941, and B) that relocating it was an incredible achievement. Hence implying that it might not have gone so well and you shouldn't take it for granted. In addition, the Germans were able to deny the Soviets key mineral resources and 60% of their coal in 1941.
- The superiority of Allied production vs German. Both the Americans and the Russians failed to mobilize effectively in World War I. After two years of war, the first American tank was scheduled to be produced in 1919, although how it would have gotten to Europe when the US had only enough shipping to send manpower I'm not sure. The fact that the Allies pulled off miracles of production in World War 2 simply shouldn't be taken for granted, and neither should Germany's poor mobilization effort.
- The inability to critically damage the Soviet Union. The Germans probably had a chance to do enough damage to the Soviet economy in 1942 so that their ability to prosecute the war would have degraded, and some sort of stalemate in the East would have occurred for the rest of the war.
- No compromise peace with the Soviet Union. Those who argue that Germany could not win the Second World War usually make this assumption, or never clearly define what "victory" would look like. Stahel takes the German leaderships' goals at face value and equates victory with the complete destruction of the Soviet Union. The reality is that simply holding on to European hegemony and most of the land that was conquered from 39-41 would have been a victory for the Axis, and the idea that the war was always an all or nothing proposition is false. Without the Red Army, the western allies were not going to take the casualties to liberate Europe. Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Mussolini, and Oshima approached Hitler about making a separate peace with the Soviets, and we know that German and Soviet delegates met in Sweden to discuss this in 1943. Hitler himself always rejected the idea, but if the bomb in his plane had gone off in the spring of 43, or other earlier attempts on his life had succeeded, who knows. It is also not clear that Stalin was truly interested in these negotiations, but they remain a probability until more research is done.
As far as the campaign itself, Stahel does an excellent job explaining the strategic foundations of Barbarossa and the rationale behind it. In essence, the German high command underestimated the Soviet Union through a combination of racial/ideological arrogance and bad intelligence, then assumed they could recreate the stunning success they enjoyed in France a year earlier. Stahel does well to point out that there were critics of Barbarossa within the Axis coalition, particularly in the foreign ministry and the supply services, but contradicts his own critique, which is informed by hindsight, when discussing the similarity between the German and Allied assessments of Soviet capability. If the US and Britain believed the Soviet Union would fall to the Germans in 1941, it more or less makes sense that they chose to invade.
Additionally, there is too little discussion of the relationship between supply and operations officers within the German army to support the conclusion that bad logistical planning was a profound failing of the Wehrmacht. My suspicion is that it actually was, but Stahel doesn't demonstrate it very well. Even the western allies outran their supply lines during the rush to the Rhine in the fall of 1944, and suffered from chronic shortages of landing craft throughout 1942-44. The point is that this is an endemic issue for militaries, and you would need some kind of comparison to prove that the Germans were uniquely bad at it. If you could show that US operations officers listened to their quartermasters 50% of the time, and their German counterparts only did it 25% of the time this would be a more compelling argument.
Stahel's account of the battles for Minsk and Smolensk, accompanied by good maps and first hand accounts from soldiers, depict how devastating this campaign was for the Germans and not just the Soviets. What was expected to be a walkover turned into fierce fighting which pushed the infantry and mobile forces to their limit. It is easy to see how Stahel read his sources, with their palpable desperation, and concluded that the Germans were winning themselves to death. The shocking amount of marching done by the infantry, some of whom died from the strain, the constant ambushes of vulnerable supply columns, and the oft cited tables of diminishing tank and truck numbers paint a grim picture. The greatest strength of this book is its ability to convey the realities of these battles for the Germans. These are often glossed over by merely reciting the amount of Soviet prisoners taken and numbers of equipment destroyed.
The last several chapters and the conclusion of the book are where Stahel's flawed assumptions become apparent. He believes that the battles of Minsk and Smolensk were such Pyrrhic victories for the Wehrmacht that the war was essentially lost in July-August of 1941. No serious student of the Second World War doubts that the Wehrmacht was critically degraded during 1941. In 1942 the Germans could only launch one major mobile offensive in the East, as opposed to the the three they had launched in the previous year. Stahel believes that this loss of mobile forces in 1941 doomed Germany to a battle of attrition it didn't have the resources to win, because in the eyes of the German high command, these mobile troops were the only ones capable of destroying the Soviet Union. The problem, however, is that this view takes the following for granted:
- The United States enters the war. Hitler chose to declare war on the US in December of 1941 and this was not a foregone conclusion in August. If the Americans had not entered the war in Europe some aid would probably still have been sent to the Soviet Union and Britain, but there is a good chance that the bulk of the effort would have focused on Japan. FDR might have managed to enter the European war by instigating enough incidents in the Atlantic, but a later American entry in Europe would probably have favored the Axis.
- The successful relocation of Soviet industry. Stahel cites "When Titans Clashed" by Glantz and House, who write that A) most of the Soviet war industry was west of Moscow in 1941, and B) that relocating it was an incredible achievement. Hence implying that it might not have gone so well and you shouldn't take it for granted. In addition, the Germans were able to deny the Soviets key mineral resources and 60% of their coal in 1941.
- The superiority of Allied production vs German. Both the Americans and the Russians failed to mobilize effectively in World War I. After two years of war, the first American tank was scheduled to be produced in 1919, although how it would have gotten to Europe when the US had only enough shipping to send manpower I'm not sure. The fact that the Allies pulled off miracles of production in World War 2 simply shouldn't be taken for granted, and neither should Germany's poor mobilization effort.
- The inability to critically damage the Soviet Union. The Germans probably had a chance to do enough damage to the Soviet economy in 1942 so that their ability to prosecute the war would have degraded, and some sort of stalemate in the East would have occurred for the rest of the war.
- No compromise peace with the Soviet Union. Those who argue that Germany could not win the Second World War usually make this assumption, or never clearly define what "victory" would look like. Stahel takes the German leaderships' goals at face value and equates victory with the complete destruction of the Soviet Union. The reality is that simply holding on to European hegemony and most of the land that was conquered from 39-41 would have been a victory for the Axis, and the idea that the war was always an all or nothing proposition is false. Without the Red Army, the western allies were not going to take the casualties to liberate Europe. Ribbentrop, Goebbels, Mussolini, and Oshima approached Hitler about making a separate peace with the Soviets, and we know that German and Soviet delegates met in Sweden to discuss this in 1943. Hitler himself always rejected the idea, but if the bomb in his plane had gone off in the spring of 43, or other earlier attempts on his life had succeeded, who knows. It is also not clear that Stalin was truly interested in these negotiations, but they remain a probability until more research is done.
January 22, 2015
The author's premise is that the outcome of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union was determined not by the long winter or the strength of the Soviet army. Rather, it was determined by German arrogance, a lack of planning for logistics and the amazing lack of intelligence gathering before the invasion.
The book makes a good case for all of these factors. However, it does not persuade me that the war could not have been won on the Eastern front even after The initial operation failed. Many factors, including the US entering the war may have been more decisive.
The author makes the additional case that Hitler truly felt that Churchill would see Germany's attack on the Soviet a union as a good thing and negotiate a peace. And, that the systematic annihilation of the Jews began when he perceived that his prediction of a world war started by Jews was beginning to occur when Churchill and Roosevelt met and began to supply the Soviet Union.
The book makes a good case for all of these factors. However, it does not persuade me that the war could not have been won on the Eastern front even after The initial operation failed. Many factors, including the US entering the war may have been more decisive.
The author makes the additional case that Hitler truly felt that Churchill would see Germany's attack on the Soviet a union as a good thing and negotiate a peace. And, that the systematic annihilation of the Jews began when he perceived that his prediction of a world war started by Jews was beginning to occur when Churchill and Roosevelt met and began to supply the Soviet Union.
December 25, 2020
New thinking on WW II eastern front
The newest thoughts on the eastern front war in WWII. A insightful look at the pivotal campaign by Germany in the war and why it set up all that happened after it.
The newest thoughts on the eastern front war in WWII. A insightful look at the pivotal campaign by Germany in the war and why it set up all that happened after it.
June 8, 2025
Meticulous and in-depth analysis. Not for someone who doesn't already have at least basic knowledge of the subject, but interesting for someone how craves more information.
May 8, 2022
OMG, this is an in-depth, day-to-day chronicle of the first 3 months of the German invasion of the USSR. If you're interested in the subject of WW2, especially its Eastern Front, then this book is definitely for you.
August 5, 2014
There are myths surrounding operation Barbarossa, the 1941 Nazi Germany invasion of the Soviet Union, that persist in the popular imagination to this day. For all appearances the Germans were invincible: they conquered vast territory, defeated many Russian armies who must have fought very poorly or not at all, evidenced by the millions of prisoners the Germans took in the process. They would have reached Moscow were they not thwarted by severe winter weather and snow. In short, as if in a retelling of a Norse saga, they were only defeated because they dared defy the gods of natural elements. As meticulous scholarship has shown, nothing could have been further from the truth. In books such as Weinberg's the World at Arms, Tooze's the Wages of Destruction, Glantz's Barbarossa Derailed and here Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, the origin of the defeat was revealed rooted in German calculations and actions and Russian reactions, not in the elements, which as Glantz and others wryly commented, happen to affect both parties. Germany did not have the strategic depth (industrial, population) to challenge the Russians or for that matter the US and England, and certainly not the three together. The Germans grossly underestimated their foe, who fought the invasion with absolute tenacity and fearsome resistance all the way from the start of the hostilities until the fall of Berlin in 1945. Even in the darkest days of the summer of 1941, the Soviet front never lost its cohesion. There were always fresh Soviet armies to fight the next battle. Even when surrounded and doomed, the Russians again and again fought on. "Ivan" was no push over.
What Stahel articulates in this book, and as such adds to our knowledge of the failure of Barbarossa, is a deep understanding of the inchoate German strategic planning: the fundamental division of opinion on the objectives of the war that emerged between Hitler and the army leadership, which resulted in inescapable confusion and problems as the operation went underway. Whereas Hitler focused on destroying Russian forces and conquering Russian territory that is relevant economically to the outcome of the global war, with Moscow being a secondary objective, the army leadership focused obsessively on the need to take Moscow as the pivotal knockout event of the war. This basic confusion about the aims of the war lead to a serious clash of visions that was detrimental to the execution and outcome of the operation. By focusing on German archives, Stahel documents gross incompetence when it comes to the planning of Barbarossa by the German staff: inability to properly size up their enemy without blinkers and racial biases, and a sense of smug superiority that blinded the German staff to the results of their own war games and analyses. Ironically, the latter were conducted by none other than Friedrich Paulus of Stalingrad fame, who on the eve of Barbarossa was deputy chief of the General Staff. The Germans threw themselves into battle with little understanding of the foe they were to face. We now know through the work of Stahel, Glantz and others that militarily Brabarossa did not fail at the gates of Moscow but much earlier, perhaps as early as the summer battles of Smolensk. With Stahel's analysis, the failure occurred even earlier, at the planning and staging phases.
Stahel's is a carefully researched book on the subject that is a pleasure to read, though it does demand patient attention. It is focused exclusively on the German archives, which is a limitation though not a shortcoming as such. For the student of WWII, other books that explore the Russian and other archives would nicely complement Stahel's research. Overall very highly recommended.
What Stahel articulates in this book, and as such adds to our knowledge of the failure of Barbarossa, is a deep understanding of the inchoate German strategic planning: the fundamental division of opinion on the objectives of the war that emerged between Hitler and the army leadership, which resulted in inescapable confusion and problems as the operation went underway. Whereas Hitler focused on destroying Russian forces and conquering Russian territory that is relevant economically to the outcome of the global war, with Moscow being a secondary objective, the army leadership focused obsessively on the need to take Moscow as the pivotal knockout event of the war. This basic confusion about the aims of the war lead to a serious clash of visions that was detrimental to the execution and outcome of the operation. By focusing on German archives, Stahel documents gross incompetence when it comes to the planning of Barbarossa by the German staff: inability to properly size up their enemy without blinkers and racial biases, and a sense of smug superiority that blinded the German staff to the results of their own war games and analyses. Ironically, the latter were conducted by none other than Friedrich Paulus of Stalingrad fame, who on the eve of Barbarossa was deputy chief of the General Staff. The Germans threw themselves into battle with little understanding of the foe they were to face. We now know through the work of Stahel, Glantz and others that militarily Brabarossa did not fail at the gates of Moscow but much earlier, perhaps as early as the summer battles of Smolensk. With Stahel's analysis, the failure occurred even earlier, at the planning and staging phases.
Stahel's is a carefully researched book on the subject that is a pleasure to read, though it does demand patient attention. It is focused exclusively on the German archives, which is a limitation though not a shortcoming as such. For the student of WWII, other books that explore the Russian and other archives would nicely complement Stahel's research. Overall very highly recommended.
March 14, 2016
A very detailed look at the first two months of Operation Barbarossa from the perspective of German Army Group Central. It shows how Germany totally underestimated the resolve of the Red Army and over estimated their logistics ability. The grinding down of the German Blitzkrieg and lack of agreement on strategic objectives meant the German Army could not defeat the Soviet Union in 1941, which essentially meant they could not win the war.
Making the same mistakes as Napoleon, Germany essentially lost the war the day they invaded, as did Napoleon. It was not the winter weather, it was the distances, lack of infrastructure and total inability to resupply men and machines lost. The High Command, from Hitler on down were unable to see the problems or admit them. To a great extent it was because they were fighting based on the lessons of the First World War.
Making the same mistakes as Napoleon, Germany essentially lost the war the day they invaded, as did Napoleon. It was not the winter weather, it was the distances, lack of infrastructure and total inability to resupply men and machines lost. The High Command, from Hitler on down were unable to see the problems or admit them. To a great extent it was because they were fighting based on the lessons of the First World War.
January 29, 2020
Exemplary
While I consider myself somewhat better versed in the details of the German-Soviet war than most, this bracing study broadened and deepened my understanding of this most merciless of modern conflicts. His contention that Barbarossa’s failure doomed the German effort, Stalingrad and other assaults notwithstanding, appears ably supported by deep research and convinced me, which is always a delight.
While I consider myself somewhat better versed in the details of the German-Soviet war than most, this bracing study broadened and deepened my understanding of this most merciless of modern conflicts. His contention that Barbarossa’s failure doomed the German effort, Stalingrad and other assaults notwithstanding, appears ably supported by deep research and convinced me, which is always a delight.
July 17, 2023
There are many excellent goodreads reviews of this book already which summarize the work and strongly recommend it--as I do. The only contribution I'll submit is to double-down on other reviewers who commend the effective way Stahel uses evidence to prove his (counterintuitive, profound) argument.
The element that makes Stahel's writing so focused and convincing is his strong, clear, disproveable thesis:
Stahel marshalls some excellent research (Soldier's through General's diaries and letters, unit after-action reviews, division war diaries and loss reports, etc.) to convincingly prove that thesis. In service to this goal, Stahel reveals to the reader the details of an extremely complex human event: the planning and first eight weeks of the Wehrmacht's Operation Barbarossa.
Step-by-step, Stahel shows that the logistical problems associated with the German offensive (with a particular focus on Army Group Center) were beyond Germany's capacity to surmount. Meaning: even in the midst of the crushing victories the Wehrmacht experienced in the first weeks of the campaign, the Wehrmacht was being attritted by lack of supply, lack of repair parts and facilities, massive distances, and the desperate Russian defence faster than it could defeat the Soviet Union. As German General Halder put it on August 11, 1941,
Stahel proves these realities by chronologically walking through the opening weeks and highlighting key communications (particularly loss reports, commander's orders, and after-action analysis sent to higher headquarters) within the German Army. These communications consistently show, as Stahel concludes,
Overall, an absolutely excellent study of Operation Barbarossa, which marshals evidence in a brilliant and entertaining way to prove Stahel's controversial thesis: by August 1941, Germany had failed to defeat the Soviet Union.
The element that makes Stahel's writing so focused and convincing is his strong, clear, disproveable thesis:
"Long before the first snows of winter began to fall, however, and even before the first autumn rains brought most movement to a halt, in fact as early as the summer of 1941, it was evident that Barbarossa was a spent exercise, unavoidably doomed to failure. [...] German operations in the east had failed by the middle of August 1941." (p. 2-3)
Stahel marshalls some excellent research (Soldier's through General's diaries and letters, unit after-action reviews, division war diaries and loss reports, etc.) to convincingly prove that thesis. In service to this goal, Stahel reveals to the reader the details of an extremely complex human event: the planning and first eight weeks of the Wehrmacht's Operation Barbarossa.
Step-by-step, Stahel shows that the logistical problems associated with the German offensive (with a particular focus on Army Group Center) were beyond Germany's capacity to surmount. Meaning: even in the midst of the crushing victories the Wehrmacht experienced in the first weeks of the campaign, the Wehrmacht was being attritted by lack of supply, lack of repair parts and facilities, massive distances, and the desperate Russian defence faster than it could defeat the Soviet Union. As German General Halder put it on August 11, 1941,
"At the start of the war we reckoned with 200 enemy divisions. Now we already count 360. These divisions are not armed and equipped in our sense, and tactically they are inadequately led in many ways. But they are there and when we destroy a dozen of them, then the Russians put another dozen in their place." (p. 388)
Stahel proves these realities by chronologically walking through the opening weeks and highlighting key communications (particularly loss reports, commander's orders, and after-action analysis sent to higher headquarters) within the German Army. These communications consistently show, as Stahel concludes,
"The attritional drain that had begun from the first day of Operation Barbarossa had progressed so far by the end of two months that Germany no longer possessed the ability to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941. Future battles, whether centred on Moscow or the Ukraine, were simply not able to crush the Red Army and conquer the Soviet Union [...] Once blitzkrieg failed, production, industrial capacity, material and manpower resources, organisation and technical skill, all became more important than tactics, training, and courage." (p. 441)
Overall, an absolutely excellent study of Operation Barbarossa, which marshals evidence in a brilliant and entertaining way to prove Stahel's controversial thesis: by August 1941, Germany had failed to defeat the Soviet Union.
May 31, 2023
Flushed with success after a string of victories in Western Europe, the Nazi war machine turned east to deal a crushing blow to the Soviet Union and aimed to not only knock them out of the war but also in doing so, force the UK to sue for peace. Accepted uncritically almost since the end of the war is that Operation Barbarossa was a success. The sheer amount of land gained, prisoners captured, and destruction dealt to Soviet land and air forces seems to support this idea.
However, just as in his masterful history of the Battle of Kiev, David Stahel begins his history of the Eastern Front with the strong assertion that Operation Barbarossa was doomed from the start - without a shot being fired, the Germans had already lost. How? Stahel methodically and expertly analyses German and Soviet/Allied industrial output, German failures in logistics, planning, and leadership, and the general geography of western Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to state simply that Germany was woefully underprepared for war with the Soviets. Instead, they were swollen with pride and racial prejudices, a false belief in the superiority of German arms and the sure success of Blitzkrieg that despite their own war games, the German high command refused to make any preparations for a long war against the Soviets, made little improvements in logistics, and failed to understand the mistakes of Napoleon in 1812 and the Western Front in World War One.
Stahel spends a substantial time following Franz Halder, head of OKH and chief architect of Barbarossa. His weak leadership, cowardice before Hitler, and failure to adapt facing stiffened Soviet resistance stand out alongside the nigh constant interpersonal difficulties he had with his fellow officers. Halder, much like the other generals, were egotistical and spent too long paralysed with indecision that wasted precious time and strategic initiative. All of them were guilty of war crimes and of horrendous mistreatment of POWs and civilians. Perhaps the greatest myth Operation Barbarossa maintains is that the Wehrmacht was a professional army led astray by Hitler’s maniac delusions. No, they were all just as guilty.
“There should be no military idols in the German high command. In 1941, the top echelon of command were at one with their Führer over his erroneous military and ideological objectives. Not even when they reached their frightening conclusion in a strategic quagmire and mass murder did even a single general resign in disgust. From Braucitsch down this was indeed Hitler’s army.”
Stahel shatters this pervasive and insidious myth that Operation Barbarossa was in any way a success. No, this was a defeat - the Soviet Union may have been deeply wounded after August 1941 but it was never defeated. Germany, however, was doomed.
However, just as in his masterful history of the Battle of Kiev, David Stahel begins his history of the Eastern Front with the strong assertion that Operation Barbarossa was doomed from the start - without a shot being fired, the Germans had already lost. How? Stahel methodically and expertly analyses German and Soviet/Allied industrial output, German failures in logistics, planning, and leadership, and the general geography of western Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to state simply that Germany was woefully underprepared for war with the Soviets. Instead, they were swollen with pride and racial prejudices, a false belief in the superiority of German arms and the sure success of Blitzkrieg that despite their own war games, the German high command refused to make any preparations for a long war against the Soviets, made little improvements in logistics, and failed to understand the mistakes of Napoleon in 1812 and the Western Front in World War One.
Stahel spends a substantial time following Franz Halder, head of OKH and chief architect of Barbarossa. His weak leadership, cowardice before Hitler, and failure to adapt facing stiffened Soviet resistance stand out alongside the nigh constant interpersonal difficulties he had with his fellow officers. Halder, much like the other generals, were egotistical and spent too long paralysed with indecision that wasted precious time and strategic initiative. All of them were guilty of war crimes and of horrendous mistreatment of POWs and civilians. Perhaps the greatest myth Operation Barbarossa maintains is that the Wehrmacht was a professional army led astray by Hitler’s maniac delusions. No, they were all just as guilty.
“There should be no military idols in the German high command. In 1941, the top echelon of command were at one with their Führer over his erroneous military and ideological objectives. Not even when they reached their frightening conclusion in a strategic quagmire and mass murder did even a single general resign in disgust. From Braucitsch down this was indeed Hitler’s army.”
Stahel shatters this pervasive and insidious myth that Operation Barbarossa was in any way a success. No, this was a defeat - the Soviet Union may have been deeply wounded after August 1941 but it was never defeated. Germany, however, was doomed.
March 6, 2020
This is an excellent history and analysis of the German campaign to conquer Russia in 1941. Stahel's core argument is that once Germany failed to achieve a blitzkrieg knockout of Russia in the summer of 1941, it was locked into a long war of attrition that it could never win. Readers may quarrel with his conclusions, but his analyses are deeply researched and closely argued. This is a coherent and lucid analysis, much of which profoundly refutes an enormous body of prior study, which had generally viewed the 1941 campaign as generally successful, with the turning point of the Eastern war being Germany's defeat at Stalingrad.
Stahel identifies many critical errors that doomed the campaign, but the points he returns to are bad planning and terrible logistics. The planning process was corrupted by the German high command's arrogant belief that the putative superiority of the German army would result in a fast collapse of the Russian forces. That premise was quickly refuted; while the Russian military leadership was disorganized and weak, the Russians fought tenaciously and inflicted casualties that deeply weakened the German army. Despite this mounting evidence, however, the Germans generals continued to believe the Russians were beaten and their collapse imminent.
German logistics also failed in ways that undermined the war effort. From early on, the campaign was chewing up German tanks and vehicles, both through combat and the rigors of fighting through swamps and bad roads. The Germans failed to anticipate these problems or to address them after they developed, resulting in the German army being chronically below full fighting strength. Even ammunition was short.
The German generals were also riven by internal jealousies and disputes with Hitler over tactical objectives.
Stahel makes a further point, that after the war the German generals and some historians tried to distance the army from Nazism and portray it as an honorable servant of the state. Stahel shows that position to be false, that the high command enthusiastically supported Hitler and carried out atrocities in the Russia campaign. Opposition to Hitler emerged only after the war was lost, he contends.
Stahel's conclusion is that by failing to conquer Russia in 1941, Germany's subsequent defeat was foreordained. Not everyone will agree with that conclusion, but all serious students of the war will recognize the powerful and persuasive scholarship that Stahel marshals to support his theories. This is an important contribution to understanding the war in the East.
Stahel identifies many critical errors that doomed the campaign, but the points he returns to are bad planning and terrible logistics. The planning process was corrupted by the German high command's arrogant belief that the putative superiority of the German army would result in a fast collapse of the Russian forces. That premise was quickly refuted; while the Russian military leadership was disorganized and weak, the Russians fought tenaciously and inflicted casualties that deeply weakened the German army. Despite this mounting evidence, however, the Germans generals continued to believe the Russians were beaten and their collapse imminent.
German logistics also failed in ways that undermined the war effort. From early on, the campaign was chewing up German tanks and vehicles, both through combat and the rigors of fighting through swamps and bad roads. The Germans failed to anticipate these problems or to address them after they developed, resulting in the German army being chronically below full fighting strength. Even ammunition was short.
The German generals were also riven by internal jealousies and disputes with Hitler over tactical objectives.
Stahel makes a further point, that after the war the German generals and some historians tried to distance the army from Nazism and portray it as an honorable servant of the state. Stahel shows that position to be false, that the high command enthusiastically supported Hitler and carried out atrocities in the Russia campaign. Opposition to Hitler emerged only after the war was lost, he contends.
Stahel's conclusion is that by failing to conquer Russia in 1941, Germany's subsequent defeat was foreordained. Not everyone will agree with that conclusion, but all serious students of the war will recognize the powerful and persuasive scholarship that Stahel marshals to support his theories. This is an important contribution to understanding the war in the East.
January 22, 2024
Timothy Smith's BLOODLANDS awoke in me a curiosity of the Soviet/German front in World War II. The Western European/American Focus on the Western Front has resulted in a disregard and blindness to the events that took place to the East: horrors, tragedies, cruelty, crimes... exceeding what happened in the West by a factor of 10 if not greater. Auschwitz was bad, but compared to Treblinka? Elie Wiesel's Night and Anne Frank's Diary of a Young Girl compared to Chil Rajchman's Last Jew of Treblinka is not a question of who suffered most. It is a testimony to how great the suffering and criminality was. More significantly, it stresses that the separation from World War II by an ever expanding gulf of time and degrees of separation, we fundamentally do not appreciate or even recognize the losses and suffering of others.
In Operation Barbarossa, Stahel share's that amongst the German High Command there were Generals and Economists who had material reasons to NOT invade the East. Their arguments were dismissed and overruled by Hitler's ambitions, and maybe impatience, if not his mania. There was a small clutch of men who were trapped in the unfolding tragedy who KNEW that with the violation of the von Ribbentrop Line, the war was now lost for Germany, and what was to follow was an orgy of death and depravity that would cost upwards of 30,000,000 lives, where each life was as valuable as yours or mine is today. What happened to those who argued against Operation Barbarossa, and who they were, how they dealt with the defeat of their argument are questions that I would like to find the answers to. Did they resign their commissions and walk away? Did they flee? Did they make a visit to the Fuehrer Bunker in March of 1945 and say "I told you so?"
Most significant to me, in light of current political/partisan passions in the U.S. today, what would they have done differently if they had been given the chance? What lessons are to be learned from junctures in national history when reason is overwhelmed by passion and emotion? Or has it always been thus, and true destruction and desolation for the U.S. has been spared us only by the grace of fortune?
In Operation Barbarossa, Stahel share's that amongst the German High Command there were Generals and Economists who had material reasons to NOT invade the East. Their arguments were dismissed and overruled by Hitler's ambitions, and maybe impatience, if not his mania. There was a small clutch of men who were trapped in the unfolding tragedy who KNEW that with the violation of the von Ribbentrop Line, the war was now lost for Germany, and what was to follow was an orgy of death and depravity that would cost upwards of 30,000,000 lives, where each life was as valuable as yours or mine is today. What happened to those who argued against Operation Barbarossa, and who they were, how they dealt with the defeat of their argument are questions that I would like to find the answers to. Did they resign their commissions and walk away? Did they flee? Did they make a visit to the Fuehrer Bunker in March of 1945 and say "I told you so?"
Most significant to me, in light of current political/partisan passions in the U.S. today, what would they have done differently if they had been given the chance? What lessons are to be learned from junctures in national history when reason is overwhelmed by passion and emotion? Or has it always been thus, and true destruction and desolation for the U.S. has been spared us only by the grace of fortune?
December 20, 2021
Germany's invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 is heralded as a significant initial victory, another feather in Hitler's military cap. After all, Nazi troops stormed across the Polish and Soviet borders, captured hundreds of thousands of troops, planes, and materiel, and continued down the road to capturing Moscow and snuffing out Soviet Communism.
David Stahel urges readers to reject the notion of initial German triumph in Soviet Russia, and instead view the summer of 1941 as a colossal strategic failure on the part of the Nazi war machine. Despite the soldiers captured and tanks rendered idle, the Nazis could not achieve strategic victory: destroying the Soviet Union's defensive strength. While Stalin's initial moves were destructive, Hitler's flawed and uncoordinated strategy for Operation Barbarossa spelled doom from the very first shots fired.
Stahel presents an accessible, fascinating and revisionist view of the Eastern Front of World War II, which is so often relegated to the dim background, outshone by US victories at Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge. If nothing else, Stahel proves how hellish the Eastern Front was; it was perhaps the first military campaign beginning, ending, and suffused throughout with hate, misery, and suffering of a wholly new magnitude.
By the end of the summer of 1941, Germany had indeed arrived at the doorstep of Stalin's Kremlin. However, Soviet forces remained strong, the economy rebounded miraculously, and communism proved a better vehicle at mobilizing for a long-term war than National Socialism in Germany. Hitler's downfall didn't begin at Kursk, Normandy, or outside of Berlin; it began, as with most European military tragedies, in the vast lands of Russia.
David Stahel urges readers to reject the notion of initial German triumph in Soviet Russia, and instead view the summer of 1941 as a colossal strategic failure on the part of the Nazi war machine. Despite the soldiers captured and tanks rendered idle, the Nazis could not achieve strategic victory: destroying the Soviet Union's defensive strength. While Stalin's initial moves were destructive, Hitler's flawed and uncoordinated strategy for Operation Barbarossa spelled doom from the very first shots fired.
Stahel presents an accessible, fascinating and revisionist view of the Eastern Front of World War II, which is so often relegated to the dim background, outshone by US victories at Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge. If nothing else, Stahel proves how hellish the Eastern Front was; it was perhaps the first military campaign beginning, ending, and suffused throughout with hate, misery, and suffering of a wholly new magnitude.
By the end of the summer of 1941, Germany had indeed arrived at the doorstep of Stalin's Kremlin. However, Soviet forces remained strong, the economy rebounded miraculously, and communism proved a better vehicle at mobilizing for a long-term war than National Socialism in Germany. Hitler's downfall didn't begin at Kursk, Normandy, or outside of Berlin; it began, as with most European military tragedies, in the vast lands of Russia.
December 11, 2022
If nothing else, the Germans seemed blinded by their own success in France and Poland, assuming that what worked in the west would also prevail in the east. They seemed oblivious to:
differences in scale between France, Poland versus the Soviet Union
Little respect for the quality and quantity of Russian troops (perhaps conditioned by experience against the Tsar’s troops in World War I?); in fairness Germans learned to respect their Russian opponents over time);
no understanding of the impact of Russian geology and development (poor to non-existent roads, railroad track gauge differences between German / Russian railroads)on Barbarossa’s logistics;
Lack of motorized transport, including dependence on motorized transport (trucks, cars, motorcycles) captured in France during the western campaign;
Lack of motorized transport, including German dependence on horses: 700,000 horses went to war with the Wehrmacht (!!)
Not enough armor; just too few tanks
German reliance on tanks designated as obsolete (Panzer Mark 1 & 2);
Russian emphasis on medium and heavy tanks (T34 and KV1) versus German preponderance of light and medium tanks.
Relatively quickly, the inability of the Germans to support their armies in the field meant they could not supply, maintain, or reinforce their armies in the field. Soviet Union too big, Wehrmacht too small for the blitzkrieg to prevail. After blitzkrieg bogged down, became a war of position and attrition, in which Germany could not prevail, especially considering the requirements of operations in western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans.
differences in scale between France, Poland versus the Soviet Union
Little respect for the quality and quantity of Russian troops (perhaps conditioned by experience against the Tsar’s troops in World War I?); in fairness Germans learned to respect their Russian opponents over time);
no understanding of the impact of Russian geology and development (poor to non-existent roads, railroad track gauge differences between German / Russian railroads)on Barbarossa’s logistics;
Lack of motorized transport, including dependence on motorized transport (trucks, cars, motorcycles) captured in France during the western campaign;
Lack of motorized transport, including German dependence on horses: 700,000 horses went to war with the Wehrmacht (!!)
Not enough armor; just too few tanks
German reliance on tanks designated as obsolete (Panzer Mark 1 & 2);
Russian emphasis on medium and heavy tanks (T34 and KV1) versus German preponderance of light and medium tanks.
Relatively quickly, the inability of the Germans to support their armies in the field meant they could not supply, maintain, or reinforce their armies in the field. Soviet Union too big, Wehrmacht too small for the blitzkrieg to prevail. After blitzkrieg bogged down, became a war of position and attrition, in which Germany could not prevail, especially considering the requirements of operations in western Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans.
September 17, 2022
Brilliant account of the first year of Operation Barbarossa, where Germany practically bled out its army, and effectively lost the entire war. From then on out, it was only a matter of time, before resources and manpower ran out.
In my ignorance, I always thought it was Hitler himself who pushed towards Moscow, but no, it was his generals who wanted this over most everything else in the campaign. Hitler was probably right from his perspective, and understood much better the economic side and importance of resources needed to win the war, and also possibly that the Red Army would not at all have been defeated, even if the capital fell into german hands. Whatever his later fatal mistakes, demanding to hold defensive lines at all cost, when retreat to better positions would have been more prudent, at least he was probably mostly right on that account. However, the totality of the megalomaniac visions and beliefs in their supposed superiority, proved very wrong indeed, and doomed the campaign from the very start. Soviet Russia was never on the brink of defeat, even though their losses were enormous, they still managed to outperform the German juggernaut in weapons production, even early on in the first phases of the war, and this gap only increased further on.
Excellent book, highly recommended.
In my ignorance, I always thought it was Hitler himself who pushed towards Moscow, but no, it was his generals who wanted this over most everything else in the campaign. Hitler was probably right from his perspective, and understood much better the economic side and importance of resources needed to win the war, and also possibly that the Red Army would not at all have been defeated, even if the capital fell into german hands. Whatever his later fatal mistakes, demanding to hold defensive lines at all cost, when retreat to better positions would have been more prudent, at least he was probably mostly right on that account. However, the totality of the megalomaniac visions and beliefs in their supposed superiority, proved very wrong indeed, and doomed the campaign from the very start. Soviet Russia was never on the brink of defeat, even though their losses were enormous, they still managed to outperform the German juggernaut in weapons production, even early on in the first phases of the war, and this gap only increased further on.
Excellent book, highly recommended.
March 23, 2024
A very detailed and thorough explication of the invasion of the USSR. But you can tell it’s a barely reworked dissertation because of the overly vehement bibliographic introduction and because it pushes a thesis that doesn’t need to be made: that the German attack was “doomed” by August 1941, soon after it was launched. The argument is that already by then the Nazi war machine was showing signs of being degraded by space, material shortfalls, and the battles themselves, which would ultimately make victory impossible. But war isn’t chess, where you resign because of an early miscalculation that can’t be overcome; in history there are no text book endgames. Since fighting in the east continued until 1944 and was followed by the grinding Soviet push to Berlin, highlighting August 1941 is irrelevant to the war as fought. (Military history is overly fixated on “turning points.”) The Germans were showing signs of overstretch (conversely the Soviets were being battered) but they still had to be defeated, which took some doing. A little less academic polemicism would have made this a better book.
August 6, 2019
Very vivid and gory detail of war and it's impact especially when the leaders on both sides (Hitler & Stalin) prepared to sacrifice everything for their megalomaniac idea of human society. The author goes to great pain to justify with facts and evidence how absurd was Hitler's ambition and Stalin's counter-strategy; with Soviet's best generals already sent to Gulag.
After the first few exciting chapters about brilliant Wehrmacht strategy that lead to quick wins emerge the the horrific details. One can't help but have an unsettling feeling in the stomach about the real consequences of a war. In fact, I felt very sorry for those eastern Europe civilians that bore the brunt. I couldn't help but quit reading after the middle chapters
Not for the faint of the heart.
After the first few exciting chapters about brilliant Wehrmacht strategy that lead to quick wins emerge the the horrific details. One can't help but have an unsettling feeling in the stomach about the real consequences of a war. In fact, I felt very sorry for those eastern Europe civilians that bore the brunt. I couldn't help but quit reading after the middle chapters
Not for the faint of the heart.
November 17, 2023
Focusses primarily on the Summer Offensive of 1941, with a focus on Army Group Center. Stahel spends far too long pounding out his tired, and by no means interesting or revolutionary thesis that Barbarossa was hamstrung by logistical difficulties and infighting in the German high command. His characterization of the key players is 2 dimensional and wooden, the worst of which is AH, of whom he attempts a passing psychological analysis. He paints a dismal picture of the Wehrmacht by the end of August, but the successes of Fall 1941 (eg. Kiev, Vyasma) are relegated to a footnote and barely explored - and the drama of Operation Typhoon is relegated to a single sentence. Overall, brutally wasted potential. Still worth the read for the detailed operational information.
December 31, 2024
Really interesting and well argued. In fighting (too many cooks in the kitchen) between Hitler's generals is a glaring reason for the failure of Operation Barbarossa that I have not found fully explored by many others. Stahel has mined many important war diaries and other resources to provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationships, spats and course of events at the front which caused discord and confusion. I thought the author was implying that if the German army had an Eisenhower-like figure, who worked to keep the allied armies together through his leadership, the operation might have not been so hard on the German infantry. The German Infantry, overtime, grew disillusioned with their leadership as they were put through staggeringly prolonged marches and heavy fighting, while taking obscene casualties, with a serious lack of supplies.
February 11, 2019
If you’ve ever wondered how Germany could advance so deeply and so swiftly in the heart of European Russia and then fail to defeat Russia, you must read this book. It is an excellent recounting of why the invasion of Russia in 1941 (code named Barbarossa) failed. It is told primarily from the standpoint of the German perspective. What were their plans, who were the critical field generals as well as the High Command members and of course, Hitler. All the mistakes are there and explained, both the planning mistakes and the errors in execution of the plan. This is a very readable history and very informative recounting of the war in the East.
May 26, 2025
This was a nice micro-history of operation Barbarossa through August 1941. I appreciated this new look, in contrast to the last book I read on this subject, and you can definitely tell this was written by a historian. The impressive amount of nuance was refreshing and really showed how normalized the fawning over the wehrmacht is in western telling's of the eastern front is.
The comparison of the red army with Grant's forces and the wehrmacht with Lee's forces in the US Civil War comes to my mind after reading this book. Essentially superior manpower/industrial capacity vs generally superior performance/strategy.
The comparison of the red army with Grant's forces and the wehrmacht with Lee's forces in the US Civil War comes to my mind after reading this book. Essentially superior manpower/industrial capacity vs generally superior performance/strategy.
February 21, 2023
Stahelek bere doktorego-tesian oinarritutako liburua.
Bertan, azken mendean zehar Alemania Naziak SESBaren aurka eginiko erasoaren inguruko tesi nagusiei egiten die aurre, armada alemaniarrak izandako "ospe" moduko horri aurre eginez. Tesi nagusia zera da: ekialdeko frontearen emaitza ez zen erabaki Kursk, Stalingrad edo Moskun, erasoaldiaren lehen hilabeteetan baizik, non gainbegiratuta alemaniarren garaipenak ugari ziren (Minsk, Smolensk...), baina estrategikoki, garaipen taktiko horiek sakondu besterik ez zituen egin Wehrmacht-aren gabeziak.
Bertan, azken mendean zehar Alemania Naziak SESBaren aurka eginiko erasoaren inguruko tesi nagusiei egiten die aurre, armada alemaniarrak izandako "ospe" moduko horri aurre eginez. Tesi nagusia zera da: ekialdeko frontearen emaitza ez zen erabaki Kursk, Stalingrad edo Moskun, erasoaldiaren lehen hilabeteetan baizik, non gainbegiratuta alemaniarren garaipenak ugari ziren (Minsk, Smolensk...), baina estrategikoki, garaipen taktiko horiek sakondu besterik ez zituen egin Wehrmacht-aren gabeziak.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 57 reviews