Reading Francis Fukuyama evokes in me only frustration, so I will keep this review brief and clear. This book is a waste of time. It reads like a paper written by an undergraduate student who has not put much effort into understanding the sources he is citing or build a compelling argument. There are more instances of unsubstantiated claims, misinterpretation of sources, and outright falsehoods than any serious writer should allow in his work.
For instance, Fukuyama asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “almost totally unanticipated” by “[v]irtually everyone professionally engaged in the study of politics and foreign policy”. This is not true. Among many others, notable figures in American policy-making — diplomat George F. Kennan and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski — predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union as early as the forties. Kennan argued in his famous containment theory that the Soviet Union would collapse by itself and that as long as America contained Soviet expansionist tendencies without undermining its own economy and stability, the Soviet party structure would eventually be strained, which would lead either to the collapse or the gradual weakening of Soviet power. As an academic at Columbia University, Brzezinski wrote a number of books and articles that seriously considered the possibility of collapse. His book Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, published in 1969, contained fourteen articles dealing with the future of the Soviet Union. Six of them, by Brzezinski himself, Robert Conquest, Merle Fainsod, Eugene Lyons, Giorgio Galli, and Isaac Don Levine, asserted that the Soviet Union might eventually collapse. In 1989, Brzezinski again argued that the Soviet Union would most likely enter a period of stagnation or, less likely but possible, collapse. Prominent realist political thinker Raymond Aron also believed in Soviet collapse and compared the Soviet Union to a prophet that, having conquered and then ruled by force, loses faith in his own prophecy. Fukuyama neglects to mention any of these thinkers and instead puts forward a false narrative.
He also makes a loud and unsubstantiated claim that the Soviet Union could have never democratized without splitting into smaller states. Why? Fukuyama does not elaborate. I suspect that he wrote this just because the Soviet Union actually separated along national lines. But was its dissolution a natural process, or was it artificial and imposed on a people that wanted to remain one big country and were fed lies that the Soviet Union would soon be rebuilt and all the states would be together again? Fukuyama does not give this a thought.
He draws upon Plato’s The Republic, but misinterprets what Plato wrote. According to Fukuyama, Plato compares a spirited man fit to be a guardian of his ideal city “to a noble dog who is capable of great courage and anger fighting strangers in defense of his own city.” This is wrong. Plato did not compare the guardians to dogs because of the spiritedness, or courage, that they both possess. “Socrates”, Plato’s mouthpiece, says that the guardians should possess the “love of knowledge” that he saw in a dog. “When it sees someone it doesn't know, a dog turns nasty, even though it hasn't been badly treated by him in the past. When it sees someone familiar, it welcomes him, even if it has never been at all well treated by him.” According to “Socrates”, the dog shows “a true love of wisdom” because “it classifies what it sees as friendly or hostile solely on the fact that it knows one, and doesn't know the other. It must be a lover of knowledge if it defines friend and enemy by means of knowledge and ignorance.” Then he argues that the guardians of the city should behave in the same way. Fukuyama did not engage with Plato’s work as deeply as he should have.
In chapter 23, Fukuyama attacks the ideas of the realist school of international relations, but his arguments are weak. He criticizes Henry Kissinger for facilitating the US-Soviet détente in the seventies and dismisses it as “a détente between a liberal democracy and a totally unreformed Soviet Union”. He does not hide his disapproval of realist Kissinger, who thought that since America and the Soviet Union share an interest in preventing nuclear war and the Soviet Union’s Communist ideology cannot be changed, the best policy is to accommodate instead of to confront. Fukuyama finds fault in Kissinger’s actions, but he does not propose any alternatives. He does not seem to have considered how the Cuban Missile Crisis could have ended if Kennedy had chosen to confront Khrushchev and chastise him on his immorality — Fukuyama criticizes realists for their exclusion of moralism from foreign policy — instead of to negotiate and accommodate him. The rest of this chapter is just a good summary of the realist theory without any strong arguments against it.
The main argument of Fukuyama’s work are similarly unpersuasive. He argues that we have reached the “endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution”, when “all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over ‘large’ issues and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity.” According to him, people’s biggest problem will be boredom.
Realist thinker John Mearsheimer gave the best answer to this claim: “It hardly needs mentioning that boredom has not yet descended upon us.” In his book The Great Delusion, he criticizes Fukuyama’s defense of the democratic peace theory, which was based on the belief that after the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy would steadily spread around the world, bringing peace everywhere. As Mearsheimer points out, time has not proven Fukuyama right. Authoritarianism is on the rise, and liberal democracy is not conquering the world anytime soon. Furthermore, the democratic peace theory is flawed. It assumes that liberal democratic states are peaceful by nature and do not initiate wars. If the citizens of a liberal democracy were strongly opposed to war, Mearsheimer asserts, they would be just as opposed to fighting with non-democratic states as with democratic. But this is not the case. America has fought seven wars since the end of the Cold War, and it initiated all seven. “During that period it has been at war for two out of every three years. It is no exaggeration to say that the United States is addicted to war,” writes Mearsheimer. Great Britain, another liberal democracy, has been supporting America through all of these conflicts.
END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN is a popular but not well-written work. Fukuyama has not developed strong arguments to defend his ideas, and he has been proven wrong by history and by other political thinkers. This book is not worth reading.