What do you think?
Rate this book
Supernatural Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods, and Buddhas
The cognitive science of religion is a rapidly growing field whose practitioners apply insights from advances in cognitive science in order to provide a better understanding of religious impulses, beliefs, and behaviors. In this book Ilkka Pyysiäinen shows how this methodology can profitably be used in the comparative study of beliefs about superhuman agents. He begins by developing a theoretical outline of the basic, modular architecture of the human mind and especially the human capacity to understand agency. He then goes on to discuss examples of supernatural agency in detail, arguing that the human ability to attribute beliefs and desires to others forms the basis of conceptions of supernatural agents and of such social cognition in which supernatural agents are postulated as interested parties in social life. Beliefs about supernatural agency are natural, says Pyysiäinen, in the sense that such concepts are used in an intuitive and automatic fashion. Two dots and a straight
line below them automatically trigger the idea of a face, for example. Given that the mind consists of a host of such modular mechanisms, certain kinds of beliefs will always have a selective advantage over others. Abstract theological concepts are usually elaborate versions of such simpler and more contagious folk conceptions. Pyysiäinen uses ethnographical and survey materials as well as doctrinal treatises to show that there are certain recurrent patterns in beliefs about supernatural agents both at the level of folk-religion and of formal theology.
line below them automatically trigger the idea of a face, for example. Given that the mind consists of a host of such modular mechanisms, certain kinds of beliefs will always have a selective advantage over others. Abstract theological concepts are usually elaborate versions of such simpler and more contagious folk conceptions. Pyysiäinen uses ethnographical and survey materials as well as doctrinal treatises to show that there are certain recurrent patterns in beliefs about supernatural agents both at the level of folk-religion and of formal theology.
304 pages, Hardcover
First published April 27, 2009
3 people are currently reading
193 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
November 1, 2012
Ilkka Pyysiäinen sets out in this book, a cognitive science approach to religion, “to show that the mental representation of God and of buddhas are made possible by the same mental mechanisms that are used in representing ourselves and our fellow human beings as embodied agents (souls). God, buddhas, and human beings are agents in the sense of animated organisms that have a mentality or mind. Agency thus consists of the two properties of animacy (liveliness, self-propelledness) and mentality (beliefs and desires).”
The book is extremely well organized and presented. There are point-form summaries at the end of each chapter and an excellent concluding paragraph that sums up much of the book (in case, as I found to be the case, one becomes bogged down along the way in detail and loses the thread of the argument). Also, the basic arguments are extremely well made.
Pyysiäinen puts forward “three overlapping cognitive mechanisms that contribute to agentive reasoning” in humans (and other animals to some degree) to support his overall position:
“The first is hyperactive agent detection (HAD…): the tendency to postulate animacy—this mechanism is triggered by cues that are so minimal that it often produces false positives….” [Think of the crooked stick on the path that says “snake!!!”] Second is hyperactive understanding of intentionality (HUI): the tendency to postulate mentality and to see events as intentionally caused even in the absence of a visible agent.” [The world is out to get you when it rains on your outdoor wedding.] “Third is hyperactive teleofunctional reasoning (HTR): the tendency to see objects as existing for a purpose.” [Why are we here? Or There must be a reason why it rained on my wedding.]
Given these basic mechanisms in all of us, the author sets out to show how they led to our developing “religious” beliefs. Living in a world in which there is a great deal of danger and things and events which we can neither predict nor understand, it was natural that humankind developed these mechanisms as a means of survival. It was also natural that, as a sort of “spandrel”, a by-product of these mechanisms, that we would intuit non-existent entities and empower them. Pyysiäinen then leads us through a number steps to show the role played by agency, religion and its rituals to strengthen societies and the sense of community while pointing out the “high cost” to individuals and societies of maintaining these beliefs. In particular, much of religion is counterintuitive and counterfactual and must be maintained at the cost of dealing with reality.
Pyysiäinen then proceeds with an in-depth analysis of certain religious belief systems, ranging from somewhat primitive societies: concepts of souls, ghosts (spirits of the dead), and shamanism (spirit possession) through Christianity and Buddhism. These chapters, while seeming a bit selective in their material, taught me a great deal about the theology of Paul Tillich and various issues within the theology of Buddhism. It was of particular interest in that he challenged the “truism” that there are no Buddhist gods. He also pointed out the issues within the religion that are raised by denying the existence of the soul. If people (and animals) have no souls, what is there to be reincarnated? What continues to exist of the buddhas after death? Fun to bring up with your Buddhist friends next time you see them.
I do have some concerns about the book however. First, much of the book is written in such a way as to be easily understandable by the non specialist. Certain parts, on the other hand, seem to require a specialized knowledge of cognitive science, philosophy or religion. This leads to an uneven reading experience.
Secondly, my personal rant, there are editing problems with the book. I encountered problems of missing prepositions, redundancies, and strange locutions. I suspect that they may have arisen simply as a result of the fact that English is not the author’s first language. My ire is aimed at Oxford University Press for missing so many errors. I reread many sentences wondering if I was not understanding before I realized the problem with the text.
My third issue with the book is more basic to the arguments being made. Generally, I would think that a cognitive scientist looking for evidence of religious beliefs in the world would want to stay as much as possible with the “intuitive” beliefs of common believers. Although Pyysiäinen does this early in the book, in his main discussions of Christianity and Buddhism, he turns to theological discussions. For example, for Christianity, we are given a good historical discussion ranging from the scholastics to Paul Tillich. I found the discussions enlightening but not pertinent to the argument of the book. Just as a linguist should not be citing Strunk and White’s “Elements of Style” to make his points about the structure of English, cognitive scientists should not be using theology. It is too far from the basic thinking of the common believer and does not really support the arguments of the book.
For the most part, I found the book to be enlightening and did a great deal to answer certain of my questions about why so much of humanity is obsessed with such counterintuitive belief systems. While I am still somewhat perplexed as to why so much is invested in religion, I think that Pyysiäinen has taken me part of the way towards an answer.
The book is extremely well organized and presented. There are point-form summaries at the end of each chapter and an excellent concluding paragraph that sums up much of the book (in case, as I found to be the case, one becomes bogged down along the way in detail and loses the thread of the argument). Also, the basic arguments are extremely well made.
Pyysiäinen puts forward “three overlapping cognitive mechanisms that contribute to agentive reasoning” in humans (and other animals to some degree) to support his overall position:
“The first is hyperactive agent detection (HAD…): the tendency to postulate animacy—this mechanism is triggered by cues that are so minimal that it often produces false positives….” [Think of the crooked stick on the path that says “snake!!!”] Second is hyperactive understanding of intentionality (HUI): the tendency to postulate mentality and to see events as intentionally caused even in the absence of a visible agent.” [The world is out to get you when it rains on your outdoor wedding.] “Third is hyperactive teleofunctional reasoning (HTR): the tendency to see objects as existing for a purpose.” [Why are we here? Or There must be a reason why it rained on my wedding.]
Given these basic mechanisms in all of us, the author sets out to show how they led to our developing “religious” beliefs. Living in a world in which there is a great deal of danger and things and events which we can neither predict nor understand, it was natural that humankind developed these mechanisms as a means of survival. It was also natural that, as a sort of “spandrel”, a by-product of these mechanisms, that we would intuit non-existent entities and empower them. Pyysiäinen then leads us through a number steps to show the role played by agency, religion and its rituals to strengthen societies and the sense of community while pointing out the “high cost” to individuals and societies of maintaining these beliefs. In particular, much of religion is counterintuitive and counterfactual and must be maintained at the cost of dealing with reality.
Pyysiäinen then proceeds with an in-depth analysis of certain religious belief systems, ranging from somewhat primitive societies: concepts of souls, ghosts (spirits of the dead), and shamanism (spirit possession) through Christianity and Buddhism. These chapters, while seeming a bit selective in their material, taught me a great deal about the theology of Paul Tillich and various issues within the theology of Buddhism. It was of particular interest in that he challenged the “truism” that there are no Buddhist gods. He also pointed out the issues within the religion that are raised by denying the existence of the soul. If people (and animals) have no souls, what is there to be reincarnated? What continues to exist of the buddhas after death? Fun to bring up with your Buddhist friends next time you see them.
I do have some concerns about the book however. First, much of the book is written in such a way as to be easily understandable by the non specialist. Certain parts, on the other hand, seem to require a specialized knowledge of cognitive science, philosophy or religion. This leads to an uneven reading experience.
Secondly, my personal rant, there are editing problems with the book. I encountered problems of missing prepositions, redundancies, and strange locutions. I suspect that they may have arisen simply as a result of the fact that English is not the author’s first language. My ire is aimed at Oxford University Press for missing so many errors. I reread many sentences wondering if I was not understanding before I realized the problem with the text.
My third issue with the book is more basic to the arguments being made. Generally, I would think that a cognitive scientist looking for evidence of religious beliefs in the world would want to stay as much as possible with the “intuitive” beliefs of common believers. Although Pyysiäinen does this early in the book, in his main discussions of Christianity and Buddhism, he turns to theological discussions. For example, for Christianity, we are given a good historical discussion ranging from the scholastics to Paul Tillich. I found the discussions enlightening but not pertinent to the argument of the book. Just as a linguist should not be citing Strunk and White’s “Elements of Style” to make his points about the structure of English, cognitive scientists should not be using theology. It is too far from the basic thinking of the common believer and does not really support the arguments of the book.
For the most part, I found the book to be enlightening and did a great deal to answer certain of my questions about why so much of humanity is obsessed with such counterintuitive belief systems. While I am still somewhat perplexed as to why so much is invested in religion, I think that Pyysiäinen has taken me part of the way towards an answer.
August 10, 2011
Out of the many books looking into the phenomena of religion from the standpoint of cognitive science, this one stands out in its intellectual addition, insight, and encyclopedic scope. In my estimation, not since Pascal Boyer’s (2001) Religion Explained or Scott Atran’s (2002) In Gods We Trust has such a complete volume in the discipline been published by a single author.
Covered here are most of the important aspects of religion as they are studied scientifically. And while I won’t give another capsule overview of a cognitive scientific perspective on religion (see my review of Todd Tremlin’s {2006} Minds and Gods for a basic one), it is important to point out the excellent additions that Pyysiäinen makes in this book. For instance, other scholars have articulated that there are some basic cognitive processes present in human thought that make religious concepts readily believable and transferrable. Among these are theory of mind (ToM) and hyperactive agency detection (HAD) (see Justin Barrett’s {2004} Why Would Anyone Believe in God?). Pyysiäinen discusses two more important processes: hyperactive understanding of intentionality (HUI) and hyperactive teleofunctional reasoning (HTR).
These tendencies in human thought to see events in light of intentionality and to see objects as designed for a purpose (as teleofunctional) are a core observation in piecing together a theoretical framework of religious thought. We can find easy examples of this type of thinking in culture and in observations of human thought. The term “Act of God” when used to describe natural disasters (notice the dichotomy between the terms) is an example of adding intentionality to events (HUI). When children describe clouds as “for raining” instead of something that clouds simply do, it is an example of HTR. Both of these types of reasoning are vital in the formation, maintenance, and salience of religious thought (e.g. creationist beliefs as strongly related to HTR).
Besides laying down a general set of cognitive processes that can be used to get a strong theoretical handle on religion, Pyysiäinen treads into territory that is usually only lightly touched upon in the cognitive science of religion literature – theology. The cognitive science of religion is mostly concerned with the folk-psychological and intuitive aspects of the way that religious concepts are processed by the human mind and therefore is dismissive of academic theology as philosophical elaborations of what is ultimately folk psychology. Drawing mostly upon the writings of Paul Tillich, Pyysiäinen goes beyond the simple dismissal and shows why even though theology tends to be a more coherent system of thought than the often contradictory folk-psychological intuitions, it is still rooted in folk-psychology and exhibits the symptoms of such.
Pyysiäinen goes into much more detail about topics that I won’t touch here due to length, mainly Buddhism, the subject of atheism as is related to this discipline, and (in the excellent appendix) peripheral issues in the scientific study of religion. Overall, the book is certainly an excellent addition to any student of religion’s library and is a great contribution to the “by-product” interpretation of religious and supernatural belief literature.
Covered here are most of the important aspects of religion as they are studied scientifically. And while I won’t give another capsule overview of a cognitive scientific perspective on religion (see my review of Todd Tremlin’s {2006} Minds and Gods for a basic one), it is important to point out the excellent additions that Pyysiäinen makes in this book. For instance, other scholars have articulated that there are some basic cognitive processes present in human thought that make religious concepts readily believable and transferrable. Among these are theory of mind (ToM) and hyperactive agency detection (HAD) (see Justin Barrett’s {2004} Why Would Anyone Believe in God?). Pyysiäinen discusses two more important processes: hyperactive understanding of intentionality (HUI) and hyperactive teleofunctional reasoning (HTR).
These tendencies in human thought to see events in light of intentionality and to see objects as designed for a purpose (as teleofunctional) are a core observation in piecing together a theoretical framework of religious thought. We can find easy examples of this type of thinking in culture and in observations of human thought. The term “Act of God” when used to describe natural disasters (notice the dichotomy between the terms) is an example of adding intentionality to events (HUI). When children describe clouds as “for raining” instead of something that clouds simply do, it is an example of HTR. Both of these types of reasoning are vital in the formation, maintenance, and salience of religious thought (e.g. creationist beliefs as strongly related to HTR).
Besides laying down a general set of cognitive processes that can be used to get a strong theoretical handle on religion, Pyysiäinen treads into territory that is usually only lightly touched upon in the cognitive science of religion literature – theology. The cognitive science of religion is mostly concerned with the folk-psychological and intuitive aspects of the way that religious concepts are processed by the human mind and therefore is dismissive of academic theology as philosophical elaborations of what is ultimately folk psychology. Drawing mostly upon the writings of Paul Tillich, Pyysiäinen goes beyond the simple dismissal and shows why even though theology tends to be a more coherent system of thought than the often contradictory folk-psychological intuitions, it is still rooted in folk-psychology and exhibits the symptoms of such.
Pyysiäinen goes into much more detail about topics that I won’t touch here due to length, mainly Buddhism, the subject of atheism as is related to this discipline, and (in the excellent appendix) peripheral issues in the scientific study of religion. Overall, the book is certainly an excellent addition to any student of religion’s library and is a great contribution to the “by-product” interpretation of religious and supernatural belief literature.
October 26, 2012
An enjoyable, reasonably short book, that's well written & easy to read, about how religion utilises processes and psychological biases, "evolved to help us negotiate our relationships with other people, to detect agency and intent, and to generate a sense of safety." It's a good summary, spanning a wide area of research, with copious references.
Much of it is about showing how religion has hijacked ancient adaptions - much like how fast food chains have hijacked ancient adaptions - giving us supernormal stimuli for fatty and sweet foods. For example the attachment system used between parent and child (think of religious "fathers", "mother" theresa, sisters in the nunnery, brothers in the monastery and so on) is used by religion to provide "supernormal parents" (and all the feelings that go with it).
He also covers the mind/body split (hence some people's belief we have a soul); decoupled cognition (how we always evaluate the likely thoughts of others) and its extension into relationships with unseen others; has a nice bit on intentionality; how humans can ascribe agency to almost anything (from faces on toast to the wind at the door); deference to authority; ritual; and much more.
Of, if you like this, you'll also like Pascal Boyer's fantastic (but terribly named) Religion Explained.
Much of it is about showing how religion has hijacked ancient adaptions - much like how fast food chains have hijacked ancient adaptions - giving us supernormal stimuli for fatty and sweet foods. For example the attachment system used between parent and child (think of religious "fathers", "mother" theresa, sisters in the nunnery, brothers in the monastery and so on) is used by religion to provide "supernormal parents" (and all the feelings that go with it).
He also covers the mind/body split (hence some people's belief we have a soul); decoupled cognition (how we always evaluate the likely thoughts of others) and its extension into relationships with unseen others; has a nice bit on intentionality; how humans can ascribe agency to almost anything (from faces on toast to the wind at the door); deference to authority; ritual; and much more.
Of, if you like this, you'll also like Pascal Boyer's fantastic (but terribly named) Religion Explained.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews