The history of The Hitler Book is as intriguing as its content. When the Third Reich collapsed in 1945, a wary Stalin refused to believe that Hitler was actually dead, and he ordered a comprehensive account of the Nazi leader's political history, along with proof that his suicide was genuine. The resulting 1949 book was prepared by Soviet leaders for Stalin himself. It was based largely on testimony from Otto Günsche and Heinz Linge, two of Hitler's SS adjutants who had fallen into Soviet hands in May 1945. Only two copies of The Hitler Book were made: one was given directly to Stalin and is now thought to be in Putin's personal possession; the other was deposited into the Kremlin archives under the title Document No. 462a. The latter was forgotten until Western academics Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl discovered it in 2005 and translated it into English.
The book, spanning the time from Hitler's rise to power in 1933 to the end of the war in May 1945, is a detailed account of Hitler's personality, daily life, and military strategy. The book moves quickly through the early years of his dictatorship and gradually slows with increasing detail, until by the end of the war the account moves by the day and sometimes by the hour. The narrative reveals Hitler's personal and psychological decline as his empire, which had once dominated continental Europe, shrank mile by mile until only a hundred yards separated his Berlin bunker from the Soviet line.
Equally fascinating are the book's glaring omissions and misleading emphases. Stalin, not the public, was the book's sole intended audience, and anything he might have found upsetting was airbrushed away by the authors. Germany's western front against the Allies is presented as insignificant. The Normandy landing on D-Day is barely mentioned, and the insinuation is that the Anglo-American offensive was both overdue and incompetently managed. The Allied strategy of constant bombing raids, which targeted Germany's military industry and rendered substantial new Wehrmacht offenses impossible after 1943, is downplayed as ineffective. The 1939/1940 alliance between Germany and Soviet Russia is, incredibly, never mentioned. A mere handful of references are made to the non-aggression pact between the two countries, and the invasion of Poland is depicted exclusively as an act of German blitzkrieg expansion. The Holocaust is completely absent. The staggering military successes of the Wehrmacht in 1941 on both eastern and western fronts are ignored. Also omitted are references to Hitler's effectiveness as an orator and controller of the masses - something which Stalin, whose personal charisma was far less inspiring, would have seen as an unfavorable comparison.
However, the book is not incorrect in connecting the outcome of the war to the bitter struggle on the eastern front. Though Germany's initial push into Russia was overwhelmingly successful, and nearly 4 million Soviet soldiers were taken captive between 1941 and 1943, the offensive ground to a halt at Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow. From those points the Soviet army, now fully mobilized, began a lumbering westward offensive that would slowly push the lines of combat all the way back to Berlin, claiming 7.6 million German casualties along the way.
If the Soviet authors, in the service of their communist agenda, at times exaggerate, distort, and omit the facts, a simple comparison of their wartime casualty statistics to those of the Anglo-Americans may help us understand why. A book recounting Hitler's downfall from a Soviet perspective may not be perfectly accurate. It does, however, reveal the viewpoint of Hitler's most bitter military enemy and the nation which suffered and lost the most at the hands of the Nazis - and which was angling to gain the most from the post-war wreckage of Eastern Europe.