This considerable book—more than 600 pages, not counting endnotes—had a strange genesis. During the early 1990s, Alexander Vassiliev, a Russian journalist and former KGB officer, was allowed comparatively brief access to KGB files about Russian espionage in the United States during the 1930s and ‘40s. Vassiliev filled eight notebooks with beautiful handwritten copies and summaries of material that he had been allowed to see—occasionally restraining himself from jumping out of his chair and yelling, "Yes! I got him! Look what I found!” (xxxvii) In 2005 Haynes and Klehr, American historians who had earlier written a book about Soviet espionage in America, realized the importance of Vassiliev’s notebooks and determined to write a book largely based on them.
Because of the unusual way in which the sources were gathered and the book conceived, the suggestion of the subtitle—that this is an organizational history of the KGB in the United States—is misleading. What the three authors have given us is mostly a spy-by-spy account, under fairly rough-and-ready chapter divisions, of how the KGB infiltrated US government agencies. (Sensibly, Alger Hiss and the Manhattan Project are given their own chapters.) Because the book is not a true narrative, my guess is that few readers will read it from end to end without skipping biographies of less interest to them.
This is an important book not because of its extreme readability (though nowhere is it abstruse) but because it demonstrates the essential truth of charges made during the 1950s by Elizabeth Bentley, Whittaker Chambers, and even Joseph McCarthy, that the KGB had infiltrated the highest echelons of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Furthermore, this extensive Soviet infiltration had significant historical consequences. It allowed Stalin to develop atomic weapons more quickly and much more inexpensively than would have otherwise been the case, and it gave him confidence to authorize the Korean War without worrying that US intelligence might be reading Soviet military communications.
Still, the authors disprove the media myth of a KGB as “near superhuman organization staffed by skilled officers carrying out sophisticated schemes designed by clever Moscow overlords who had a long-standing plan on how to subvert the West.” (483) KGB personnel often performed more like characters out of the 1960s American comedy series “Get Smart” than like those in the James Bond movies that the series parodied. The KGB conducted ideological witch-hunts that destroyed their own organization, and it experienced major personnel disasters such the defection of Elizabeth Bentley. Problems also arose from the fact that spies were simple human beings: jealous, acquisitive, clumsy, overworked, and flatly incompetent.
For readers with a dark sense of humor, there are many funny scenes, in part because the authors write with so much professional detachment. One mentally unstable KGB agent correctly identified to the FBI a dozen Russian agents while in the process of bizarrely urging American authorities to reveal to the Soviets that their New York station chief had been secretly spying for Germany and Japan. (528-29) In 1941, the KGB created a hiding place in the Russian consulate for “explosives, a timer-detonator, poisons, and weapons,” but six years later no one could find it. And what master spy conceived of a rendezvous scenario that included having an agent appear at a Jewish philanthropic center on the first and third Saturday of every month wearing gloves and holding a green book, a tennis ball, and a third glove? (95)