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Approaches to World Order
Robert Cox's writings have had a profound influence on recent developments in thinking in world politics. This book brings together for the first time his most important essays, grouped around the theme of world order. The volume is divided into sections dealing respectively with theory; with the application of Cox's approach to recent changes in world political economy; and with multilateralism and the problem of global governance. This volume will be an essential guide to Robert Cox's critical approach for students and teachers of international relations and international political economy.
572 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1995
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November 2, 2013
[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]
-- Assigned chs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 21, & 22 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies –
I found Cox’s book to be a very interesting perspective on a proposed new world order – one that seeks to remedy the disparity between the rich and poor, and one that respects the equity of representation by all groups. While I do not share Cox’s optimism about the potential for such an order, I would love to live in such a world (assuming my own human frailty wouldn’t get in its way). I’ve given my summary of each of my assigned chapters, plus chapter 5, in the following:
Chapter 5 introduces the topic of “futurology” which focuses on how society will have to adapt to technology (vs. how traditional theories try to anticipate the future). The author describes the three approaches to futurology: natural-rational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. Natural-rational considers the reality created by the subjective mind as it translates the objective world. Positivist-evolutionary looks at the world purely through the scientific method. Historicist-dialectical acknowledges the duality of reality, but looks for facts in history to anticipate future events.
The author stresses that he is biased toward liberalism as the best international condition for world order, and that domestic policy affects international policy – they must be aligned for maximum benefit.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the impact of social forces and states on the world order, “Beware of underrating state power, but in addition give proper attention to social forces and processes and see how they relate to the development of states and world orders. Above all, do not base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses” (87).
An important concept the author brings up is the difference between problem-solving theory and critical theory (88-91).
Problem-solving theory “takes the world as it finds it…The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble…The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination” (88).
Critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about” (88). “It is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts” (89). The weakness of one theory is the strength of the other. However, critical theory is not concerned with the problems of the real world.
Cox also introduces his three forces (ideas, material capabilities, and institutions) as they intersect with three levels (social forces, forms of state, and world orders) in the context of increasing internationalization (different from globalization, which Cox seems to attribute as primarily an America-centric prospect). This is where his critical theory is founded and where the rest of the book takes root.
Chapter 7 focuses on how Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks impacted Cox’s ideas on hegemony and world order. To paraphrase – the “bourgeois” hegemon has a social responsibility to those it has influence over, and would necessarily be representative of the order’s interests (in order to be allowed to retain hegemony) – see page 136. Then this order will work for mutual interest and development.
Chapter 8 looks at the 14th-century Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation of reality as he surveyed historical events. Cox’s interest in Khaldun’s perspective is due to Cox’s belief that the Islamic civilization will be a major player in the emerging future world order. The analysis focuses on the Islamic political identity, how that reflects on the states as being a basis for the international system, and the critical role of culture/religion as part of the world order.
Cox also uses Hedley Bull’s premises on order, values, the world order, and international order to build his argument. Institutions are also part of the solution for Cox. It is important to understand that Cox defines “hegemony” as “a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities” (151). This will inform the rest of his ideas.
Chapter 10 considers how the global economy is breaking away from American leadership and is being heavily influenced by multiple actors with transnational interests. The political action that results from social interests will continue to have an effect on globalization such that it will take on a different character that does not necessarily meet American interests.
Chapter 14 introduces the relationship between production and security. He discusses “post-Fordism” which is similar to Dicken’s introduction of Transnational Corporations. The distinction is in Cox’s distaste for the concept of globalization since he sees it as an extension of American dominance. He also uses Kennedy’s argument about the connection between economy and military capability as a way to demonstrate that overextension of military investment can subsequently bring about the demise of the very thing you were trying to protect. His eventual point is that post-Fordism will bring about global connections – similar to Dicken’s argument regarding TNCs. Cox does not believe the US is consistent in its role as a globalization leader and its focus on territorial security.
Chapter 15 is a direct indictment of globalization: “Global perestroika, more euphemistically called ‘globalization,’ is not the consequence of a conscious decision of political leadership. It is a result of structural changes in capitalism, in the actions of many people, corporate bodies, and states, that cumulatively produce new relationships and patterns of behavior” (296). Globalization is a control mechanism, available only to those states with the resources to be able to engage in it via capitalism. It is not a true sense of what Cox envisions as internationalism, and will not work toward a fair system that all can participate in.
Chapter 21 redefines “multilateralism” as “the institutionalization and regulation of established order [and]…the locus of interactions for the transformation of existing order” (497). Multilateralism, for Cox, is a means toward transforming the world order. Cox envisions an order that mutually recognizes distinct traditions of civilization and “towards a kind of supra-intersubjectivity that would provide a bridge among the distint and separate intersubjectivities of the different coexisting traditions of civilization” (519).
Chapter 22 concludes Cox’s book with a prescription for the next world order, assuming the current one will soon fall inward upon itself. His solution is based on a global society that is governed through a participative democracy (534), and is organized through Cox’s definition of multilateralism.
-- Assigned chs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 21, & 22 for School of Advanced Air & Space Studies –
I found Cox’s book to be a very interesting perspective on a proposed new world order – one that seeks to remedy the disparity between the rich and poor, and one that respects the equity of representation by all groups. While I do not share Cox’s optimism about the potential for such an order, I would love to live in such a world (assuming my own human frailty wouldn’t get in its way). I’ve given my summary of each of my assigned chapters, plus chapter 5, in the following:
Chapter 5 introduces the topic of “futurology” which focuses on how society will have to adapt to technology (vs. how traditional theories try to anticipate the future). The author describes the three approaches to futurology: natural-rational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. Natural-rational considers the reality created by the subjective mind as it translates the objective world. Positivist-evolutionary looks at the world purely through the scientific method. Historicist-dialectical acknowledges the duality of reality, but looks for facts in history to anticipate future events.
The author stresses that he is biased toward liberalism as the best international condition for world order, and that domestic policy affects international policy – they must be aligned for maximum benefit.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the impact of social forces and states on the world order, “Beware of underrating state power, but in addition give proper attention to social forces and processes and see how they relate to the development of states and world orders. Above all, do not base theory on theory but rather on changing practice and empirical-historical study, which are a proving ground for concepts and hypotheses” (87).
An important concept the author brings up is the difference between problem-solving theory and critical theory (88-91).
Problem-solving theory “takes the world as it finds it…The general aim of problem solving is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble…The strength of the problem-solving approach lies in its ability to fix limits or parameters to a problem area and to reduce the statement of a particular problem to a limited number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination” (88).
Critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about” (88). “It is directed toward an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts” (89). The weakness of one theory is the strength of the other. However, critical theory is not concerned with the problems of the real world.
Cox also introduces his three forces (ideas, material capabilities, and institutions) as they intersect with three levels (social forces, forms of state, and world orders) in the context of increasing internationalization (different from globalization, which Cox seems to attribute as primarily an America-centric prospect). This is where his critical theory is founded and where the rest of the book takes root.
Chapter 7 focuses on how Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks impacted Cox’s ideas on hegemony and world order. To paraphrase – the “bourgeois” hegemon has a social responsibility to those it has influence over, and would necessarily be representative of the order’s interests (in order to be allowed to retain hegemony) – see page 136. Then this order will work for mutual interest and development.
Chapter 8 looks at the 14th-century Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation of reality as he surveyed historical events. Cox’s interest in Khaldun’s perspective is due to Cox’s belief that the Islamic civilization will be a major player in the emerging future world order. The analysis focuses on the Islamic political identity, how that reflects on the states as being a basis for the international system, and the critical role of culture/religion as part of the world order.
Cox also uses Hedley Bull’s premises on order, values, the world order, and international order to build his argument. Institutions are also part of the solution for Cox. It is important to understand that Cox defines “hegemony” as “a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities” (151). This will inform the rest of his ideas.
Chapter 10 considers how the global economy is breaking away from American leadership and is being heavily influenced by multiple actors with transnational interests. The political action that results from social interests will continue to have an effect on globalization such that it will take on a different character that does not necessarily meet American interests.
Chapter 14 introduces the relationship between production and security. He discusses “post-Fordism” which is similar to Dicken’s introduction of Transnational Corporations. The distinction is in Cox’s distaste for the concept of globalization since he sees it as an extension of American dominance. He also uses Kennedy’s argument about the connection between economy and military capability as a way to demonstrate that overextension of military investment can subsequently bring about the demise of the very thing you were trying to protect. His eventual point is that post-Fordism will bring about global connections – similar to Dicken’s argument regarding TNCs. Cox does not believe the US is consistent in its role as a globalization leader and its focus on territorial security.
Chapter 15 is a direct indictment of globalization: “Global perestroika, more euphemistically called ‘globalization,’ is not the consequence of a conscious decision of political leadership. It is a result of structural changes in capitalism, in the actions of many people, corporate bodies, and states, that cumulatively produce new relationships and patterns of behavior” (296). Globalization is a control mechanism, available only to those states with the resources to be able to engage in it via capitalism. It is not a true sense of what Cox envisions as internationalism, and will not work toward a fair system that all can participate in.
Chapter 21 redefines “multilateralism” as “the institutionalization and regulation of established order [and]…the locus of interactions for the transformation of existing order” (497). Multilateralism, for Cox, is a means toward transforming the world order. Cox envisions an order that mutually recognizes distinct traditions of civilization and “towards a kind of supra-intersubjectivity that would provide a bridge among the distint and separate intersubjectivities of the different coexisting traditions of civilization” (519).
Chapter 22 concludes Cox’s book with a prescription for the next world order, assuming the current one will soon fall inward upon itself. His solution is based on a global society that is governed through a participative democracy (534), and is organized through Cox’s definition of multilateralism.
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