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On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can Be Done
Book by Sunstein, Cass R.
112 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2009
18 people are currently reading
606 people want to read
About the author
Cass R. Sunstein
167 books736 followersCass R. Sunstein is an American legal scholar, particularly in the fields of constitutional law, administrative law, environmental law, and law and behavioral economics, who currently is the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration. For 27 years, Sunstein taught at the University of Chicago Law School, where he continues to teach as the Harry Kalven Visiting Professor. Sunstein is currently Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he is on leave while working in the Obama administration.
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October 7, 2016
كتاب جيد ومختصر في فقه الشائعات يصب في صالح تحطيم صنم نظرية المؤامرة...
وجد عالم النفس "جيب هيث" أن الإشاعات المشمئزة أكثر قابلية للرواج من غيرها مثل الإساءة إلى طفل ضمن شعائر شيطانية أو سلوك جنسي منحرف أو البكتيريا التي تلتهم جسد الإنسان، فكلما استثارت الإشاعة مشاعر الإشمئزاز والغضب والاستفظاع كلما كانت أكثر عرضة للنشر بين الناس ، وهذا ما يسمونه بالانتقاء الانفعالي... وأظهر تنوع كبير من السياقات الاختبارية أن وجهات نظر الناس تصبح أكثر تطرفاً لمجرد تأكيد وجهات نظرهم الأولية ولأنهم تمتعوا بالثقة بعد علمهم أن آخرين يشاركونهم نفس وجهات نظرهم... ويوفر الإرهاب مثالاً خطيراً على ذلك عندما ينشر المتطرفون المتماثلون في الفكر الشائعات ويناقشون المظالم التي قد تؤدي إلى نتائج عنيفة...
وجد عالم النفس "جيب هيث" أن الإشاعات المشمئزة أكثر قابلية للرواج من غيرها مثل الإساءة إلى طفل ضمن شعائر شيطانية أو سلوك جنسي منحرف أو البكتيريا التي تلتهم جسد الإنسان، فكلما استثارت الإشاعة مشاعر الإشمئزاز والغضب والاستفظاع كلما كانت أكثر عرضة للنشر بين الناس ، وهذا ما يسمونه بالانتقاء الانفعالي... وأظهر تنوع كبير من السياقات الاختبارية أن وجهات نظر الناس تصبح أكثر تطرفاً لمجرد تأكيد وجهات نظرهم الأولية ولأنهم تمتعوا بالثقة بعد علمهم أن آخرين يشاركونهم نفس وجهات نظرهم... ويوفر الإرهاب مثالاً خطيراً على ذلك عندما ينشر المتطرفون المتماثلون في الفكر الشائعات ويناقشون المظالم التي قد تؤدي إلى نتائج عنيفة...
December 5, 2019
Una de las peores cosas que puedo decir sobre cualquier libro es: “yo podría haber escrito esto”. Lo que no viene a ser, o no tanto, una consideración sobre mis limitaciones como escritor, sino más bien una reflexión sobre la inutilidad de haber leído el libro en cuestión. O sea: podría haber armado este libro con cosas que ya sabía, o que me suponía, o que podría haber inventado en el camino. Y da la impresión de que eso es justamente lo que hizo el autor. Rumorología es un encadenamiento de verdades de Perogrullo, obviedades, afirmaciones mayormente injustificadas y muy pocas respaldadas por fuentes inviables. Me evoca al alumno que sin haber estudiado nada es capaz de hablar por veinte minutos en el examen final.
August 27, 2021
Debo confesar que sentí este libro tremendamente actual, como si hubiera sido planeado y escrito al calor de los sucesos políticos del 2016 que dieron forma a novelas como La decadencia de Nerón Golden. En realidad no es tan viejo, pero si se siente tan reciente es solo porque las problemáticas denunciadas solo han sido profundizadas y han cristalizado en consecuencias graves imprevistas en los años posteriores a su publicación (2009). Finalmente, con todo y la proliferación de teorías conspirativas que en su momento hubo contra el Candidato Barack Obama, no le impidieron a este ganar ni a su campaña anti-calumnias lograr en parte su objetivo. Muy diferente a lo ocurrido en 2016 tanto en EEUU, RU y , en muy humilde menor alcance e importancia mundial, en el plebiscito Colombiano. Todos eventos los cuales pueden contarse como victorias parciales, o casi totales, de la conspiranoia, las reacciones emocionales radicalizadas por el tribalismo político; las ansiedades grupales enfrentadas y las noticias falsas favorecidas por las cámaras de resonancia que ofrecen las redes sociales.
Seguramente Sunstein hubiese tenido mucho más trabajo si hubiera esperado unos años más al escandalo de Cambridge Analytica. Seguramente hubiese sido mucho más ilustrativo haber tenido a la mano el ejemplo de Pizzagate o la violencia supremacista cimentada en la idea de "invasiones culturales" para ejemplificar los peligros de las noticias falsas en lugar del incidente del puente Al-Ayma en 2005. Como aproximación inicial sobre el tema y como explicación sintetizada de los peligros de menospreciar la verdad fáctica para favorecer la lealtad grupal o el odio partidista, es un gran libro para leer además que ofrece una lista de referencias empíricas para varias de sus observaciones sobre las tendencias similares en personas afines al conservadurismo o el progresismo. También resalto el análisis sobre los retos de regular los daños de la libertad de expresión en sus usos más peligrosos a terceros, siempre aceptándola como un valor innegociable de una sociedad libre y como la lucha contra las noticias falsas y los rumores peligrosos no pueden ser una excusa para olvidarla ni penalizar a los comunicadores de buena fe.
Seguramente Sunstein hubiese tenido mucho más trabajo si hubiera esperado unos años más al escandalo de Cambridge Analytica. Seguramente hubiese sido mucho más ilustrativo haber tenido a la mano el ejemplo de Pizzagate o la violencia supremacista cimentada en la idea de "invasiones culturales" para ejemplificar los peligros de las noticias falsas en lugar del incidente del puente Al-Ayma en 2005. Como aproximación inicial sobre el tema y como explicación sintetizada de los peligros de menospreciar la verdad fáctica para favorecer la lealtad grupal o el odio partidista, es un gran libro para leer además que ofrece una lista de referencias empíricas para varias de sus observaciones sobre las tendencias similares en personas afines al conservadurismo o el progresismo. También resalto el análisis sobre los retos de regular los daños de la libertad de expresión en sus usos más peligrosos a terceros, siempre aceptándola como un valor innegociable de una sociedad libre y como la lucha contra las noticias falsas y los rumores peligrosos no pueden ser una excusa para olvidarla ni penalizar a los comunicadores de buena fe.
January 11, 2026
ENGLISH
Cass Sunstein examines how rumors spread and persist in society in this remarkably clearly written book. He breaks the phenomenon down into its core psychological and social components — pre-existing beliefs, informational cascades, conformity cascades, group polarization, and cognitive biases — showing how these forces shape what people believe and share.
A rumor tends to stick more depending on how predisposed people are to accept its content; will have more acceptance if more people already believe it or seem to believe it; will spread out more extensively because least engaged people with its content will display public conformity as others are doing the same; will gain power among those not initially committed to it as they get in contact with others more likely to accept it.
A rumor depends not only on its content, but also on who spreads it and who receives it. The same claim can be readily and enduringly accepted in one group and dismissed in another.
Sunstein shows that rumors are especially powerful when they trigger strong emotions and align with prior beliefs. Confirmation bias and motivated reasoning play out strongly in the phenomenon, as people are more inclined to accept information that reinforces what they already think. The identity of the messenger sometimes also matters, as people are more likely to trust and repeat information coming from someone they like or view as credible.
Sunstein also notes that exposing people to more balanced views often fails to dislodge deeply held beliefs and may even reinforce them, especially — and perhaps not too surprisingly — among well-educated audiences.
Supported by strong empirical research, the book dissects the anatomy of a hypothetical rumor explaining how individual incentives and psychological mechanisms operate at each stage.
The book also addresses the long-standing U.S. debate over freedom of speech and the regulation of harmful discourse, such as libel. Sunstein challenges the idea that the “marketplace of ideas” will always allow truth to prevail, especially in an era where the Internet enables falsehoods to spread rapidly and widely.
Perhaps the most important position on freedom of speech in North-American law comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” [Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting].
But Sunstein argues that the “marketplace of ideas” sometimes works poorly, as serious harm can occur long before misinformation is corrected — if at all corrected sometimes — particularly for individuals who lack the resources to defend themselves. Higher tolerance with libel is expected against public officials and celebrities, though, as they already face or should face public exposure more regularly.
As the book points out, coercion of libel can create a “chilling effect” that discourages harmful behavior, but excessive restrictions also risk undermining free speech. The challenge for a liberal democracy lies in finding a workable balance between these competing concerns, as Sunstein defends it.
The final story on a writer and member of the UK Parliament is hilarious. Edwin During-Lawrence firmly believed that Shakespeare was merely a moron, and the plays attributed to him were actually written by Francis Bacon. There are many other rumors attributing Shakespeare’s plays to other authors. Sunstein brings this to illustrate how even clever people can believe in absurd ideas — to a point of even publishing a book about it, which During-Lawrence did in 1910.
This book is of particular interest to me because it addresses a social phenomenon that I examined in my own book, “Difamação e Antitruste” (Disparagement and Antitrust), published in 2025 (here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). While Sunstein focuses on rumors and public discourse in general, my research focused on the spread of disparaging rumors among competitors in the marketplace, examining how science points to reactions of consumers and how Brazilian antitrust enforcement should work in those cases.
One last word about the writing style of this book. As is becoming frequent in books written by academics for a wider audience, the text is incredibly clear, going straight to the main research conclusions in short, simple paragraphs, and leaving the few citations of scientific research for notes gathered at the end. It seems strange to complain about clarity and didacticism when it comes to science, since examples of the opposite have always abounded: texts in coded language with no concern for reader comprehension, sometimes even for specialists.
However, the obsession with didacticism sometimes hinders retention; not infrequently, I have difficulty or cannot remember insights, lessons, and research from books written in this way. Of course, between older, excessively coded texts and those that are clearer, I prefer the former.
But just as Sunstein proposes a middle ground between protecting freedom of expression and coercion for defamation, I too propose a more balanced approach to scientific writing: arousing enthusiasm by making the text less truncated, but without the reader forgetting it completely the day after turning its last page due to excessive simplicity.
PORTUGUÊS
Neste livro, escrito de forma incrivelmente clara, Cass Sunstein examina como os rumores se espalham e persistem na sociedade. Ele decompõe o fenômeno em seus componentes psicológicos e sociais essenciais — crenças preexistentes, cascatas informacionais, cascatas de conformidade, polarização de grupo e vieses cognitivos — mostrando como essas forças moldam o que as pessoas acreditam e compartilham.
Um rumor tende a se fixar mais dependendo de quão predispostas as pessoas estão a aceitar seu conteúdo; terá maior aceitação se mais pessoas já acreditarem nele ou parecerem acreditar; se espalhará mais amplamente porque muitas pessoas menos envolvidas com seu conteúdo demonstrarão conformidade publicamente pois outras estão fazendo o mesmo; ganhará força entre aqueles que inicialmente não estavam comprometidos com ele à medida que entrarem em contato com outros mais propensos a aceitá-lo.
Um rumor depende não apenas de seu conteúdo, mas também de quem o espalha e quem o recebe. A mesma afirmação pode ser prontamente e duradouramente aceita em um grupo e rejeitada em outro.
Sunstein mostra que os rumores são especialmente poderosos quando desencadeiam emoções fortes e se alinham com crenças preexistentes. O viés de confirmação e o raciocínio motivado funcionam fortemente no fenômeno, pois as pessoas tendem a aceitar informações que reforçam suas crenças preexistentes. A identidade do mensageiro também importa, já que as pessoas são mais propensas a confiar e repetir informações vindas de alguém de quem gostam ou que consideram confiável.
Sunstein também observa que expor as pessoas a visões mais equilibradas muitas vezes não consegue desmantelar crenças profundamente arraigadas e pode até reforçá-las, especialmente — e talvez não surpreendentemente — entre públicos com alto nível de escolaridade.
Com base em sólida pesquisa empírica, o livro disseca a anatomia de um boato hipotético, explicando como os incentivos individuais e os mecanismos psicológicos operam em cada etapa.
O livro também aborda o antigo debate nos EUA sobre a liberdade de expressão e a regulamentação de discursos nocivos, como a difamação. Sunstein questiona a ideia de que o "mercado de ideias" sempre permitirá que a verdade prevaleça, especialmente em uma era em que a internet possibilita a disseminação rápida e ampla de informações falsas.
Talvez a posição mais importante sobre a importância da liberdade de expressão no direito norte-americano tenha vindo do Juiz Oliver Wendell Holmes, que afirmou que “o bem supremo desejado é mais bem alcançado pelo livre comércio de ideias — que o melhor teste da verdade é o poder do pensamento de se fazer aceitar na competição do mercado” (Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., voto dissidente - tradução livre).
Mas Sunstein argumenta que o “mercado de ideias” às vezes funciona mal, pois danos graves podem ocorrer muito antes que a desinformação seja corrigida — se chegar a ser corrigida —, particularmente para indivíduos que não têm recursos para se defender. Espera-se, contudo, maior tolerância à difamação contra autoridades públicas e celebridades, visto que elas já enfrentam, ou devem enfrentar, exposição pública com mais frequência.
Como o livro destaca, a coerção em casos de difamação pode criar um “efeito inibidor” que desencoraja comportamentos nocivos, mas restrições excessivas também correm o risco de minar a liberdade de expressão. O desafio para uma democracia liberal reside em encontrar um equilíbrio viável entre essas preocupações conflitantes, como Sunstein defende.
A história final sobre um escritor e membro do Parlamento do Reino Unido é hilária. Edwin During-Lawrence acreditava firmemente que Shakespeare era um mero ignorante, e que as peças teatrais atribuídas a ele foram escritas, na verdade, por Francis Bacon. Há muitos outros rumores atribuindo as peças de Shakespeare a outros autores. Sunstein usa isso para ilustrar como até mesmo pessoas inteligentes podem acreditar em ideias absurdas — a ponto de publicar um livro sobre o assunto, como During-Lawrence fez em 1910.
Este livro me interessou particularmente porque aborda um fenômeno social que examinei em meu próprio livro, “Difamação e Antitruste”, publicado em 2025 (aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). Enquanto Sunstein se concentra em rumores e discurso público em geral, minha pesquisa focou na disseminação de rumores depreciativos entre concorrentes no mercado, examinando como a ciência aponta para as reações dos consumidores e como a aplicação das leis antitruste brasileiras deveria funcionar nesses casos.
Uma última palavra sobre o estilo de escrita deste livro. Como está se tornando frequente em livros escritos por acadêmicos para um público mais amplo, o texto é Incrivelmente claro, indo direto às principais conclusões de pesquisas em parágrafos curtos e simples, e deixando as poucas citações de pesquisas científicas para notas reunidas ao final. Parece estranho reclamar de clareza e didatismo quando se trata de ciência, já que sempre abundaram exemplos do contrário: textos em linguagem codificada e sem qualquer preocupação com a compreensão do leitor, às vezes até mesmo para especialistas.
No entanto, a obsessão com o didatismo às vezes prejudica a retenção; não raro, tenho dificuldade ou não consigo me lembrar de insights, lições e pesquisas de livros escritos dessa maneira. Claro, entre textos antigos excessivamente codificados e aqueles mais claros, fico com os primeiros.
Mas do mesmo jeito que Sunstein propõe um meio-termo entre a proteção da liberdade de expressão e a coerção por difamação, eu também proponho uma abordagem mais equilibrada para a escrita científica: despertar entusiasmo deixando o texto menos truncado, mas sem que o leitor se esqueça dele completamente no dia seguinte em que virar sua última página pelo excesso de simplicidade.
Cass Sunstein examines how rumors spread and persist in society in this remarkably clearly written book. He breaks the phenomenon down into its core psychological and social components — pre-existing beliefs, informational cascades, conformity cascades, group polarization, and cognitive biases — showing how these forces shape what people believe and share.
A rumor tends to stick more depending on how predisposed people are to accept its content; will have more acceptance if more people already believe it or seem to believe it; will spread out more extensively because least engaged people with its content will display public conformity as others are doing the same; will gain power among those not initially committed to it as they get in contact with others more likely to accept it.
A rumor depends not only on its content, but also on who spreads it and who receives it. The same claim can be readily and enduringly accepted in one group and dismissed in another.
Sunstein shows that rumors are especially powerful when they trigger strong emotions and align with prior beliefs. Confirmation bias and motivated reasoning play out strongly in the phenomenon, as people are more inclined to accept information that reinforces what they already think. The identity of the messenger sometimes also matters, as people are more likely to trust and repeat information coming from someone they like or view as credible.
Sunstein also notes that exposing people to more balanced views often fails to dislodge deeply held beliefs and may even reinforce them, especially — and perhaps not too surprisingly — among well-educated audiences.
Supported by strong empirical research, the book dissects the anatomy of a hypothetical rumor explaining how individual incentives and psychological mechanisms operate at each stage.
The book also addresses the long-standing U.S. debate over freedom of speech and the regulation of harmful discourse, such as libel. Sunstein challenges the idea that the “marketplace of ideas” will always allow truth to prevail, especially in an era where the Internet enables falsehoods to spread rapidly and widely.
Perhaps the most important position on freedom of speech in North-American law comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” [Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting].
But Sunstein argues that the “marketplace of ideas” sometimes works poorly, as serious harm can occur long before misinformation is corrected — if at all corrected sometimes — particularly for individuals who lack the resources to defend themselves. Higher tolerance with libel is expected against public officials and celebrities, though, as they already face or should face public exposure more regularly.
As the book points out, coercion of libel can create a “chilling effect” that discourages harmful behavior, but excessive restrictions also risk undermining free speech. The challenge for a liberal democracy lies in finding a workable balance between these competing concerns, as Sunstein defends it.
The final story on a writer and member of the UK Parliament is hilarious. Edwin During-Lawrence firmly believed that Shakespeare was merely a moron, and the plays attributed to him were actually written by Francis Bacon. There are many other rumors attributing Shakespeare’s plays to other authors. Sunstein brings this to illustrate how even clever people can believe in absurd ideas — to a point of even publishing a book about it, which During-Lawrence did in 1910.
This book is of particular interest to me because it addresses a social phenomenon that I examined in my own book, “Difamação e Antitruste” (Disparagement and Antitrust), published in 2025 (here: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). While Sunstein focuses on rumors and public discourse in general, my research focused on the spread of disparaging rumors among competitors in the marketplace, examining how science points to reactions of consumers and how Brazilian antitrust enforcement should work in those cases.
One last word about the writing style of this book. As is becoming frequent in books written by academics for a wider audience, the text is incredibly clear, going straight to the main research conclusions in short, simple paragraphs, and leaving the few citations of scientific research for notes gathered at the end. It seems strange to complain about clarity and didacticism when it comes to science, since examples of the opposite have always abounded: texts in coded language with no concern for reader comprehension, sometimes even for specialists.
However, the obsession with didacticism sometimes hinders retention; not infrequently, I have difficulty or cannot remember insights, lessons, and research from books written in this way. Of course, between older, excessively coded texts and those that are clearer, I prefer the former.
But just as Sunstein proposes a middle ground between protecting freedom of expression and coercion for defamation, I too propose a more balanced approach to scientific writing: arousing enthusiasm by making the text less truncated, but without the reader forgetting it completely the day after turning its last page due to excessive simplicity.
PORTUGUÊS
Neste livro, escrito de forma incrivelmente clara, Cass Sunstein examina como os rumores se espalham e persistem na sociedade. Ele decompõe o fenômeno em seus componentes psicológicos e sociais essenciais — crenças preexistentes, cascatas informacionais, cascatas de conformidade, polarização de grupo e vieses cognitivos — mostrando como essas forças moldam o que as pessoas acreditam e compartilham.
Um rumor tende a se fixar mais dependendo de quão predispostas as pessoas estão a aceitar seu conteúdo; terá maior aceitação se mais pessoas já acreditarem nele ou parecerem acreditar; se espalhará mais amplamente porque muitas pessoas menos envolvidas com seu conteúdo demonstrarão conformidade publicamente pois outras estão fazendo o mesmo; ganhará força entre aqueles que inicialmente não estavam comprometidos com ele à medida que entrarem em contato com outros mais propensos a aceitá-lo.
Um rumor depende não apenas de seu conteúdo, mas também de quem o espalha e quem o recebe. A mesma afirmação pode ser prontamente e duradouramente aceita em um grupo e rejeitada em outro.
Sunstein mostra que os rumores são especialmente poderosos quando desencadeiam emoções fortes e se alinham com crenças preexistentes. O viés de confirmação e o raciocínio motivado funcionam fortemente no fenômeno, pois as pessoas tendem a aceitar informações que reforçam suas crenças preexistentes. A identidade do mensageiro também importa, já que as pessoas são mais propensas a confiar e repetir informações vindas de alguém de quem gostam ou que consideram confiável.
Sunstein também observa que expor as pessoas a visões mais equilibradas muitas vezes não consegue desmantelar crenças profundamente arraigadas e pode até reforçá-las, especialmente — e talvez não surpreendentemente — entre públicos com alto nível de escolaridade.
Com base em sólida pesquisa empírica, o livro disseca a anatomia de um boato hipotético, explicando como os incentivos individuais e os mecanismos psicológicos operam em cada etapa.
O livro também aborda o antigo debate nos EUA sobre a liberdade de expressão e a regulamentação de discursos nocivos, como a difamação. Sunstein questiona a ideia de que o "mercado de ideias" sempre permitirá que a verdade prevaleça, especialmente em uma era em que a internet possibilita a disseminação rápida e ampla de informações falsas.
Talvez a posição mais importante sobre a importância da liberdade de expressão no direito norte-americano tenha vindo do Juiz Oliver Wendell Holmes, que afirmou que “o bem supremo desejado é mais bem alcançado pelo livre comércio de ideias — que o melhor teste da verdade é o poder do pensamento de se fazer aceitar na competição do mercado” (Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., voto dissidente - tradução livre).
Mas Sunstein argumenta que o “mercado de ideias” às vezes funciona mal, pois danos graves podem ocorrer muito antes que a desinformação seja corrigida — se chegar a ser corrigida —, particularmente para indivíduos que não têm recursos para se defender. Espera-se, contudo, maior tolerância à difamação contra autoridades públicas e celebridades, visto que elas já enfrentam, ou devem enfrentar, exposição pública com mais frequência.
Como o livro destaca, a coerção em casos de difamação pode criar um “efeito inibidor” que desencoraja comportamentos nocivos, mas restrições excessivas também correm o risco de minar a liberdade de expressão. O desafio para uma democracia liberal reside em encontrar um equilíbrio viável entre essas preocupações conflitantes, como Sunstein defende.
A história final sobre um escritor e membro do Parlamento do Reino Unido é hilária. Edwin During-Lawrence acreditava firmemente que Shakespeare era um mero ignorante, e que as peças teatrais atribuídas a ele foram escritas, na verdade, por Francis Bacon. Há muitos outros rumores atribuindo as peças de Shakespeare a outros autores. Sunstein usa isso para ilustrar como até mesmo pessoas inteligentes podem acreditar em ideias absurdas — a ponto de publicar um livro sobre o assunto, como During-Lawrence fez em 1910.
Este livro me interessou particularmente porque aborda um fenômeno social que examinei em meu próprio livro, “Difamação e Antitruste”, publicado em 2025 (aqui: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...). Enquanto Sunstein se concentra em rumores e discurso público em geral, minha pesquisa focou na disseminação de rumores depreciativos entre concorrentes no mercado, examinando como a ciência aponta para as reações dos consumidores e como a aplicação das leis antitruste brasileiras deveria funcionar nesses casos.
Uma última palavra sobre o estilo de escrita deste livro. Como está se tornando frequente em livros escritos por acadêmicos para um público mais amplo, o texto é Incrivelmente claro, indo direto às principais conclusões de pesquisas em parágrafos curtos e simples, e deixando as poucas citações de pesquisas científicas para notas reunidas ao final. Parece estranho reclamar de clareza e didatismo quando se trata de ciência, já que sempre abundaram exemplos do contrário: textos em linguagem codificada e sem qualquer preocupação com a compreensão do leitor, às vezes até mesmo para especialistas.
No entanto, a obsessão com o didatismo às vezes prejudica a retenção; não raro, tenho dificuldade ou não consigo me lembrar de insights, lições e pesquisas de livros escritos dessa maneira. Claro, entre textos antigos excessivamente codificados e aqueles mais claros, fico com os primeiros.
Mas do mesmo jeito que Sunstein propõe um meio-termo entre a proteção da liberdade de expressão e a coerção por difamação, eu também proponho uma abordagem mais equilibrada para a escrita científica: despertar entusiasmo deixando o texto menos truncado, mas sem que o leitor se esqueça dele completamente no dia seguinte em que virar sua última página pelo excesso de simplicidade.
January 17, 2018
Essentially a non book. It's very , very rare that I skim a book but after 20 odd pages of a 70 or so page book I was bored and underwhelmed. Rumours start and you'll believe them if you want and won't if you don't. Other factors influence you such as peers, emotions and news. Does anybody not know this ?
No new mechanism is put forward to address what can be done which was to be the point in reading the book.
Really didn't see the point. Go read nassim taleb on the importance of grandmothers to get at least some views on how to act in real life.
No new mechanism is put forward to address what can be done which was to be the point in reading the book.
Really didn't see the point. Go read nassim taleb on the importance of grandmothers to get at least some views on how to act in real life.
January 18, 2020
I was disappointed with this, because I expect more insights from Cass Sunstein. The book does a good job of laying out the problems with counting on a 'marketplace of ideas' to produce truth. But the ideas of polarization by conversation, of confirmation bias, and other psychological concepts well-demonstrated by experiment, are ideas I already knew about. Sunstein's suggestions for changes to better balance 'chilling of free speech' with deference against promulgating false rumors are somewhat interesting, but seem too little address the problem. I had hoped for more.
March 5, 2013
This had GREAT potential. Then the author threw it away by droning on in suppositions and hypotheticals. Really? Like there aren't enough real people believing completely ridiculous rumors that he could have used to make this interesting and engaging?
December 29, 2024
The concept of this book is more important than ever, in a world that is growing increasingly polarised and full of misinformation. That being said, I did expect more.
Having recently read that it was this book which laid the foundation for Morgan McSweeney’s campaign that successfully defeated the BNP in Barking during the 2010 local elections, I expected to come away with a wide array of ideas on how to address the current wave of right-wing populism sweeping through the UK.
The book does a good job of identifying the primary causes of how misinformation spreads. It highlights two key mechanisms: information cascades— a catch 22 where beliefs gain rapid traction and widespread appeal, leading to even more people to accept them as true—and conformity cascades, where individuals, even if skeptical of the belief, go along with it to fit in with the crowd. As well as how we are often subject to confirmation bias in our own beliefs.
However, Sunstein’s proposed solutions are less compelling. His suggestions include using social media to counter misinformation with the truth, encouraging prominent figures—particularly those aligned with the source of the rumor—to publicly refute it, and advocating for stronger legal measures to address the issue. While practical, these solutions feel uninspired and lack innovative approaches to tackling the problem effectively.
It is a very short book, so on the whole is probably worth the read. Funnily enough my rating was solidified having read other reviews in the comment section. So am I now a victim of an information cascade?
Having recently read that it was this book which laid the foundation for Morgan McSweeney’s campaign that successfully defeated the BNP in Barking during the 2010 local elections, I expected to come away with a wide array of ideas on how to address the current wave of right-wing populism sweeping through the UK.
The book does a good job of identifying the primary causes of how misinformation spreads. It highlights two key mechanisms: information cascades— a catch 22 where beliefs gain rapid traction and widespread appeal, leading to even more people to accept them as true—and conformity cascades, where individuals, even if skeptical of the belief, go along with it to fit in with the crowd. As well as how we are often subject to confirmation bias in our own beliefs.
However, Sunstein’s proposed solutions are less compelling. His suggestions include using social media to counter misinformation with the truth, encouraging prominent figures—particularly those aligned with the source of the rumor—to publicly refute it, and advocating for stronger legal measures to address the issue. While practical, these solutions feel uninspired and lack innovative approaches to tackling the problem effectively.
It is a very short book, so on the whole is probably worth the read. Funnily enough my rating was solidified having read other reviews in the comment section. So am I now a victim of an information cascade?
June 4, 2021
“If you want people to move away from their prior convictions, and to correct a false rumor, it is best to present them not with the opinions of their usual adversaries, whom they can dismiss, but instead with the views of people with whom they closely identify.”
In “On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can Be Done,” American legal scholar Cass Sunstein writes about the ever-pervasive problem – rumors.
Rumors often arise and gain traction because they fit with, and support, the prior convictions of those who accept them. Some people and some groups are predisposed to accept certain rumors because those rumors are compatible with their self-interest, or with what they think they know to be true. Some people are strongly motivated to accept certain rumors because it pleases them to do so.
The Problem
Rumors are nearly as old as human history, but with the rise of the Internet, they have become ubiquitous. In fact we are now awash in them. False rumors are especially troublesome; they impose real damage on individuals and institutions, and they often resist correction. They can threaten careers, relationships, policies, public officials, democracy, and sometimes even peace itself.
Many of the most pervasive rumors involve governments—what officials are planning and why. Others involve famous people in politics, business, and entertainment, or companies, large and small. Still others involve people who are not at all in the public eye. On Facebook and on Twitter, everyone is at some risk. All of us are potentially victims of rumors, including false and vicious ones.
Fear or Hopes
Many of us accept false rumors because of either our fears or our hopes. Because we fear al-Qaeda, we are more inclined to believe that its members are plotting an attack near where we live. Because we hope that our favorite company will prosper, we might believe a rumor that its new product cannot fail and that its prospects are about to soar.
In the context of war, one group’s fears are unmistakably another group’s hopes—and whenever groups compete, the fears of some are the hopes of others. Because rumors fuel some fears and alleviate others, radically different reactions to the same rumor are inevitable.
Social Cascades and Group Polarization
Rumors spread through two different but overlapping processes: social cascades and group polarization.
Cascades occur because each of us tends to rely on what other people think and do. If most of the people we know believe a rumor, we tend to believe it too.
Cascade
Cascades occur because each of us tends to rely on what other people think and do. If most of the people we know believe a rumor, we tend to believe it too. Lacking information of our own, we accept the views of others. When the rumor involves a topic on which we know nothing, we are especially likely to believe it.
A cascade occurs when a group of early movers say or do something and other people follow their signal. In the economy, rumors can fuel speculative bubbles, greatly inflating prices, and indeed speculative bubbles help to account for the financial crisis of 2008. Rumors are also responsible for many panics, as fear spreads rapidly from one person to another, creating self-fulfilling prophecies. And if the relevant rumors trigger strong emotions, such as fear or disgust, they are far more likely to spread.
Group polarization
Group polarization refers to the fact that when like-minded people get together, they often end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk to one another. Suppose that members of a certain group are inclined to accept a rumor about, say, the malevolent intentions of an apparently unfriendly group or nation. In all likelihood, they will become more committed to that rumor after they have spoken among themselves. Indeed, they may have moved from being tentative believers to being absolutely certain that the rumor is true, even though all they know is what other group members think.
“The simple idea is that people process information in a way that fits with their own predilections.”
Biased assimilation
Biased assimilation refers to the fact that people process new information in a biased fashion; those who have accepted false rumors may not easily give up their beliefs, especially when they have a strong emotional commitment to those beliefs. It can be exceedingly hard to dislodge what people think, even by presenting them with the facts. That presentation might cause them to become more entrenched.
“Biased assimilation is partly produced by our desire to reduce cognitive dissonance. We seek out and believe information that we find pleasant to learn, and we avoid and dismiss information that we find upsetting or disturbing.”
Why Rumours Spread
Prurient, cruel, and malicious propagators will be especially effective when those who read or hear them are facing some kind of distress and when they seek to make sense out of their situation. Their actions are especially worrisome insofar as they are able to spread rumors about ordinary people who find that their reputations, their relationships, and their careers are seriously damaged. Such rumors often stick, and even if they do not, they can raise questions and doubts that haunt people for a long time.
In the aftermath of a crisis, numerous speculations will be offered. To some people, those speculations will seem plausible, perhaps because they provide a suitable outlet for outrage and blame. Terrible events produce outrage, and when people are outraged, they are all the more likely to accept rumors that justify their emotional states, and also to attribute those events to intentional action. Some rumors simultaneously relieve “a primary emotional urge” and offer an explanation, to those who accept them, of why they feel as they do; the rumor “rationalizes while it relieves.
“When conditions are bad, rumors, both true and false, tend to spread like wild-fire. It has been observed that rumors do well “in situations characterized by social unrest. Those who undergo strain over a long period of time—victims of sustained bombings, survivors of a long epidemic, a conquered populace coping with an army of occupation, civilians grown weary of a long war, prisoners in a concentration camp, residents of neighborhoods marked by interethnic tension” are likely to believe and to spread false rumors.”
Excerpt From: Sunstein, Cass R. “On Rumors.” Apple Books.
Propagators
Rumors are often initiated by self-conscious propagators, who may or may not believe the rumors they spread. Rumor propagators have diverse motivations.
Narrowly Self-Interested.
Some propagators are narrowly self-interested. They seek to promote their own interests by harming a particular person or group. They want to make money, to win some competition, or otherwise to get ahead. They spread rumors for that reason.
Self-Interested.
Other propagators are generally self-interested. They may seek to attract readers or eyeballs by spreading rumors.
Propagators of this kind are entirely willing to publish rumors about people’s professional or personal lives, and those rumors may be false. But they have no stake in hurting anyone. However serious, the damage turns out to be collateral. On the Internet, people often publish false rumors as a way of attracting eyeballs. Those who spread baseless gossip fall into this category. Their initiation of the rumor might be based on no evidence, a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal. What matters is that their self-interest is conspicuously at stake.
Altruistic.
Still other propagators are altruistic. They are concerned with some kind of cause. When they say that some public person has a ridiculous or dangerous belief, or has engaged in terrible misconduct, they are attempting to promote the public good as they see it. In starting or spreading a rumor about an individual or an institution, propagators often hope to help the cause they favor.
Self-Defeating Corrections
When a false rumor is spreading, of course, those who are injured by it do not want balanced information. They want the falsehood to be corrected.
“ Corrections of false impressions can actually strengthen those very impressions.”
If a false rumor is circulating, efforts at correction may not help; they might even hurt. Once a cascade has spread false information or group polarization has entrenched a false belief, those who tell the truth in order to dispel the rumor may end up defeating their own goal.
Disconfirmation Bias
People’s tendency to work especially hard to disprove arguments that contradict their original beliefs. If our judgments are motivated, then it is easy to see why balanced information might serve only to entrench our original beliefs.
“A good way to squelch a rumor is to demonstrate that those who are apt to believe it in fact do not.”
Even if false rumors are everywhere, we are inclined to suspect that they contain a glimmer of truth, especially when they fit with, and support, what we already believe. True, a higher dose of skepticism is a likely consequence of a world with so many unreliable voices. But even in such a world, propagators of false rumors will have many successes.
Often the truth fails to catch up with a lie.
In “On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can Be Done,” American legal scholar Cass Sunstein writes about the ever-pervasive problem – rumors.
Rumors often arise and gain traction because they fit with, and support, the prior convictions of those who accept them. Some people and some groups are predisposed to accept certain rumors because those rumors are compatible with their self-interest, or with what they think they know to be true. Some people are strongly motivated to accept certain rumors because it pleases them to do so.
The Problem
Rumors are nearly as old as human history, but with the rise of the Internet, they have become ubiquitous. In fact we are now awash in them. False rumors are especially troublesome; they impose real damage on individuals and institutions, and they often resist correction. They can threaten careers, relationships, policies, public officials, democracy, and sometimes even peace itself.
Many of the most pervasive rumors involve governments—what officials are planning and why. Others involve famous people in politics, business, and entertainment, or companies, large and small. Still others involve people who are not at all in the public eye. On Facebook and on Twitter, everyone is at some risk. All of us are potentially victims of rumors, including false and vicious ones.
Fear or Hopes
Many of us accept false rumors because of either our fears or our hopes. Because we fear al-Qaeda, we are more inclined to believe that its members are plotting an attack near where we live. Because we hope that our favorite company will prosper, we might believe a rumor that its new product cannot fail and that its prospects are about to soar.
In the context of war, one group’s fears are unmistakably another group’s hopes—and whenever groups compete, the fears of some are the hopes of others. Because rumors fuel some fears and alleviate others, radically different reactions to the same rumor are inevitable.
Social Cascades and Group Polarization
Rumors spread through two different but overlapping processes: social cascades and group polarization.
Cascades occur because each of us tends to rely on what other people think and do. If most of the people we know believe a rumor, we tend to believe it too.
Cascade
Cascades occur because each of us tends to rely on what other people think and do. If most of the people we know believe a rumor, we tend to believe it too. Lacking information of our own, we accept the views of others. When the rumor involves a topic on which we know nothing, we are especially likely to believe it.
A cascade occurs when a group of early movers say or do something and other people follow their signal. In the economy, rumors can fuel speculative bubbles, greatly inflating prices, and indeed speculative bubbles help to account for the financial crisis of 2008. Rumors are also responsible for many panics, as fear spreads rapidly from one person to another, creating self-fulfilling prophecies. And if the relevant rumors trigger strong emotions, such as fear or disgust, they are far more likely to spread.
Group polarization
Group polarization refers to the fact that when like-minded people get together, they often end up thinking a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk to one another. Suppose that members of a certain group are inclined to accept a rumor about, say, the malevolent intentions of an apparently unfriendly group or nation. In all likelihood, they will become more committed to that rumor after they have spoken among themselves. Indeed, they may have moved from being tentative believers to being absolutely certain that the rumor is true, even though all they know is what other group members think.
“The simple idea is that people process information in a way that fits with their own predilections.”
Biased assimilation
Biased assimilation refers to the fact that people process new information in a biased fashion; those who have accepted false rumors may not easily give up their beliefs, especially when they have a strong emotional commitment to those beliefs. It can be exceedingly hard to dislodge what people think, even by presenting them with the facts. That presentation might cause them to become more entrenched.
“Biased assimilation is partly produced by our desire to reduce cognitive dissonance. We seek out and believe information that we find pleasant to learn, and we avoid and dismiss information that we find upsetting or disturbing.”
Why Rumours Spread
Prurient, cruel, and malicious propagators will be especially effective when those who read or hear them are facing some kind of distress and when they seek to make sense out of their situation. Their actions are especially worrisome insofar as they are able to spread rumors about ordinary people who find that their reputations, their relationships, and their careers are seriously damaged. Such rumors often stick, and even if they do not, they can raise questions and doubts that haunt people for a long time.
In the aftermath of a crisis, numerous speculations will be offered. To some people, those speculations will seem plausible, perhaps because they provide a suitable outlet for outrage and blame. Terrible events produce outrage, and when people are outraged, they are all the more likely to accept rumors that justify their emotional states, and also to attribute those events to intentional action. Some rumors simultaneously relieve “a primary emotional urge” and offer an explanation, to those who accept them, of why they feel as they do; the rumor “rationalizes while it relieves.
“When conditions are bad, rumors, both true and false, tend to spread like wild-fire. It has been observed that rumors do well “in situations characterized by social unrest. Those who undergo strain over a long period of time—victims of sustained bombings, survivors of a long epidemic, a conquered populace coping with an army of occupation, civilians grown weary of a long war, prisoners in a concentration camp, residents of neighborhoods marked by interethnic tension” are likely to believe and to spread false rumors.”
Excerpt From: Sunstein, Cass R. “On Rumors.” Apple Books.
Propagators
Rumors are often initiated by self-conscious propagators, who may or may not believe the rumors they spread. Rumor propagators have diverse motivations.
Narrowly Self-Interested.
Some propagators are narrowly self-interested. They seek to promote their own interests by harming a particular person or group. They want to make money, to win some competition, or otherwise to get ahead. They spread rumors for that reason.
Self-Interested.
Other propagators are generally self-interested. They may seek to attract readers or eyeballs by spreading rumors.
Propagators of this kind are entirely willing to publish rumors about people’s professional or personal lives, and those rumors may be false. But they have no stake in hurting anyone. However serious, the damage turns out to be collateral. On the Internet, people often publish false rumors as a way of attracting eyeballs. Those who spread baseless gossip fall into this category. Their initiation of the rumor might be based on no evidence, a little, a moderate amount, or a great deal. What matters is that their self-interest is conspicuously at stake.
Altruistic.
Still other propagators are altruistic. They are concerned with some kind of cause. When they say that some public person has a ridiculous or dangerous belief, or has engaged in terrible misconduct, they are attempting to promote the public good as they see it. In starting or spreading a rumor about an individual or an institution, propagators often hope to help the cause they favor.
Self-Defeating Corrections
When a false rumor is spreading, of course, those who are injured by it do not want balanced information. They want the falsehood to be corrected.
“ Corrections of false impressions can actually strengthen those very impressions.”
If a false rumor is circulating, efforts at correction may not help; they might even hurt. Once a cascade has spread false information or group polarization has entrenched a false belief, those who tell the truth in order to dispel the rumor may end up defeating their own goal.
Disconfirmation Bias
People’s tendency to work especially hard to disprove arguments that contradict their original beliefs. If our judgments are motivated, then it is easy to see why balanced information might serve only to entrench our original beliefs.
“A good way to squelch a rumor is to demonstrate that those who are apt to believe it in fact do not.”
Even if false rumors are everywhere, we are inclined to suspect that they contain a glimmer of truth, especially when they fit with, and support, what we already believe. True, a higher dose of skepticism is a likely consequence of a world with so many unreliable voices. But even in such a world, propagators of false rumors will have many successes.
Often the truth fails to catch up with a lie.
August 23, 2018
Rumour Has It...
A light read and essentially an abridged version of Sunstein's Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide with the same basic arguments and examples. I recommend the longer version @ 4*. The goal is to explain why people accept false and destructive rumors and if we can protect ourselves against them. The key concepts presented are "social cascades" and "group polarization". The former is about whether or not one's peer group already holds a particular pov towards the subject. Casstein suggests that there is a tipping point level of external endorsement, different for each of us, where notions previously thought foolish or marginals suddenly become not only acceptable but consequential.
Once a rumour becomes entrenched there is a tendency to seek confirmation and filter out contradictory data... and people, either by forming cliques or other associations. This is especially easy to do on the Internet where simple search will lead one to communities of like minded people that can act as an echo chamber.
Rumour propagators may in some cases be malicious, in other cases they are simply interested in drawing a crowd to present their case where damage to others is collateral and unintended. Propagators may also believe themselves to be sincere and altruistic in bringing the rumour to the world's attention; listeners may latch onto the sincerity and reputation of the speaker, enhanced by the size, membership or credentials of other members of the community as justification for accepting false or misleading information. Solidarity leads to conformity and more tightly held views. In extreme case cases individuals become progressively radicalized to the point where aggressive action becomes a real possibility, and dominates personal behaviour.
As a model of how we accept, process and internalize information the theory is not bad, but while we would hope for some insight as to whether a particular rumour is true or false Sunstein admits to not having an answer. In my parent's generation there were voices of authority that people would respect in order to ascertain which beliefs were normalative and acceptable - a chilling effect on fringe ideas which Sunstein cautions is not always bad. And where one might place hope in Justice Brandeis's dictum that sunlight and a free society is the best disinfectant for falsehood, Sunstein worries that this is no guarantee as people do assimilate argumentation incompletely with an emotional bias.
Compared to Extremes what the book lacks is an index, footnotes pointing to Sunstein's sources and the latter chapters on social movements. If all you are interested in are the ideas or if you are a teacher and your target audience is middle or high school students, pick this one, which IMV is easy, accessible and brief. Otherwise get Extremes. Both would be unnecessary.
A light read and essentially an abridged version of Sunstein's Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide with the same basic arguments and examples. I recommend the longer version @ 4*. The goal is to explain why people accept false and destructive rumors and if we can protect ourselves against them. The key concepts presented are "social cascades" and "group polarization". The former is about whether or not one's peer group already holds a particular pov towards the subject. Casstein suggests that there is a tipping point level of external endorsement, different for each of us, where notions previously thought foolish or marginals suddenly become not only acceptable but consequential.
Once a rumour becomes entrenched there is a tendency to seek confirmation and filter out contradictory data... and people, either by forming cliques or other associations. This is especially easy to do on the Internet where simple search will lead one to communities of like minded people that can act as an echo chamber.
Rumour propagators may in some cases be malicious, in other cases they are simply interested in drawing a crowd to present their case where damage to others is collateral and unintended. Propagators may also believe themselves to be sincere and altruistic in bringing the rumour to the world's attention; listeners may latch onto the sincerity and reputation of the speaker, enhanced by the size, membership or credentials of other members of the community as justification for accepting false or misleading information. Solidarity leads to conformity and more tightly held views. In extreme case cases individuals become progressively radicalized to the point where aggressive action becomes a real possibility, and dominates personal behaviour.
As a model of how we accept, process and internalize information the theory is not bad, but while we would hope for some insight as to whether a particular rumour is true or false Sunstein admits to not having an answer. In my parent's generation there were voices of authority that people would respect in order to ascertain which beliefs were normalative and acceptable - a chilling effect on fringe ideas which Sunstein cautions is not always bad. And where one might place hope in Justice Brandeis's dictum that sunlight and a free society is the best disinfectant for falsehood, Sunstein worries that this is no guarantee as people do assimilate argumentation incompletely with an emotional bias.
Compared to Extremes what the book lacks is an index, footnotes pointing to Sunstein's sources and the latter chapters on social movements. If all you are interested in are the ideas or if you are a teacher and your target audience is middle or high school students, pick this one, which IMV is easy, accessible and brief. Otherwise get Extremes. Both would be unnecessary.
October 26, 2019
I bought this book as, serendipitously I’d been the victim of a rumour and was fascinated at how you could say something and it be taken in completely the wrong way. Furthermore that by addressing that rumour publicly only added fuel to flames. We often think of those who spread rumours as being self-interested and those who attempt to demise the reputation of another in an evil way. Whilst this is sometimes the case we fail to understand the benefit that rumours give us; we find out information about things and people that may ultimately benefit us if true and don’t harm us if we find out they are indeed false. Once one person states something and another takes this up and propagates it, it becomes more believable, as why else would so many people be saying the same thing? We often share what we have heard without checking the truth of every statement. Shared falsehood have apparent respectability. We are social animals and Sunstein outlines experiments in social psychology which demonstrate the phenomenon of our want to be liked and to be right and so we may pass rumours on for either of these reasons. Sunstein aided my understanding in group polarisation and showed that our own biases blind us to another viewpoint and with discussion of the other side it only fixes us more to our original stance. Thus it is futile to address a falsehood against you, as you make a stronger case against yourself for those who believed it anyway; those who believe you would not have believed the falsehood in the first place. Similarly when trying to rationally argue your religious, political or such views to another it will only make them more strongly opposed to you. Essentially Sunstein argues that there is nothing that can be done beside litigation against slander but this prohibits free speech and we all know how 1984 looked.
May 4, 2021
Really enjoyed this book. Don't really enjoy how easily falsehoods spread and how married to them people have become. Maybe we've always been this way but seeing the events of the last couple years and how misinformation/disinformation is traveling these days, I don't have a lot of faith that things will ever get better. I mean, my buddy's wife is currently recommending more vitamin C instead of a 'Rona vaccine. And there are people out there who will read that and think that's a perfectly reasonable solution and that science is dumb. We're sorta fucked. Idiocracy is not going to take until 2505 to happen here.
May 20, 2010
While essentially an essay, and interesting for the most part, that author fails to convince me of his conclusions. The more interesting and telling part is the discussion on the psychology of rumors, why people accept them, and why they are so difficult to refute. The author then tries to discuss legal cases and statutes in which he implies that a softening of the First Amendment would be best for stopping the spread of falsehood, which I find troubling. A quick read, but one to take with more than one grain of salt.
July 5, 2015
بحث جميل وصغير الحجم في مسألة (الإشاعات)؛ دوافع إنشائها وطرق انتشارها، والسبل المتاحة لمقاومتها. ويمكن تعميم هذا البحث ليشمل طرق انتشار الأفكار الجديدة.
يمكن اختصار الكتاب في عشر أو عشرين صفحة، وذلك بسبب تكرار الأمثلة وكثرتها.
قرأت للكاتب قريباً كتابه wiserوقد اشتمل على غالب النقاط التي وردت هنا، خاصة في دراسته لآلية انتشار الإشاعة. مثل آليات التشدد (التطرف الجمعي) والمتواليات المعرفية والإجتماعية.
ولعل من أهم ما في الكتاب هو مراجعته لفكرة مقاومة الإشاعات عن طريق نشر الحقائق، وما قد يتبع ذلك من تعزيز ممكن للإشاعة.
يمكن اختصار الكتاب في عشر أو عشرين صفحة، وذلك بسبب تكرار الأمثلة وكثرتها.
قرأت للكاتب قريباً كتابه wiserوقد اشتمل على غالب النقاط التي وردت هنا، خاصة في دراسته لآلية انتشار الإشاعة. مثل آليات التشدد (التطرف الجمعي) والمتواليات المعرفية والإجتماعية.
ولعل من أهم ما في الكتاب هو مراجعته لفكرة مقاومة الإشاعات عن طريق نشر الحقائق، وما قد يتبع ذلك من تعزيز ممكن للإشاعة.
July 27, 2013
I loved Nudge, but this book is far from insightful. I will save you some time: read the title and subtitle, and spend half an hour thinking to yourself about the topic. You've now probably hit all the major points. You can then skip the book and won't miss much, except some legal factoids near the end.
September 13, 2013
كتاب يفسر سبب ظهور الشائعات وآليات انتشارها ويقدم عدداً من الامثلة على احداث راهنة. الكتاب بالمجمل جيد وفيه شيء من التحليل الجيد
January 17, 2019
A lightweight quick-read on the state of cognitive research into bias and error correction as of the 2008 election. For anyone reading this in the future (meaning now) it is difficult to gainsay any of the warnings Sunstein draws from his source studies (initial bias predicts outcomes, the "double-down" phenomenon, the innate tendency of people to discount evidence that contradicts their opinions) and how the explosion of social media has created self-perpetuating ecosystems of opinion, since this pretty accurately sums up the hellscape that we inhabit in this Year of Our Lord 2019. What Sunstein can't do is suggest more than a few pages of "be nice to each other and stay open minded" cures to this problem. Some of it he argues is self-healing, as demonstrated by the demise of the Nigerian Prince scams of the 2000s, but he misses the problem that as users become more sophisticated so do the scams. It is an arms race where the perfect and most rational user of social media is never the target. The lowest hanging fruit will always be those already predisposed to believe the lie. This has always been true, the big bang for the buck when it comes to lies is to hunt out the gullible, the desperate, and the aged. As the old adage has it, an entertaining lie will circle the globe in the time it takes for the truth to tie its shoelaces. This is not a new problem, and Sunstein has no new ideas.
July 27, 2020
Decent book on how and why false rumors spread, with primary focus on cognitive biases which result in people using existing beliefs to confirm or discard new information. A few things:
1) Sunstein references one study that seems to indicate when the stakes are higher, people tend to minimize influence of biases - Sunstein doesn’t discuss whether this mutes the practical importance of his thesis. Generally, Sunstein seems to rely on lab-setting studies that seem low stakes to make broad claims. I’m skeptical of this approach as the experimental Econ literature has shown that stakes seem to generally matter with respect to robustness of research findings.
2) Sunstein seems to confuse Twitter for the real world (crazy there’s a difference right). Rumors spread fast on Twitter. People mindlessly retweet and add asinine comments - but does this influence voter behavior/polarization at the margin? I’m personally doubtful of this claim. See related study informing my doubts: https://www.brown.edu/Research/Shapir...
I’d send this to book to anyone you respect who spends too much time on Twitter/Facebook mindlessly sharing/retweeting content below their intellectual capability who seem to be driven by the latest outrage. Hopefully it would cause for a moment of self-reflection.
Overall, Sunstein provides a useful framework of thinking about these issues, but I have my doubts about their empirical robustness.
1) Sunstein references one study that seems to indicate when the stakes are higher, people tend to minimize influence of biases - Sunstein doesn’t discuss whether this mutes the practical importance of his thesis. Generally, Sunstein seems to rely on lab-setting studies that seem low stakes to make broad claims. I’m skeptical of this approach as the experimental Econ literature has shown that stakes seem to generally matter with respect to robustness of research findings.
2) Sunstein seems to confuse Twitter for the real world (crazy there’s a difference right). Rumors spread fast on Twitter. People mindlessly retweet and add asinine comments - but does this influence voter behavior/polarization at the margin? I’m personally doubtful of this claim. See related study informing my doubts: https://www.brown.edu/Research/Shapir...
I’d send this to book to anyone you respect who spends too much time on Twitter/Facebook mindlessly sharing/retweeting content below their intellectual capability who seem to be driven by the latest outrage. Hopefully it would cause for a moment of self-reflection.
Overall, Sunstein provides a useful framework of thinking about these issues, but I have my doubts about their empirical robustness.
April 9, 2018
This is a short (100 pages) book on the spread of rumors, a most timely subject. The author covers things like information cascades, how people's previous opinions and knowledge affects their willingness to accept and spread rumors. Sunstein presents us with the slightly discouraging fact, that when people have very strong prior opinions, presenting balanced evidence will push people more strongly in the direction of their previous opinions. However, with people less committed this need not be a problem, and the problem can be overcome if somebody of their own tribe denounces a rumor.
The book was initially written in 2008, prior to Sunstein assuming a position in the Obama administration. This edition contains an afterword, written in 2013. Sunstein reflects on his learnings from his time in Washington DC, noting that he got to see/be the subject of the strategic use of rumors. However, he notices that there is also good news, as elected officials are "almost always generous and courteous," and "within the executive branch, we were not much moved by rumors." This was the verdict in 2013.
The book is most timely, and should help understand the spread of information and rumors, and what can be done about it. A good read for anyone aspring to being an active citizen.
The book was initially written in 2008, prior to Sunstein assuming a position in the Obama administration. This edition contains an afterword, written in 2013. Sunstein reflects on his learnings from his time in Washington DC, noting that he got to see/be the subject of the strategic use of rumors. However, he notices that there is also good news, as elected officials are "almost always generous and courteous," and "within the executive branch, we were not much moved by rumors." This was the verdict in 2013.
The book is most timely, and should help understand the spread of information and rumors, and what can be done about it. A good read for anyone aspring to being an active citizen.
February 7, 2022
This was my second time reading this book, and it’s still great. If you want a short introduction to the psychology of misinformation and how rumors spread, grab a copy of this book. By no means does it dive deeply into the research and various areas of how these things spread, but it’s great to get started. If this
June 10, 2019
Why do people believe rumours -- even when they are false, bizarre and destructive? Why do some groups accept a rumour, while others dismiss it completely? What can we do to protect ourselves against rumours?
July 20, 2019
Quattro stelle per un interessante manuale per il neofita in cui vengono raccolte e spiegate le principali dinamiche alla base del funzionamento delle fake news e della creazione del consenso. Per avvicinarsi all’argomento credo sia un’ottima scelta.
June 8, 2017
An ok book
Simple book about rumours,
Hoped for more depth into different angles about the topic.
Some solutions to solve it wouldve been good to add as well
Simple book about rumours,
Hoped for more depth into different angles about the topic.
Some solutions to solve it wouldve been good to add as well
November 6, 2017
a short political piece from the author.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 13, 2018
A brief essay that should give us reason to pause and consider how we take in and process information about others. Some redundancy by the author but short enough not to be too much of s concern.
November 4, 2019
Could have been a 20 page essay rather than a 90 page book. Interesting, but only touches on the subject.
July 26, 2020
Absolutely amazing boon understanding why and how rumors spread.
September 3, 2022
Rum and done de Mag Navarra
July 30, 2017
A 100-page 101 on rumours - how they arise, live and spread. Well-written and accessible. Concise and to the point.
Cass R. Sunstein details the role of prior convictions as the first precondition - and that we are all susceptible to it. And then how a rumour can take on a life on its own by spreading through:
1. Informational cascades - i.e. 'Once a certain number of people believe a rumour, others will believe it too...'
2. Conformity cascades - i.e. 'Sometimes people believe rumours because other people believe them. But sometimes people just act as if they do.' -- so, sort of the inverse of the above, yet maintaining the viral effect.
3. Group polarization - a topic Sunstein returns to in the longer Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide - suffice to say, we're all susceptible to group think...
Where the book could have packed a few more punches is in its delivery of the 'what can be done' part (as promised in the title). For starters: practical steps to improve critical thinking, whether drawn from law (Sunstein's own field), or perhaps philosophy. The book does talk about legal implications / actions that can be taken after-the-fact (or post-hoc as the lawyers would say). That's not what I mean: rather, how can we help people nip things in the bud. Whilst there is a helpful section on unconscious bias etc. it doesn't quite amount to a clear recommendation for how to tackle this universal; timeless - and at the same time urgent - challenge.
Cass R. Sunstein details the role of prior convictions as the first precondition - and that we are all susceptible to it. And then how a rumour can take on a life on its own by spreading through:
1. Informational cascades - i.e. 'Once a certain number of people believe a rumour, others will believe it too...'
2. Conformity cascades - i.e. 'Sometimes people believe rumours because other people believe them. But sometimes people just act as if they do.' -- so, sort of the inverse of the above, yet maintaining the viral effect.
3. Group polarization - a topic Sunstein returns to in the longer Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide - suffice to say, we're all susceptible to group think...
Where the book could have packed a few more punches is in its delivery of the 'what can be done' part (as promised in the title). For starters: practical steps to improve critical thinking, whether drawn from law (Sunstein's own field), or perhaps philosophy. The book does talk about legal implications / actions that can be taken after-the-fact (or post-hoc as the lawyers would say). That's not what I mean: rather, how can we help people nip things in the bud. Whilst there is a helpful section on unconscious bias etc. it doesn't quite amount to a clear recommendation for how to tackle this universal; timeless - and at the same time urgent - challenge.
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