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752 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2003
For Western views of the nations of Eastern Europe, where they existed at all, often possessed a decidedly judgemental character. Winston Churchill, for example, divided the states of Europe unkindly into 'giants' and 'pygmies'. The giants were the Great Powers who had just fought the Great War. They pygmies were all those troublesome national states which had emerged through the collapse of the old empires and which had promptly started to fight each other. The dismissive approach to the New Europe was thinly disguised. And it was accompanied by a tendency to classify the pygmies as one might classify children, into the nice and the naughty. Europe's new nations were pictured as nice in Allied eyes if, like the Czechs and the Slovaks, they had won their independence by fighting against Germany or Austria. If, like the Ukrainians or the Irish, they had gained it by rebelling against an Allied power, they were naughty, not to say downright nasty. In the case of Ukraine, which had carved out its own republic with German help, it was taken to be a fiction. States which had not obtained Allied recognition did not really exist.
As for the Poles, who had dared to assert themselves both against the Central Powers and against Russia, they could be nothing other than mixed-up problem children. They were pygmies pretending to be giants.
Britain's dilemma with its eastern allies was well illustrated by the case of Czechoslovakia, which, after Austria, was the second of Germany's neighbours to feel the heat of Hitler's attentions. In the 1930s, Britain simply had no means of intervening in Central Europe. The RAF had very few warplanes with the practical capability to fly across Germany and to return without refuelling. The Royal Navy could not steam along 'the coast of Bohemia'. The tiny British army could not contemplate marching across Germany. And to take any sort of action on the Continent without French support was unthinkable. Hence, during the Munich Crisis of September 1938, the British Government took the perfectly rational option of appeasing Nazi Germany rather than of confronting it. They did not play their hand very cleverly, and missed the chance of reaching a workable compromise. But they had already made the mistake of issuing an unenforceable guarantee to Austria and of seeing the guarantee humiliatingly sideline by the Anschluss. So they were all too eager to save face and to reach a settlement. Czechoslovakia capitulated without a fight, signing an agreement that proved to be its death warrant. In less than six months, Hitler was in Prague, waving from the same window in Hradcany Castle from which Presidents Masaryk and Benes had been wont to wave. Slovakia broke away. Bohemia nad Moravia were turned into a protectorate of the Reich. President Benes and his Czecho-Slovak Committee took up residence in Paris, and then, after the fall of France, moved to London, where they stayed until the end of the war.However, as we all know, the Czechs were not at all pleased with the Soviet occupation.
Throughout the war years, the Czechs planned for the day when their people would rise against the Nazi oppressor and welcome their exiled rulers back home. They were to have many setbacks, and a long wait. Yet in the end their patience was rewarded. A rising broke out in Slovakia in late August 1944, and in the first week of May 1945 a popular rising in Prague immediately preceded Liberation. An understanding was reached between the Western Allies and the Soviets to avoid friction. It was swiftly followed by the homecoming of President Benes and the restoration of the exiled Government with the blessing of the Allied powers.