One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or 'phronesis'--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues--a trend Russell argues is ultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, 'the virtuous person'. Written in a clear and careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers and students alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology.
This was the last book of about eight that I read as part of a self-led course on virtue ethics, so I came to the topic with a fairly solid background. That said, I give my five stars with enthusiasm. Russell's defense of what he calls "hard virtue ethics" -- meaning virtue ethics that requires a central role for practical wisdom -- is compelling.
Along the way he develops a fascinating "model" theory of virtue that deals with the problem of just how much virtue it takes to be considered genuinely virtuous, a problem that forms the core of many critiques of virtue ethics. Roughly, we don't seem to have a problem understanding someone as being genuinely rational even though, of course, no one is perfectly rational. Russell's model theory fleshes out the details of this analogy.
Russell also offers interesting discussions of topics that I hadn't encountered before, like the "enumeration problem" (the proliferation of virtues of virtues to the point of making virtue theory useless) and the "critical distance" view of responsibility for character, which offers an alternative to the paradoxical view that responsibility requires ultimate responsibility for one's origins (an obvious impossibility). Instead, responsibility can be grounded in the ability to critically reflect on one's origins and one's reasons, and be able to transform nature's raw ends (e.g., the programmed instinct to survive) into one's own ends (developing things to live for).
A cautionary note is in order. This book is tough. It's mere luck that I picked it up after I read a bunch of other virtue ethics material. Had I picked this book up first, I might have abandoned the whole project. I recommend Rosalind Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics as a place for the beginner to start.
The most philosophically sophisticated book in the virtue ethics tradition that I have read. There's a lot in here for people not interested in that school specifically, too---a very provocative section on moral standards and when "good enough" just is "good". An excellent tour of social psychology and its relevance to ethics. A strong conclusion on the notion of personal responsibility in a world where your character and mental framework is shaped largely by things outside of your control. This is a book I will be returning to many times to mine for wisdom.