Author Seagrave has pulled together a wealth of information to make his case that the modern emperors of Japan were complicit in the failure of democracy and the rise of military expansionism as well as the attack on Pearl Harbor which led to her ultimate defeat in World War II. It’s not a new book, but I think it has relevance, and I think it’s worth reading, I also see some weaknesses. Seagrave illustrates how the determination of Japanese power factions to make Japan in the 1930’s, not just a player, but top dog in East/Southeast Asia came into conflict with the United States, who was also seeking to establish its credentials as a world player in the Pacific and Asia. The decisions by the U.S. to establish its own footprint in the Pacific and East Asia and to enforce it with economic sanctions seems eerily similar to what is happening today—the U.S. threatened by China and the U.S. responding by imposing economic sanctions with the potential for an upward spiral of tensions. Likewise with Iran and Korea. History may not repeat itself exactly, but it does tend to have recurring theses.
The author’s discussion of the criminal activity and corruption involving Japan’s prewar and wartime militarists and the postwar zaibatsu is interesting, but I think he overstates the case for Hirohito’s culpability. The Japanese military dominated regime leading up to WWII was indeed diabolical in many respects, and they did commit war crimes and treated conquered territories as virtual slave camps to be used for Japan’s benefit. It is also true that the U.S. occupation did ignore or easily forgave war criminals to suit their own political agenda or benefit American economic interests. My fault with Seagrave’s book is that his account seems unbalanced. Seagrave grew up in China, according to his bio, and understandably felt some anger over how the Japanese treated China in the 1930’s and 40’s, and that probably influenced the way he approached this subject. I think his bias may be indicated by the curious photo he selected for the cover of his book. It is a photo of Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor who the Japanese installed in Manchukuo as their puppet monarch. (The cover photo was changed in subsequent editions.) I don’t think it was a mistake on his part.
Yes, Hirohito did play some part in the war-time decisions, but he was not the developer of those policies. Had he opposed them, he may have been killed or replaced by someone else. The fact that, in the end, he did stand up and make the decision to end the war which avoided a U.S./Soviet invasion that would have resulted in millions more deaths—yes millions—and probably split the country up into Soviet and American sections with potential for future war. Immediately after the war, the emperor was a stabilizing influence and aided the peaceful laying down of arms by Japanese forces elsewhere in Asia. Seagrave seems to say that it would have been better for Hirohito to abdicate. Had he done so at American insistence, there may have been an Isis like reaction from military die-hards, again resulting in more deaths.
Yes, MacArthur was a self-promoting narcissist who reversed SCAP policy in 1948 on prosecution of war criminals and on political reforms. This was consistent with overall U.S. policy that became more concerned about expansion of communism world-wide. Eastern Europe was being taken over by Soviet puppets. Korea was split into communist and non-communist sectors. When Mao defeated Chiang Kai Shek in China, the Americans were desperate to save Japan and that also contributed to the reversal of policies in Japan. Seagrave is critical of the U.S. occupation and the emperors’ pusillanimity towards the power brokers, but ignores the fact that the postwar occupation of Japan, along with that of West Germany, became one of the few real success stories American could point to in the postwar years.
The position of the emperor in Japan had cultural roots that made a difference in Japan’s recovery. Following the U.S. occupation, almost seventy years have passed during which time Japan avoided internal revolution, has abstained from military entanglements, and disavowed use of military weapons. Not many countries can say that—certainly not the U.S. In Iran, the U.S. manipulated things to put the Shah on the throne. That didn't work out well. In Vietnam, the U.S. needed a front man and put Emperor Bao Dai on the throne in the South. That didn’t work out well either. Then in Iraq, the U.S. leadership ignored cultural/religious issues which resulted in a follow-on warfare resulting in tens of thousands of innocent civilian deaths. Japan was different. It was a success for the U.S. and for Japan itself. Japan is not a perfect democracy, but it is no longer a military dictatorship. Japan’s economic recovery and years of peace following the war may not outweigh all the bad things that happened earlier, but the outcome has been a positive for the world, and Seagrave discounted that. For those reasons I couldn’t give this book more than three stars.