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368 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1939
While Hitler's National Socialism by Rainer Zitelmann does a spectacular job providing a meticulous overview of Hitler's political/social philosophy of National Socialism, The Vampire Economy: Doing Business Under Fascism by Günter Reimann provides an incredibly in-depth study of the actual economics of Nazism. There is no other book (as far as I am aware of) that provides such a comprehensive investigation of the economics of Nazism alone from other topics. However, there is one mistake I would like to correct right away with the title of this book: Nazism is not Fascism. The two ideologies are distinctly different from each other, even if they share some similarities. I would correct the title to say: The Vampire Economy: Doing Business Under Nazism. I cannot blame Mr. Reimann; lumping Fascism with Nazism has been common parlance ever since the 1930s.
Metaphorically relating the Nazi economy akin to a vampire is very appropriate. Stealing a definition from Wikipedia, a vampire is: "a creature from folklore that subsists by feeding on the vital essence (generally in the form of blood) of the living.". Since we now have a general understanding of what a vampire is, how is it fair to relate the Nazi economy with this terrible creature? Let us examine a excerpts from this wonderful book (please read them, they are essential to my main point):
[Quote 1] A considerable part of the liquid funds of all companies is requisitioned by the State either for the financing of State-sponsored industrial projects, or as tax payments. The latter have risen to such an extent that many industrial enterprises have had to reduce their reinvestments.
[Quote 2] Most textile manufacturers have had to buy new machinery in order to work with German cotton and wool ersatz. According to the official figures on new investments and production of capital goods, Germany’s industrial capital has increased greatly. But these reports do not indicate the amount of “capital goods” used for armaments; they say nothing about the extent to which machinery must be replaced so that ersatz may be used. The boom in many German industries indicates that the whole industrial structure is undergoing a rapid transformation at the hands of the State in order to meet present emergency situations and in preparation for a future wartime economy. New factories arise for the satisfaction of special demands, springing from unforeseen raw material shortages. No one knows how long such emergencies will last. Industrialists, therefore, feel that they should be prepared for future losses and the probability that much machinery will soon have to be renewed or may, in a relatively short time, become obsolete. Consequently they try to recover the money spent on new plant investments as rapidly as possible. This is often impossible, because the State has so many investment schemes of its own. It has created new technical difficulties which can be overcome only through new investments.
[Quote 3] The flow of capital is no longer regulated by a capital market which directs it into industries that are particularly profitable. The State has supplanted the capital market. It compels private capitalists to make investments in a future wartime economy and creates economic conditions which cause old investments to decline in value. Thus the State makes drastic preparation for a still greater scarcity of raw materials and labor supply—all this in the expectation that wartime economy is not far off.
[Quote 4] These big banks are today again under private ownership. This fact easily misleads the foreign observer. For under fascism “private banks” are as much under State control and are as co-ordinated as ordinary State banks.
[Quote 5] The Nazi State was unable to find enough capitalists willing to buy State debentures. Yet it raised huge short-term credits and even loans by compelling capitalists and financial institutions, unwilling and unable to risk their money in new investments, to invest their capital in the riskiest form of large-scale, short-term financing of State “investments.” This explains the impressive ability of the Nazi State to spend and spend extravagantly, to finance huge deficits without an immediate breakdown of the economic system. The Nazi State takes advantage of the fact that Germany is a highly industrialized country where the savings of several generations have accumulated in the form of gigantic investments and in an industrial machine bigger than that of France or even England. In comparison with Germany, Italy is a poor country; its technical equipment and industrial capital is merely a fraction of such investments in Germany. Mussolini, therefore, finds it much more difficult to finance excessive State deficits than does Hitler, and Mussolini’s deficits have a greater and more immediate effect upon private economy than Hitler’s. Yet the final consequences of living at the expense of the savings of the past are more fatal for a system which can feed its population only by means of a highly industrialized economy and not entirely or mainly by means of agricultural labor. This living on the capital of the nation finds expression in the growing indebtedness of the State to private economy. It has been authoritatively estimated 7 that in Germany today direct and indirect State indebtedness in all forms—bonds, other securities, bank credits and so on—amounts to over 55 per cent of the total indebtedness, with private debts accounting for the remaining 45 per cent. Excluding mortgage debts, the indebtedness of the State amounts to something like 75 per cent of the total. If traditional relations between creditor and debtor prevailed, the debtor should be under the control of the creditor—in receivership—if there were any difficulties in paying interest and amortization charges. Figures and words have changed their meaning. Many private enterprises have managed to pay off debts under the Nazi regime. The fight against “interest slavery”—a propaganda slogan of the Nazis before they came to power—has in part been successful insofar as private debts are concerned, and interest payments have shrunk. But this shrinkage of debt and interest payments has been more than offset by the growth of debt and interest obligations of the State, and also by a tremendous growth of taxation. Yet this does not mean that the State as a debtor is “enslaved” to its creditors—the bondholders. For the State has the power, at any time it pleases, to refuse fulfillment of its obligations as a debtor. “National Socialism does not allow either the level of interest rates or the distribution of new money capital to be determined by the free play of demand, supply and quotations. The present interest rate is the result of a number of planned and carefully adjusted economic measures which are not based on the impracticable idea of giving interest laws the character of police orders but which are based on the desire to control all factors which influence the rate of interest.
[Quote 6] With the growth of this control system, bureaucratic requirements have grown tremendously. Even the smallest artisan must fill out dozens of questionnaires and must read long circulars. One circular of the Reich Estate for German Handicrafts with regard to applications for a supply of iron and steel asks thirty-one questions which have to be answered with great care by all independent artisans in Germany. The clash between different groups and authorities who simultaneously claimed to represent the most urgent and most important “interests of the State” and therefore insisted on preferential treatment, resulted in such anarchy, in such a flood of complaints, investigations and wasted correspondence, that as a final solution, a new authority was created for the most important branches of industry. Three commissars were appointed: one for the building trades, one for the machine-tool industry, and one for the iron and steel industry. These new commissars are plenipotentiaries extraordinary who can overrule decisions of all other authorities; they are responsible solely to Goering. This “reform” might have made superfluous a part of the paper war between different offices and authorities, but the relationship between supply and demand did not improve. Nor was a method found for the elimination of preferential treatment for those having “good contacts.”
[Quote 7] The businessman needs every bit of his ingenuity to circumvent regulations and restrictions and to avoid interruptions in production. Rubber, for example, is extremely scarce, and it is consequently very difficult to buy a new rubber tire. It has become an officially decreed rule that no new tires may be sold unless the old tire is returned completely worn out. But this system does not work out in practice. Reserve tires are needed so badly that firms have resorted to buying entire new trucks just to obtain new tires. These tires were then removed and the new trucks sold without the tires as scrap iron. Business ingenuity in circumventing the State bureaucracy thus results in fantastic waste of materials, all in the name of preventing waste.
One can notice a theme throughout all of these excerpts: bureaucracy bonanza. Contrary to popular belief, the Nazi economy was heavily state regimented. By the 1940s, there was barely anything a businessman could do without a permit, certificate, or verification from the local Nazi government office. Laissez-faire was not in the Nazi lexicon. Complete government control of trade, heavy protectionism, currency manipulation / currency colonialism abroad, insanely strict price/wage/rent controls, forceful confiscation of wealth/savings from entrepreneurs to fund the rearmaments program, hundreds of bureaucracy organizations created for the most simple trade tasks, endless permits/licenses required for basic business tasks, using the government to forcefully negotiate on behalf of both employers and employees through the Deutsche Arbeitsfront, and much more. Using the Hegelian dialectic model (HDM), one can deduce how these ideologies came to existence. Let us have "capitalism" as the thesis and "communism" as the antithesis; the synthesis is the conglomeration of these two ideologies that manifest themselves as a form of a "mixed-economy" or, as some may be inclined to say, "socialism" (though the scale is heavily weighed towards the economic interventionism side). These are known as "Third Positions" (i.e. Italian Fascism and Nationalism Socialism). Despite what some people on the left may try to say about these ideologies, they are just another form of etatism.
Since the basics have been covered, how does the Nazi economy appear to be like a "vampire"? The quotes that I had provided above are just a clue / sneak-peak to the myriad details that have been provided in the entire book. Essentially, the Nazi economy took advantage of Germany's industrialization that was only made possible due to private enterprise and "freer" trade, and wished to squeeze and suck the blood out of that success. All the progress that had been made since Bismarck to make Germany the industrial powerhouse of Europe had been taken for granted. National Socialists had convinced the German people that private enterprise was not enough; heavy economic interventionism and astoundingly high levels of protectionism and economic isolationism were embraced as the only solutions to Germany's woes. The Nazi economy did not just leech off of the progress that had been made within Germany-proper, but had also leeched off of other countries (whether we are talking about the countries that were subjected to Hitler's lebensraum or countries who had to deal with Hjalmar Schacht's currency manipulation schemes). In order for the Nazi economy to succeed, it had to suck the blood, sweat, tears, and currency/money of Germans and other peoples.
This is a highly recommended book for anyone who wants more than just a cursory glance at the intricacies of National Socialist bureaucracy and political economy. The book may be a bit dry at times, but if you are able to get over the "textbook" feel of this fantastic read, it pays off in the end.