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Contours of Christian Theology #3
CCT: the Providence of God
In this concise and accessible introduction, Paul Helm outlines for students and interested readers the doctrine of divine providence. Unlike many doctrinal treatments, his approach is not historically oriented. Instead Helm focuses on the underlying metaphysical and moral aspects of God's providence, paying particular attention to the ideas of divine control, providence and evil, and the role of prayer in relationship to providence.
256 pages, Paperback
First published October 15, 1993
15 people are currently reading
221 people want to read
About the author
Paul Helm
73 books15 followersPaul Helm teached philosophy at the University of Liverpool before becoming Professor of the History and Philosophy of Religion at King s College, London (1993-2000).
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
June 16, 2020
Je donnerais 3.5 étoiles à ce livre. Dans ce livre, Helm propose et défend une vision "sans risque" de la providence et en trace les implications théologiques et philosophiques. Il couvre les sujets de la responsabilité humaine, de l'efficacité de la prière, de l'existence du mal à la lumière de cette vision de la providence. Étant donné que le livre fait 250 pages, vous aurez compris que chacun de ces sujets, auxquels des livres entiers ont été traités, ne seront abordés qu'en surface.
J'ai vraiment apprécié la méthodologie employée par Helm au cours de son ouvrage : il affirme quelle est la position qu'il défend, mais tente néanmoins d'exposer équitablement les positions alternatives, tout en mentionnant les défauts qu'il y trouve.
Globalement, je trouve le livre bien écrit, bien traduit, assez accessible (même si académique), intéressant. Cependant, je me suis retrouvé frustré à plusieurs reprise, car j'ai eu l'impression que Helm faisait, à plusieurs reprises, des sauts entre plusieurs concepts qui lui semblaient peut-être évidents, mais qui ne le sont pas pour moi; les raisonnements sont alors plus difficiles à suivre, ce qui est dommage. Ainsi, les arguments qu'il expose en faveur du compatibilisme, de notre interaction avec Dieu au travers de la prière ou encore de la théorie du plus grand bien ne sont pas autant convaincants qu'ils auraient pu l'être.
J'ai vraiment apprécié la méthodologie employée par Helm au cours de son ouvrage : il affirme quelle est la position qu'il défend, mais tente néanmoins d'exposer équitablement les positions alternatives, tout en mentionnant les défauts qu'il y trouve.
Globalement, je trouve le livre bien écrit, bien traduit, assez accessible (même si académique), intéressant. Cependant, je me suis retrouvé frustré à plusieurs reprise, car j'ai eu l'impression que Helm faisait, à plusieurs reprises, des sauts entre plusieurs concepts qui lui semblaient peut-être évidents, mais qui ne le sont pas pour moi; les raisonnements sont alors plus difficiles à suivre, ce qui est dommage. Ainsi, les arguments qu'il expose en faveur du compatibilisme, de notre interaction avec Dieu au travers de la prière ou encore de la théorie du plus grand bien ne sont pas autant convaincants qu'ils auraient pu l'être.
February 7, 2019
Thorough
July 29, 2013
I really like the Contours of Christian Theology series and I liked this book, but it was admittedly difficult for me to grasp all of the philosophical arguments that were presented (I'm sure it's me, not the author). This IVP series covers the major systematic theology loci but presents them in a different way than the standard outline, statement of fact form. In particular, this book is a thoughtful journey through the major questions and options which relate to God's decree, will, and knowledge and covers topics such as guidance, prayer, the fall, evil, justice, grace, miracles, chance, accountability, and causality. Overall the topics were clearly presented, but at a fairly philosophical level. This may need a re-read at some point. Some good pre-reading on this topic I would recommend R.C. Sproul's "Not a Chance," WCF V, and either Berkhof or Grudem on Decrees/Providence.
February 17, 2010
Helm is, more and more, becoming the contemporary God-father of a classically reformed understanding of God. In this book, "The Providence of God", Helm hovers over some major issues, often making the remark, "There is not space here to go much deeper...." Yet, Helm successfully, in my opinion, makes his case for a "no risk", Compatiblistic understanding of the providence of God. For some further discussion on his understanding, see his article in the new John Frame festschrift "Speaking the Truth in Love."
March 28, 2024
Paul Helm lives in Vancouver, British Columbia, and teaches at Regent College. He holds the position of “teaching fellow in theology and philosophy” (IVP, “Paul Helm”). According to one biography, “[He] was educated at Worcester College, Oxford” (Banner Authors “Paul Helm”). His work, The Providence of God, is not his only academic contribution to the doctrine of God’s sovereignty. He has additionally contributed chapters to Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views and God and Time: Four Views (IVP). Having written extensively on this particular doctrine, Helm offers a thorough perspective on the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human responsibility, and he give his clear view on the relationship specifically in The Providence of God.
In the brief introduction to his work, Helm quickly clarifies his position of God’s providence as “the ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence” which he contends for throughout the book (15). However, he desires serious assessment and critique of his position from those who read his work (16). In the first chapter, Helm explains the relevance of the doctrine of God’s providence and gives the reader a concise definition of the doctrine (17–18). He reveals that his volume is structured under the categories of “whom God provides for, what he provides, and how he provides it” (18), and then explains God’s providential care of the universe—which certainly includes all people (see p. 21). Additionally, he introduces the reader to multiple questions that arise when one considers God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility (26), and concludes the chapter with a rebuttal to those who deny God’s action and providential work in the universe (34–37).
In the second chapter, Helm explains “risk” and “no-risk” views of God’s providence in greater depth. He helpfully interacts with various positions on divine sovereignty and human responsibility—including William Lane Craig’s argument for middle knowledge and J. I. Packer’s argument for the antinomy. Despite the conciseness of the assessments of these positions, Helm is still able to make observations about the strengths and weaknesses of each view. Helm himself adheres to the compatibilist view of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility (66–68).
Whereas the second chapter’s primary focus was different approaches to God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility, the third chapter’s primary focus is the different approaches to God’s involvement in the world. The different approaches presented in the chapter are those of pantheism, deism, and theism. For Helm, “[pantheism] is not acceptable to the Christian because it denies the distinction between God and the universe” (72). A distinction between God and his creation is fundamental to the Christian worldview. The important role of miracles and prayer in the Christian worldview also render Deism insufficient for the Christian (75–79). The shortcomings of these views lead Helm to contend for the theistic view of God’s involvement in the world. This view contends for “God’s immanence and transcendence” which Helm understands as “his providential rule of his universe” (90, italics mine).
In chapter four, Helm’s focal concern is God’s providential care in the history of the world. Helm observes that “the Christian idea of providence may be said to give us the rudiments of a philosophy of history. For as providence has a course, so does history – not only the history of redemption but the history of the entire human civilization” (118). This observation leads him to conclude that “it does imply a teleological view of history, even though the telos is found outside history, in the purpose of God” (118). In other words, the doctrine of God’s providence is fundamental for understanding that history is working towards a final purpose.
The central issue of the fifth chapter is “how divine providence affects the life of the Christian” (121). While he recognizes that the problem of evil in the Christian life naturally and inevitably arises from his “no-risk” view of providence (133), he is still careful to defend against “disadvantageous” and fatalistic charges that critics level against his view (138), as well as “flattening arguments” (141). His solution to fatalistic charges is recognizing “that not only the ends are ordained by God but also the means to those ends” (139). Means in life matter as they accomplish ends, but both are ordained by God.
In many ways, chapter six and its focus on prayer is also concerned with the Christian life (121). In keeping with his deterministic view of means and ends, Helm contends that “if anyone prays, then God has ordained the prayer. The praying is thus an action in the order of divine providence like any other action” (154). God ordains Christian prayers as “means to accomplish those ends. Now in some cases, in God’s wisdom, the means include people warrantably asking him to do certain things” (157). While this is a deterministic view of prayer, Helm believes that prayer actually accomplishes things in the Christian life.
Helm dedicates chapter seven to the problem of man’s responsibility under God’s deterministic sovereignty. Pertinent to the chapter’s focus is an assessment of God’s relationship to evil and the positions or “models” that attempt to resolve the problems in this relationship. Helm comes to a uniquely compatibilist conclusion regarding God’s relationship to evil: “According to Scripture, there is an important asymmetry between acts of moral evil and acts of goodness…God ordains evil but he does not intend evil as evil…In the case of goodness, God not only ordains the goodness, he is the author of it” (190). His solution to the problem of evil is to posit a disconnect between the relationship God has with goodness and the relationship he has with evil. Chapter eight delves further into the problem of evil, as well as “Some consequences for the problem of evil” (197). He examines the punative and non-punative solutions to the problem of evil and assesses the strengths and shortcomings of each solution as he does with all the positions he assesses throughout the book. He closes chapter eight with an assessment of the “greater-good defence” as a solution to the problem of evil and the major weakness of the “incompatibilist view of free will” in its solution to the problem of evil (215–216).
In the final chapter, Helm focuses on issues already familiar in his work. He once again defends his position from charges of fatalism and explains what he means by “God’s weakness in providence” (224–228). He concludes his work by explaining God’s good purposes in evil and the necessity of believers “recognizing that the evil that they and others experience has been sent” by God himself (231). God sovereignly uses and sends evil “for [the believer’s] good” (231).
Helm has a fourfold purpose in writing this book. First, he seeks to “put forward the ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence” (15) and develop this view thoroughly. The degree to which he accomplishes this purpose is tied to the second purpose of the book—to study God’s providence through the lens of the “three contexts of divine providence” (21). These three contexts are “the interests of the individual Christian, with the interests of all Christians – the Christian church – and with the interests of the whole of the creation animate and inanimate.” These three contexts are fundamental for Helm’s study of the doctrine as “No account of divine providence can afford to neglect any one of these contexts, or the relationship between them” (21). Approaching the doctrine in this way allows Helm to develop and defend his “no-risk” view of God’s providence in a holistic manner, and so he accomplishes the first purpose of explaining his view.
Helm consistently follows his second purpose of examining God’s providence under the three contexts of the Christian, the church, and the universe. For example, chapter 3 focuses on God’s providence in the universe (69). Chapter four is “concerned with the second context – the need of reconciliation with God, and the provision of reconciliation through Christ” (93). Chapter five approaches the doctrine according to the first context (121). While he does not examine each of these contexts in the order that he initially lists them, he still gives great space to the three contexts in the book.
His third purpose of explaining “whom God provides for, what he provides, and how he provides it” (18) is not accomplished as directly and as straightforwardly as his approaching the doctrine of God’s providence under the three contexts. Nevertheless, the three contexts reveal “whom God provides for.” Two particular chapters, “Providence: Risky or Risk Free?” and “Reckoning with Providence” reveal how God provides. His chapters on “Providence and Guidance” and “Providence and Evil” explain to the reader what God provides for believers. Therefore, Helm successfully structures his book under these categories.
His fourth purpose for writing is directed toward the reader. Writing on divine sovereignty and human responsibility, Helm is adamant in stating that “Readers may care to work out for themselves which if any of these models ought to be preferred, whether there are other more persuasive models, and whether or not any of them could be fruitfully combined together” (183). While he makes this point specifically about human responsibility and its relationship to God’s sovereignty, his purpose and desire is for readers to decide for themselves what position they will hold to on the various issues related to God’s providence. This desire for the reader to choose his or her own position leads him to present the various models or viewpoints of each issue in the doctrine. Examples of Helm fulfilling this purpose is his presentation of the various views of God’s sovereignty (55–68), and God’s relationship to evil (203–215). The presentation of various models that pertain to the doctrine of God’s providence is also a strength of Helm’s work as the reader is not merely presented with a one-sided work. Helm is not interested in merely stating his own view. Instead, he desires the reader to be fully informed about the doctrine, and this means informing the reader on all views of God’s providence. The believer who reads this book will finish it well-informed about the doctrine.
His fifth and final purpose for writing is considered by Helm to be “The overall aim in this book,” and that aim “is to make an accurate study of God’s activity now” (94). Elsewhere, Helm writes, “Far from studying what is static or abstract, we are to be concerned with God’s action in our world, and with how, according to Scripture, that activity is carried out” (17). Helm’s primary purpose is to show the believer how God’s providence is relevant in day-to-day life. His emphasis and focus on the three contexts of God’s providence—especially as these contexts pertain to all people—carries out this primary aim well. This desire to reveal the relevance of God’s providence to believers is also a notable strength of Helm’s work as he shows the reader why understanding the workings of God’s providence in all things matters. Such an emphasis on the relevance of this doctrine makes the book a fundamental read for any believer who does consider the doctrine to be “static” or “abstract.”
Despite his desire to avoid fatalism, a notable weakness in Helm’s work is that some of his arguments veer towards his personal definition of fatalism. His unintentional leaning towards fatalism can be observed in chapter five: “It would be fatalistic only if God decreed ends without decreeing any or all of the means to those ends, or if God’s will was itself fated” (138–139, emphasis added). Yet, before explaining fatalism as God’s fated will, he insists, “This doctrine of providence, then, has the consequence that no human decision can change the divine will in any respect. What God has ordained will come to pass” (138). Following his somewhat obscure definition of fatalism as God’s will being fated, does his insistence on the inevitability of God’s will taking place make that exact point? The distinction between Helm’s definition of fatalism and his very definition of God’s providence remains unclear.
Helm writes this book for inquiring theologians and students desiring to learn about God’s providence. Having this audience in mind as he writes, Helm’s work is not overly accessible to lay readers. Some lay readers will find his chapters on the problem of evil to be fairly dense and not written in the most accessible manner. Therefore, his book is not intended for the lay person but for students and theologians.
Helm is biased towards a compatibilist view of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. However, he holds to a view of compatiblism that “favours deterministic freedom” (67). Helm goes so far as to argue for “the compatibilist view of human freedom and determinism which I believe most naturally coheres with it” (67). This argument for and bias toward both compatibilist freedom and deterministic freedom makes Helm’s work a unique work. Despite his bias toward this position, Helm desires overall “that readers make up their own minds in the light of the evidence presented to them” (67). While he has a bias toward a particular position, he doesn’t want this to influence the reader too much.
In the brief introduction to his work, Helm quickly clarifies his position of God’s providence as “the ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence” which he contends for throughout the book (15). However, he desires serious assessment and critique of his position from those who read his work (16). In the first chapter, Helm explains the relevance of the doctrine of God’s providence and gives the reader a concise definition of the doctrine (17–18). He reveals that his volume is structured under the categories of “whom God provides for, what he provides, and how he provides it” (18), and then explains God’s providential care of the universe—which certainly includes all people (see p. 21). Additionally, he introduces the reader to multiple questions that arise when one considers God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility (26), and concludes the chapter with a rebuttal to those who deny God’s action and providential work in the universe (34–37).
In the second chapter, Helm explains “risk” and “no-risk” views of God’s providence in greater depth. He helpfully interacts with various positions on divine sovereignty and human responsibility—including William Lane Craig’s argument for middle knowledge and J. I. Packer’s argument for the antinomy. Despite the conciseness of the assessments of these positions, Helm is still able to make observations about the strengths and weaknesses of each view. Helm himself adheres to the compatibilist view of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility (66–68).
Whereas the second chapter’s primary focus was different approaches to God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility, the third chapter’s primary focus is the different approaches to God’s involvement in the world. The different approaches presented in the chapter are those of pantheism, deism, and theism. For Helm, “[pantheism] is not acceptable to the Christian because it denies the distinction between God and the universe” (72). A distinction between God and his creation is fundamental to the Christian worldview. The important role of miracles and prayer in the Christian worldview also render Deism insufficient for the Christian (75–79). The shortcomings of these views lead Helm to contend for the theistic view of God’s involvement in the world. This view contends for “God’s immanence and transcendence” which Helm understands as “his providential rule of his universe” (90, italics mine).
In chapter four, Helm’s focal concern is God’s providential care in the history of the world. Helm observes that “the Christian idea of providence may be said to give us the rudiments of a philosophy of history. For as providence has a course, so does history – not only the history of redemption but the history of the entire human civilization” (118). This observation leads him to conclude that “it does imply a teleological view of history, even though the telos is found outside history, in the purpose of God” (118). In other words, the doctrine of God’s providence is fundamental for understanding that history is working towards a final purpose.
The central issue of the fifth chapter is “how divine providence affects the life of the Christian” (121). While he recognizes that the problem of evil in the Christian life naturally and inevitably arises from his “no-risk” view of providence (133), he is still careful to defend against “disadvantageous” and fatalistic charges that critics level against his view (138), as well as “flattening arguments” (141). His solution to fatalistic charges is recognizing “that not only the ends are ordained by God but also the means to those ends” (139). Means in life matter as they accomplish ends, but both are ordained by God.
In many ways, chapter six and its focus on prayer is also concerned with the Christian life (121). In keeping with his deterministic view of means and ends, Helm contends that “if anyone prays, then God has ordained the prayer. The praying is thus an action in the order of divine providence like any other action” (154). God ordains Christian prayers as “means to accomplish those ends. Now in some cases, in God’s wisdom, the means include people warrantably asking him to do certain things” (157). While this is a deterministic view of prayer, Helm believes that prayer actually accomplishes things in the Christian life.
Helm dedicates chapter seven to the problem of man’s responsibility under God’s deterministic sovereignty. Pertinent to the chapter’s focus is an assessment of God’s relationship to evil and the positions or “models” that attempt to resolve the problems in this relationship. Helm comes to a uniquely compatibilist conclusion regarding God’s relationship to evil: “According to Scripture, there is an important asymmetry between acts of moral evil and acts of goodness…God ordains evil but he does not intend evil as evil…In the case of goodness, God not only ordains the goodness, he is the author of it” (190). His solution to the problem of evil is to posit a disconnect between the relationship God has with goodness and the relationship he has with evil. Chapter eight delves further into the problem of evil, as well as “Some consequences for the problem of evil” (197). He examines the punative and non-punative solutions to the problem of evil and assesses the strengths and shortcomings of each solution as he does with all the positions he assesses throughout the book. He closes chapter eight with an assessment of the “greater-good defence” as a solution to the problem of evil and the major weakness of the “incompatibilist view of free will” in its solution to the problem of evil (215–216).
In the final chapter, Helm focuses on issues already familiar in his work. He once again defends his position from charges of fatalism and explains what he means by “God’s weakness in providence” (224–228). He concludes his work by explaining God’s good purposes in evil and the necessity of believers “recognizing that the evil that they and others experience has been sent” by God himself (231). God sovereignly uses and sends evil “for [the believer’s] good” (231).
Helm has a fourfold purpose in writing this book. First, he seeks to “put forward the ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence” (15) and develop this view thoroughly. The degree to which he accomplishes this purpose is tied to the second purpose of the book—to study God’s providence through the lens of the “three contexts of divine providence” (21). These three contexts are “the interests of the individual Christian, with the interests of all Christians – the Christian church – and with the interests of the whole of the creation animate and inanimate.” These three contexts are fundamental for Helm’s study of the doctrine as “No account of divine providence can afford to neglect any one of these contexts, or the relationship between them” (21). Approaching the doctrine in this way allows Helm to develop and defend his “no-risk” view of God’s providence in a holistic manner, and so he accomplishes the first purpose of explaining his view.
Helm consistently follows his second purpose of examining God’s providence under the three contexts of the Christian, the church, and the universe. For example, chapter 3 focuses on God’s providence in the universe (69). Chapter four is “concerned with the second context – the need of reconciliation with God, and the provision of reconciliation through Christ” (93). Chapter five approaches the doctrine according to the first context (121). While he does not examine each of these contexts in the order that he initially lists them, he still gives great space to the three contexts in the book.
His third purpose of explaining “whom God provides for, what he provides, and how he provides it” (18) is not accomplished as directly and as straightforwardly as his approaching the doctrine of God’s providence under the three contexts. Nevertheless, the three contexts reveal “whom God provides for.” Two particular chapters, “Providence: Risky or Risk Free?” and “Reckoning with Providence” reveal how God provides. His chapters on “Providence and Guidance” and “Providence and Evil” explain to the reader what God provides for believers. Therefore, Helm successfully structures his book under these categories.
His fourth purpose for writing is directed toward the reader. Writing on divine sovereignty and human responsibility, Helm is adamant in stating that “Readers may care to work out for themselves which if any of these models ought to be preferred, whether there are other more persuasive models, and whether or not any of them could be fruitfully combined together” (183). While he makes this point specifically about human responsibility and its relationship to God’s sovereignty, his purpose and desire is for readers to decide for themselves what position they will hold to on the various issues related to God’s providence. This desire for the reader to choose his or her own position leads him to present the various models or viewpoints of each issue in the doctrine. Examples of Helm fulfilling this purpose is his presentation of the various views of God’s sovereignty (55–68), and God’s relationship to evil (203–215). The presentation of various models that pertain to the doctrine of God’s providence is also a strength of Helm’s work as the reader is not merely presented with a one-sided work. Helm is not interested in merely stating his own view. Instead, he desires the reader to be fully informed about the doctrine, and this means informing the reader on all views of God’s providence. The believer who reads this book will finish it well-informed about the doctrine.
His fifth and final purpose for writing is considered by Helm to be “The overall aim in this book,” and that aim “is to make an accurate study of God’s activity now” (94). Elsewhere, Helm writes, “Far from studying what is static or abstract, we are to be concerned with God’s action in our world, and with how, according to Scripture, that activity is carried out” (17). Helm’s primary purpose is to show the believer how God’s providence is relevant in day-to-day life. His emphasis and focus on the three contexts of God’s providence—especially as these contexts pertain to all people—carries out this primary aim well. This desire to reveal the relevance of God’s providence to believers is also a notable strength of Helm’s work as he shows the reader why understanding the workings of God’s providence in all things matters. Such an emphasis on the relevance of this doctrine makes the book a fundamental read for any believer who does consider the doctrine to be “static” or “abstract.”
Despite his desire to avoid fatalism, a notable weakness in Helm’s work is that some of his arguments veer towards his personal definition of fatalism. His unintentional leaning towards fatalism can be observed in chapter five: “It would be fatalistic only if God decreed ends without decreeing any or all of the means to those ends, or if God’s will was itself fated” (138–139, emphasis added). Yet, before explaining fatalism as God’s fated will, he insists, “This doctrine of providence, then, has the consequence that no human decision can change the divine will in any respect. What God has ordained will come to pass” (138). Following his somewhat obscure definition of fatalism as God’s will being fated, does his insistence on the inevitability of God’s will taking place make that exact point? The distinction between Helm’s definition of fatalism and his very definition of God’s providence remains unclear.
Helm writes this book for inquiring theologians and students desiring to learn about God’s providence. Having this audience in mind as he writes, Helm’s work is not overly accessible to lay readers. Some lay readers will find his chapters on the problem of evil to be fairly dense and not written in the most accessible manner. Therefore, his book is not intended for the lay person but for students and theologians.
Helm is biased towards a compatibilist view of divine sovereignty and human responsibility. However, he holds to a view of compatiblism that “favours deterministic freedom” (67). Helm goes so far as to argue for “the compatibilist view of human freedom and determinism which I believe most naturally coheres with it” (67). This argument for and bias toward both compatibilist freedom and deterministic freedom makes Helm’s work a unique work. Despite his bias toward this position, Helm desires overall “that readers make up their own minds in the light of the evidence presented to them” (67). While he has a bias toward a particular position, he doesn’t want this to influence the reader too much.
November 26, 2018
Thesis: “In summary, the essential elements of divine providence are these. God preserves his creation and all that it sustains” (Helm 22). Helm adopts the “no-risk” view of providence. God’s perfect knowledge and will aren’t threatened by the actions of human beings. Against this view is the “risky” view of providence: God can’t know the future because the future free decisions aren’t knowable.
Helm quickly lists several problems with the “risky” view: If the “risky” view obtains, then it appears that God has a number of beliefs which are false (given the free actions of humans). There is even a problem with God’s goodness: given that God wishes to be good to people, how intense can this goodness be, given the free actions of humans? I don’t think this objection is particularly strong. Part of the battle in our spiritual life is that we often resist God’s blessings.
Solution of divine accommodation. Per Calvin, the movement of direction is from God to mankind, and not vice-versa (52ff). It’s not simply that we are choosing the “sovereignty” passages at the expense of the risky ones. Rather, it “is a logically necessary condition of dialogue between people that those people should act and react in time” (53). However, omnipotence and omniscience are essential properties in God; therefore, they have priority.
One option that avoids these two is Middle Knowledge
Necessary truths: logic, mathematics, stuff related to God’s essence.
Free knowledge: things as a result of God’s freely willing them.
Middle knowledge: among the conditional propositions that God knows “are those which indicate what would happen if an individual performed a free (ie. non-deterministic) action (57). God only actualizes the outcomes necessary to his plan. The rest are human possibilities (which God knows).
Difficulties: it looks like on the MK account that the universe has a “shadow picture.” Another problem is that God seems to only have knowledge of a mirror account of the universe, and never an actualized account (59). I don’t know. I think modern defenses of MK are much stronger than Helm accounts for. I don’t hold to MK myself but I don’t see why God’s having knowledge of possible worlds threatens his perfect knowledge. I can think of a number of theologically plausible worlds, and presumably so can God.
His argument against MK seems to be that on MK’s own admission, people have indeterminist freedom. Therefore, God can’t know what they would do because what they would do is precisely what isn’t known. There seems to be something to that charge.
God-World Relationship
When we say God existed “before” the universe, we are using “before” in a hierarchical, not temporal sense.
Pantheism: if the universe is God, and an individual performed a certain action, then logically God performed that action.
Deism: few today would hold to Deist temptations, and it is a diabolical worldview, but it is a much tougher opponent than pantheism. If the universe was created good, then why does it need miracles? Indeed, in a nice phrase, miracles are “a metaphysical first aid kit.” There are some obvious problems with Deism. Helm lists a few:
a) it is an obvious dogmatism (76). Why don’t miracles exist? Because they don’t.
b) it is not obvious why the Spirit-filled believer must define miracles as “violations” or “interventions” of nature. Indeed, in an open-universe why wouldn’t we expect miracles?
Prayer and Providence
This is the familiar problem if God knows all things, then why pray? Helm doesn’t really solve it, but he does provide a number of clarifying insights that allow us to better approach the issue. Our praying to God exists within a personal matrix within which are a number of smaller issues. If I take out one of those issues, then the matrix changes.
Further, there can be legitimate inter-personal interaction yet there be pressures, limitations, and givens, even in human-human relationships. Why not so in God-man relationships? Therefore, I can pray, and it be real prayer, and God answereth it, yet it still be ordained.
Conclusion
This is more of a philosophical than a theological text. As such, there isn’t much exegesis of key passages. To be fair, though, that would have made the text unwieldy. Nonetheless, Helm nicely covers the issues and provides a number of clarifications.
Helm quickly lists several problems with the “risky” view: If the “risky” view obtains, then it appears that God has a number of beliefs which are false (given the free actions of humans). There is even a problem with God’s goodness: given that God wishes to be good to people, how intense can this goodness be, given the free actions of humans? I don’t think this objection is particularly strong. Part of the battle in our spiritual life is that we often resist God’s blessings.
Solution of divine accommodation. Per Calvin, the movement of direction is from God to mankind, and not vice-versa (52ff). It’s not simply that we are choosing the “sovereignty” passages at the expense of the risky ones. Rather, it “is a logically necessary condition of dialogue between people that those people should act and react in time” (53). However, omnipotence and omniscience are essential properties in God; therefore, they have priority.
One option that avoids these two is Middle Knowledge
Necessary truths: logic, mathematics, stuff related to God’s essence.
Free knowledge: things as a result of God’s freely willing them.
Middle knowledge: among the conditional propositions that God knows “are those which indicate what would happen if an individual performed a free (ie. non-deterministic) action (57). God only actualizes the outcomes necessary to his plan. The rest are human possibilities (which God knows).
Difficulties: it looks like on the MK account that the universe has a “shadow picture.” Another problem is that God seems to only have knowledge of a mirror account of the universe, and never an actualized account (59). I don’t know. I think modern defenses of MK are much stronger than Helm accounts for. I don’t hold to MK myself but I don’t see why God’s having knowledge of possible worlds threatens his perfect knowledge. I can think of a number of theologically plausible worlds, and presumably so can God.
His argument against MK seems to be that on MK’s own admission, people have indeterminist freedom. Therefore, God can’t know what they would do because what they would do is precisely what isn’t known. There seems to be something to that charge.
God-World Relationship
When we say God existed “before” the universe, we are using “before” in a hierarchical, not temporal sense.
Pantheism: if the universe is God, and an individual performed a certain action, then logically God performed that action.
Deism: few today would hold to Deist temptations, and it is a diabolical worldview, but it is a much tougher opponent than pantheism. If the universe was created good, then why does it need miracles? Indeed, in a nice phrase, miracles are “a metaphysical first aid kit.” There are some obvious problems with Deism. Helm lists a few:
a) it is an obvious dogmatism (76). Why don’t miracles exist? Because they don’t.
b) it is not obvious why the Spirit-filled believer must define miracles as “violations” or “interventions” of nature. Indeed, in an open-universe why wouldn’t we expect miracles?
Prayer and Providence
This is the familiar problem if God knows all things, then why pray? Helm doesn’t really solve it, but he does provide a number of clarifying insights that allow us to better approach the issue. Our praying to God exists within a personal matrix within which are a number of smaller issues. If I take out one of those issues, then the matrix changes.
Further, there can be legitimate inter-personal interaction yet there be pressures, limitations, and givens, even in human-human relationships. Why not so in God-man relationships? Therefore, I can pray, and it be real prayer, and God answereth it, yet it still be ordained.
Conclusion
This is more of a philosophical than a theological text. As such, there isn’t much exegesis of key passages. To be fair, though, that would have made the text unwieldy. Nonetheless, Helm nicely covers the issues and provides a number of clarifications.
December 18, 2019
This is a very fine "no-risk" account of God's providence. I would have liked more biblical exegesis, and perhaps a further consideration of other views. But I believe Helm's position to be correct (based on Scripture, as well as philosophical analysis of other views). There are some good reflections on the problem of evil here, too.
Again, if the book had a bit more detail, I would rate it higher. Still, this is a fine place to learn more about God's providence.
Again, if the book had a bit more detail, I would rate it higher. Still, this is a fine place to learn more about God's providence.
July 20, 2021
I’ve never read a better book on this subject. I don’t expect to. It is simply superb. It is a magnificent synthesis of exegesis, theology, and philosophy, written with simplicity and pastoral sensitivity.
February 8, 2019
The doctrine of providence is crowded with complexities and considerations. Anybody who wants to understand it better requires help. Helm is very helpful.
Read
August 26, 2024For PhD seminar
November 13, 2011
Maybe the first thing I should say is that this is definitely an academic work - don't pick it up if you are looking for some light reading about God's Providence. If you're looking to take a short break after every paragraph to make sure you understood what was just said, this may be the book for you.
This book starts off by examining two competing views of God's providence, the "risk" view and "no-risk" view. (And thus I already learned something, for I had never heard of this distinction or of the ideas composing the "risk" view.) Proponents of the "risk" view essentially hold that God takes "risks" with His creation by voluntarily choosing not to know what is going to happen, especially what us humans are going to do. Proponents of the view believe it is necessary to maintain real human freedom and responsibility, and also use it to explain passages in which God appears to express regret, etc. There are plenty of Biblical objections to this view, but perhaps the biggest philosophical objection is to ask, "if God doesn't know how people are going to act, how can He achieve His goals in the end?" And the common answer given is to make analogy to a master chess player (God) playing a novice (us). The master may not know what move the novice is going to make, but he is also able to counter any move made to achieve his goal, victory, in the end.
By contrast, the "no-risk" view, probably easily the more common view, says that God does not take risks. God knows everything that is going to happen - indeed, is outside of time (something apparently forbidden by the "risk" view) - and in some sense ordains or wills it all. This is the point of view taken by the author, Helm, and he spends most of the book flushing it out and talking about ways to reconcile it with human freedom and responsibility, and the existence of evil.
The book is filled with a lot of subtle arguments, and a lot of "what do we mean when we use such and such a word?" For example, consider human choice, a critical (probably the critical) aspect of free will. What does it mean to say that while Bob chose to have ice cream for dessert, he could have chosen to have a fruit cup? If we mean, had Bob's preferences and desires been different he could have chosen a fruit cup, then that view of human choice is in perfect conformity with a no-risk view of providence. But some people think that real freedom means that the exact same Bob, placed in the exact same situation, could still have chosen the fruit cup - but does that idea even makes sense, given rational human beings?
Toward the end of the book, Helm discusses different ways to handle "the problem of evil". Interestingly to me, Helm rejects the explanation for evil that I think many of us have heard, namely that, in creating truly free human beings, God necessarily opened up the possibility of evil. Helm believes that with a "no-risk" view of providence, and with the view of human freedom Helm develops, God would have been quite capable of creating human beings who freely did only what was morally right. So why didn't He? One possibility is that allowing evil ultimately allowed greater good to come. Thus we come to the quotation that made me pick up this book in the first place.
"As it is impossible for a person to be forgiven who has not committed a fault, so it is impossible for God to forgive, to show mercy, in a universe in which there is no fault. If one supposes that it is a good thing for God to display his mercy and grace, and that both the universe and its creator benefit if God manifests his forgiveness and grace, then this also provides a reason for permitting evil."
Recommended.
This book starts off by examining two competing views of God's providence, the "risk" view and "no-risk" view. (And thus I already learned something, for I had never heard of this distinction or of the ideas composing the "risk" view.) Proponents of the "risk" view essentially hold that God takes "risks" with His creation by voluntarily choosing not to know what is going to happen, especially what us humans are going to do. Proponents of the view believe it is necessary to maintain real human freedom and responsibility, and also use it to explain passages in which God appears to express regret, etc. There are plenty of Biblical objections to this view, but perhaps the biggest philosophical objection is to ask, "if God doesn't know how people are going to act, how can He achieve His goals in the end?" And the common answer given is to make analogy to a master chess player (God) playing a novice (us). The master may not know what move the novice is going to make, but he is also able to counter any move made to achieve his goal, victory, in the end.
By contrast, the "no-risk" view, probably easily the more common view, says that God does not take risks. God knows everything that is going to happen - indeed, is outside of time (something apparently forbidden by the "risk" view) - and in some sense ordains or wills it all. This is the point of view taken by the author, Helm, and he spends most of the book flushing it out and talking about ways to reconcile it with human freedom and responsibility, and the existence of evil.
The book is filled with a lot of subtle arguments, and a lot of "what do we mean when we use such and such a word?" For example, consider human choice, a critical (probably the critical) aspect of free will. What does it mean to say that while Bob chose to have ice cream for dessert, he could have chosen to have a fruit cup? If we mean, had Bob's preferences and desires been different he could have chosen a fruit cup, then that view of human choice is in perfect conformity with a no-risk view of providence. But some people think that real freedom means that the exact same Bob, placed in the exact same situation, could still have chosen the fruit cup - but does that idea even makes sense, given rational human beings?
Toward the end of the book, Helm discusses different ways to handle "the problem of evil". Interestingly to me, Helm rejects the explanation for evil that I think many of us have heard, namely that, in creating truly free human beings, God necessarily opened up the possibility of evil. Helm believes that with a "no-risk" view of providence, and with the view of human freedom Helm develops, God would have been quite capable of creating human beings who freely did only what was morally right. So why didn't He? One possibility is that allowing evil ultimately allowed greater good to come. Thus we come to the quotation that made me pick up this book in the first place.
"As it is impossible for a person to be forgiven who has not committed a fault, so it is impossible for God to forgive, to show mercy, in a universe in which there is no fault. If one supposes that it is a good thing for God to display his mercy and grace, and that both the universe and its creator benefit if God manifests his forgiveness and grace, then this also provides a reason for permitting evil."
Recommended.
February 18, 2015
Helm puts forth what he calls the "no risk" view of providence, over against the "risk" view of providence (although how you can call the "risk" view providence at all is beyond me). He sets up this distinction early in the book, allowing him first to discuss alternatives like pantheism and deism. He then discusses providence in three realms, three concentric circles--in all of creation, in the works of redemption, and in the lives of believers.
His latter chapters discuss issues such as how a firm grasp of providence can provide guidance in our lives, how providence does not preclude the necessity of prayer, how providence still leaves room for accountability, how providence is related to the reality of evil, and finally how we interface with providence on a daily basis.
I have no issue with Helm's theology. His method was a little off. He made a big point at the beginning of the book in discussing his method by saying that he would focus all his attention on Scripture. And yet, Scripture was sparse in his following discussions. Furthermore, he tends to cloud his conclusions rather than elucidating them. Third, his attempts at applying the doctrine to believers' lives seemed crippled.
His latter chapters discuss issues such as how a firm grasp of providence can provide guidance in our lives, how providence does not preclude the necessity of prayer, how providence still leaves room for accountability, how providence is related to the reality of evil, and finally how we interface with providence on a daily basis.
I have no issue with Helm's theology. His method was a little off. He made a big point at the beginning of the book in discussing his method by saying that he would focus all his attention on Scripture. And yet, Scripture was sparse in his following discussions. Furthermore, he tends to cloud his conclusions rather than elucidating them. Third, his attempts at applying the doctrine to believers' lives seemed crippled.
April 22, 2014
Helm, explains this doctrine explicitly and allows readers to decide on their on views. I love his break down of middle knowledge. He is one of the few consistent philosophers, that disagree with middle knowledge.
June 9, 2016
I liked this book, however it is from a philosophical viewpoint (which is probably why I like it.) The book gets you thinking and helps you to understand just how the topic of the providence of God is multifaceted.
November 26, 2013
Great resource on the Providence of God.
September 12, 2016
Read this years ago, presents a strong Reformed perspective.
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